GREATER    AMERICA 


BY 

ARCHIBALD    R.   COLQUHOUN 

M.I.C.E.,  F.R.G.S.,  GOLD  MEDALLIST  ROYAL  GEOGRAPHICAL  SOCIETY 
AUTHOR  OF 

"OVERLAND  TO  CHINA"  "  RUSSIA  AGAINST  INDIA" 
"CHINA  IN  TRANSFORMATION"  ETC. 


WITH     MAPS 


HARPER    6-    BROTHERS    PUBLISHERS 

NEW  YORK   AND   LONDON 

1904 


Copyright,  1904,  by  ARCHIBALD  R.  COLQUHOUN. 

All  rifkts  reurvtct. 

Published  April,  1904. 


PREFACE 


IN  calling  this  book  Greater  America,  the  author 
is  aware  that  he  challenges  comparison  with  a  far 
more  important,  studied,  and  weighty  work.  No 
other  title,  however,  conveys  so  successfully  the 
main  idea  of  this  book. 

It  is  not  only  the  territorial  magnitude  of 
Greater  America,  her  innumerable  problems  of 
race  and  policy,  and  her  resources,  wealth,  and 
progressive  theories  which  are  the  motive  of  this 
book — it  is  rather  Greater  America  as  a  world- 
power,  the  American  peoples,  and  the  American 
ideal  in  the  cosmogony  of  the  world. 

An  attempt  is  here  made — it  is  believed  for  the 
first  time  —  to  present  American  evolution  as  a 
whole,  to  treat  her  history  from  the  stand-point 
of  its  wide  national  significance,  to  show  to  what 
point  she  has  progressed,  to  indicate  what  her 
future  may  be.  To  do  this  in  one  comparatively 
short  volume  involved  an  amount  of  compression 
and  elision  which  must,  perforce,  lead  to  a  certain 
abruptness;  it  was  impossible,  in  many  cases,  to 
do  more  than  indicate  a  line  of  thought  or  suggest 
a  train  of  ideas. 

What  does  Greater  America  mean? 

iii 

125005 


P  R  E  FA  C  E 

If  we  could  answer  that  question  succinctly,  if 
we  could  estimate  the  direction  in  which  this 
huge  dynamic  force  will  be  exercised,  we  should 
be  able  to  take  a  long  look  into  the  future.  But 
America  ---  so  it  seems  to  the  author  —  is  at  a 
critical  period  in  her  history.  Very  much  de 
pends  on  the  spirit  infused  into  her  national  life, 
both  at  home  and  abroad,  during  the  next  few 
years. 

As  these  lines  are  written  comes  the  news  of 
the  final  burst  of  the  war  cloud  in  the  Pacific, 
and  although  long  expected,  we  are  not  yet  able 
to  estimate  what  it  may  mean  to  the  rest  of  the 
world.  Nearly  twenty  years  ago  the  writer  of 
these  lines  predicted  the  shifting  of  the  centre  of 
gravity*  of  world  affairs  from  the  Atlantic  to  the 
Pacific  Ocean.1  Ten  years  later  he  embodied  the 
same  idea  in  a  book  which  urged  the  cutting  of  an 
isthmian  canal  under  American  auspices.2  Final 
ly,  in  his  last  book,  published  two  years  ago,  he 
was  able  from  personal  knowledge  to  describe  the 
principal  features  in  that  change  which  already 
had  come  over  the  Pacific.3 

The  three  great  factors  in  the  transformation 
of  the  Pacific  are  the  advance,  overland  and  over 
sea,  of  the  two  great  expansive  powers,  Russia  and 
America,  and  the  regeneration  of  Japan.  We  see 
the  embroilment  of  two  of  these  in  a  struggle 

1  R.  U.  S.  Institution,   1885. 

2  The  Key  of  the  Pacific,   1895. 

8  The  Mastery  of  the  Pacific,   1902. 
iv 


PREFACE 

which  may  have  far-reaching  consequences,  not 
merely  for  either  or  both,  but  for  the  whole 
world. 

What  part  will  Greater  America  play  in  the 
drama? 

It  is  with  intention  that  the  writer  has  to  a 
certain  extent  ignored  domestic  politics  in  this 
study  of  Greater  America,  and  has  dealt  chiefly 
with  problems  of  imperial  importance,  which 
affect  not  the  United  States  alone  but  Greater 
America  as  a  whole.  The  questions  of  foreign 
relations,  of  alien  peoples,  of  national  defence, 
of  government  of  dependencies  —  these  are  the 
matters  which  are  of  vital  importance  to  the 
future  of  a  great  expansive  nation,  but  on  one 
domestic  question — that  of  efficiency  and  purity 
in  the  administration  —  so  many  of  these  wide 
questions  ultimately  depend  that  it  must  be 
given  a  foremost  place.  The  character  of  such 
a  work  as  this  is  rather  critical  than  descriptive. 
It  is  less  of  a  travel-book  than  any  yet  attempted 
by  the  author,  although  he  has  visited,  and  in 
some  cases  revisited,  almost  every  part  of  Greater 
America.  If  he  seems,  at  times,  to  be  bent  on 
picking  out  weak  spots,  he  asks  his  reader  to 
believe  that  it  is  in  no  unfriendly  spirit.  A  nation 
imbued  with  so  many  elements  of  greatness  as 
the  Americans,  and  with  so  large  a  measure  of 
success  behind  them,  needs  criticism  far  more 
than  lesser  peoples. 

In  writing  both  for  the  British  and  American 


.       PREFACE 

publics,  the  author  was  met  by  a  difficulty  in 
avoiding  what  might,  at  times,  seem  unnecessary 
explanation,  since  matters  which  are  simple  to 
the  one  are  often  cryptic  to  the  other.  The 
American  reader  must,  therefore,  exercise  indul 
gence  in  reading  such  chapters  as  that  on  "  How 
Greater  America  Is  Governed,"  while  the  Briton 
will  perhaps  forgive  the  dissertations  on  our 
Civil  Service  and  the  government  of  India,  when 
he  reflects  that  these  are  frequently  the  subjects 
of  misconception  on  the  part  of  even  enlightened 
Americans. 

Incidentally,  it  may  be  mentioned  that,  in 
using  the  term  "  America"  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
qualifying  prefix  "  United  States  of,"  the  author 
is  not  only  avoiding  circumlocution  but  is  techni 
cally  correct.  The  citizens  of  the  United  States 
of  America  must  be  called  Americans,  since  they 
have  no  other  word  to  express  their  nationality, 
whereas  the  Canadians,  Brazilians,  or  Mexicans, 
geographically  Americans,  have  a  distinct  na 
tional  name.  The  term  United  States,  so  fre 
quently  used,  might  be  with  equal  correctness 
applied  to  other  than  the  North  American  States, 
but  there  is  no  other  people  who  claim  the  name 
Americans,  and  no  other  country  which  could  be 
spoken  of  as  America.  It  may  not  be  out  of 
place  to  mention  here  that,  although  some  of  the 
subjects  raised  in  this  book  are  not  new  to  the 
author,  they  are  all  studied  afresh  in  the  light 
of  the  most  recent  developments,  and  that  no 

vi 


PREFACE 

part  of  the  book  has  appeared  previously  in  any 
form  on  either  side  of  the  Atlantic. 

In  conclusion,  the  author  wishes  to  thank  the 
many  friends,  British  and  American,  who  have 
assisted  him  in  his  task  in  various  ways,  and  more 
particularly  the  courteous  officials  at  Washington, 
who  gave  him  every  assistance  in  their  power  in 
obtaining  information. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PACK 

PREFACE iii 

I.  THE  AMERICAN  PEOPLE i 

II.  AMERICA  AND  COLONIZATION 38 

III.  PACIFIC  EXPANSION:  THEORY  AND  PRACTICE    .  62  •» 

IV.  PACIFIC  EXPANSION:  THE  PHILIPPINES — THREE 

YEARS  AFTER 85 

V.  CARIBBEAN    EXPANSION:    CUBANS    AND    THEIR 

AMERICAN  FRIENDS 112 

VI.  CARIBBEAN  EXPANSION — CUBA  AND  THE  UNITED 

STATES 132 

VII.  THE  NEW  AMERICAN  SPHERE 147  tf 

VIII.  THE  CONTROL  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN    .     .     .     .     .  171 
-~IX.       PAN-AMERICANISM  IN  THE  SOUTHERN  CONTINENT  199 

X.         CANADA  AND  PAN-AMERICANISM 226 

XL       How  GREATER  AMERICA  Is  GOVERNED     ...  253 

XII.  AMERICANS  IN  THE  TROPICS 284 

XIII.  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPANSION  —  CIVIL  SERVICE  RE 

FORM     302 

XIV.  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPANSION — THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF 

NATIVES 317 

XV.  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPANSION — ARMY  AND  NAVY     .  345 

XVI.  ASIA  IN  TRANSFORMATION 366 

XVII.  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 394  * 

APPENDIX 419 

INDEX 421 


LIST    OF    MAPS 

POLITICAL    SKETCH    MAP    OF   THE   WORLD  ....   Facing  p.      I 

RACE    DIAGRAM 24 

DIAGRAM    SHOWING   ACCESSIONS   OF   TERRITORY.      .  48 

DIAGRAM    SHOWING    ALASKA    TERRITORY     ....  58 

PANAMA    AS    A    STARTING-POINT    FOR    THE     PACIFIC 

AND   FAR   EAST 162 

PANAMA   AS  A  SHORT   ROUTE    FROM  NEW  YORK  AND 

NEW  ORLEANS  TO  THE  PACIFIC  SLOPE      ...  164 

THE    CONTROL   OF   THE    CARIBBEAN    SEA       ....  190 

UNITED     STATES     AND     SOUTH     AMERICA,   SHOWING 

TRANSPORTATION    ROUTES 2OO 

DIAGRAM     SHOWING     DENSITY     OF     POPULATION     IN 

SOUTH   AMERICA 2O4 

MAP    SHOWING    EXISTING    AND    PROJECTED    TRANS- 
CANADA    RAILWAYS 250 

RAILWAY     MAP     OF     ASIA,    SHOWING     RUSSIAN     EX 
PANSION    "        368 


fTBRART' 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 

or 


GREATER    AMERICA 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  AMERICAN  PEOPLE 

WHILE  it  is  impossible,  in  the  scope  of  this  book, 
to  deal  adequately  with  a  subject  so  vast  and  so 
complex  as  that  of  the  American  people,  it  is 
essential,  in  order  to  appreciate  what  "Greater 
America"  means,  to  glance  briefly  at  the  com 
position  and  tendencies  of  the  nation. 

It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  even  the  Early 
English  were  hardly  so  mixed  in  race  as  the  modern 
Americans,  and  although  the  different  elements 
may  be  politically  fused,  physically,  morally,  and 
socially  they  are  still,  to  a  great  extent,  distinguish 
able.  This  is  inevitable  when  we  consider  the 
steady  stream  of  immigration  which  since  1830 
has  been  pouring  into  the  country.  Before  that 
date  it  was  not  considerable,  nor  did  it  reach  its 
greatest  volume  for  some  years.  The  Irish  famine 
and  political  conditions  in  Germany  provided  a 
stimulus  in  the  forties,  and  simultaneously  came 
the  discovery  of  gold  in  California  and  the  be- 


GREATER    AMERICA 

ginnings  of  steam  communication.  The  main 
stream  of  immigration  until  1880  was  from  north 
ern  Europe,  which  had  supplied  so  many  of  the 
pre  -  Revolution  colonists,  and  from  the  first  the 
bulk  of  immigrants  naturally  avoided  the  South 
and  settled  in  the  Eastern  and  Northern  States. 
The  tendency  from  that  date  was  to  increase  the 
urban  population.1 

The  growth  of  cities  in  the  last  quarter- century 
has,  of  course,  been  infinitely  more  rapid  than  in 
the  preceding  era.  In  1880  only  one  city — New 
York — had  a  population  of  over  one  million;  in 
1900  there  were  three,  and  three  others  had  more 
than  half  a  million  each.  New  York  had  a  popu 
lation  of  nearly  three  and  a  half  millions;  Chica 
go  one  and  three  -  quarter  millions ;  Philadelphia 
one  and  a  quarter  millions.  After  1880  a  fresh 
element  in  immigration  was  introduced.  Hun 
garians,  Italians,  Armenians,  Roumanians,  Rus 
sians,  and  Poles  began  to  flock  in,  until,  in  1902, 
they  formed  seven-tenths  of  the  total  immigration. 
In  1903  the  great  bulk  of  European  aliens  came 
from  the  three  countries  of  Austria- Hungary,  Italy, 
and  Russia.  The  aggregate  immigration  was 
105,000  in  excess  of  that  reported  for  any  pre- 


1  In  the  century  between  1790  and  1890  the  urban  population 
rose  from  one-thirty-third  of  the  total  to  one-third ;  and  while 
the  total  population  increased  sixteen  times,  the  urban  popu 
lation  increased  one  hundred  and  thirty -nine  times.  These 
figures  include  the  preponderance  of  the  rural  population  in 
the  South,  where  agricultural  interests  still  claim  87  per  cent, 
of  the  population. 

2 


GREATER    AMERICA 

vious  year.  In  New  York  over  one-third  of  the 
population  is  foreign-born.  There  are  over  300,000 
Germans,  275,000  Irish,  155,000  Russians,  145,000 
Italians,  150,000  Austro-Hungarians ;  the  balance 
from  the  other  countries  of  Europe,  Asia,  Canada, 
and  South  America.  A  great  number  of  these 
are,  of  course,  Jews  expelled  from  their  adopted 
countries.  Others,  like  the  Italians,  are  Latin 
people;  while  the  Hungarians,  Roumanians,  Rus 
sians,  and  Armenians  bring  a  strain  of  Eastern 
blood.  Hitherto  the  United  States  has  had  no 
real  difficulty  in  combining  all  the  immigrants  into 
a  coherent  whole.  The  admiration  with  which 
we  view  this  achievement  should  not  blind  us  to 
some  of  its  features.  While  the  bulk  of  the  immi 
grants  belonged  to  stocks  kindred  to  that  of  the 
original  Americans,  the  process  of  race  fusion  was 
in  reality  little  more  remarkable  than  that  ac 
complished  in  the  early  history  of  Britain.  With 
the  introduction  of  Latin  and  Slavonic  elements, 
however,  a  serious  problem  arises.  They  are  not 
brought  in  contact  with  a  pure,  homogeneous  peo 
ple,  but  with  a  nation,  one,  perhaps,  in  political 
principles,  but  heterogeneous  in  many  other  re 
spects.  It  is  usual  to  speak  of  American  national 
character  as  if  it  were  some  outside  influence 
which  envelops  and  subdues  the  immigrant  as 
soon  as  he  becomes  an  American  citizen.  The 
fact  is,  of  course,  that  immigration  has  mould 
ed  the  national  character  and  will  continue  to 
do  so. 

3 


GREATER    AMERICA 

It  was  recognized  from  early  times  that  the 
native-born  would  have  a  difficulty  in  holding  his 
own,  not  only  racially  but  politically.  The 
attempt  to  found  a  national  party  was  met  with 
ridicule  and  the  title  of  "  Know-nothings,"  but  it 
was  a  sign  of  a  very  general  desire  to  perpetuate 
the  influence  of  the  old  colonial  stock,  and  finds 
an  echo  in  the  writings  of  a  modern  American 
statesman,  Mr.  Roosevelt,  when  he  speaks  of 
"communities  where  the  native  -  American  ele 
ments  are  largest"  as  most  promising  from  the 
point  of  view  of  social  evolution. 

It  is  natural  that  Americans  should  be  proud 
of  their  colonial  ancestors.  Early  colonization 
provided  the  United  States  with  a  sturdy,  steady 
and  yet  enterprising  stock,  wedded  to  the  prin 
ciples  of  hard  work  and  civic  liberty.  In  this 
element  we  fail  to  find  the  seeds  of  the  social 
problems  of  modern  America,  which  chiefly  centre 
round  the  worship  of  the  golden  calf.  It  is  prob 
ably  true  that  a  purely  native— that  is,  colonial — 
American  community  would  be  free  from  the  most 
objectionable  features  of  American  democracy. 
But  such  a  community  is  hard  to  find  after  nearly 
a  century  of  unrestricted  immigration,  and  it  is 
impossible  that  a  country  whose  resources  have 
made  it  the  rendezvous  for  the  speculators  and 
adventurers  of  Europe  should  have  failed  to  show 
their  influence  in  its  political  and  social  develop 
ment. 

If  a  vague  uneasiness  was  felt  concerning  peo- 

4 


GREATER    AMERICA 

pie  of  kindred  stock,  it  was  certainly  justifiable 
as  regards  aliens;  but  as  to  one  class  of  immi 
grants,  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  their  com 
ing  and  their  English  speech  have  blinded  most 
people  to  the  fact  that  they  are  essentially  an 
alien  race.  The  Irish  immigration  was  a  factor 
in  national  life  which  the  United  States  was  far 
from  wishing  to  reject ;  but  as  introducing  a  Celtic 
people  into  the  midst  of  a  nation  largely  Teutonic 
it  has  been  a  fateful  experiment.  The  quickness 
of  the  Celt,  his  natural  eloquence,  vivacity,  and 
love  of  politics  have  enabled  him  to  usurp  on  the 
American  continent  a  position  of  much  power. 
The  "  Irish  vote"  is  more  influential  in  Amer 
ican  than  in  British  affairs,  and  has  had  fre 
quently  a  baneful  influence  on  the  welfare  of 
the  nation.  In  municipal  life  especially  the  Irish 
element  has  made  for  corruption  and  intrigue, 
the  natural  weapons  of  a  people  who  have  never 
won  for  themselves,  or  enjoyed  as  their  birthright, 
the  exercise  of  national  rights.  They  have  also 
used  their  influence  on  many  occasions  for  the 
redress  of  their  private  grievances  rather  than  for 
the  true  welfare  of  the  community  at  large.  Alto 
gether,  this  Celtic  element  has  been  fraught  with 
serious  consequences,  and  it  has  retained  its 
essential  peculiarities  while  developing  nominally 
on  the  lines  of  democracy. 

But  if  the  less  desirable  class  of  Teutonic  immi 
grants  from  northern  Europe  and  the  Irish  Celts 
have  proved  not  unmixed  blessings  to  the  land  of 

5 


GREATER    AMERICA 

their  adoption,  what  shall  we  say  of  a  later  stream  ? 
Although  it  is  generally  assumed  in  America  that 
the  national  digestion  is  strong  enough  to  enable 
her  to  assimilate  anything,  there  are  already  signs 
of  uneasiness  in  some  quarters,  and  laws  are  aimed 
at  regulating  this  stream,  which  comes  chiefly  from 
southeastern  Europe.  At  a  time  when  unskilled 
labor  is  not  so  much  in  request,  when  the  whole 
question  of  labor  is  involved  in  a  struggle  to  main 
tain  the  highest  standard  of  remuneration,  it  is 
specially  undesirable  that  large  numbers  of  foreign 
ers,  with  a  much  lower  standard  of  living,  should 
be  admitted.  But  the  racial  question  is  of  even 
graver  importance ;  and  with  the  practical  stagna 
tion  of  the  native-born  and  the  rapid  increase 
among  the  poorest  aliens,  it  is  of  the  highest 
moment  that  steps  should  be  taken  to  preserve  the 
ascendency  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  type  of  American. 
In  Japan  there  are  two  races  which  have  lived  so 
long  together  that  their  origin  is  forgotten.  One 
is  aristocratic,  the  other  plebeian.  Outwardly 
they  are  unmistakable,  and  yet  it  is  practically 
impossible  to  find  the  actual  line  of  cleavage. 
One  would  not  desire  to  see  a  similar  state  of 
affairs  in  America,  nor  is  it  possible  under  a  de 
mocracy  ;  but  the  conditions  might  well  be  similar 
if  the  American  nation  should  become  superim 
posed  with  an  alien  and  inferior  stratum.  Strong 
as  is  the  assimilative  power  of  this  young  country, 
which  has  been  turning  out  young  Americans  from 
all  sorts  of  material,  she  will  find  the  assimila- 

6 


GREATER    AMERICA 

tion  of  her  new  citizens  a  difficult  task.  It  is 
often  boasted  that  the  naturalized  American  and 
his  children  are  more  patriotic  even  than  the 
native-born — plus  royaliste  que  le  roi.  This  state 
ment  the  writer  has  seen  justified  by  a  quotation 
from  a  speech  made  by  a  naturalized  German  in 
one  of  the  Western  towns.  He  concluded  a  fiery 
oration  with  the  sentiment:  "  America,  our  coun 
try,  against  the  world!  America,  right  or  wrong!" 
This  may,  of  course,  be  with  some  people  the  idea 
of  patriotism,  but  it  is  not  enlightened  patriotism, 
and  it  illustrates  most  forcibly  what  a  perverted 
jingoism  may  lead  to.  The  native-born,  it  may  be 
believed,  would  have  too  much  sense  of  national 
honor,,  too  profound  a  respect  for  the  heroes  of  his 
race,  and  too  true  an  understanding  of  the  coun 
try's  best  interests  to  utter  so  shallow  and  so 
mischievous  a  sentiment.  However  this  may  be, 
if  unrestricted  immigration  from  southern  and 
eastern  Europe  continues  on  a  large  scale  despite 
the  restrictions  now  established,  and  if  the  native- 
born  continues  to  increase  so  slowly,  an  undesir 
able  modification  of  national  character  will  take 
place.  Already  a  very  considerable  change  is  no 
ticeable,  not  altogether  due  to  industrial  develop 
ment.  This  has  been  chiefly  in  the  direction  of 
quick-wittedness  and  adaptability.  There  is  noth 
ing  in  the  climate  which  could  affect  a  race  to  such 
an  extent;  the  modification  is  greatly  due  to  the 
constant  immigration  to  America  of  the  keenest 
and  most  ambitious  spirits.  This  was  the  land 

7 


GREATER    AMERICA 

to  make  money  in,  and  to  it  flocked  those  to  whom 
worldly  success  was  an  ideal. 

It  is  a  fact  whose  significance  has  seldom  been 
appreciated  that  the  flowering  period  of  American 
literature  was  that  immediately  before  the  civil 
war,  preceding  the  great  industrial  development 
and  the  era  of  millionaires.  It  is  easy  to  under 
stand  why  there  should  have  been  little  literary 
life  up  to  this  period;  but  the  comparative  pov 
erty  of  American  achievement  since  the  New  Eng 
land  school  died  out  is  hard  to  explain.  There 
are  modern  American  writers  by  the  score,  a  few 
American  painters  of  reputation,  and  still  fewer 
musicians;  but  modern  America  has  become  the 
home  of  mediocrity — she  produces  talent  but  not 
genius — nor  is  there  to  be  found  to-day  in  any 
part  of  the  United  States  that  peculiar  literary  or 
aesthetic  atmosphere  which  is  so  often  the  cradle 
for  genius.  It  was,  and  is  not.1 

The  solution  lies  to  a  great  extent  in  this 
question  of  immigration.  Ever  since  the  forties 
Europe  has  been  pumping  in  hard-headed  men  of 
business,  keen,  ambitious,  inartistic.  The  compe- 

1  Unlike  any  other  civilized  country,  America  lacks  a  national 
capital,  a  fact  which  is  undoubtedly  contributory  to  the 
peculiar  condition  of  her  intellectual  and  aesthetic  develop 
ment.  There  is  a  dispersion  of  intellectual  activity,  a  lack 
of  focus  in  education  and  of  fixed  standards  or  ideals.  Despite 
this  fact,  it  might  have  been  possible  for  one  or  other  of  the 
great  cities  to  become  the  intellectual  centre,  as  Boston  was 
at  her  best  period.  At  present,  however,  there  is  no  such 
concentration,  and  literary  and  aesthetic  life  finds  no  rally  ing- 
ground. 

8 


GREATER    AMERICA 

tition,  under  circumstances  in  which  no  one  is 
handicapped  by  birth,  territorial  possessions,  or 
tradition,  as  in  the  Old  World,  is  tremendously 
keen.  There  has  been  a  constant  sharpening-up 
of  wits  and  faculties  and  an  ever  -  increasing 
acceleration  in  the  pace  set,  until  American  life 
has  become  one  continuous  whirl — a  never-ceasing 
struggle  to  be  first  in  an  endless  race.  The  im 
pression  given  is  that  every  one  wants  not  so  much 
to  make  money  as  to  make  more  money  than  his 
neighbor;  but  the  truth  probably  is  that  to  relax 
would  mean  to  be  thrown  out  altogether.  This 
high  tension  among  business-men  has  undoubtedly 
had  its  origin  largely  in  the  fact  that  a  great  many 
of  them  were,  and  are,  fighting  for  life  in  a  country 
foreign  to  them;  but  it  has  now  become  a  habit— 
a  national  characteristic.  The  man  who  hasn't 
made  much  is  absorbed  in  plans  for  making  more, 
and  the  millionaire  dies  young  as  the  result  of 
overstrain,  and  leaves  his  fortune  to  his  children. 
Here,  at  last,  then,  we  have  a  leisured  class — a 
cultured  class,  too,  for  most  of  the  millionaires' 
children  enjoy,  besides  the  excellent  education  of 
their  own  country,  a  polishing  process  in  Europe. 
Here  should  be  the  milieu  for  literary  and  artistic 
life,  the  cradle  for  the  fine  arts,  the  forcing-bed 
for  the  efflorescence  of  American  civilization.  But, 
alas!  despite  the  appreciation  of  European  art, 
which  has  led  Americans  to  buy  up  wholesale  the 
museums  of  the  Continent,  it  must  be  confessed 
that  the  leisured  class  of  Americans  is  the  very 

9 


GREATER    AMERICA 

last  among  which  the  Muses  would  be  likely  to 
make  their  home.  They  do  not  want  a  capricious 
and  extravagant  patronage,  and,  indeed,  while 
far  from  aristocratic  in  their  preferences,  they  are 
peculiarly  averse  to  parvenus. 

Much  the  same  causes  which  have  led  to  a  cer 
tain  barrenness  in  the  realms  of  aesthetic  achieve 
ment  have  affected  the  public  life  of  the  nation. 
While  it  is  generally  admitted  by  all  the  best 
Americans  that  their  government  leaves  much  to 
be  desired,  very  few  will  sacrifice  time  and  in 
clination  in  order  to  put  things  right.     And  yet 
public  service  was  as  traditional  with  the  colonial 
Americans  as  it  is  with  us,  and  in  the  early  days 
of  the  nation's  history  a  man  of  character  and 
talent  saw  no  better  way  to  employ  them  than  in 
the  service  of  his  state.     What  a  distance  has  been 
traversed  from  then  to  now,  when  a  gentleman 
will  hardly  "soil  his  hands"  with  politics!     This 
is  so  much  the  case  that  the  conditions  of  public 
life  in  England  are  hardly  understood  in  America. 
It  is  almost  inconceivable  to  an  average  American 
that  there  are  hundreds  of  men  in  England  who 
spend  not  only  their  lives  but  their  incomes  on  a 
career  which  offers  them  practically  no  material 
advantages  or  preferments.     Social  ambition  is  a 
strong  incentive  to  some,  but  many  are  placed 
above  even  such  a  temptation.     It  would,  perhaps, 
seem  impossible  to  an  American  that  a  great  terri 
torial  magnate — a  duke  or  an  earl — should  spend 
part  of  his  time  in  discharging  the  functions  of  a 

10 


GREATER    AMERICA 

provincial  mayor;  but  this  does  not  seem  to  us  a 
surprising  self-sacrifice  on  his  part.  We  are  accus 
tomed  to  regard  devotion  to  unremunerative  public 
duty  as  the  natural  field  of  energy  for  any  man 
who  can  afford  it. 

The  case  is,  of  course,  different  in  a  democracy. 
Owing  to  circumstances  which  must  be  dealt  with 
later,  politics  have  become  a  trade — and  not  an 
honest  trade,  either;  but  the  natural  love  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  for  plain,  straightforward  govern 
ment  would  have  secured  the  constant  co-operation 
of  the  best  citizens  and  their  devotion  to  public 
life  but  for  one  factor. 

This  factor  was  the  constant  influx  of  fresh  and 
turbulent  elements.  While  the  business-men  be 
gan  at  once  that  struggle  to  wrest  a  fortune  from 
the  new  land,  the  political  outcasts  of  Europe— 
the  theorists,  demagogues,  malcontents — who  were 
assured  of  complete  liberty,  and  even  license,  in 
their  new  home,  became  gradually  fused  into  the 
American  democracy  and  soon  learned  to  control 
it.  Jobbery,  intrigue,  party  tactics  of  the  most 
unscrupulous  kind  were  weapons  which  could  not 
have  been  used  to  such  deadly  advantage  but  for 
the  fact  that  a  low  moral  standard  had  been  allowed 
to  establish  itself.  This  is  not  the  standard  of  the 
countrymen  of  Washington  and  Lincoln.  It  owes 
its  inspiration  to  the  gutters  of  Europe. 

Some  American  writers  point  proudly  to  the 
ebullition  of  national  feeling — the  "  birth  of  the 
nation"— when  first  the  West  made  its  weight 

ii 


GREATER    AMERICA 

strongly  felt  in  the  Union,  and  Jackson  became 
President,  bringing  the  roughness  of  frontier  life 
into  the  polished  circles  of  a  government  which 
had  been  framed  by  a  Washington  and  a  Hamil 
ton.  Jackson,  however,  inaugurated  the  "  spoils 
system,"  whose  baleful  influence  has  retarded  the 
moral  growth  of  the  United  States  more  than  any 
thing  else.  Who  knows  to  what  heights  of  judicial 
and  administrative  perfection  America  might  not 
have  attained  but  for  this  rude  interruption  of  her 
settled  and  ordered  development.  There  was  no 
question  of  a  relapse  into  hereditary  institutions; 
but  there  was  every  question  of  profiting  by  the 
experience  of  the  Old  World  and  of  framing  society 
on  a  model  at  once  fresh  and  mellowed  with  bor 
rowed  experience.  The  frontier  element  proved 
too  strong.  It  undoubtedly  breathed  a  keener 
and  more  belligerent  spirit  into  the  Union,  but  it 
pervaded  the  whole  political  and  social  life  with 
an  element  of  crudity  and  unscrupulousness  which 
still  remain. 

Since  the  time  of  Jackson  and  the  earliest  in 
cursion  of  the  Westerner  into  political  life  a  great 
change  has  undoubtedly  been  creeping  over  the 
country  west  of  the  Alleghanies.  The  most  recent 
phase  of  this  is  the  development  of  the  great 
Mississippi  Valley  and  the  rolling  of  the  tide  of 
prosperity  and  progress  southward  to  New  Orleans. 
The  Federalists,  anxious  to  secure  the  supremacy 
of  the  Atlantic  States  in  the  Union,  opposed  the 
annexation  of  Louisiana,  and  their  prognostica- 

12 


GREATER    AMERICA 

tions  have  been  verified,  for  to-day  the  West, 
with  a  minority  of  electors,  has  an  overwhelming 
majority  of  Senators.1 

The  Westerners,  it  must  not  be  forgotten,  were 
not  the  first  type  of  American,  and  it  may  be  ques 
tioned  whether  they  were  the  finest.  Before  the  in 
dustrial  immigration  of  the  thirties  most  of  the  im 
migrants  were  not  absorbed  by  the  Eastern  cities, 
but  spread  westward  into  newer  districts,  settling 
mainly  on  the  land.  They  were  far  rougher  and 
cruder  as  communities,  and  intensely  democratic. 
It  was  a  long  time  before  they  made  themselves 
heard  in  the  Union,  for,  during  the  period  of  storm 
and  stress,  when  the  East  and  South  were  fighting 
the  battles  of  the  young  republic,  winning  her  a 
place  in  the  comity  of  nations,  arranging  her  in 
ternal  affairs,  and  rehabilitating  her  finances,  the 
West,  shut  off  by  mountains,  was  developing  on 
its  own  lines.  Isolated  by  its  position  from  the 
influences  of  the  Old  World,  the  Westerners  grew 
up  with  a  sturdy  independence  and  an  entire  ig 
norance  of  world  conditions.  The  dominant  note 
which  they  brought  into  the  Union  was  an  aggres 
sive  desire  for  an  entire  separation  from  European 

1  The  total  population  of  the  United  States,  according  to  the 
twelfth  census,  is  76,305,387.  The  population  of  the  forty- 
five  States  is  74,181,336.  New  York  has  nearly  10  per  cent, 
of  this  figure,  Pennsylvania  about  8  per  cent.,  Illinois  about 
6^  per  cent.,  Ohio  about  5^  per  cent.,  Missouri  about  4^  per 
cent.,  and  Massachusetts  over  3^  per  cent.  These  six  States 
have  altogether  about  38*4  per  cent,  of  the  total  population  of 
the  States,  but  their  combined  voting  strength  in  the  Senate  is 
only  twelve  out  of  ninety. 


GREATER    AMERICA 

interests,  and,  with  true  provincialism,  they  be 
lieved  it  possible  that  the  American  nation  could  be 
all  sufficient  to  itself.  They  joined  heartily  in — if 
they  did  not  initiate — a  policy  of  expansion  which 
would  eliminate  Europe  from  the  American  con 
tinent.  They  have  ever  been  in  the  van  in  fight 
ing.  Size  has  a  natural  fascination  for  a  people  liv 
ing  in  such  a  vast  country,  and«the  Westerner  was 
perhaps  the  first,  though  not  the  last,  American  to 
make  an  ideal  of  bigness  rather  than  goodness. 

With  the  civil  war  came  a  rapprochement  between 
East  and  West,  and  in  recent  years  the  growth  of 
industrial  life  has  helped  to  assimilate  the  South 
as  well  as  other  sections  to  the  dominant  type 
of  Americanism.  With  the  growth  of  cities  a 
change  has  come  to  the  West.  The  Western  type 
is  no  longer  that  of  the  frontier-man  farmer,  but 
includes  the  business -man  and  speculator.  A 
tendency  to  a  cleavage  of  interests  between  ag 
riculture  and  industrialism  is  showing  itself.  The 
former,  once  the  life  of  the  country,  feels  itself  left 
behind  in  the  promotion  of  interests.  The  farmers 
see  themselves  supplanted  by  industrial  immigrants 
and  political  adventurers,  just  as  they  supplanted 
the  colonial  American.  Physically,  the  old  type 
of  Westerner  is  superior  to  any  other  of  the 
present  day,  though  not  to  the  old  colonial  stock; 
mentally  and  morally,  he  has  advanced  consider 
ably  since  facilities  of  communication  and  educa 
tion  gave  his  civilization  an  upward  turn.  It  is 
to  a  race  bred  on  the  soil  and  in  pure  air  that  every 

14 


GREATER    AMERICA 

nation  must  look  for  constant  renewal,  and  this 
the  West  supplies;  but  the  evil  tendencies  of 
political  evolution  are  so  serious  in  their  action  on 
communities  still  raw  and  crude  that  it  is  to  be 
feared  that  American  national  life  may  be  poi 
soned  at  the  very  source  from  which  it  should  draw 
its  supplies  of  moral  as  well  as  physical  renewal. 
Where  in  this  constant  recasting  of  the  national 
type  do  we  find  the  true  birth  of  the  American 
people?  It  is  customary  to  speak  of  Washington 
as  the  first  American,  but  it  would  be  hard  to 
imagine  a  greater  contrast  than  would  be  present 
ed  were  he  to  stand  beside  a  modern  American, 
whether  of  the  Eastern  or  Western  cities.  By  right 
of  priority  the  colonial  stock  may  be  regarded  as 
the  first  Americans,  and  the  country  owes  to  them 
not  only  its  constitution,  but  many  of  its  truest  ele 
ments  of  greatness.  In  the  shock  of  contact  with 
the  virile  West  this  type  lost  many  characteristics. 
Traditions  and  ideals,  good  or  bad,  went  over 
board,  and  only  a  few  little  social  backwaters — 
like  Concord,  New  England — remained  for  a  time. 
Then  to  the  influence  of  the  stranger  from  over  the 
mountains  was  added  that  of  the  stranger  within 
the  gates,  and  with  the  industrial  wave  which 
swept  over  the  country  the  original  Americans  were 
either  submerged  or  carried  away.1 

1  Within  recent  years  we  have  seen  the  practical  elimination 
of  one  of  the  oldest  and  most  forceful  of  American  types. 
With  the  migration  of  the  sturdy  New  England  yeomen  dis 
appears  one  of  the  last  strongholds  of  the  native  American. 

15 


GREATER    AMERICA 

A  significant  feature  of  modern  Americanism 
is  the  wide-spread  movement  among  descendants 
of  colonial  times  to  band  together  for  mutual 
recognition  and  support.  Ridiculous  as  may  seem 
in  a  democratic  community  the  self  -  conferred 
distinctions  of  societies  of  the  Cincinnati,  Colonial 
Dames,  Sons  and  Daughters  of  the  Revolution, 
and  kindred  societies;  incongruous  as  may  appear 
the  prestige  attached  to  a  "  Knickerbocker  "  family 
— these  are  all  signs  of  the  times  which  cannot  be 
overlooked. 

The  fascinating  study  of  sociology  in  America  is 
altogether  outside  the  scope  of  this  book.  It  has 
been  treated  at  length  by  many  abler  pens.  The 
writer  is  inclined  to  believe,  however,  that  the  im 
portance  of  the  modifications  in  what,  for  lack  of 
a  better  term,  we  may  call  the  national  character, 
which  are  due  to  a  constant  influx  of  two  distinct 
types  of  immigrants,  has  been  somewhat  over 
looked.  These  modifications  are  going  on  under 
our  eyes.  The  race  fusion  of  which  Americans 
speak  with  pride  has  not  been  a  constant  as 
similation  of  all  elements  to  the  American  type, 
but  the  steady  modification  of  that  type  by  fresh 
elements.  How  else  can  one  account  for  the 
heterogeneous  nature  of  American  society,  the 
dissimilarity  visible  between  State  and  State,  or 
even  city  and  city?  Americans  not  infrequently 
boast  that  the  city  from  which  a  man  comes  is 
betrayed  not  only  by  his  clothes  and  speech,  but 
by  his  very  face  and  manner.  One  has  only  to 

16 


GREATER    AMERICA 

read  the  classic  descriptions  of  De  Tocqueville  to 
realize  how  much  more  truly  homogeneous  was 
the  democracy  of  his  time,  though  even  then  he 
saw  elements  of  incongruity  and  danger.  No 
modern  traveller  could  give  an  account  of  the 
American  people  which  would  be  at  once  so 
simple  and  convincing.  Bryce,  who  devoted  to 
the  task  abilities  of  the  highest  order,  gives  us 
a  study  marvellous  for  detail,  but  leaving  the 
reader  who  does  not  know  America  without  a 
mental  picture.  The  reason  is  not  far  to  seek. 
One  cannot  correctly  paint  a  chameleon ;  one  can 
not  fix  on  paper  what  is  forever  changing.  It 
might  have  been  possible  for  a  sympathetic  ob 
server  to  catch  the  spirit  of  American  life,  to 
translate  into  words  the  soul  of  the  nation — 
there  are  books  on  other  countries  which  do  this 
without  any  attempt  at  social  or  political  dis 
section — but  is  there,  in  truth,  any  such  element 
in  American  life?  If  it  exists  it  is  smothered 
from  sight  by  the  excrescences  of  an  evanescent 
modernity. 

This  is  why  all  writers  who  have  attempted  to 
give  a  picture  of  the  American  nation  have  failed. 
Either  they  take  local  conditions  or  some  of  the 
excrescences  and  magnify  them  out  of  all  pro 
portion,  or  they  fall  back  on  some  period  of  his 
tory — preferably  the  civil  war — and  draw  a  pict 
ure  which  has  long  been  out  of  date.  The  writer 
has  failed,  in  an  exhaustive  search,  to  find  any 
book,  small  or  great,  which  gave  at  once  a  pict- 
a  17 


GREATER    AMERICA 

ure  of  the  American  people  and  the  key  to 
their  peculiar  and  complex  civilization.  Few 
Americans  care  for  the  study  of  themselves.  Like 
[ITopsy,  they  "guess  they  growed";  and  it  is 
only  the  more  thoughtful  who  are  beginning  to 
have  misgivings  as  to  the  tendency  of  that 
growth. 

What  is  the  bearing  of  this  difficult  and  com 
plex  subject  on  Greater  America?  In  the  first 
place,  it  has  been  the  primary  factor  in  insuring 
the  constant  expansion  by  which  Greater  Amer 
ica  has  been  built  up.  Not  only  the  quantity  but 
the  quality  of  the  immigration  at  various  periods 
has  been  directly  contributory  to  this.  First,  the 
adventurous  pioneers  who  helped  to  win  the  West ; 
then  the  industrial  element,  which  devoted  itself 
to  commercial  affairs  and  stimulated  expansion 
by  a  constant  demand  for  fresh  markets ;  then  the 
Western  element,  also  expansionist  in  spirit,  from 
a  desire  to  insure  complete  divorce  from  Europe 
and  to  secure  an  outlet  on  the  sea  -  coast.  So 
on  in  a  circle  runs  the  current  of  American  evolu 
tion  :  immigration  leads  to  industrial  develop 
ment,  and  that  to  further  expansion,  calling  for 
fresh  immigration. 

At  last  a  halt  seems  to  have  been  called  in  this 
course  of  development.  Chinese  and  Japanese 
immigration  is  discouraged;  a  general  disinclina 
tion  is  shown  to  bring  into  the  Union  Territories 
where  the  foreign  element  predominates;  and  im 
migration  from  Europe  is  to  be  closely  restricted. 

18 


GREATER    AMERICA 

At  this  period  also  the  United  States  finds  herself 
at  the  head  of  a  great  colonial  empire,  the  centre 
of  a  governmental  system  with  many  variations, 
and  pledged  to  a  career  very  different  to  the 
isolated  splendor  she  had  once  marked  out  for 
herself. 

It  is,  at  first  sight,  a  curious  comment  on  the 
universal  truth  and  wisdom  of  the  democratic 
principle  that  America  should  be  the  mistress  of 
not  one  but  many  alien  races,  to  whom  she  can 
not,  or  will  not,  give  those  individual  rights  which 
she  claims  as  the  heritage  of  every  man.  The 
present  writer  would  be  the  last  to  question  the 
wisdom  of  this  reservation.  He  hopes  to  show 
in  succeeding  chapters  some  of  the  salient  feat 
ures  of  these  outlying  parts  of  Greater  America, 
and  how  they  affect,  and  are  affected  by,  the 
national  ideals  and  idiosyncrasies  of  the  United 
States.  What  are  the  probabilities  that  all  these 
dependencies  may  be  by  degrees  assimilated  to 
the  American  ideal,  and  that  democracy  may 
triumphantly  vindicate  itself  by  becoming  the 
basis  of  every  government  under  the  Stars  and 
Stripes? 

Misgivings  may  well  arise  in  the  mind  of  the 
ardent  democrat  when  he  recollects  with  how  little 
success  he  has  dealt  with  the  internal  problem  of 
adjusting  the  relations  of  races  of  different  color 
and  varying  degrees  of  civilization. 

With  the  Indians  he  has  attempted  to  deal  more 
or  less  paternally— if,  indeed,  a  course  of  action 

19 


GREATER    AMERICA 

can  be  deemed  paternal  which  is  so  demoralizing 
for  those  on  whom  it  acts.  The  Indian  has  never 
been  regarded  as  fit  for  the  exercise  of  rights 
like  the  white  American.  First  a  bitter  foe  and 
then  a  conquered  and  submissive  vassal,  the  one 
aim  has  been,  while  depriving  the  red-man  of  his 
stake  in  the  land,  to  keep  him  apart  from  his  con 
queror  and  to  secure  to  him  just  enough  ground 
and  just  sufficient  money  to  prevent  his  feeling 
the  pinch  of  want,  which  might  drive  him  to  a 
more  strenuous  life.  Immured,  therefore,  in  res 
ervations,  in  which  the  tribal  organization,  mean 
ingless  under  modern  conditions  of  civilization, 
has  been  artificially  preserved ,  deprived  of  the  only 
stimulating  occupations  he '  had  ever  known — war 
and  hunting, — the  Indian  might  have  declined  in 
numbers  and  died  out,  slowly  but  respectably, 
had  he  been  strictly  and  wisely  governed  within 
the  limits  of  the  reservations.  Here  we  find, 
however,  the  baneful  effect  of  the  Spoils  System. 
No  permanent  department  has  the  interests  of 
Indians  at  heart.  If  there  is  any  subject  which 
should  be  totally  outside  party  politics  it  is  this, 
in  which  is  involved  the  welfare  of  so  many  help 
less  beings  without  any  interest  in  party  govern 
ment.  The  Indian  Bureau,  however,  has  become 
a  mere  political  machine,  and  its  members  are  ap 
pointed  on  party  grounds,  and  not  for  their  knowl 
edge  of,  or  sympathy  with,  Indians.  It  is  not 
surprising,  therefore,  that  incompetent  and  un 
suitable  men  have  sometimes  been  appointed  to 

20 


GREATER    AMERICA 

oversee  the  reservations,1  and  that,  seeing  dis 
honesty,  ignorance,  laziness,  and  even  intemper 
ance  among  the  men  whom  they  are  taught  to 
regard  as  examples,  the  Indians,  incapable  of  the 
virtues  of  American  civilization,  have  lapsed  into 
the  vices.2 

In  any  case,  the  reservation  system,  with  or 
without  political  influence,  is  a  bad  one  under  a 
democracy.  To  maintain  a  truly  paternal  rule 
over  these  communities  scattered  from  Minnesota 
to  Mexico  and  from  Michigan  to  California  is  a 
practical  impossibility  for  the  federal  government. 
Then,  too,  land  in  America  is  already  getting 
precious,  immigrants  press  in  on  the  reservations, 
and  against  energy  and  enterprise  the  Indian  sloth 
and  carelessness  can  make  little  stand.  From  the 
circumstances  of  their  lives — their  dependence  on 
the  government,  lack  of  incentive  to  work,  and 
general  degeneracy — the  Indians  in  their  reserva 
tions  have  become,  too  often,  plague-spots  on 
American  society,  centres  of  depravity  and  vice. 
At  the  best,  they  afford  a  dismal  spectacle  and 
an  evil  example.  It  is  now  strongly  urged  that 
the  reservation  system  should  be  gradually  broken 

1  "The  officials  .  .  .  work  under  hard  conditions,  and  also 
under  conditions  which  render  it  easy  to  do  wrong  and  very 
difficult  to  detect  wrong.     Consequently  they  should  be  amply 
paid  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  a  particularly  high 
standard  should  be  demanded  from  them:  and  where  mis 
conduct  can  be  proved  the  punishment  should  be  exemplary." 
— Message  of  the  President,  1902. 

2  Lyman  Abbott,  in  North  American  Review,  1898. 

21 


GREATER    AMERICA 

up,  and  the  red-man  allowed  to  mix  with  his  fel 
low-Americans — on  the  same  plane,  at  all  events, 
as  Poles,  Hungarians,  and  Italians.  The  Indian 
race  cannot  survive  as  a  separate  entity;  the  one 
hope  for  it  is  fusion  with  the  dominant  Anglo- 
Saxon;  but  whether,  after  a  long  course  of  de 
moralization,  it  will  prove  a  desirable  element  in 
the  nation  is  more  than  doubtful. 

A  decaying  and  enfeebled  race  like  the  Indians, 
however,  forms  but  a  minor  problem  beside  that 
of  the  negroes  and  their  place  in  American  society. 
Although  the  black  people  are  not  increasing  at  a 
ratio  which,  so  far,  threatens  white  supremacy 
(while  white  immigration  continues),  yet  they  are 
increasing  steadily,  and,  moreover,  are  segregating 
in  what  is  known  as  the  black  belt  in  the  Southern 
States.  This  movement  is  one  that  cannot  fail 
to  cause  uneasiness  to  Americans.  Scattered 
throughout  the  Southern  States  (with  a  sprinkling 
in  the  North),  dominated  morally  and  mentally, 
if  not  numerically,  by  the  whites,  the  negro  race 
was  a  problem  but  not  a  menace.  Even  now  the 
situation  is  not  so  grave  that  it  may  not  be  re 
trieved.  The  leaders  of  the  black  race  have  no 
other  ambition  at  present  than  to  raise  their  people 
to  a  higher  level  in  the  cosmogony  of  America.  It 
is  as  citizens  of  the  American  Republic  that  they 
desire  to  face  the  future.  And  yet  overwhelming 
public  opinion  denies  them  this  position,  is  pushing 
them  slowly  but  surely  away  from  it,  and  is  making 
their  segregation  more  and  more  inevitable. 

22 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  vital  importance  of  this  question  to  Greater 
America  cannot  be  overestimated.  With  the  bur 
dens,  as  well  as  the  glories,  of  world-greatness  upon 
her,  America  needs  above  everything  to  assure  to 
herself  internal  unity  and  progress.  The  negro 
problem  has  already  assumed  proportions  which 
make  it  possible  that  the  whole  policy  of  the  na 
tion  may  turn  on  a  point  of  race  prejudice.  The 
unhealthiness  of  this  condition  must  cause  the 
gravest  uneasiness  to  every  thoughtful  man. 
While  it  is  impossible  in  this  book  to  enter  with 
any  fulness  into  this  most  difficult  subject,  it 
is  necessary  to  summarize  briefly  the  main  points 
in  the  controversy. 

On  the  one  hand,  a  large  majority  of  whites, 
especially  in  the  Southern  States,  feel  that  any 
attempt  to  place  the  negroes  on  the  footing  of 
American  citizens  would,  owing  to  their  numerical 
superiority  in  certain  districts,  secure  to  them 
the  government  not  only  of  themselves  but  of 
the  white  minority.  Apart  from  the  question  of 
whether  that  government  would  be  good  or  bad, 
there  is,  in  the  white  man's  breast,  an  ineradicable 
aversion  against  being  dominated  by  a  black,  or 
even  colored,  people.  This  is  partly  race  prej 
udice,  partly  the  result  of  terrible  experience  in 
the  reconstruction  period.  In  any  case,  it  is  too 
strong  a  sentiment  to  be  rooted  out  or  disregard 
ed.  On  this  foundation  any  schemes  for  the 
future  must  be  laid. 

The  writer  must  confess  that  to  him  this  prej- 

23 


GREATER    AMERICA 

udice,  while  natural  in  its  original  form,  is  now 
carried  to  an  excess;  but  to  a  Briton,  secure  in 
that  form  of  government  which  makes  black  and 
white  alike  free,  but  alike  bound  to  obey  a  superior 
authority  (always  white!),  there  is  not  that  lurk 
ing  dread  of  the  power  of  a  black  democracy.  If 
the  American  would  acknowledge  freely  and  hon 
estly  the  break- down  of  the  democratic  system, 
would  accept  his  position  as  the  dominant  factor 
in  a  great  republican  empire,  would  cease  to  en 
deavor  to  square  his  theory  with  his  practice, 
he  might  still  advance  along  the  paths  of  prog 
ress,  might  achieve  the  freest  and  most  liberal 
form  of  government,  but  would  still  not  be  de 
barred  from  dealing  justly  with  alien  and  subject 
races. 

The  negro  is  a  subject  race.  There  is  no  proof 
of  its  incapacity  to  rise  to  higher  things;  there  is 
every  proof  that  at  present  it  is,  as  a  mass,  on  a 
lower  level  of  civilization  than  the  white  Amer 
ican.  Instinct,  which  is  stronger  than  logic,  and 
common-sense,  which  is  better  than  theory,  tell 
us  two  things  about  the  negro.  First,  that  race- 
fusion  between  him  and  the  white  man  is  not  the 
solution  of  the  problem,  that  it  is  to  be  deprecated 
on  both  physical  and  moral  grounds;  secondly, 
that  unless  he  is  provided  with  a  legitimate  ambi 
tion  in  life  he  will  find  an  illegitimate  one.  Left 
alone,  permitted  to  segregate,  and  deprived  of  the 
stimulating  contact  of  a  higher  civilization,  the 
American  negro  will  sink  to  lower  levels.  He  will 

24 


GREATER    AMERICA 

act  as  a  drag  and  a  menace  to  the  nation  of  which, 
after  all,  he  is  an  integral  part. 

Education — the  universal  panacea  of  modern 
times — is  the  only  practical  remedy  which  has 
been  suggested.  In  its  way  it  is  the  most  im 
portant  factor.  Properly  applied  and  directed,  it 
may  make  a  good  negro  out  of  a  bad  one,  and  a 
good  negro  is  a  far  better  citizen  than  a  bad 
white.  But  when  the  negro  is  educated,  is 
raised,  not  individually  but  racially,  to  a  higher 
level  of  knowledge  and  character,  what  then?  Is 
it  to  be  expected  that  he  will  press  forward  to 
this  goal  without  incentive,  without  hope  of  re 
ward?  Is  the  negro  race  to  be  admitted,  by  de 
grees  perhaps,  but  certainly  and  finally,  to  the 
full  enjoyment  of  the  privileges  of  American  cit 
izens  ?  At  present  the  exhibition  of  the  strong 
est  civic  virtues,  the  highest  talents,  and  the  most 
disinterested  ambitions  do  not  secure  a  negro  in 
America  from  treatment  which  the  humblest  sub 
ject  of  the  British  crown,  black  or  brown,  might 
resent.  Americans  who  value  liberty  and  jus 
tice  more  than  life,  who  have  been  willing  to  shed 
their  blood  to  secure  them  to  Cubans  and  Fili 
pinos,  refuse  them  to  a  fellow-American  because- 
he  is  black. 

The  necessity  for  a  proper  adjustment  of  racial 
relations  has,  therefore,  become  a  burning  ques 
tion.  The  writer  pleads  with  his  American 
cousins  for  a  fairer  and  more  open  considera 
tion  of  the  subject,  and  for  its  readjustment  on 

25 


GREATER    AMERICA 

rational,  honest,  and  truthful  lines.  Treat  the 
negro  as  a  subject  race,  but  remember  that  a  sub 
ject  race  has  rights.  Draw  the  line  of  color  as 
strongly  as  you  will,  but  do  not  treat  the  black 
man  as  if  he  were  not  human.  The  white  men 
own  the  American  continent;  they  have  every 
right  to  dictate  to  others  the  terms  on  which  they 
shall  inhabit  it;  but  for  their  own  sakes,  if  for  no 
higher  motive,  they  should  see  that  those  terms 
will  be  such  as  self-respecting  people  can  accept. 
It  may  be  said  that  the  negro  is  not  self-respect 
ing;  if  so  the  terms  of  existence  should  be  regu 
lated  as  to  arouse  in  him  that  sentiment,  which 
is  the  only  basis  for  a  useful  life. 

Generalizations  like  these  are  open  to  the  crit 
icism  that  they  are  easy  to  make  but  hard  to 
realize.  The  negro  question,  however,  has  hardly 
yet  reached  in  America  the  stage  of  generalization. 
There  is  no  agreement,  no  settled  policy,  no  unity 
of  sentiment  on  the  subject.  The  one  distinct 
and  certain  feature  is  the  widening  of  the  gulf 
between  the  races  and  the  embitterment  of  their 
mutual  relations.  Every  State  has  its  own 
method  of  dealing  with  what  is,  in  reality,  a  na 
tional  matter.  Isolated  efforts  at  reform  in  one 
section  are  nullified  by  abuses  in  another. 

This  is  eminently  one  of  those  quagmires 
through  which  the  American  people  need  the  lead 
ing  hand  of  a  strong,  constructive  statesman. 
Nothing  but  drastic  reform,  based  on  a  profound 
change  in  public  sentiment,  can  revolutionize  the 

26 


i    \j  n » v 

X£<M 


GREATER    AMERICA 

present  condition  of  drift  and  muddle.  The 
placing  of  all  official  positions  on  a  firmer  and  less 
corrupt  basis  would  be  a  step  in  the  right  direction, 
for  it  would  strengthen  the  powers  of  the  federal 
government  in  proportion  as  it  weakened  those  of 
local  politicians.  Reform  should  open  an  avenue 
to  the  really  high -class  negro,  which  could  be 
done  without  increasing  by  one  iota  the  influ 
ence  of  a  black  democracy. 

It  is  surely  not  too  much  to  expect  of  so  adaptive 
and  virile  a  people  as  the  Americans  that  they 
should  be  able  to  evolve  at  least  a  working  com 
promise  which  would  deprive  the  " black  cloud" 
of  its  most  baneful  possibilities.  Imperfect  as  is 
the  British  system  of  dealing  with  negroes  in  the 
West  Indies,  it  is  truer  to  the  spirit  of  democracy 
than  that  found  in  America,  since  it  affords  them 
not  only  opportunities  but  incentives  to  rise,  rec 
ognizes  and  rewards  individual  merit,  deals  out 
an  even-handed  justice  to  black  and  white,  and 
finally  makes  good  subjects  instead  of  bad  ones. 
And  all  this  while  securing  for  the  white  popula 
tion  (a  mere  handful  among  the  blacks)  a  position 
in  the  respect  and  affection  of  the  negroes  which 
many  a  Southerner  must  envy.1 

In  dealing,  however  briefly,  with  the  people  of 
Greater  America,  one  is  constantly  obliged  to 
refer  to  education  as  the  suggested  solvent  for 

1  The  question  is  more  fully  discussed  in  an  article  by  the 
writer,  "The  Negro  Problem,"  North  American  Review,  May, 
1903. 

27 


GREATER    AMERICA 

many  racial  and  political  problems.  Nothing  is 
more  striking  in  American  life  than  the  interest 
taken  in  educational  projects,  the  sums  devoted  to 
them  by  private  beneficence,  and  the  importance 
attached  to  the  possession  of  a  training  in  one  or 
other  of  the  great  colleges.  It  must  be  confessed 
that  all  this  is  novel  to  the  average  Briton.  His 
interest  in  the  education  given  in  the  Elementary 
Schools  (in  America  called  Public  Schools)  is  limit 
ed  to  a  grumble  at  the  rates  which  he  has  to  pay 
for  them.  The  agitation  regarding  the  education 
bill  rages  chiefly  round  a  point  which  does  not 
actually  affect  the  efficiency  of  the  training  given 
in  the  schools.  As  for  the  public  schools — Eton, 
Harrow,  Rugby,  and  the  others — they  have  be 
come  a  tradition  out  of  which  it  will  be  hard  to 
shake  the  conservative  Briton.  He  will  continue 
to  grumble  at  the  unpractical  nature  of  the  educa 
tion  obtained  there,  in  the  same  spirit  as  at  the 
large  bills;  but,  as  a  rule,  he  thinks  that  public 
schools  are  the  training-grounds  which  best  fit  his 
boy,  physically  and  morally,  if  not  mentally,  to 
take  his  place  in  English  society;  and,  until  the 
whole  fabric  of  that  society  tumbles  into  ashes, 
perhaps  he  is  right. 

A  great  industrial  people  like  the  Americans,  a 
nation  made  up  of  "  pushers,"  a  society  in  which 
stagnation  has  become  impossible,  could  hardly 
take  this  abstract  view.  Education  to  an  English 
man  means  character  development;  to  an  Amer 
ican  it  means  actual  equipment  for  the  battle  of 

28 


GREATER    AMERICA 

life.  The  attention  paid  to  the  subject,  the  money 
expended,  and  the  interest  displayed  have  secured 
for  American  education  a  foremost  place.  It  is 
up  to  date  in  appliances,  in  mechanical  aids,  in 
scientific  methods.  There  is  an  attempt  to  teach 
just  what  every  American  citizen  will  want  to 
know,  and,  above  all,  to  make  him  bright,  ready 
of  expression,  quick  in  decision,  self-possessed,  and 
practical.  The  poorest  can  obtain  this  type  of 
education,  which  is  specially  designed  to  act  as  a 
solvent  on  the  many  elements  of  which  the  lowest 
grade  of  society  is  composed;  and  of  late  years 
patriotism — love  of  America  and  devotion  to  her 
institutions — has  been  steadily  inculcated. 

Excellent  in  many  of  its  features,  American 
education  is  open  to  criticism  on  one  or  two  points 
which  vitally  affect  the  character  of  the  people  as 
a  nation.  First,  the  tendency  is  towards  material 
ism — a  sacrifice  of  the  more  subtle  forms  of  char 
acter  development,  which  is  the  true  aim  of  edu 
cation,  for  a  mere  training  in  certain  'ologies  and 
'isms.  Efficiency  is  more  sought  after  than  depth 
or  thoroughness.  There  is  too  much  desire  for  the 
actual  advantages  that  learning  can  bestow  rather 
than  love  of  it  for  its  own  sake,  and  for  the  possibil 
ities  in  the  way  of  happiness  which  it  opens  to  rich 
and  poor  alike.  It  is  to  this  materialistic  ten 
dency  that  some  of  the  most  unpromising  feat 
ures  of  American  society  can  be  traced,  for  it  must 
be  remembered  that,  as  true  happiness  in  an  in 
dividual  has  its  roots  in  spiritual  far  more  than 

29 


GREATER    AMERICA 

in  material  well-being,  so  it  is  with  the  nation  of 
which  that  individual  is  a  unit. 

An  interesting  comment  upon  a  kindred  side  of 
American  life — the  effect  of  industrial  expansion 
and  a  high  state  of  mechanical  efficiency  upon  the 
real  happiness  of  the  people  —  is  afforded  by  a 
Japanese  writer  who  was  sent  by  the  head  of  the 
Foreign  Office  to  make  inquiry 

"in  those  places  where  these  wonderful  machines  are  most 
used,  as  to  their  social  effects,  and  learn  what  methods,  if 
any,  have  been  adopted  to  cause  them  to  bring  that  comfort 
and  leisure  to  the  masses  for  which  they  were  evidently 
devised. 

"This  I  did"  [says  the  writer].  "In  Philadelphia  I  saw 
a  new  phase  of  American  life.  On  a  former  visit,  with 
apartments  in  the  Continental,  I  had  seen,  I  now  found, 
but  the  upper  side  of  things  —  art-galleries,  museums, 
libraries,  colleges,  costly  churches,  elegant  dwellings,  and 
well-to-do,  distinguished  people.  I  had,  too,  no  doubt, 
seen  great  department  stores,  ship-yards,  and  locomotive 
works,  but  all  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  well-fed  and 
contented  man.  My  attention  had  not  been  attracted  to 
the  workers,  except  that  they  appeared  to  be  better 
clothed,  better  fed,  better  housed,  and  apparently  happier 
than  with  us. 

"I  now,  under  my  instructions,  was  to  abjure  the 
civilities  of  the  rich  in  order  to  spend  my  time  among  and 
learn  something  about  the  poor.  My  former  perceptions 
I  soon  found  to  be  illusive.  The  better  dress,  houses, 
furniture,  more  varied  food  of  these  people  was  accom 
panied,  I  was  surprised  to  find,  with  more  tension,  more 
anxiety,  and,  I  think,  with  less  happiness  than  among  the 
same  classes  in  Japan.  In  factories,  amid  the  roar  of 
labor-saving  machinery,  I  found  considerable  numbers  of 

30 


GREATER    AMERICA 

children  and  young  people  of  both  sexes  working  ten 
hours  daily,  which,  with  the  noon  hour  and  the  half-hours 
occupied  in  going  and  returning,  make  a  twelve-hour  day; 
called  to  toil  by  shrieking  steam-whistles,  and  so  fearful 
of  being  docked  or  discharged  that  usually  the  larger  part 
of  them  were  waiting  at  the  factory  doors  fifteen  to  thirty 
minutes  before  time.  Posted  conspicuously  about  the 
rooms  I  saw  'The  Rules,'  rigidly  forbidding  talk,  forbidding 
friends  to  enter,  and  so  on,  enforced  by  fines.  I  found  that, 
with  the  lapse  of  time,  machines  have  been  speeded  faster 
and  faster,  and  that  sometimes  one  person  who  formerly 
ran  but  one  machine  now  runs  two,  three,  or  even  more. 
In  cotton  factories  one  young  woman  now  has  charge  of 
four  looms,  and  occasionally  five.  I  found  that  these 
workers  rarely  owned  their  own  homes,  three-fourths  at 
least  being  tenants  liable  to  eviction  upon  thirty  days' 
notice.  Wages  seemed  to  be  no  more  than  a  bare  living, 
though  at  a  much  higher  standard  than  in  Japan,  very 
few  accumulating  anything."1 

There  is  about  these  lines  an  air  of  truthfulness 
and  conviction,  and  the  facts  are  indisputable  as 
far  as  they  go.  They  lead  us  naturally  to  that 
most  serious  question  with  which  the  American 
people  are  now  face  to  face — the  relations  between 
capital  and  labor. 

De  Tocqueville  noted  with  approbation  the 
equality  of  fortune  among  Americans,  and  even  at 
a  later  date  it  seemed  as  though  the  good  things 
of  this  world  were  more  evenly  distributed  in 
America  than  anywhere  else  in  the  civilized  world. 
Millionairism,  in  fact,  is  a  modern  disease,  and, 

1  Japanese  Notions  of  American  Political  Economy.  By 
Tentearo  Makato.  Philadelphia,  1899. 

31 


GREATER    AMERICA 

unfortunately,  it  is  one  which  seems  to  have  be 
come  endemic.  The  natural  sequence  of  events 
in  a  country  where  certain  people  are  inordinately 
rich  is  that  others  should  be  excessively  poor,  not 
because  the  rich  deprive  or  oppress  the  poor 
directly,  but  because  money,  piled  up  million  on 
million,  becomes  too  much  for  the  control  of  one 
man  and  ceases  to  be  an  active  power  for  good.  Its 
productiveness  is  not  actually  lessened,  since  it  is 
well  known  that  millions  beget  more  millions,  but 
it  is  too  often  diverted  into  channels  of  minor 
usefulness  to  the  community  at  large.  Then  the 
combinations  known  as  Trusts,  which  often  in 
clude  several  millionaires,  not  only  tend  to  crush 
individual  effort,  but,  by  their  power  of  artificially 
stimulating  or  depressing  the  market,  are  able  to 
control  the  destiny  of  the  laborer  or  artisan  to  an 
extent  impossible  in  a  country  where  Trusts  are 
still  in  their  infancy.  Titanic  forces  are,  there 
fore,  meeting  in  this  conflict  of  capital  and  labor. 
On  the  one  hand,  men  commanding  resources  so 
vast  as  to  be  almost  illimitable;  on  the  other,  the 
strongest  democracy  in  the  world.  Neither  can 
do  without  the  other,  but  both  are  prepared  to 
fight  to  the  death  for  power.  All  over  Europe 
we  see  the  growth  of  socialism,  which  teaches  men 
to  combine  for  the  security  of  their  rights  and  for 
the  express  purpose  of  nullifying  the  advantages 
possessed  by  capitalists.  The  American  people, 
with  a  wholesome  regard  for  the  rights  of  prop 
erty,  have  not  yet  gone  to  the  excesses  which  have 

32 


GREATER    AMERICA 

marred  the  cause  of  freedom  and  liberty  on  the 
European  continent.  They  have,  indeed,  enjoyed 
a  measure  of  freedom,  opportunity,  and  comfort 
far  above  that  possessed  formerly  by  other 
peoples ;  but  their  patience  is  now  being  sorely 
tried.  So  long  as  industrial  prosperity  lasts  and 
workers  are  at  a  premium,  the  pinch  of  the  boot 
may  not  be  so  keenly  felt ;  but  there  are  signs  that 
a  period  of  reaction  is  about  to  follow  that  of  over 
production,  and  this,  coming  at  a  time  when 
immigration  is  still  high,  must  force  upon  the 
people  the  inequalities  of  their  position  as  re 
gards  labor. 

It  is  not  altogether  correct  to  attribute  to  the 
influence  of  Trusts  the  present  financial  condition 
in  America.  The  fact  is  that  a  country,  like  an 
individual,  has  an  earning  power  of  so  much  a 
year,  that  a  certain  portion  must  be  spent  in 
living  expenses  and  the  rest  invested.  America 
has  been  investing  out  of  proportion  to  her  earn 
ing  power  in  many  ways,  not  least  in  over-pro 
duction,  and  now  comes  the  swing  of  the  pendulum 
and  the  natural  reaction,  both  of  which  are  as 
likely  to  go  a  little  too  far  in  the  other  direction. 
There  appears  to  be  no  remedy  for  this  state  of 
affairs,  which  is  familiar  to  us  in  Europe;  and 
though  artificial  conditions  can  retard  or  acceler 
ate  the  swing,  no  true  equilibrium  will  ever  be  es 
tablished.  The  sufferers  by  this  economic  fluct 
uation  are  naturally  those  who  live  nearest  the 
margin  of  poverty.  If  the  Japanese  observer  and 
3  33 


GREATER    AMERICA 

many  others  are  to  be  believed,  there  are  more 
of  these  in  the  United  States  than  the  generally 
prosperous  look  of  the  people  would  warrant.  The 
poverty  of  the  Japanese  peasant,  and  even  artisan, 
is  inconceivable  to  a  Western  mind — it  has  been 
computed  that  many  families  live  and  are  housed 
on  an  income  of  some  £5  a  year — and  yet  no  one 
who  knows  both  Japan  and  America  would  hastily 
decide  as  to  which  country  contains  the  happiest 
and  healthiest  working-classes.  We  in  England 
are  wont  to  speak  wonderingly  of  Goldsmith's 
parson  " passing  rich  with  forty  pounds  a  year!" 
But  the  picture  was  a  true  one  when  painted; 
the  period  was  one  of  simplicity  and  rudeness, 
even  in  a  class  above  that  of  the  actual  worker. 
It  is,  to  a  great  extent,  our  needs,  and  not  our 
incomes,  which  decide  our  worldly  position.  "  In 
come  twenty  shillings,  expenditure  nineteen  and 
six — riches,"  said  the  celebrated  Mr.  Micawber; 
"  Income  twenty  shillings,  expenditure  twenty-one 
— bankruptcy] ' ' 

Circumstances — education,  the  claims  upon  vital 
ity,  the  natural  pride  of  a  self-governing  people — 
have  raised  the  standard  of  American  life  to  a 
height  hitherto  unrealized  in  civilized  society.  The 
American  artisan  or  mechanic  must  give  more  of 
himself,  and  naturally  expects  more  in  return.  It 
is,  therefore,  a  very  intricate  and  important  ques 
tion  how  to  regulate  the  swinging  pendulum  of 
economic  prosperity  so  that  its  backward  sweep 
does  not  knock  down  a  large  portion  of  this  del- 

34 


GREATER    AMERICA 

icately  constructed  and  highly  wrought  fabric  of 
American  society.  Poor  as  he  is,  the  Japanese 
peasant  knows  he  need  never  be  poorer,  and  his 
simple  wants  enable  him  to  strike  a  balance,  like 
Mr.  Micawber,  between  revenue  and  expenditure. 
It  is  one  of  the  weakest  spots  in  a  higher  and 
more  complex  civilization  that  such  a  simple  solu 
tion  of  the  problem  becomes  impossible. 

The  regulation  of  Trusts,  in  which  many  people 
see  the  only  remedy  for  these  economic  evils — for 
the  discouragement  of  millionaires  and  the  general 
levelling-up  of  conditions — is  an  extremely  diffi 
cult  matter.  Technically,  the  Trusts  are  corpora 
tions,  and  as  such  legally  sound.  Practically,  they 
have  been  largely  instrumental  in  promoting  the 
prosperity  of  the  country.  So  vast  a  territory, 
with  such  varied  conditions  and  conflicting  in 
terests,  might  have  been  much  longer  in  accom 
plishing  its  industrial  development  but  for  the 
artificial  stimulus  of  these  great  combines.  Never 
theless,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  in  the  truest  interests 
of  the  American  people,  that  some  method  will 
now  be  found  to  check  the  further  formation  of 
these  monopolistic  enterprises,  which  have  al 
ready  answered  their  purpose  and  done  their  best 
work.  Any  further  development  of  them  will  be 
against  the  interests  of  the  democracy  and  for 
the  benefit  of  a  group  of  millionaires.  It  will 
widen  the  gap  between  capital  and  labor,  for  the 
personal  relation  between  employer  and  employe, 
which  is  so  valuable  an  element  in  all  difficulties, 

35 


GREATER    AMERICA 

is  out  of  the  question  in  these  mammoth  organ 
izations.  It  will  strengthen  those  organizations 
which,  depending  on  a  lavish  and  unprincipled 
expenditure  of  money  for  their  power,  are  sapping 
individual  liberty,  eating  out  the  very  heart  of 
democracy,  and,  in  fact,  delivering  America  over 
bound  and  helpless  into  the  hands  of  a  plutocracy. 
It  is  in  the  Senate  that  the  strongest  support  of 
Trusts  will  be  found,  for  in  that  body  are  repre 
sented  the  principal  interests  involved.  When  one 
recollects  the  growing  influence  of  the  Senate,  its 
jealousy  regarding  prerogatives,  and  the  power  it 
exercises  over  any  but  the  strongest  President,  one 
cannot  but  wonder  if  Americans  are  blind  to  the 
nature  of  the  government  in  which  they  place  such 
supreme  confidence.  The  Senate,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  ability,  is  a  body  of  which  any  country 
might  be  proud;  but  it  is  as  plutocratic,  as  much 
representative  of  class  interests  in  its  own  way  as 
the  British  House  of  Lords  is  aristocratic  and  con 
servative  in  another.  Indeed,  there  are  signs  of 
far  greater  sympathy  with  the  masses  about  the 
latter  body.  Has  Demos  cast  himself  down  from 
his  throne  and  set  up  the  figure  of  Mammon  in  his 
stead? 

These  and  many  other  questions  perplex  every 
one  who  considers,  even  superficially,  the  problems 
of  modern  America  and  her  people.  The  problems 
are,  for  the  most  part,  not  peculiar  to  America, 
but  are  shared  in  modified  form  by  every  pro 
gressive  nation.  But  the  immensity  of  her  territory 

36 


GREATER    AMERICA 

and  its  resources,  the  number  of  her  children,  and 
the  lofty  ideals  which  she  has  set  before  herself, 
differentiate  America  from  the  rest  of  the  world, 
and  make  her  at  once  the  subject  for  highest 
admiration  and  for  severest  criticism. 


CHAPTER   II 
AMERICA  AND  COLONIZATION 

THERE  has  recently  sprung  up  in  the  self-govern 
ing  dependencies  of  the  British  Empire  a  dislike 
to  the  term  "colony,"  as  applied  to  themselves; 
and  a  sentiment  similar  in  its  origin  would  lead 
most  Americans  to  demur  to  the  statement  that 
the  United  States  is  essentially  a  colonizing  power. 
The  objection,  doubtless,  has  its  root  in  the  original 
meaning  of  the  word  "colony,"  which  was  at  first 
synonymous  with  "  plantation  "—a  name  of  un- 
pleasing  suggestions,  though  it  originally  had  ref 
erence  merely  to  the  planting  of  people  on  an 
alien  soil.  Both  words,  in  reality,  imply  nothing 
more  than  the  taking  root  in  a  new  soil  of  people 
who  remain  in  close  touch  with  their  mother- 
country.1 

This  being  the  usually  accepted  definition,  it  is 
obvious  that  limitation  and  distortion  of  the  word 
"  colony  "  must  be  in  the  minds  of  Canadians  and 

'The  Century  Dictionary  gives  the  following  definition: 
A  body  or  company  of  people  who  migrate  from  their  native 
home  to  a  new  province,  district,  or  country  and  inhabit  it, 
but  remain  subject  to,  or  intimately  connected  with,  the 
parent  state.  Also,  the  descendants  of  such  settlers  so  long 
as  connection  with  the  mother-country  is  retained." 

38 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Australasians  when  they  reject  it.  As  far  as 
America  is  concerned,  she  may  be  said  with 
accuracy  to  be  largely  composed  of  colonies,  whose 
connection  with  the  parent  states  is  almost  as 
variable  as  the  relations  of  British  colonial  posses 
sions  to  their  mother-land. 

It  is  instructive  to  note  how  the  motives  for 
colonization  have  recurred  with  modifications  from 
age  to  age,  and  how  frequently  history  has  repeat 
ed  itself  in  this  matter.  The  earliest  incentive 
which  drove  men  from  their  homes  to  settle  on 
alien  soil  was  the  desire  for  conquest;  but  the  first 
great  colonial  power  whose  movements  we  can 
clearly  trace  was  Carthage,  a  purely  commercial 
state,  whose  dominion  lasted  six  hundred  years 
and  broke  up  because  of  wealth  and  effeminacy 
at  the  capital  and  a  lack  of  defensive  organiza 
tion.  Greece  and  Venice  also  colonized  for  trade 
purposes.  Rome,  on  the  contrary,  expanded  for 
political  reasons.  The  strength  and  virility  of  her 
internal  constitution  made  the  absorption  of  weak 
er  organisms  inevitable.  She  was  the  first  state 
colonizer,  introducing  her  own  laws  and  methods 
of  government  wherever  she  went,  and  the  uni 
formity  and  method  with  which  she  assimilated 
left  a  permanent  mark  on  the  world.  The  causes 
of  Roman  decay  are  too  complex  to  be  summed 
up  in  a  single  sentence,  but  it  must  be  noted 
that,  just  as  Greece  failed  through  too  little  cen 
tralization,  Rome  eventually  decayed  because  of 
too  much;  and  that,  just  as  Carthage  fell  for  lack 

39 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  military  and  naval  strength,  Rome,  the  great 
empire  founded  on  military  conquest,  went  to 
pieces  because  she  counted  too  much  on  her  in 
vincible  legions.  In  the  Roman  conception  of 
colonies  as  integral  parts  of  the  state  we  find,  as 
in  so  many  Roman  conceptions,  the  inspiration 
for  modern  ideas  of  colonial  policy. 

With  the  Portuguese  began  a  new  era,  that  of 
discovery  and  adventure,   coupled  with  the  lust 
for  gold  to  be  got  without  much  labor.     Thus  we 
have  the  three  main  motives  for  colonization — 
conquest,  trade,  and  adventure.     All  these  were 
combined  in  varying  degrees  by  the  more  modern 
colonizing  powers.     Spain  added  to  these  the  mis 
sionary  zeal  which  was  the  natural  result  of  her 
fanatical  and  powerful  priesthood.     France,  whose 
adventurers  accomplished  so  much  of  the  explora 
tion  of  the  New  World,  was  unsuccessful  in  her 
attempts  at  true  colonization,  and  in  later  years 
her  efforts  at  expansion   have   been  for  political 
reasons  and  by  other  means.     Holland  was  always 
a  purely  commercial   power,  and  being  poor  and 
insignificant  as  a  state,  she  worked  through  trad 
ing  companies,  whose   history  illustrates  the  uses 
and  abuses  of  such  agencies.     All  these  powers,  in 
trade  with   their  colonies,  enforced  a  strict  sys 
tem  of  monopolies,  and  regarded  their  possessions 
from  the  point  of  view  of  profit-bearing  concerns 
for  the  use  of  the  mother-country. 

While  Spain,  France,  and  Holland  marked  the 
zenith  of  their  prosperity  by  their  colonial  enter- 

40 


GREATER    AMERICA 

prises,  Britain  began  to  colonize  at  a  period  of 
insignificance  abroad  and  discord  at  home.  Her 
insular  position  and  the  fact  that  so  much  foreign 
blood  ran  in  the  veins  of  her  people  made  it  more 
natural  for  them  to  contemplate  leaving  their 
country  when  they  were  not  satisfied  with  the 
conditions  of  life  there.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
they  were  not  groaning  under  special  oppression, 
nor  were  they  worse  off  than  other  European 
peoples;  but  the  idea  of  individual  liberty  and 
constitutional  government  had  very  early  taken 
root  on  this  Northern  soil,  and  grew  strong  in  the 
hearts  of  the  sturdy  island  brood.  When  Eng 
lish  emigration  began,  the  seed  had  grown  to 
fair  proportions  and  was  beginning  to  find  its 
surroundings  too  cramping.  The  people,  not  yet 
strong  enough  to  get  their  will  at  home,  were  ripe 
for  transplantation  overseas.  The  middle  class 
had  grown  in  numbers  and  wealth  by  the  increase 
of  industries,  and  the  system  of  land-tenure,  then 
as  now,  made  it  difficult  for  either  merchants  or 
the  younger  nobility  to  found  families  at  home, 
while  the  peasantry  were  ready  for  any  scheme 
which  freed  them  from  the  incubus  of  the  decay 
ing  feudal  system.  The  great  incentive  held  out 
was  that  each  and  all  should  possess  their  own 
land,  and  the  consequence  was  that  the  stream 
which  began  to  flow  westward  was  of  a  character 
peculiarly  adapted  to  develop  the  country  they 
adopted  as  their  home.  Practically  every  element 
of  civilized  communities  was  transplanted  over- 

41 


GREATER    AMERICA 

seas,  and  even  in  the  most  aristocratic  of  the 
colonies  a  strong  democratic  feeling  was  at  once 
apparent.  This  overflow  of  population,  this  seek 
ing  for  a  wider  sphere  of  opportunities,  has  been 
throughout  the  main  factor  in  British  colonization, 
and  differentiates  it  from  that  of  other  peoples. 
It  was  not  a  state  movement,  for  political  or 
military  or  even  trade  purposes;  it  was  individual 
istic,  spontaneous,  and  for  that  reason  no  com 
parison  with  other  colonizations  is  apposite. 

There  is  one  important  factor  in  colonization 
which  has  had  a  peculiar  effect  on  the  American 
continents.  Religious  persecution  has  driven 
people  from  their  homes  in  every  country  and  at 
every  age,  but  it  was,  perhaps,  natural  that  the 
New  World,  which  was  not  discovered  until  the 
last  and  greatest  religion  of  the  world  had  reached 
a  mature  stage  in  its  development,  should  become 
the  refuge  for  all  whose  creeds  laid  them  open 
to  persecution.  They  did  not  always  find  a  warm 
welcome  from  the  earlier  colonists,  who  were 
often  as  bigoted  in  their  own  way  as  the  persecutors 
of  Europe,  and  this  fact  played  its  part  in  driving 
men  on  into  the  West  and  thus  continuing  the 
work  of  pioneer  colonization.  What  they  did 
escape  was  the  strong  arm  of  a  power  at  once 
secular  and  religious.  The  New  World,  although 
portioned  out  by  the  Pope  between  the  two  great 
Catholic  States  was  too  far  removed  from  the 
seats  of  religious  dogmatism  to  be  easily  domi 
nated  by  either  of  them,  and,  besides,  conditions 

42 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  life  were  strenuous.  Therefore,  although  Pu 
ritans  persecuted  Quakers  and  the  Inquisition  did 
its  best  to  dominate  those  parts  of  the  New  World 
which  were  pre-empted  by  Spain  (religious  war 
fare  being  still  the  inheritance  of  Latin  America), 
the  emigration  of  people  of  all  creeds  from  Europe 
has  made  North  America  peculiarly  the  home  of 
religious  freedom. 

A  sixth  and  last  motive  for  colonization  is  that 
of  national  jealousy  and  rivalry,  and  the  latter 
part  of  the  nineteenth  century  saw  a  notable  out 
break  of  this.  The  fact  that  the  vacant  spaces 
of  the  world  were  being  rapidly  filled  up  by  pre 
emption  of  the  great  States  led  to  a  scramble  in 
Africa  and  the  Pacific,  and  is  still  agitating  Asia. 
This  movement  must  not  be  confounded  with 
expansion  for  trade,  colonizing,  or  other  legiti 
mate  motives.  As  a  political  move  it  is  legiti 
mate  only  so  far  as  it  preserves  the  balance  of 
power,  and  many  of  the  acquisitions  made  can 
hardly  be  defended  on  any  of  these  grounds. 

If  we  take  these  six  motives — trade,  conquest, 
adventure,  overflow  of  population,  religious  per 
secution,  and  political  rivalries — we  find  that  the 
United  States  has  practically  been  animated  by 
each  in  turn  in  the  course  of  her  expansion. 

Trade  has  been  a  constant  incentive;  of  this 
the  acquisition  of  Hawaii  is  an  illustration.  Con 
quest  —  the  desire  for  territorial  expansion  — 
led  to  many  additions  of  territory  in  the  early 
days ;  the  Mexican  wars  and  consequent  annexa- 

43 


GREATER    AMERICA 

tions  will  serve  as  an  example.  The  love  of  ad 
venture  led  to  the  formation  of  frontier  com 
munities  long  before  the  interior  was  occupied. 
The  overflow  of  population  (not  because  of  over 
crowding)  from  Great  Britain  has  its  analogy  in 
the  movement  in  1785,  when  Congress  treated  the 
land  of  the  Northwest  as  federal  territory,  sold  it  to 
immigrants,  and  granted  colonial  charters  on  the 
lines  of  the  Massachusetts  and  Pennsylvania  ones. 
The  poverty  and  confusion  reigning  in  the  older 
States  at  this  period  contributed  to  make  the  tide 
set  in  strongly  towards  the  West.  While  religious 
persecution  cannot  be  said  to  have  greatly  affected 
the  colonization  by  United  States  citizens,  we  have 
in  Utah  one  case  of  a  colony  founded  by  reason 
of  it.1  International  rivalry,  as  displayed  in  the 
latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  by  the  great 
powers  of  Europe,  may  not  have  consciously  in 
fluenced  the  United  States;  but  if  we  come  to 
examine  the  reasons  for  her  recent  oversea  ex 
pansion  we  shall  find  that  this  motive  also  plays  a 
not  inconsiderable  part,  while  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
as  now  interpreted,  has  a  strong  tendency  in  this 
direction. 

The  fact  is  that  from  the  earliest  period  of  its 
national  existence,  even  while  that  existence  was 
trembling  in  the  balance,  the  United  States  has 
expanded  steadily.  That  this  expansion  was  for 

1  There  are,  of  course,  several  other  cases,  in  which  religious 
persecution  was  the  direct  cause  of  the  formation  of  fresh 
communities. 

44 


GREATER    AMERICA 

some  time  confined  to  the  North  American  con 
tinent  does  not  at  all  detract  from  the  truth  of  the 
statement  that  it  is  as  a  colonizing  power  she  has 
attained  her  present  proportions  and  position  as  a 
great  world  power.  ' '  Accretion,  not  colonization , ' ' 
was  the  theory  until  the  other  day.  But,  though 
her  expansion  was  at  first  contiguous,  and  there 
fore  appears  to  us  less  remarkable,  the  distances 
were  so  great  and  the  physical  difficulties  so 
enormous  that,  until  steam  and  electricity  tri 
umphed  over  these,  West  was  more  removed 
from  East,  and  North  from  South,  than  were  the 
original  colonies  from  Britain.  It  is  estimated 
that  in  the  early  days  of  federal  government  a 
courier  took  two  months  to  go  from  Philadelphia 
to  the  farthest  frontier. 

The  condition  of  the  thirteen  original  States 
after  the  recognition  of  their  independence  was 
not  altogether  a  promising  one.  Their  fiscal 
system  was  entirely  upset,  their  trade  hampered 
and  partially  destroyed,  while  they  were  held  to 
gether  in  the  loosest  manner  by  a  federal  govern 
ment  whose  control  was  far  from  effective.  The 
determination  to  round  off  their  borders  had  al 
ready  led  the  colonies  to  fight  for  an  extension  of 
their  authority,  and  they  obtained  this  concession 
in  the  1783  treaty,  which  gave  them  a  large  slice 
of  territory  in  the  Northwest  and  a  narrow  strip 
in  the  South.  This  was  the  only  land  appertain 
ing  to  the  States  in  common,  but  its  area  was  in 
creased  later  by  the  cession  of  lands  whose  posses- 

45 


GREATER    AMERICA 

sion  was  disputed  by  various  States.  The  first 
act  of  national  sovereignty  was  the  sale  by  Con 
gress  of  land  in  the  Northwest  to  emigrants  and 
companies  in  1785.  The  stream  of  emigration 
West  had  begun  before  this,  people  being  glad  to 
leave  the  old  States,  with  the  internal  problems 
engendered  by  revolution,  and  to  live  in  the  wild 
freedom  of  pioneer  communities.  Already  it  was 
estimated  that  there  were  fifty  thousand  people 
west  of  Pittsburg,  enough  to  found  the  first  news 
paper  west  of  the  Alleghanies  —  the  Pittsburg 
Gazette.  As  these  communities  became  settled, 
peaceful,  and  freed  from  the  attacks  of  Indians,  the 
older  pioneers  —  many  of  them  old  soldiers  and 
frontiersmen — moved  on  into  the  wilderness.  The 
dangers  of  the  life  they  led  may  be  estimated  from 
the  fact  that  between  the  years  1787  and  1790 
no  fewer  than  fifteen  hundred  frontiersmen  were 
killed  by  Indians. 

The  second  generation  were  hardy,  good  marks 
men,  and  roughly  organized  for  defence,  but  lack 
ing  the  experience  and  training  of  their  fathers. 
They  were  farmers,  ignorant,  rude,  and  without 
the  traditions  which  the  first  generation  brought 
from  the  East,  their  principal  characteristic  being 
an  intense  democracy,  natural  in  such  rudely 
organized  communities.  The  next  influx  from  the 
East  brought  a  civilizing  influence.  Settlers  now 
took  out  proper  papers  for  their  land,  started 
educational  schemes,  organized  local  government, 
and  finally  founded  Territories  which  were  ad- 

46 


GREATER    AMERICA 

mitted  to  the  Union  as  States  when  they  reached 
the  required  electoral  standard.  It  is  this  work 
ing  towards  Statehood  and  rapid  attainment  of 
that  goal  which  differentiates  these  communities 
from  ordinary  colonies ;  but  in  fact,  if  not  in  name, 
they  retained  their  colonial  aspect  for  a  con 
siderable  period,  owing  to  their  distance  from  the 
more  advanced  centres  of  the  East  and  the  strenu 
ous  conditions  of  life.  When  they  developed,  it 
was  on  colonial  lines,  free  and  original,  and  it  was 
not  till  the  end  of  the  first  quarter  of  last  century 
that  their  influence  began  to  be  felt  in  the  national 
life. 

In  considering  the  beginnings  of  American  col 
onization  we  must  remember  that  at  the  time  of 
the  adoption  of  the  federal  Constitution,  in  1789, 
the  population  of  the  thirteen  States  was  only 
some  four  millions,  by  no  means  homogeneous  in 
race  or  language,  over  one-fifth  being  colored. 
The  proportions  in  North  and  South  were  fairly 
equal,  Pennsylvania  and  the  States  to  the  north 
having  about  two  millions,  and  Maryland  and  the 
States  to  the  south  about  the  same  number. 
Socially  and  politically,  the  South  was  dominant. 
The  Southern  States  were  parcelled  out  into  large 
estates,  the  cultivation  of  tobacco  being  gradually 
supplanted  by  that  of  cotton,  and  slave  labor 
being,  of  course,  the  rule.  The  North,  on  the 
contrary,  divided  up  into  small  holdings,  with  a 
great  diversity  of  products,  was  chiefly  agricultural. 
Wealth  and  trade  were,  on  the  whole,  pretty 

47 


GREATER    AMERICA 

equally  distributed  between  the  two  sections,  the 
population  being  chiefly  massed  in  a  narrow  strip 
on  the  Eastern  seaboard. 

When  these  circumstances  are  taken  into  con 
sideration,  it  becomes  the  more  remarkable  that 
from  the  first  the  United  States  has  never  hesitated 
on  her  path  of  expansion.  At  the  same  time  the 
policy  was  not  commended  by  many  of  her  great 
est  statesmen,  and  has  met  at  different  periods 
with  strong  opposition  from  various  States  that 
feared  a  disturbance  of  the  balance  of  trade  and 
power  by  a  reckless  extension  of  boundaries.  The 
question  of  forming  fresh  States  became,  of  course, 
a  burning  one  in  the  slavery  dispute  —  at  this 
period  we  see  State-aided  colonization  at  work. 
But,  even  allowing  for  the  stimulus  so  given,  we 
see  in  the  constant  pushing  forward  of  United 
States'  colonists,  in  the  vigor  of  their  pioneer 
communities,  and  the  support  afforded  them  in 
all  emergencies  by  Congress,  the  strong  expan 
sionist  bias  of  the  American  people,  the  restless, 
indomitable  spirit  in  their  mixed  blood,  and  the 
power  of  organization  which  is  so  characteristic 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon. 

While  the  nation  was  still  in  its  very  infancy  it 
doubled  its  area  at  one  stroke  by  the  Louisiana 
Purchase  in  1803.  This  was  a  daring  coup  for  a 
people  who  had  only  just  begun  to  recover  from  a 
terrible  financial  crisis;  but  it  was  successful,  chief 
ly  because  of  fortuitous  circumstances  in  European 
politics.  The  importance  of  the  great  Mississippi 

48 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Valley  to  the  United  States  can  hardly  be  ex 
aggerated,  but  at  the  time  of  the  purchase  it  was 
largely  conjectural,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  was 
only  hoped  by  the  negotiators  to  secure  the  mouth 
of  the  river  and  the  two  Floridas.  The  offer  of 
the  whole  of  Louisiana  came  from  the  French. 
There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  infant  repub 
lic,  without  realizing  exactly  what  that  great  terri 
tory  might  mean,  was  so  anxious  to  expand  and  to 
gain  command  of  the  great  waterway  that  she 
was  prepared  to  back  her  request  by  force  if 
Napoleon  would  not  sell.  She  was  aware,  of 
course,  that  the  cession  of  Louisiana  by  Spain  to 
France  substituted  a  strong  power  for  a  decay 
ing  one,  but  that,  for  the  time,  France  had  little 
desire  for  American  colonies.  Napoleon  was  too 
much  engaged  with  schemes  of  European  conquest 
to  care  for  a  territory  so  barren  of  military  glory, 
and  he  grasped  at  an  opportunity  of  doing  Eng 
land  a  bad  turn  by  increasing  the  power  of  her 
revolted  colonies.  Whatever  the  actual  circum 
stances,  however,  it  is  a  notable  fact  that  the 
federal  government  shouldered  the  responsibility 
of  this  huge  acquisition  of  territory,  with  its  tiny 
population  of  fifty  thousand  whites  and  the  same 
number  of  black  and  colored  people,  without  hes 
itation,  although  there  was  considerable  opposi 
tion  in  the  Northern  States. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  such  an  act  as  the 
purchase  of  Louisiana  was  not  directly  provided 
for  under  the  Constitution.  Jefferson,  indeed, 

4  49 


GREATER    AMERICA 

thought  of  proposing  an  amendment  asking  Con 
gress  to  justify  his  action.  Even  at  this  early 
period  of  the  history  of  the  Constitution,  there 
fore,  it  became  necessary  for  its  interpreters  to 
endeavor  to  make  it  correspond  with  their  actions. 
The  discovery  of  a  loosely  worded  clause  (No.  18)  — 
the  so-called  " elastic  clause"  -provided  them 
with  what  they  needed.  This  gives  to  Con 
gress  the  right  "  to  make  all  laws  which  shall  be 
necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  into  execution 
.  .  .  the  powers  vested  by  this  Constitution  in  the 
government  of  the  United  States."  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  it  was  not  until  a  quarter  of  a  century  later 
that  anything  resembling  an  authoritative  read 
ing  of  this  clause  was  given.  Chief -Justice  Mar 
shall  then  laid  down  that  the  Constitution  "con 
fers  absolutely  on  the  government  the  power  of 
making  wars  and  treaties;  consequently,  that 
government  possesses  the  power  of  acquiring 
territory  either  by  conquest  or  treaty." 

The  legality  of  United  States'  expansion  is  a 
question  which  has  been  raised  many  times  in  the 
course  of  American  history.  The  liberal  inter 
pretation  of  her  own  Constitution  is  a  matter 
entirely  for  her  own  conscience,  and  seems  to  have 
given  rise  to  rather  unnecessary  discussion,  since 
the  Constitution  was  obviously  made  for  America 
—not  America  for  the  Constitution.  But  she  has 
on  other  occasions  committed  legal  breaches  of  a 
most  serious  character  in  disregarding  the  de 
cisions  of  the  highest  judicial  authority,  as  in  the 

50 


GREATER    AMERICA 

case  of  Indian  territory.  Although  the  pro 
prietary  right  of  Indians  to  the  lands  they  occupy 
is  a  vexed  question,  their  claims  in  Alabama  and 
Georgia,  for  instance,  although  three  times  allowed 
in  the  Supreme  Court  were  disregarded  by  the 
Executive. 

The  period  following  the  acquisition  of  Louisi 
ana  was  one  of  great  prosperity  and  rapid  growth, 
especially  in  the  matter  of  naval  strength,  as  was 
evidenced  by  the  part  played  by  the  United  States 
in  putting  down  piracy  in  the  Mediterranean.  In 
1812,  notwithstanding  her  ultimate  defeat  in  the 
war  with  England,  the  United  States  navy  acquit 
ted  itself  with  credit. 

Disorders  on  the  boundaries  of  Florida  and  raids 
by  the  Serninole  Indians  into  Georgia  led  to  re 
prisals  by  the  United  States,  and  finally  to  the 
purchase  of  Florida  from  Spain.  A  long  delay  in 
fulfilling  the  terms  of  the  contract  ended  in  1819, 
when  the  United  States  refused  to  temporize  any 
longer.1  After  this  there  was  no  recognized  ex 
pansion  by  the  United  States  for  twenty-six  years, 
but  the  ground  was  being  prepared  for  further 
advance. 

1  Florida  had  had  an  eventful  history,  being  originally 
colonized  by  Spain,  but  ceded  to  Great  Britain  in  1763,  in 
return  for  Cuba  and  the  Philippines.  For  this  loss,  incurred 
through  an  alliance  with  her,  France  indemnified  Spain  by 
ceding  New  Orleans  and  the  country  west  of  the  Missis 
sippi.  In  1783  Great  Britain  restored  Florida  to  Spain,  most 
of  the  English  colonists  leaving  the  country,  and  till  1819 
it  remained  a  Spanish  colony,  one  of  the  last  possessions  of  the 
earliest  conqueror  on  American  soil, 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  annexation  of  Texas  presents  novel  features 
in  the  story  of  colonization.  A  colony  of  United 
States  citizens  established  themselves  in  Mexico, 
on  territory  actually  belonging  to  a  foreign  power, 
just  as,  for  instance,  the  Germans  have  done  in 
Brazil.  Being  liberally  received,  they  flourished 
and  increased,  but  the  internal  politics  of  a  Latin- 
American  republic  were  distasteful  to  them,  and 
they  particularly  resented  being  placed,  as  they 
eventually  were,  under  military  rule.  They  re 
volted,  and,  headed  by  Houston,  with  the  aid  of 
volunteers  from  their  native  country  succeeded 
in  establishing  an  independent  State  in  1836,  and 
in  1845  were  admitted  to  the  Union  at  the  same 
time  as  Florida.1  The  rapid  development  of  these 
States  and  their  admission  into  the  Union  were,  of 
course,  partly  due  to  the  slavery  contest,  then  at 
its  full  height.  The  admission  of  a  Northern,  or 
non-slavery,  State  led  to  an  immediate  demand 
for  an  increase  in  slave-holding  States  in  the  South. 
Arkansas  was  answered  by  Michigan,  Texas  and 
Florida  by  Iowa  and  Wisconsin. 

1  The  annexation  was  foreseen  by  De  Tocqueville  ten  years 
before.  "The  inhabitants  of  the  United  States  are  per 
petually  migrating  to  Texas,  where  they  purchase  land;  and 
although  they  conform  to  the  laws  of  the  country,  they  are 
gradually  founding  the  empire  of  their  own  language  and 
their  own  manners.  The  province  of  Texas  is  still  part  of 
the  Mexican  dominions,  but  it  will  soon  contain  no  Mexicans; 
the  same  thing  has  occurred  wherever  the  Anglo-Americans 
have  come  in  contact  with  a  people  of  a  different  origin." — 
Democracy  in  America,  De  Tocqueville,  1898,  New  York  edition, 
vol.  i.,  pp.  554,  555- 

52 


GREATER    AMERICA 

In  1842  Fremont  made  his  exploring  expedition 
towards  the  Pacific,  and  the  United  States  came 
in  sight  of  that  ocean.  Boundary  disputes  led 
to  the  second  Mexican  war  in  1845-46,  which 
finally  resulted  in  the  seizure  of  New  Mexico  (in 
cluding  Arizona)  and  California.  Immediately 
after  this  occurred  the  discovery  of  gold  in  Cali 
fornia,  which  led  to  an  enormous  rush  to  that 
country,  and  so  rapidly  was  it  filled  up  that  in 
1849  California  applied  for  admission  as  a  State. 

While  matters  were  moving  thus  rapidly  in  the 
South  there  was  an  important  development  in 
the  North.  The  Democratic  party  pressed  for 
the  annexation  of  Oregon,  as  a  reply  to  Texas, 
and  this  was  eventually  carried  despite  bitter 
opposition.  John  Quincy  Adams  declared  that 
the  admission  of  Texas  would  justify  a  dissolution 
of  the  Union,  while  Lloyd  Garrison  won  applause 
by  suggesting  that  Massachusetts  should  secede. 
The  American  claims  to  Oregon  were  for  a  long 
time  disputed  by  Britain,  the  claims  being  very 
difficult  of  decision.  By  right  of  exploration  and 
discovery  it  probably  belonged  to  Spain,  but  the 
right  of  occupation  seems  to  have  been  pretty 
evenly  divided  between  the  United  States  and 
Britain.  From  1818  to  1846  the  country  was 
jointly  occupied  by  both  powers.  Emigration  on 
a  fairly  large  scale  went  on  from  the  States,  the 
profitable  fur  trade  being  the  chief  inducement. 
The  expansionist  spirit,  fanned  by  considerations 
of  party  interest,  was  strong  in  the  land,  as  attest- 

53 


GREATER    AMERICA 

ed  by  the  cry  of  "  fifty-four  forty  or  fight,"  alluding 
to  the  proposed  latitude  of  the  Oregon  boundary 
and  British  claims,  but  a  compromise  was  event 
ually  arrived  at,  and  in  1846  an  Anglo-American 
boundary  between  Oregon  and  Canada  was  settled 
at  parallel  49  degrees. 

The  acquisition  by  purchase  and  conquest  of 
the  two  great  slices  of  territory  in  North  and 
South,  during  the  years  1845-46,  was  not  suffi 
cient,  for  it  left  a  wedge  of  alien  possessions  in  the 
very  heart  of  the  United  States.  Two  years  later 
the  successful  negotiations  which  ended  in  the 
Mexican  cession  rounded  off  America,  which  be 
came  a  solid,  contiguous  mass,  bounded  by  Canada 
on  the  north,  Mexico  and  its  gulf  on  the  south, 
and  stretching  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific. 
This  solidarity  of  position  left  nothing  in  ques 
tion  save  a  settlement  of  boundary  disputes  too 
numerous  to  be  mentioned;  but  it  is  to  be  noted 
that  in  practically  every  case  the  United  States  has 
made  a  good  bargain  and  increased  her  possessions, 
usually  adopting  the  method  of  asking  for  more 
than  she  was  prepared  to  accept  and  backing  her 
proposals  with  determination. 

The  new  lands,  still  waiting  to  be  filled  up  and 
affording  ample  scope  for  adventure,  did  not  suf 
fice  for  the  restless  activities  of  the  people.  In 
1851  attempts  were  made,  of  a  filibustering  char 
acter,  to  annex  Cuba,  and  in  1853-54  a  solemn 
conference  of  American  ministers  met  at  Ostend 
and  urged  that,  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  being  of  ad- 

54 


GREATER    AMERICA 

vantage  to  the  United  States,  in  the  event  of  Spain 
refusing  to  sell,  it  should  be  wrested  from  her  rather 
than  left  to  be  Africanized  like  San  Domingo.  When 
responsible  representatives  of  the  government 
could  express  such  spread-eagle  opinions  one  can 
not  be  surprised  at  the  daring  enterprises  of  fili 
busters  like  Walker,  who  made  an  abortive  at 
tempt  to  conquer  Nicaragua  and  Honduras.  The 
President,  Buchanan,  was  so  far  from  deploring 
this  tendency  of  his  countrymen  that  he  proposed 
in  Congress  the  establishment  of  a  protectorate 
over  the  nearer  portions  of  the  ' '  dissolving  Mex 
ican  Republic "  and  the  control  of  the  whole 
isthmus.  The  decision  of  Congress  in  1856  re 
garding  Aves  Islands  authorized  the  protection 
of  American  citizens  who  occupy  land  or  islands 
not  already  in  occupation  by  another  power.  This 
principle  is,  of  course,  no  new  one  in  the  history 
of  colonization,  for  the  flag  has  followed  trade 
quite  as  often  as  vice  versa,  but  it  definitely  puts 
an  end  to  any  theory  of  the  United  States  as 
a  self  -  contained,  isolated  republic,  and  practi 
cally  closes  the  period  of  solely  contiguous  ex 
pansion. 

At  this  period  one  cannot  fail  to  pause  and  re 
view  the  circumstances  in  which  that  unparalleled 
development  took  place,  and  one  is  immediately 
struck  by  the  steady  continuity  of  purpose  which 
seems  half  unconsciously  to  have  dominated  the 
people  and  their  rulers,  In  prosperity  and  adver 
sity,  in  defence  of  slavery  and  in  spite  of  it,  by  Fed- 

55 


GREATER    AMERICA 

eralists  and  by  Democrats,  the  work  went  steadily 
on.  If  Indian  claims  stood  in  the  way,  they  were 
ignored;  if  the  country  were  pre-empted,  it  was 
bought — if  the  owner  would  not  sell,  it  was  con 
quered.  Frontiers  were  pushed  on  into  the  wilds, 
regardless  of  the  horrors  of  Indian  warfare ; 
American  settlers  in  foreign  territory  organized 
rebellion,  helped  by  their  own  people,  if  not  act 
ually  instigated  by  the  government,  as  in  the 
case  of  Houston  in  Texas.  In  short,  the  career 
of  the  United  States  has  been  from  the  first  one 
of  masterful,  irresistible  expansion,  not  for  lack 
of  space  or  opportunity  at  home,  but  because  of 
sheer  force,  initiative,  and  nervous  energy,  charac 
teristics  which  are  peculiarly  strong  in  the  race 
which  the  North  American  continent  has  devel 
oped  from  so  many  alien  stocks. 

The  great  crisis  of  the  civil  war  had  a  tem 
porary  effect  in  checking  the  expansionist  move 
ment,  for  in  the  reconstruction  which  followed 
there  was  plenty  to  occupy  statesmen  and  cit 
izens  alike.  The  strong  party  motives  for  the  ad 
mission  of  new  States  were  largely  removed,  and 
of  those  Territories  which  had  not  attained  State 
hood  at  the  time  of  the  war,  one,  New  Mexico,  out 
of  which  the  Territory  of  Arizona  has  been  carved, 
remains  still  in  embryo.  The  long  -  cherished 
schemes  for  controlling  the  West  Indies,  which  led 
to  a  treaty  with  Denmark,  came  up  at  this  time, 
but  were  suppressed  by  the  Senate,  although  St. 
Thomas  and  San  Domingo  were  anxious  to  be 

56 


GREATER    AMERICA 

admitted  to  the  Union.1  This  anti-expansionist 
feeling  nearly  prevented  the  purchase  of  Alaska 
when  it  was  offered  by  Russia  in  1867.  Seward, 
a  strong  believer  in  the  future  of  the  Pacific, 
needed  all  his  influence  to  push  the  matter  through, 
though  he  was  helped  by  the  general  sentiment 
in  favor  of  Russia,  founded  on  her  mythical  claims 
to  a  sympathetic  attitude  during  the  war. 

For  over  a  quarter  of  a  century  there  was  no 
increase  of  United  States  territory.  The  country 
developed  her  resources,  increased  her  manufact 
ures,  and  embarked  on  the  most  brilliant  period 
of  her  industrial  career,  assisted  by  a  tariff  system 
which,  having  its  birth  in  the  need  for  revenue 
during  the  war,  was  retained  as  a  protection  to  the 
manufactures  which  had  just  been  inaugurated, 
and  soon  led  to  a  vast  increase  of  foreign  trade. 

The  opening  of  the  Pacific  coast  naturally  led 
to  a  great  development  of  trade  with  the  Far 
East.  Even  prior  to  it  American  seamen  had  been 
active  in  the  Pacific,  the  Stars  and  Stripes  being 
several  times  hoisted  on  Pacific  islands,  but  it  was 
not  till  1869  that  America  actually  took  steps  for 

1"  These  terms  not  proving  acceptable  to  Denmark,  the 
negotiations  were  prolonged  until  finally  Mr.  Seward  gave  up 
the  attempt  to  fix  the  date  of  ratification,  concurred  in  a 
stipulation  in  the  convention  for  the  consent  of  the  inhabitants, 
and  offered  $7,500,000  for  St.  Thomas  and  St.  John. 

"On  this  basis  a  treaty  was  concluded  on  October  25,  1867. 
This  was  promptly  ratified  by  Denmark,  but  the  United 
States  Senate  delayed  action  on  it,  and  finally  rejected  it  in 
the  session  of  1868,  as  appears  by  the  records  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  State." — Wharton,  vol.  i.,  §  6ia,  p.  416. 

57 


GREATER    AMERICA 

occupying  one  of  them.  At  that  date  money  was 
voted  for  establishing  a  naval  station  and  harbor 
on  Midway  Island,  and  though  the  project  was 
abandoned,  the  island  was  retained.  In  1875  her 
predominant  trade  in  Hawaii  led  the  United  States 
to  make  a  reciprocity  treaty  with  those  islands. 
American  interest  in  the  Pacific  was  increased  by 
the  rapid  absorption  of  island  groups  by  European 
powers.  The  native  Hawaiian  dynasty  was  bol 
stered  up  for  a  time,  but  its  retention  was  a  farce 
in  view  of  the  rapid  adoption  of  American  ideas; 
and  in  1892  a  republic  was  proclaimed,  which  was 
recognized  by  the  States,  and  finally  taken  over 
in  1897.  The  acquisition  in  Samoa  is  another 
instance  of  the  methods  by  which  a  powerful 
government  must  protect  her  trade,  matters  there 
being  complicated  by  the  rival  claims  of  Germany 
and  Britain.  The  position  of  Samoa  makes  it  an 
important  point  on  the  American  -  Australasian 
trade  route,  and  in  the  harbor  of  Pango-Pango  the 
United  States  acquired  a  useful  naval  base. 

Before  the  final  acquisition  in  Samoa,  however, 
America  had  embarked  on  an  oversea  career  very 
different  from  these  peaceful  victories  in  the  in 
terests  of  commerce.  In  1898  the  war  with  Spain 
was  rendered  inevitable  by  her  action  in  Cuba,  and 
the  appeal  of  the  latter  to  the  great  neighbor  re 
public.  The  Cuban  war  led  to  a  military  occupation 
of  that  island,  now  merged  into  a  protectorate,  and 
the  permanent  occupation  of  Puerto  Rico.  The 
war  also,  by  one  of  the  curious  freaks  of  fate,  led 

58 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  Americans  to  Manila  Bay,  and  involved  them 
irretrievably  in  the  government  of  an  Oriental  de 
pendency. 

To  the  present  generation  of  Americans,  to 
whom  the  Mexican  and  Florida  campaigns  are 
as  much  past  history  as  the  Revolution,  the 
Spanish  war  came  almost  as  a  shock,  and  seem 
ed  in  many  respects  epoch-making.  In  no  other 
country  do  events  move  so  fast  or  are  memories 
so  short,  and  it  is,  perhaps,  not  to  be  wondered  at 
that  the  modern  American  felt  startled  when  he 
realized  the  lengths  to  which  he  had  gone.  But, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  struggle  with  Spain  has 
been  going  on  steadily  all  through  the  century 
and  a  quarter  of  the  United  States'  national  exist 
ence.  The  republic  is  built  up  on  the  foundations 
of  the  old  Spanish  colonial  empire ;  and  Louisiana, 
Texas,  Florida,  New  Mexico,  California,  were  steps 
in  the  path  which  led  them  first  to  the  Caribbean 
and  then  across  the  Pacific  to  the  Philippines. 

In  the  last  few  years  of  the  past  century  America 
ceased  to  be  a  purely  continental  power.  As  a 
colonizer  she  met  with  extraordinary  success  with 
in  her  own  continent,  so  far  as  the  development 
of  the  resources  of  the  country,  the  spread  of 
civilization,  and  the  cultivation  of  a  national  spirit 
were  concerned.  In  another  respect,  however, 
she  has  hitherto  been  unfortunate.  Her  experi 
ence  for  a  long  time  brought  her  into  contact 
with  only  two  races  of  lower  caliber  than  her  own. 
White  men  of  every  nationality  she  has  hitherto 

59 


GREATER    AMERICA 

absorbed  with  apparent  success,  but  the  Indian 
and  the  negro  have  never  ceased  to  be  problems 
and  burdens.  She  has  attempted  to  solve  the 
Indian  difficulty  by  treating  them  paternally  and 
the  negro  problem  by  a  (soon  abandoned)  pro 
gramme  of  fraternity.  In  both  cases  she  has  been 
singularly  unfortunate,  and  though  the  Indian 
reservations,  ill-regulated  as  they  are,  will  grad 
ually  cease  to  be  a  serious  problem  because  of 
their  dwindling  population,  there  is  no  prospect 
that  the  negroes  will  do  anything  but  increase  in 
numbers  and  power  until  they  can  no  longer  be 
disregarded  as  a  factor  in  the  state. 

From  whatever  point  of  view  we  regard  her 
present  condition,  it  is  obvious  that  one  of  the 
most  pressing  problems  of  Greater  America  is  that 
of  the  government  of  alien  races  —  an  imperial 
problem  in  some  phases,  a  colonial  one  in  others. 
Strong  in  the  colonizing  spirit,  Americans  have 
pushed  on  to  the  limits  of  their  own  continent, 
an4  have  then  overflowed — not  so  much  in  popu 
lation  as  in  energy  —  into  distant  islands  of  the 
Pacific  and  adjacent  islands  of  the  Caribbean. 
Even  on  their  own  continent  they  became  the  mas 
ters  of  alien  peoples — Indians,  negroes,  the  Latin 
populations  of  Louisiana,  California,  and  Mexico; 
and  although  immigration  from  Europe  apparently 
fuses  without  trouble  into  the  American  nation, 
it  is  noteworthy  that  the  three  great  divisions  of 
alien  stock  which  have  come  under  the  American 
rule  on  the  continent  —  the  Latin,  negro,  and 

60 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Indian — have  remained  distinct,  and  present  grave 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  homogeneity  of  the 
nation.  To  this  day  French  is  spoken  in  Louisi 
ana;  Texas,  Arizona,  and  California  are  partly 
Spanish  in  feeling;  while  the  negro  is  beginning 
to  segregate  in  a  black  belt  of  which  the  only 
thing  to  be  said  here  is  that  it  is  about  as  un- 
American  as  any  community  can  well  be.  It 
is,  therefore,  in  the  direction  in  which  she  has 
been  least  successful  in  the  past  that  much  of 
America's  energy  must  be  expended  in  the  future. 
Steadily,  consistently,  in  the  teeth  of  all  difficul 
ties,  she  has  gone  on  with  her  expansion,  coloniz 
ing  her  own  continent,  taking  over  the  colonies  of 
others,  granting  self-government  only  to  her  own 
people  and  only  when  they  showed  their  fitness; 
governing  as  a  colonial  and  imperial  power  all 
communities  too  weak  for  self-organization  or  too 
alien  in  race  to  be  kindred  in  feeling.  The  history 
of  colonization  shows  that  these  circumstances  are 
inevitable.  Every  virile,  ambitious  people  has  met 
with  the  same  difficulties,  but  none  has  met  them 
in  quite  the  same  spirit.  American  democracy 
has  yet  to  demonstrate  to  the  world  that  her  way 
is  the  short  cut  to  that  stability,  progress,  and 
general  prosperity  which  it  should  be  the  aim  of 
every  strong  people  to  bestow  upon  the  weaker 
ones  which  come  under  their  wing. 


CHAPTER  III 
PACIFIC  EXPANSION:  THEORY  AND   PRACTICE 

THE  Pacific  expansion  of  the  United  States  is 
in  a  peculiar  stage.  Hawaii  is  practically  Amer 
icanized;  it  has  its  local  problems,  but  the  lack  of 
virility  in  the  native  people  has  made  them 
singularly  malleable  to  American  influence,  and 
Hawaii  will,  no  doubt,  continue  to  advance  in 
prosperity  on  the  lines  of  an  American  colony 
which  has  little  prospect  of  becoming  incorporated 
more  closely  than  at  present  under  its  style  as  a 
"  Territory."  Samoa,  likewise,  has  little  economic 
or  political  significance,  being  chiefly  important 
for  strategic  reasons.  The  interest  of  Pacific  ex 
pansion  is  focussed  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  and 
these,  from  many  points  of  view,  it  is  necessary  to 
study  rather  closely  in  order  to  appreciate  the 
present  phase  of  United  States  expansion.  They 
represent  the  struggle  between  the  principles  and 
theories  of  the  United  States  and  the  practice 
forced  on  her  by  circumstances.  She  still  clings 
to  the  theory  that  expansion  for  her  will  bring  all 
the  benefits  of  increased  commerce,  prestige,  and 
influence  without  saddling  her  with  responsibilities. 
In  the  Philippines  this  cherished  delusion  is  being 

62 


GREATER    AMERICA 

rapidly  dispelled.  She  still  partly  believes  that  she 
has  evolved  the  best  system  of  government,  the 
highest  form  of  civilization,  and  the  most  com 
plete  recognition  of  individual  rights  in  the  world, 
and  is  by  no  means  anxious  to  hide  her  light  under 
a  bushel.  It  is  the  arrogance  and  energy  of  youth 
which  have  nerved  her  to  the  task,  but  by  the 
time  she  has  arrived  within  sight  of  its  conclusion 
she  will  be  mature,  and  will  have  a  middle-aged 
tolerance  for  weak  human  nature,  and  that  read 
iness  to  accept  compromises  and  be  less  particular 
about  ethical  perfection,  which  comes  with  world 
ly  wisdom. 

Looking  around  on  a  vast  and  prosperous  con 
tinent,  on  a  progress  unrivalled  in  world  history, 
and  on  resources  apparently  boundless,  the  aver 
age  American  is  apt  to  forget  that  these  con 
ditions  are  by  no  means  entirely  due  to  the  po 
litical  and  social  system  which  prevails.  When 
the  optimistic  American  arrived  in  the  Philip 
pines  he  was  inclined  to  think  that  all  that  was 
needed  was  the  gospel  according  to  Demos.  The 
Filipinos  were  poor,  disorganized,  ignorant,  shift 
less — all  because  they  had  been  suffering  for  three 
centuries  from  an  organized  misgovernment  by 
an  effete  monarchy.  The  American  loves  phrases 
better  than  anything — Presidential  elections  have 
been  known  to  turn  on  them — and  at  this  juncture 
the  favorite  phrase  set  forth  the  benefits  to  be 
derived  by  the  Filipinos  from  the  planting  of  the 
tree  of  liberty  in  their  midst  —  glorious  liberty 

63 


GREATER    AMERICA 

under  whose  branches  they  had  never  yet  been 
able  to  shelter. 

"  We  shall  plant  our  institutions  deep  in  the 
soil,"  said  one  of  the  pioneers  of  American  civiliza 
tion  to  the  writer  when  he  landed  in  Manila.  "  We 
shall  give  the  people  liberty  and  light  and  freedom. 
There  is  a  certain  logical  progress  in  our  American 
civilization.  We  have  been  progressing  from  step 
to  step,  and  if  we  went  back  on  our  principles  now 
by  establishing  an  ordinary  colony  we  should  be 
arresting  that  progress.  No!  We  shall  bestow 
all  the  benefits  which  we  believe  to  be  the  glory 
of  America  upon  these  islands,  and  if  we  believe 
in  our  country  and  her  institutions  we  cannot 
doubt  the  result.  We  mean  to  establish  a  free, 
self-governing  republic  in  these  islands,  and  to 
introduce  the  institutions  which  are  our  corner 
stone.  If  we  merely  started  a  colony  here  or 
established  trading  communications,  we  should  be 
false  to  the  traditions  of  our  country.  We  are 
not  going  to  follow  on  any  lines  of  precedent;  it 
is  quite  a  new  thing  we  mean  to  produce." 

This  statement,  in  the  actual  words  of  the 
speaker,  represents  very  fairly  the  attitude  in 
which  the  ablest  of  the  men  who  had  to  deal  with 
the  problem  approached  it.  There  was,  of  course, 
another  group  who  thought  the  Philippines  should 
be  evacuated  and  left  to  themselves;  but  with 
their  views  we  are  not  now  concerned.  The  ques 
tion  which  naturally  arose  out  of  this  reiterated 
resolution  to  "  plant  the  glorious  tree  of  American 

64 


GREATER    AMERICA 

civilization "  was,  of  course,  as  to  the  nature  of 
the  soil  in  which  it  was  expected  to  flourish.  The 
answer  given  by  the  gentleman  already  quoted 
is  so  characteristic  of  a  section  of  opinion  in  the 
United  States  that  it  must  be  given  verbatim. 

"A  great  many  of  your  countrymen,"  he  said, 
"will  say  that  the  only  way  with  a  Filipino  is  to 
beat  him  every  morning — he  is  sure  to  deserve  it 
before  night;  but  we  don't  take  that  view.  There 
is  the  same  difference  between  educated  and  cult 
ured  gentlemen  and  ignorant  peasants  in  this 
country  as  elsewhere ;  but  the  better-class  Filipinos 
rise  to  an  extremely  high  level  of  intelligence. 
There  are  native  lawyers  and  judges  here  who 
would  compare  favorably  with  those  of  any  coun 
try,  and  if  one  meets  them  in  controversy  or 
argument  they  can  hold  their  own  with  great 
skill  and  eloquence.  At  a  recent  banquet  given 
on  George  Washington's  birthday  there  were  after- 
dinner  speeches  by  Filipinos  which  would  compare 
favorably  with  those  at  any  banquet  in  the  old 
country." 

No  one  who  has  even  a  bowing  acquaintance 
with  the  Filipino  can  doubt  the  truth  of  the  last 
statement,  and  there  is  a  consensus  of  opinion  as 
to  the  high  level  of  intelligence,  as  far  as  mere 
book-learning  and  abstract  science  are  concerned, 
among  the  educated  Filipinos.  The  difficulty  is 
to  see  how  this  peculiar  form  of  brilliance  consti 
tutes  a  people  fit  to  assimilate  "the  concomitants 
of  American  civilization, ' '  whatever  that  may  mean, 
s  65 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  mental  capacity  of  educated  Filipinos,  their 
fluency  and  forensic  ability,  can  be  matched  only 
among  people  of  Latin  stock,  who  have  proved 
themselves  in  other  respects  the  very  antithesis 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  races  in  their  ideals  of  social 
organization  and  government.  Altruism,  which 
should  be  the  ideal  of  democracy,  and  individual 
ism,  which  is  its  invariable  outcome,  require  for 
the  development  of  the  first  and  control  of  the 
second  a  strength  and  steadiness  of  character,  a 
plain  common-sense,  and  a  power  of  seeing  things 
in  their  true  proportions  which  are  singularly  in 
compatible  with  the  artistic  Latin  temperament. 
Added  to  this  is  the  general  topsy-turvydom  of 
Oriental  ethics,  from  the  Western  point  of  view, 
and  here  we  have  the  soil  in  which  "American 
institutions  "  were  to  take  instant  root.  Incident 
ally,  the  plant  was  not  only  expected  to  draw 
nourishment  from  the  soil,  but  to  change  its  whole 
character  by  some  occult  process. 

Apart  from  the  difficulties  which  the  United 
States  leaders  made  for  themselves  by  the  enuncia 
tion  of  high-sounding  phrases,  which  Filipinos  were 
unable  to  appreciate  at  their  true  value,  there 
were  many  conditions  in  the  Philippines  which 
made  the  establishment  of  law  and  order  a  heavy 
task. 

The  islands  are  scattered  and  in  many  cases 
difficult  of  access,  and  the  physical  drawbacks 
were  accentuated  by  the  lack  of  cohesion  among 
the  people  themselves.  Although  it  has  pleased 

66 


GREATER    AMERICA 

a  party  in  the  United  States  to  speak  of  the 
"  Filipino  nation,"  it  is  well  known  by  all  who 
have  devoted  any  study  to  the  history  of  the 
islands  that  none  of  the  characteristics  of  a  nation 
are  to  be  found  there.  There  is  merely  a  con 
geries  of  tribes,  speaking  several  distinct  languages 
and  a  great  variety  of  dialects,  in  different  stages 
of  civilization  —  some  heathens,  others  Moham 
medans,  and  a  majority  nominally  Christians. 
The  hostility  and  distrust  among  the  chief  tribes 
are  even  reproduced  in  village  communities  of 
kindred  blood,  and  there  had  never  been  any 
approach  to  a  clearly  defined  national  sentiment 
until  hatred  of  the  oppressing  friars  united  all 
parties,  for  a  time,  in  the  desire  to  expel  them. 
The  widely  spread  opposition  to  American  arms 
had  its  origin,  not,  as  is  frequently  stated,  in  the 
Filipino  desire  for  freedom,  but  in  a  variety  of 
causes,  in  which  the  ambitions  of  a  mestizo  aris 
tocracy  and  the  ignorance  and  prejudices  of  the 
masses  were  the  chief  factors,  and  tyranny,  mis 
representation,  and  treachery  the  main  instru 
ments. 

The  peculiar  features  of  country  and  climate 
prolonged  the  war  to  an  unconscionable  extent, 
and  before  it  was  well  over  the  work  of  "  planting 
the  institutions  which  are  the  corner  -  stone  of 
liberty  "  was  commenced. 

The  motives  actuating  the  United  States  were 
threefold.  First,  she  desired  to  give  the  Filipinos 
a  good  government;  secondly,  she  wanted  to 

67 


GREATER    AMERICA 

give  them  a  democratic  government ;  and  thirdly, 
she  wanted  to  do  this  without  following  any 
precedent  laid  down  by  other  nations.  "It  is 
quite  a  new  thing  we  mean  to  introduce,"  said 
Mr.  Roosevelt;  "we  are  not  going  to  follow  any 
lines  of  precedent." 

There  was  naturally  a  good  deal  of  trouble  to 
reconcile  these  three  ideals.  The  simple  and  ob 
vious  method  of  dealing  with  a  conquered  coun 
try  is  to  place  it  under  military  rule  until  order 
is  evolved  and  trade  and  agriculture  are  resuming 
their  normal  condition.  The  next  stage  is  one  of 
transition,  a  semi  -  military  rule,  in  which  the 
plainest  and  simplest  laws  and  regulations  are 
enforced  by  civil  measures.  The  personality  of  of 
ficials  is  the  most  important  factor  at  this  period, 
which  prepares  the  way  for  civil  government, 
under  which  local  autonomy  may  be  introduced. 

As  has  already  been  mentioned,  there  was  one 
special  difficulty  in  the  way  of  such  a  scheme 
as  this,  and  that  consisted  in  the  peculiar  so 
cial  organization  of  the  Filipinos.  Had  the  isl 
ands  only  a  native  population,  with  leaders  of 
their  own  race,  this  method  would  have  met 
the  needs  of  the  situation  admirably,  as,  for 
instance,  .it  did  in  Burma.  Unfortunately,  the 
Spanish  domination  had  led  to  the  establishment 
of  a  class  known  as  mestizo,  or  half-breed,  some 
almost  entirely  white,  who  occupy  the  position  of 
a  self-constituted  aristocracy,  acquired  by  their 
superior  intelligence  and  education  and  the  social 

68 


GREATER    AMERICA 

prestige  derived  from  their  descent  from  the 
ruling  race.  They  have  no  hereditary  or  terri 
torial  hold  over  the  people,  but  they  look  down 
on^  the  natives,  just  as  they  are  themselves 
despised  by  the  pure-blooded  Spaniards.  This 
mestizo  class  is  most  numerous  and  powerful  at 
Manila,  and  the  capital  is  to  them  what  Paris  is 
to  the  French — a  world  within  a  world.  They 
have  hitherto  occupied  the  place  in  the  political 
and  social  world  which  an  aristocracy  would  fill 
in  Europe,  but  with  this  exception,  that  they  have 
not  that  interest  in  the  well-being  of  the  peasants 
or  that  hold  on  their  affections  which  the  feudal 
relation  implied.  It  is  to  this  class  that  the  Amer 
icans,  in  the  first  flush  of  enthusiasm,  pledged 
themselves,  and  it  is  they  alone  who,  by  education 
and  opportunity,  are  able  to  flood  the  government 
offices,  and  who  are  already  prominent  as  lawyers 
and  politicians.  With  a  class  of  this  kind — rest 
less,  intriguing,  brainy,  treacherous,  and  eloquent 
—it  would  have  been  difficult  to  adopt  any  con 
ceivable  system  of  government  which  did  not 
provide  some  scope  for  their  energies. 

The  choice  was  between  two  dangers — that  of 
employing  them  and  of  leaving  them  unemployed— 
and  the  first  was  decidedly  preferable.  The  un 
fortunate  circumstance  was  that  the  United  States 
programme  prohibited  any  form  of  government 
wrhich  was  not  democratic  in  its  essentials.  The 
obvious  impossibility  of  working  into  such  a 
scheme  a  people  apathetic  and  ignorant,  and  an 

69 


GREATER    AMERICA 

aristocracy  at  once  ambitious,  irresponsible,  and 
arrogant,  did  not  deter  the  United  States  from 
making  the  attempt. 

The  Philippines  were  fortunate  in  the  man  sent 
out  to  superintend  the  democratization  of  the 
islands.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  com 
mission  were  sent  to  establish  civil  government, 
and,  having  to  fulfil  that  task,  they  had  only  to 
adopt  the  least  harmful  form.  Public  opinion 
at  home  would  not  have  tolerated  a  less  liberal 
provision  for  the  individual  rights  of  the  Filipino. 
The  war  was  scarcely  over — it  lingers  still  in  the 
islands  in  the  form  of  ladronism — when  the  people 
were  called  together  and  told  that  they  were  to 
be  shown  how  to  govern  themselves. 

The  first  and  foremost  step  was  the  bestowal 
of  elective  powers.  After  a  short  period  of  govern 
ment  by  a  nominated  official,  elections  were  held 
for  the  post  of  provincial  governors.  The  educa 
tional  effect  of  the  exercise  of  the  elective  function 
is  one  of  the  firmest  convictions  of  the  American 
idealist,  albeit  on  his  own  continent  he  has  already 
been  obliged  to  withdraw  it  practically  from  one- 
ninth  of  the  nation,  and  is  proposing  to  adopt 
measures  which  will  exclude  still  more.  The 
problem  in  the  Philippines  is  whether  the  Filipino 
gains  sufficiently  in  moral  status  by  merely  re 
cording  his  vote  to  compensate  for  what  he  loses 
by  being  ill  governed.  It  is  well  known  that  the 
ballot-box  is  one  of  the  most  potent  weapons  of 
corruption,  unless  safeguarded  most  carefully,  and 

70 


GREATER    AMERICA 

it  is  difficult  to  see  what  steps  have  been,  or  can 
be,  taken  to  secure  a  genuine  vote. 

All  this,  it  may  be  said,  is  true  of  other  countries 
than  the  Philippines;  and  yet  many  of  these 
countries  apparently  enjoy  prosperity.  But  the 
Filipino  is  at  a  crisis  in  his  career  when  he  must 
have  good  government,  fair  government,  strong 
and  energetic  government,  if  he  is  ever  to  rise 
above  his  present  level.  The  country  is  laid  waste 
by  war  and  its  inevitable  consequences  of  famine, 
disease,  and  misery.  The  people  have  a  danger 
ous  facility  for  politics  and  a  lack  of  practical 
common  -  sense  which  are  fatal  qualities  —  the 
very  antithesis  of  the  Chinese,  who  are  indifferent 
to  affairs  of  state,  but  are  intent  on  their  own 
business,  and  in  whose  blood  is  the  faculty  of  local 
self-government.  It  would  have  been  greatly  to 
the  advantage  of  the  Filipinos  if  all  their  energies 
could  have  been  directed  into  the  practical  channel 
of  self-help  and  if  the  development  of  an  elaborate 
political  system  had  been  left  to  a  future  date. 
Peace  and  prosperity  are  the  first  gifts  a  nation 
should  confer  upon  the  race  it  desires  to  elevate, 
and  without  prosperity  it  will  be  impossible  to 
crush  the  hydra-headed  monster  of  discontent  and 
intrigue. 

One  of  the  first  and  most  discouraging  checks 
which  American  enthusiasm  received  in  the  Philip 
pines  was  the  discovery  that  the  Filipino  could 
not  be  intrusted  with  the  control  of  funds;  his 
intelligence  was,  unfortunately,  superior  to  his 


GREATER    AMERICA 

honesty.  It  was,  therefore,  necessary  to  provide 
in  each  province  an  American  treasurer,  and,  as 
the  public  works  demanded  also  more  skill  and 
integrity  than  could  be  found  among  the  natives, 
an  American  engineer,  called  the  "  supervisor. " 
The  municipalities  enjoy  a  very  complete  local  au 
tonomy,  so  much  so  that,  although  the  provincial 
Governor  is  expected  to  act  towards  them  as 
"disciplinarian,"  he  cannot  even  force  them  to 
adopt  regulations  which  would  insure  a  relative 
uniformity  in  the  conditions  and  requirements  of 
civil  life  in  the  different  pueblos. 

One  of  the  leading  Filipinos,  and  a  member  of 
the  commission,  Senor  B.  Legarda,  acknowledges 
that  the  suffrage  and  individual  rights  are  entire 
ly  new  in  the  Philippines,  and  admits  the  danger 
of  the  elective  system  in  municipalities,  "  where 
voters  are  only  influenced  by  casiquism  (bossism) 
or  by  the  party  passions  and  puerile  reactionism 
which  incited  the  late  war."  But  he  and  others 
-  for  instance,  Pardo  de  Tavera  and  R.  de 
Luzuriago — claim  that  a  period  of  two  or  three 
years'  provisional  government  should  fit  the 
Filipinos  for  the  unrestricted  discharge  of  citizen 
functions  and  lead  up  to  admission  as  a  State 
within  the  Union — a  somewhat  curious  conclusion 
to  arrive  at  on  such  premises. 

The  time  that  has  elapsed  since  the  establish 
ment  of  civil  government  is  too  short  to  permit  of 
a  comprehensive  judgment  on  the  results,  but  the 
extreme  optimism  of  the  central  government  can- 

72 


GREATER    AMERICA 

not  conceal  the  fact  that  so  far  the  elections  of 
governors  and  municipalities  have  been  exactly 
what  was  expected  by  less  sanguine  people;  they 
are  mischievous  or  harmless,  exactly  in  proportion 
to  the  amount  of  American  influence  brought  to 
bear  on  them  and  the  control  exercised  by  the 
civil  Governor  and  white  officials.  The  process  of 
democratization  has  not  been  carried  very  far — 
it  is  essentially  a  system  of  "make  see";  but  the 
objection  to  placing  authority  in  the  hands  of  any 
class  of  officials  nominated  by  government  has  led 
to  an  extraordinary  degree  of  centralization.  The 
civil  Governor,  an  indispensable  figure — entirely 
out  of  the  picture,  exercising,  as  he  must,  absolute 
power — has  to  be  referred  to  in  every  matter. 
He  may  not  be  assisted  by  really  responsible 
American  officials  on  whom  he  can  rely,  and  his 
Sisyphean  task  is  rendered  heavier  by  the  necessity 
for  closely  controlling  the  sham  Filipino  governors 
and  educating  them  up  to  the  needs  of  their  posi 
tion.  The  burdens  of  his  position  include  the  con 
trol  of  the  civil-service  board,  the  insular  pur 
chasing  agent,  the  office  for  the  improvement  of 
the  port  of  Manila,  and  the  provincial  and  munic 
ipal  governments.  He  has,  moreover,  to  assume 
the  duties  of  absent  heads  of  all  executive  depart 
ments;  he  is  president  of  the  Philippine  commis 
sion,  which  involves  a  large  amount  of  arduous  and 
most  important  legislative  work;  and,  finally,  he 
must  receive  at  all  times  the  public  and  officials 
of  all  degrees.  For  all  this  he  receives  a  salary  of 

73 


GREATER    AMERICA 

$15,000  per  annum,  which,  at  the  rate  of  living  in 
Manila,  will  barely  cover  his  household  expenses. 
This  intolerable  conglomeration  of  functions  is, 
perhaps,  the  inevitable  fate  of  an  official  who  is 
the  agent  of  a  democratic  government.  When  the 
" principles  of  democracy"  demand  that  the  man 
who  is  the  head  of  the  greatest  republic  in  the 
world  is  expected  to  fritter  away  on  petty  personal 
matters  time  which  might  be  employed  in  study 
ing  vital  national  questions,  it  can  hardly  be  ex 
pected  that  the  Governor  of  a  United  States  de 
pendency  should  be  accorded  more  liberal  treat 
ment.  The  effect  of  this  system  in  the  United 
States,  however,  is  far  less  harmful  than  in  the 
Philippines.  The  former  has  other  machinery 
than  the  mere  brain  and  will  of  the  President  on 
which  to  depend,  and,  in  fact,  the  majority  of 
Presidents  are  not  chosen  for  their  capacity  and 
are  so  tied  by  party  trammels  as  to  have  little 
scope  for  initiative.  But  in  the  Philippines  the 
man  at  the  head  is  the  most  important  factor, 
and  should  be  a  man  of  capacity  and  be  given 
a  free  hand  and  a  strong  backing.  Democratic 
government  is  impossible ;  aristocratic  government 
would  be  the  result  of  any  attempt  to  give  the 
Filipinos  political  freedom.  A  strong  paternal 
government  is  the  only  form  left;  but  a  weak 
paternal  regime  will  result  in  spoiled  children  and 
a  divided  household.  Meanwhile,  the  attempt  to 
check  the  sham  autonomy  by  a  system  of  referring 
everything  to  the  civil  Governor  has  made  the 

74 


GREATER    AMERICA 

mass  of  clerical  work  so  enormous  that  it  can  only 
be  dealt  with  by  the  multiplication  of  bureaus. 

There  is  something  peculiarly  fascinating  to  the 
American  mind  in  the  organization  of  a  bureau, 
and  no  one  at  all  familiar  with  the  United  States 
can  fail  to  have  observed  the  relations  between 
these  bureaus  and  the  great  American  public.  At 
any  hour  of  the  day  they  are  open  to  inspection 
and  inquiry  by  any  chance  visitor,  and  in  many 
of  them  special  officials  are  told  off  to  show  curious 
strangers  the  working  of  the  different  departments. 
The  bureaus  and  their  officials  are,  in  fact,  the 
property  of  the  democracy,  and  there  is  none 
of  the  reserve  and  unapproachableness  to  which 
Europeans  are  accustomed  in  their  government 
offices.  In  some  ways  the  system  has  undoubted 
advantages,  and  it  is,  of  course,  consistent  with 
democratic  principles.  The  tendency,  however, 
is  the  same  in  many  other  phases  of  democratic 
government.  That  which  is  accorded  to  every 
one  ceases  to  be  either  valued  or  valuable,  and 
the  efficiency  of  a  department  is  impaired  instead 
of  being  increased.  The  old  adage  is  true,  after 
all,  that  familiarity  breeds  contempt. 

A  second  notable  feature  of  American  bureaus 
is  the  prodigious  amount  of  clerical  work  which 
is  deemed  necessary  to  prove  their  value.  Quan 
tity,  and  not  quality,  appears  to  be  regarded  as  a 
test,  and  no  doubts  are  entertained  of  the  effective 
ness  of  work  which  involves  the  use  of  a  record 
amount  of  stationery. 

75 


GREATER    AMERICA 

These  principles  have  been  faithfully  carried 
into  effect  in  Manila,  and  the  record  of  the  work 
ing  hours  of  officials,  the  number  of  type-writers 
in  use,  the  amount  of  correspondence  dealt  with, 
the  variety  of  languages  to  be  interpreted,  are 
enough  to  stagger  the  quondam  British  official, 
who  has  been  used  to  imagine  that  he  was  over 
worked  and  overbound  by  red-tape  in  the  days 
when  he  sat  under  a  banyan-tree  and  dispensed 
rough-and-ready  justice  to  a  district  in  upper 
Burma.  Of  one  bureau  we  read  that  a  staff  of 
six  are  engaged  in  reading  and  answering  applica 
tions  for  appointments,  "many  of  which  exist 
only  in  the  imagination  of  the  writer."  There  is 
reason  to  believe  that  this  staff  is  disgracefully 
overworked.  Letters  are  received  in  "almost 
every  known  language  " ;  and  at  the  present  time 
there  are  interpreters  ready  to  translate  from 
"French,  German,  Italian,  Latin  (!),  Norwegian, 
Spanish,  Swedish,  Hebrew  (modern),  and  Chinese 
(Amoy),  as  well  as  five  distinct  dialects  of  the 
Philippines."  The  task  of  examining  charges  and 
complaints  against  officials  seems  to  be  one  of  the 
heaviest;  and  we  are  told  that  one  report  occupies 
seven  hundred  and  fifty  closely  written  pages  in 
Spanish  or  Filipino  dialects.  This  bureau  also 
draughts  the  appropriation  acts  and  mails  all 
necessary  warrants,  which  vary  in  amount  "  from 
$300,000  to  2  cents." 

The  system  of  reporting  and  publishing  verbatim 
all  debates  and  speeches  (even  if  undelivered)  has 

76 


GREATER    AMERICA 

affected  the  whole  political  life  of  the  States,  and 
its  malevolent  influence  is  to  be  traced  in  the 
writing  of  reports.1  No  country  in  the  world  has 
such  machinery  for  the  output  of  governmental 
reports  on  every  conceivable  subject,  and  the 
amount  of  undigested  information  compiled  and 
issued  gratis  in  the  form  of  well-bound  volumes 
is  simply  inconceivable  to  those  who  have  not 
had  ocular  proof  of  it.  The  motive  is  laudable 
and  the  expense  of  little  consequence  to  a  country 
as  rich  as  the  United  States,  but  the  practical 
effect  is  not  quite  what  might  be  wished.  The 
American  love  of  magnitude  is  nowhere  more 
evident  than  in  this  matter,  and  the  result  is  too 
often  a  vast  conglomeration  of  facts,  reports,  and 
quotations,  without  sense  of  proportion,  un as 
similated,  badly  arranged  and  indexed,  and  in 
volving  a  vast  amount  of  work  by  the  student 
who  desires  a  clear  and  succinct  idea  of  the  matter 
in  hand.  When  American  officials  write  reports 
they  permit  themselves  a  redundancy  of  language 

1  A  very  outspoken  reference  to  this  question  was  made 
in  the  President's  annual  message  of  1902.  The  American 
editor  of  the  1898  edition  of  De  Tocqueville  (vol.  i.,  p.  269) 
has  the  following  pertinent  observation  on  this  subject: 

"  Instead  of  complaining  that '  little  is  committed  to  writing* 
in  America,  and  that  'that  little  is  soon  wafted  away  forever,' 
he  ought  to  censure  the  inordinate  loquacity  of  Presidents, 
Governors,  Legislators  and  other  public  officers,  whose  in 
terminable  messages,  reports,  and  supplementary  documents 
are  preserved  by  the  public  printers  in  many  huge  volumes, 
which  nobody,  indeed,  ever  thinks  of  perusing,  but  which  are 
even  difficult  to  consult  on  account  of  their  number  and 
magnitude." 

77 


GREATER    AMERICA 

and  a  free  expression  of  personal  opinions,  even 
when  the  writers  are  merely  required  to  relate 
facts.  In  the  Philippines  this  practice  is  peculiar 
ly  unwise,  as  it  encourages  the  Filipinos  in  their 
most  fatal  gift  of  shallow  eloquence. 

It  is  to  the  skilful  manipulation  of  phrases,  by 
which  a  barren  report  may  attain  quite  respectable 
proportions,  that  we  owe  the  following  gem  from 
the  report  of  a  provincial  Governor. 

"INDUSTRY  AND  COMMERCE 

"These  branches  do  not  amount  to  much  in  the  province 
of  Rizal,  as,  in  general,  they  are  only  practised  on  a  small 
scale.  However,  the  spirit  of  association  is  awakening, 
and  it  can  be  believed  that,  when  peace  is  firmly  established 
in  all  of  the  archipelago,  civil  regime  and  the  good  dis 
positions  of  the  people  of  the  province  will  give  it  further 
progress  and  prosperity." 

It  would  be  a  happy  moment,  both  for  the  over 
worked  bureaus  and  the  people  on  whom  reports 
are  written,  if  the  directions  which  used  to  be 
well  drilled  into  young  British  officials  could  be 
given  in  the  Philippines:  Condense,  don't  gener 
alize,  and  avoid  sentiment. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  writer  wishes 
to  decry  the  labors  of  the  Manila  bureaus.  A 
certain  amount  of  routine  clerical  work  is  inevi 
table,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  many  officials 
have  devoted  themselves  without  reserve  to  these 
duties.  From  internal  evidence,  however,  there 
seems  to  be  a  decided  tendency  to  magnify  the 

78 


GREATER    AMERICA 

importance  of  mere  office -work,  and  any  one 
who  has  had  experience  of  administration  knows 
the  danger  of  allowing  this  to  increase.  The 
system  established  in  the  Philippines  seems  pe 
culiarly  adapted  for  the  growth  of  red-tape, 
and  the  nature  of  the  Filipinos  —  especially  the 
mestizos  —  with  their  love  of  oratory,  litigation, 
and  discussion  of  abstract  points,  makes  them 
liable  to  exaggerate  the  weaker  side  of  the  political 
system  devised  by  their  white  mentors. 

The  democratization  of  the  Philippines  has  so 
far  amounted  to  this:  Municipalities  have  been 
given  a  local  autonomy  which  they  never  exer 
cised  before,  and  are  subject  to  all  the  dangers 
of  the  system,  with  its  opportunities  for  undue 
influence  by  the  moneyed  class,  corruption,  and 
jobbery,  without  any  guarantee  —  save  the  over 
worked  central  government — that  they  will  be  free 
from  oppression.  There  is  no  powerful  industrial 
class  to  control  the  municipal  politicians,  and  the 
vast  majority  of  the  people  are  ignorant,  super 
stitious,  and  apathetic.  The  power  of  electing 
the  provincial  Governor  by  popular  vote  does  not 
secure  them  a  popular  government.  He  will  hold 
his  position  chiefly  at  the  pleasure  of  one  or  other 
of  the  mestizo  political  parties,  which  are,  in  fact, 
aristocratic  in  their  aims;  and  he  is  also  subject 
to  the  central  government,  a  fact  which  may  in 
crease  the  chances  of  his  efficiency,  but  does  not 
make  him  more  acceptable  to  the  Filipino.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  good  government  does 

79 


GREATER    AMERICA 

not  appeal  to  Orientals  on  its  own  merits;  but 
they,  like  all  other  people,  do  appreciate  it  when 
it  brings  them  freedom  from  taxation,  increased 
prosperity  and  opportunities.  All  these  cannot 
be  achieved  in  the  Philippines  for  many  years, 
so  that  the  present  government  cannot  expect  to 
be  regarded  as  a  popular  one. 

The  governors,  elected  by  the  people,  will  in 
evitably  fall  between  two  stools.  If  they  en 
deavor  to  enforce  the  measures  necessary  for  the 
improvement  of  the  country  (which  cannot  be 
agreeable  to  a  majority  of  the  people),  they  will 
become  unpopular  with  the  democracy;  if  they 
fail  to  do  so,  they  will  be  regarded  with  suspicion 
by  the  central  government.  This  aspect  of  the 
case  becomes  especially  serious  when  the  question 
of  taxation  arises.  In  assessing  the  country  for 
the  land-tax,  it  was  found  almost  impossible  to 
ascertain  true  values,  as  officials  favored  their 
friends.  Hitherto,  the  generous  policy  of  the 
United  States  has  avoided  serious  friction  on  the 
question  of  taxation,  but  the  matter  will  have  to 
be  placed  on  a  firm  foundation  very  soon.  The 
high  wages  paid  to  Filipino  laborers  and  work 
men  in  government  employ  have  done  much  to 
reconcile  them  to  the  new  regime,  but  when  pub 
lic  works  and  education  have  to  be  defrayed  out 
of  local  funds  —  as  must  sooner  or  later  be  the 
case — there  will  be  considerable  difficulty  in  ad 
justing  wages  on  a  scale  commensurate  with 
those  paid  in  other  parts  of  the  Orient.  The 

80 


GREATER    AMERICA 

present   scale  is  inflated  and  the  whole   system 
artificial. 

The  third  effect  of  democratization  has  been 
the  elaboration  of  central  government  at  Manila. 
How  much  the  working  of  this  machine  owes  to 
the  energy,  ability,  and  tact  of  a  few  American 
officials  will  probably  never  be  known,  unless — as 
is  their  constant  aspiration  —  the  Filipinos  take 
over  the  administration  of  the  islands  themselves 
in  the  course  of  a  few  years.  While  the  system- 
atization  of  the  work  of  government  and  the  or 
ganization  of  departments  specially  qualified  to 
deal  with  different  branches  were  a  necessity,  and 
while  the  clerical  education  of  Filipinos  in  ad 
vanced  methods  of  work — in  indexing,  classifying, 
and  so  forth — is  a  valuable  contribution  towards 
their  progress,  it  is  a  grave  misfortune  that  they 
should  have  this  object-lesson  in  government — 
an  elaborate  central  administration  turning  out  a 
vast  amount  of  clerical  work,  while  the  country 
remains  in  a  condition  of  chaos  and  public  works 
are  still  in  embryo.  It  is  possible  that  the  Amer 
ican  capacity  for  pushing  things  through  may 
enable  them  to  surmount  the  red-tape  barriers  and 
do  some  really  practical  work  in  the  Philippines; 
but  the  unique  opportunity  they  had  for  teaching 
the  Latin  Malays  a  lesson  in  doing,  as  opposed  to 
talking,  is  irretrievably  lost.  The  American's  love 
of  bureaus  and  report- writing  may  not  harm  him 
—he  is  a  thoroughly  practical  person  at  bottom- 
but  to  the  Filipino  it  must  prove  a  fatal  snare. 

6  8l 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  clash  of  democracy  with  Orientalism  is  a 
peculiarly  interesting  study.  It  must  be  noted 
that  even  Americans  do  not  propose  to  upset 
the  aristocratic  government  in  vogue  among  the 
Moros  of  the  southern  Philippines,  who  are  Mo 
hammedans.  The  doctrine  of  individual  rights  is 
not  believed  to  be  applicable  to  the  Moslem,  and 
the  British  method  of  dealing  with  these  people 
has  been  practically  adopted  without  variation. 
It  is  the  Christianity  of  the  Filipino,  apparently, 
that  gives  him  the  claim  to  individual  rights;  but, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  the  white  strain  among 
the  mestizos  that  counts  for  most  in  the  political 
situation.  Without  that  the  skin-deep  Christianity 
(varied  by  undisguised  heathendom)  of  the  peoples 
of  the  archipelago  would  not  have  been  sufficient 
to  place  them  (theoretically)  on  a  par  with  people 
who  have  fought  and  suffered  for  centuries  before 
they  were  able  to  evolve  popular  government.  The 
interesting  parallel  of  semi-Latin  peoples  on  the 
American  continent  and  in  the  Caribbean  may 
well  be  studied  in  this  connection,  and  is  dealt 
with  elsewhere.  Nowhere,  it  may  briefly  be  stated, 
has  a  semi-Latin  race  succeeded  in  founding  a 
popular  government.  The  so-called  republics  are 
victims  of  anarchy,  the  best  being  governed  by 
oligarchies  or  held  together  by  the  strength  of  a 
practical  dictator.  The  methods  of  election  in 
any  Latin-American  state  are  enough  to  dispose 
of  the  theory  that  the  democracy  has  any  voice 
in  their  government. 

82 


GREATER    AMERICA 

But,  after  all,  the  Malay  element  in  the  Filipino 
is  the  strongest,  and  the  Malay  is  an  Oriental. 
Democracy  is  an  alien  growth  on  Oriental  soil, 
and  it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  it  can  ever 
flourish  under  conditions  so  unfavorable.  Japan, 
the  only  Oriental  country  which  has  evolved  a 
modern  political  system,  is  intensely  monarchical. 
The  self-abnegation  of  her  hereditary  aristocracy 
has  not  by  any  means  destroyed  their  power, 
which  has  been  accentuated  by  their  entrance  into 
commercial  and  professional  life.  The  Japanese, 
however,  are  no  fair  comparison  for  the  Filipinos. 
They  are,  in  fact,  a  Northern  race,  strenuous, 
homogeneous,  patriotic,  whereas  the  Filipino  is  a 
true  child  of  the  tropics,  both  in  physique  and 
character. 

No  Oriental  tropical  race  has  ever  yet  evolved 
anything  approaching  popular  government,  which 
is  opposed  to  their  traditions,  inclinations,  and 
the  conditions  of  life.  The  Malay  has  been  pecul 
iarly  backward  in  organizing  political  or  social 
systems  of  any  kind,  and  his  invariable  trend  has 
been  to  an  unqualified  despotism.  Before  the 
Spaniards,  in  the  early  days,  began  their  work  of 
disintegrating  the  social  system  of  the  Filipinos, 
there  is  no  doubt  that,  like  every  other  division 
of  their  race,  the  tribes  were  aristocratic  in  their 
organization.  Hereditary  chiefs  have  always  en 
joyed  power  and  prestige  among  people  whose 
capacity  for  co-operation  was  practically  nil.  If 
an  aristocracy  were  to  come  into  power  at  the 

83 


GREATER    AMERICA 

present  day,  however,  it  would  consist  not  of  the 
descendants  of  hereditary  chiefs  but  of  the  mestizo 
class,  whose  disqualifications  have  already  been 
stated. 

Is  it  possible,  therefore,  that  democracy  will 
prove  the  solution  of  the  difficulty?  The  writer 
thinks  not.  His  experience  of  Oriental  peoples 
makes  him  more  than  doubtful  whether  they  can, 
for  many  generations  at  all  events,  reach  the 
point  of  self-government.  In  the  present  case  the 
immediate  result  of  American  evacuation  would 
be  to  place  power  in  the  hands  of  a  people  who 
do  not  know  how  to  use  it,  and  who  would  become 
the  tools  of  the  educated  mestizos.  The  ignorance 
of  the  peasant  class  may  be  remedied  in  time  by 
education,  and  it  may  be  possible  to  enlarge  their 
point  of  view,  which,  like  that  of  most  Orientals, 
is  purely  local.  When,  also,  the  mestizos  have 
given  solid  proof  of  their  probity,  loyalty,  and 
disinterestedness,  it  will  be  ample  time  to  intrust 
them  with  power. 


CHAPTER  IV 

PACIFIC  EXPANSION:   THE  PHILIPPINES— THREE 
YEARS  AFTER 

AT  the  time  of  writing  (early  in  1904)  it  may 
be  said  that  the  American  administration  of  the 
Philippines  has  been  working  for  over  three  years. 
The  cession  of  the  islands  by  Spain  to  the  United 
States,  of  course,  dates  from  1898,  but  the  actual 
subjugation  of  the  islands  was  not  anything  like 
complete  until  a  much  later  date.  Early  in  1901 
civil  government  was  established  throughout  the 
archipelago,  and  this  may,  therefore,  be  fairly 
considered  as  a  starting-point. 

The  amount  of  administrative  and  reform  work 
which  may  be  accomplished  in  three  years  in 
founding  a  government  in  the  tropics  is  not  much, 
and  the  writer  would  have  been  the  last  to  expect 
great  results  from  such  a  short  period.  But  the 
general  assumption  among  certain  leading  Fili 
pinos  (who  from  their  official  positions  appear  to 
be  in  the  confidence  of  the  government),  and  the 
tone  adopted  by  a  section  of  the  Americans  them 
selves,  seem  to  indicate  a  belief  that  miracles  are, 
indeed,  in  process,  and  that  the  Filipinos  have  been 
regenerated  and  placed  securely  on  a  footing  with 
"the  really  civilized  peoples." 

85 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  long  continuance  of  Filipino  resistance  to 
American  arms  was  a  most  unfortunate  sequel  to 
an  early  mistake.  The  rebellion  organized  by 
Aguinaldo  might  never  have  come  to  a  head 
had  the  United  States  adopted  from  the  first  a 
firm  attitude  towards  the  political  party  of  which 
he  was  the  leader.  Disappointed  with  their  own 
status  in  the  country  after  the  cession  by  Spain, 
the  mestizo  politicians  of  Manila  were  able,  by 
entirely  false  representations,  to  stir  up  the  pop 
ulation  against  the  Americans,  and  it  was  to  a 
false  idea  of  the  intentions  of  the  United  States 
that  the  stubborn  resistance  was  due.  The  conse 
quent  neglect  of  the  ordinary  business  of  life  soon 
made  fighting  a  profession  to  a  large  number  of 
the  people,  and  the  wild,  free  life  of  a  ladrone,  or 
brigand,  attracted  the  most  daring  spirits,  who,  in 
their  turn,  terrorized  the  peaceful  inhabitants.  So 
popular  is  this  irregular  mode  of  life  to  this  day 
that,  according  to  an  official  report,  a  better-class 
girl  in  certain  districts  prefers  life  as  the  stolen 
mistress  of  a  ladrone  to  marriage  with  a  well-to-do 
and  respectable  citizen.  The  stamping-out  of  or 
ganized  resistance  was  practically  ended  in  1901, 
but  there  was  evidence  at  a  much  later  date  of 
communication  between  the  ladrones  and  political 
parties  in  Manila,  which  leads  one  to  doubt  if  the 
former  are  in  reality  condemned  or  even  regarded 
with  disapprobation  by  all  their  countrymen  as 
irresponsible  robbers.  There  is  still  a  great  lack 
of  reliable  information  as  to  the  relations  between 

86 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the    insurrectos,    or    organized    rebels,    and    the 
ladrones,  or  independent  robber-bands;  but  one 
thing  is  clear — the  secret  societies,  especially  the 
Katipunan,    provide   a   link,    though   one   whose 
exact  strength  it  is  impossible  to  gauge.     Secret 
societies  have  not  been  prohibited  as  such,  but 
only  those  which  "  have  for  their  object  the  promo 
tion  of  treason,  rebellion,  or  sedition,  or  the  pro 
mulgation   of   any   political   opinion   or   policy." 
This  restriction   is   absolutely  useless,   and  it  is 
doubtful  whether  any  legislation  which  could  be 
made  to  fit  in  with  American  principles  would  be 
successful  in  stamping  out  this  most  dangerous 
pest.     In  British  possessions  stringent  laws  have 
been  enforced,  and  in  Singapore,  at  all  events,  the 
power  of  the  secret  societies  has  been  checked,  if 
not  destroyed.     But  wherever  there  are  Chinese 
there  will  be  the  organizations  so  dear  to  Celestial 
minds;  and  the  Filipino,  prone  to  political  intrigue, 
though  backward  in  organizing  power,  is  sure  to 
imitate   the   secret   societies   of  his   Chinese   and 
mestizo  friends,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  "  unions  " 
and  " leagues"  of  his  American  mentors  on  the 
other.     The  legalizing  of  these  societies  is,  there 
fore,  a  step  fraught  with  danger.     Until  1902  the 
advocacy  of  seditious  principles — i.e.,  of  separa 
tion  or  independence — either  orally,  by  writing  or 
printing,  was  forbidden ;  but  in  July  of  that  year, 
as  soon  as  "a  state  of  war"  was  over,  this  rule 
was  rescinded.     The  consequence  has  been  a  good 
deal  of  abuse  of  the  license  granted,  and  one  news- 

87 


GREATER    AMERICA 

paper,  an  American  sheet,  was,  indeed,  prosecuted 
while  the  law  was  in  force.  Until  the  United 
States  is  able  to  put  an  actual  period  to  the  term 
of  her  occupation,  it  seems  a  little  unwise  to  per 
mit  the  doctrine  of  independence  or  separation  to 
be  preached  to  an  excitable  and  easily  influenced 
people. 

The  formation  of  a  native  constabulary  was 
doubly  essential  in  a  country  thus  infected  with 
ladrones  and  their  accomplices.  The  native  is 
not  only  better  able  to  carry  on  the  peculiar  kind 
of  warfare  involved,  but  many  turbulent  spirits 
who  might  have  joined  the  robbers  were  incor 
porated  in  the  new  force,  which  offered  regular 
wages,  a  smart  uniform,  and  congenial  employ 
ment. 

The  result  seems  to  justify  the  somewhat  san 
guine  expectation  that  few  regular  troops  will  be 
needed  in  the  islands,  but  it  is  to  be  hoped  that 
the  authorities  will  not  move  too  fast  in  this 
direction.  So  far,  it  has  been  impossible,  owing 
to  the  severity  of  their  duties,  to  drill,  discipline, 
and  organize  the  constabulary  as  effectively  as 
could  be  desired,  and  it  must  be  remembered  that 
on  training,  and  not  only  on  courage  and  spirit, 
depends  their  permanent  efficiency.  There  is  also 
a  good  deal  to  be  done  in  establishing  relations 
between  the  constabulary  and  local  native  officials. 
This  will  largely  depend  on  the  white  officers  com 
manding  the  different  bodies  of  constabulary,  and 
the  loyalty  of  the  men  is  also  contingent  on  this 

88 


GREATER    AMERICA 

personal  question.  An  effort  is  needed  to  render 
this  branch  of  the  service  attractive  to  educated 
and  reliable  Americans. 

It  will,  perhaps,  be  interesting,  in  this  brief  re 
view  of  the  Philippines — three  years  after — to  see 
what  are  the  opinions  of  prominent  Filipinos,  high 
in  government  office,  on  the  benefits  of  American 
rule  and  the  prospects  of  the  archipelago.  They 
are  singularly  characteristic. 

Dr.  Par  do  de  Tavera,  a  clever  mestizo,  of  almost 
pure  Spanish  blood,  educated  in  Europe  and  highly 
qualified  in  scientific  pursuits,  is  the  initiator  of 
the  Partido  Federal,  which  was  an  ally  of  the 
United  States  during  the  closing  stages  of  the 
insurrection,  in  the  establishment  of  civil  govern 
ment.  Dr.  de  Tavera  considers  that  the  principal 
benefit  bestowed  on  the  Filipinos  is  liberation 
from  the  friars.  It  is  possible  that  the  majority 
of  his  countrymen  would  hardly  subscribe  to  this, 
since  the  friars  were  practically  expelled  before 
the  Americans  arrived  in  the  islands,  and  a  good 
deal  of  discontent  has  been  expressed  because  the 
United  States  insists  on  dealing  fairly  with  the 
religious  communities  in  the  matter  of  confiscated 
lands.  The  next  benefit  is  municipal  government, 
and  there  is  no  doubt  that  every  participator  in 
this  will  agree  with  him  and  that  it  is  a  popular 
measure.  We  have,  at  present,  however,  no  evi 
dence  as  to  the  practical  nature  of  the  blessings 
it  is  conferring.  The  legislative  improvements 
effected  by  the  government,  especially  the  law 

89 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  habeas  corpus,  abolition  of  banishment,  im 
prisonment,  and  military  executions  on  account 
of  political  beliefs,  are  some  real  reforms  which 
Dr.  de  Tavera  and  all  his  countrymen  must  ap 
preciate;  but  freedom  of  speech,  assembly,  and 
the  press  are  blessings  which,  for  the  present  at 
all  events,  must  be  regarded  as  disguised  if  peace, 
order,  and  prosperity  are  the  ideals  in  view.  The 
enlightened  Filipino  attitude  towards  taxation  is 
well  illustrated  by  Dr.  de  Tavera.  He  regards 
it  as  an  unpleasant  necessity,  to  be  put  off  as 
long  as  possible.  His  unenlightened  countryman 
has  a  simpler  creed.  Taxation  must  be  avoided 
at  any  cost,  he  says,  with  delightful  inconse 
quence  as  to  how  expenses  are  to  be  met. 

The  two  other  Filipino  commissioners  who  are 
associated  with  Dr.  de  Tavera  concur  in  this 
expression  of  opinion  generally,  but  one,  Senor 
Legarda,  contributes  a  practical  suggestion — i.e., 
the  sale  and  development  of  public  lands,  and  the 
importation  of  American  farmers  and  laborers 
to  teach  the  Filipinos — presumably  to  illustrate 
the  "  dignity  of  labor."  These  gentlemen  unite 
in  the  belief  that  two,  or  at  most  three,  years  will 
see  the  Filipinos  in  a  position  to  dispense  with 
leading-strings  and  emerge  as  a  Territory  of  the 
United  States.  Meanwhile,  they  advocate  the 
sending  of  two  delegates,  elected  by  popular  vote, 
to  represent  the  "  nation  "  at  Washington. 

The  primary  benefit  obtained  by  Filipinos  from 
the  American  occupation,  according  to  Dr.  de 

90 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Tavera,  is,  therefore,  the  overthrow  of  the  power 
of  the  Church ;  and  as  has  been  said,  the  expulsion 
of  the  friars  can  hardly  be  ascribed  to  the  Amer 
icans.  There  may  well  be  two  opinions,  however, 
even  on  the  point  as  to  whether  the  downfall  of 
the  Church  has  been  altogether  of  advantage  to 
the  Filipinos. 

In  a  country  where  all  education,  power,  and 
prestige  were  practically  vested  in  the  Church,  the 
violent  expulsion  of  the  religious  orders  naturally 
caused  great  dislocation.  The  native  priests,  how 
ever,  continued  to  exercise  their  functions,  and  up 
to  the  time  of  the  establishment  of  civil  govern 
ment  the  Filipinos  remained  outwardly  devout 
Christians,  though  their  ignorance  rendered  them 
a  prey  to  debasing  superstitions.  The  establish 
ment  of  schools  in  which  no  religion  was  taught 
and  the  indifferent  attitude  (in  their  eyes)  of 
Americans  towards  religious  matters  must,  how 
ever,  in  time  weaken  the  bonds  which  tie  them 
to  the  Church.  It  seems  doubtful  whether  Prot 
estantism  will  make  much  headway  with  a  people 
so  sensuous  as  the  Filipinos,  but  the  immediate 
result  has  been  the  evolution  of  an  independent 
Catholic  Church,  which  renounces  its  allegiance  to 
the  Pope.  It  is  to  be  feared  that  this  severance  of 
ties  which  involve  at  least  a  continuity  of  doctrine 
will  lead  to  a  relapse  into  extravagances  and 
superstitions  which  will  retard  the  progress  of  the 
people.  Their  mental  condition  may  be  gauged 
by  the  amazing  story  of  a  man  who  organized  a 

91 


GREATER    AMERICA 

ladrone  band  and  gave  a  good  deal  of  trouble  for 
some  time,  being  at  the  time  of  writing  still  at 
liberty.  He  gained  his  ascendency  over  the  peo 
ple  by  an  announcement  that  he  would  go  to 
heaven;  and  then,  descending  from  a  tree  in  the 
presence  of  his  followers,  gave  it  out  that  he  had 
brought  back  from  the  celestial  regions  a  box 
containing  independence,  which  he  would  open 
and  confer  on  those  who  assisted  him. 

The  better-educated  Filipinos,  especially  those 
mestizos  who  have  received  European  education, 
have  the  tendency,  so  common  among  Westernized 
Orientals,  to  relapse  into  religious  indifference,  if 
not  atheism.  Altogether,  the  Philippines  appears 
to  be  a  very  suitable  ground  for  missionary  en 
deavor. 

The  subject  of  education  is  by  far  the  most  im 
portant  one  in  the  Philippines,  and  from  the  first 
absorbed  much  attention  on  the  part  of  the  Amer 
icans.  The  excellence  and  liberality  of  their  own 
public-school  system  made  them  regard  with  sur 
prise  and  indignation  the  condition  of  the  Fili 
pinos  in  this  respect.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that  the  vast  bulk  of  the  population  were  entire 
ly  ignorant,  the  village  schools  being  taught  by 
people  nearly  as  little  educated  as  their  pupils. 
Under  the  Spanish  rule,  in  many  of  the  larger 
towns  schools  and  colleges  existed,  but  these,  al 
ways  under  clerical  guidance,  were  lamentably  be 
hind  the  times  in  equipment.  At  Manila  a  certain 
number  of  the  better  class  obtained,  also  under 

92 


GREATER    AMERICA 

priestly  regime,  a  literary,  if  not  a  scientific, 
education,  and  the  best  men  went  to  Spain  or 
France  and  returned  with  diplomas  as  doctors  or 
lawyers.  Having  observed  that  the  immediate 
need  was  for  more  light  among  the  poor  and 
scattered  population,  the  United  States,  with 
characteristic  impulsive  generosity,  decided  to 
meet  this  need  at  once.  Education  requires  teach 
ers;  Americans  will  be  able  to  train  the  Filipinos 
to  become  American  in  ideals  and  standards — we 
will  send  one  thousand  American  teachers  at  once 
to  the  Philippines!  This  appears  to  have  been 
the  chain  of  reasoning,  and  the  immediate  result 
was  the  wholesale  chartering  of  teachers  in  the 
United  States,  by  a  sort  of  open  order  to  the 
various  educational  institutions,  and  within  a  short 
time  an  army  of  teachers  was  on  its  way  to  Manila, 
whence  they  were  distributed  broadcast  over  the 
islands. 

The  fatal  mistake  with  Orientals  is  to  be  in  a 
hurry.  That  reform  was  urgently  needed  is  cer 
tain,  but  that  it  could  be  met  by  such  drastic 
measures  is  far  from  certain.  The  least  evil  ac 
cruing  from  this  measure  has  been  a  vast  waste 
of  time  and  energy,  which  might  have  been  ad 
vantageously  expended  on  more  permanent  re 
forms.  That  a  number  of  the  teachers  were  un- 
suited  for  the  work  was  inevitable ;  that  many  have 
done  good  service  is  greatly  to  their  credit,  when 
it  is  remembered  that  language,  country,  climate, 
customs — everything,  in  fact — were  new  to  them. 

93 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  chief  difficulty  at  present  seems  to  be  that 
the  majority  must  return  to  the  United  States  at 
the  end  of  their  term  of  three  years  and  an  en 
tirely  fresh  and  raw  batch  be  drafted  in.  The 
enormous  cost  involved  by  this  method  is,  per 
haps,  unimportant  to  the  United  States.  But 
the  lack  of  continuity  is  a  great  drawback,  and 
it  is  unwise  for  a  country  with  a  large  surplus  to 
give  lessons  in  extravagance  to  an  exceptionally 
poor  one,  which  it  hopes  in  time  to  make  self- 
supporting.  It  is,  of  course,  difficult  to  gauge  the 
exact  value  of  the  work  done  by  Americans  in 
primary  education;  but,  to  take  the  simplest  as 
pect  of  the  case,  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  is  wise 
to  adopt  suddenly  the  American  system  with  an 
Oriental  race  like  the  Filipinos.  The  thing  to  be 
avoided  is  the  turning-out  of  a  vast  number  of 
superficially  educated  people  with  a  thin  veneer 
of  Americanism.  The  imitative  faculty  of  the 
Filipino  and  his  retentive  memory  make  him 
peculiarly  apt  to  develop  on  these  lines.  It  would 
have  been,  in  the  writer's  opinion,  a  far  wiser 
plan  to  concentrate  the  energy  and  money  on 
equipping  schools  for  Filipino  teachers  and  es 
tablishing  a  system  by  which  they  could  be  in 
sured  good  and  permanent  salaries  according  to 
the  value  of  the  work  done.  American  superin 
tendents  and  teachers  for  the  study  of  the  Eng 
lish  language  might  have  been  employed,  and  the 
primary  system  improved  by  degrees.  All  Amer 
icans  should  have  been  given  time  and  required 

94 


GREATER    AMERICA 

to  learn  Spanish,  and  the  Filipino  teachers  should 
have  learned  English,  and  have  been  required 
to  use  it  in  schools.  This  is  theoretically  the 
principle  adopted  as  regards  the  language  ques 
tion,  but  American  teachers,  corning  for  so 
short  a  period  as  three  years,  do  not  have  time 
to  perfect  themselves  in  Spanish.  It  is  recog 
nized  now  that  the  Filipino  teachers  are,  after  all, 
the  agency  upon  which  the  future  of  education 
mainly  depends,  so  that  it  seems  deplorable  that, 
to  quote  the  report,  "  the  lot  of  Filipino  teachers 
is  not  a  fortunate  one."  The  inflated  prices  paid 
by  the  government  to  workmen  and  other  em 
ployes  make  the  pay  of  the  native  teachers  seem 
small — they  are,  in  fact,  the  lowest-paid  class  in 
the  community  —  and  the  abolition  of  the  old 
system  of  fees  or  gratuities  from  pupils  cuts  them 
off  from  what  used  to  be  a  source  of  profit.  The 
system  has  made  this  almost  inevitable;  nor  are 
the  average  teachers  worth  more  than  they  get. 
But  this  is  a  state  of  affairs  which  careful  training 
and  proper  inducements  would  remedy. 

The  democratization  of  the  islands  cannot  so 
far  have  been  said  to  react  favorably  on  education, 
since  the  municipalities,  which  are  now  responsi 
ble  for  their  own  schools,  frequently  disclaim  re 
sponsibility  for  salaries  to  teachers  they  have  not 
themselves  selected,  or,  if  they  agree  to  pay,  make 
the  rate  as  low  as  they  can  and  withhold  it  as  long 
as  possible. 

It  seems,  therefore,  that,  although  a  certain 

95 


GREATER    AMERICA 

number  of  little  Filipinos  may  be  learning  to  be 
"mighty  smart,"  and  a  certain  amount  of  good 
influence  is  at  work,  the  office  of  teacher  has  been 
brought  into  disrepute  among  the  natives,  a  feel 
ing  of  injustice  engendered,  and  a  great  deal  of 
time  and  money  wasted.  That  this  is  the  case 
is  largely  due  to  American  idealism.  Not  content 
to  attempt  the  education  of  the  Filipinos  on 
the  simplest  and  least  difficult  lines,  they  were 
bent  on  infusing  into  the  educational  system  that 
atmosphere  of  democracy  which  is  their  fetish. 
The  aims  of  education  were  mixed  up  with,  and 
handicapped  by,  the  desire  to  "  upset  the  prestige 
and  domination  of  the  present  oligarchic  element 
and  secure  the  emancipation  of  the  dependent 
masses." 

University  education  and  secondary  schools  are 
receiving  attention,  and  ought  to  be  of  great 
service,  if  they  are  carefully  handled  and  not 
prostituted  to  a  desire  for  "  popularity."  It  must 
never  be  forgotten  that  character-training  is  the 
chief  safeguard  to  a  brilliant  and  shallow  people, 
and  that  it  can  hardly  be  acquired  in  one  genera 
tion.  Technical — or,  as  it  is  termed  in  the  United 
States,  industrial — education  is  desirable,  but  ap 
parently  not  particularly  popular.  The  establish 
ment  of  schools  will  not  necessarily  imply  pupils, 
but  every  effort  should  certainly  be  made  to  lead 
the  Filipinos  in  this  direction.  Unfortunately 
this  specializing  of  education  for  the  benefit  of  a 
working  class  is  not  likely  to  be  popular  under 

96 


GREATER    AMERICA 

American  tutelage,  being  opposed  to  the  spirit  of 
Democracy. 

The  educational  policy  of  the  United  States 
towards  the  Philippines  has  been  influenced  by 
the  same  motive  which  dictated  her  whole  policy 
—a  desire  to  do  for  the  Filipinos  what  had  never 
before  been  done  for  an  Oriental  people.  The 
example  of  Japan  might  have  been  followed  more 
closely,  so  far  as  the  patient  laying  of  foundations 
was  concerned;  but  the  democratic  craze,  and  the 
general  feeling  that  salvation  must  come  in  a 
couple  of  years  or  not  at  all,  have  combined  to 
mar  what  might  have  been  the  most  interesting 
educational  experiment  of  the  age.  Thanks  to  the 
generosity  of  the  United  States  in  presenting  him 
with  a  ready-made  social,  political,  and  educational 
system,  the  Filipino,  before  he  is  rudimentarily 
educated,  will  be  plunged  in  the  vices  of  over-civil 
ization,  and  the  chances  are  that  he  will  pass  from 
childhood  to  decay  without  ever  reaching  maturity. 

The  subject  of  education  leads  one  at  once  to 
the  labor  question.  No  local  question  has,  per 
haps,  been  more  freely  discussed  than  the  in 
dustrial  capacity  of  the  Filipinos,  and  there  are 
two  diametrically  opposite  views  of  their  possibili 
ties.  It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  there  is 
no  one  who  believes  the  Filipino  to  be  capable, 
unaided,  of  doing  anything  for  himself,  and 
the  history  of  Malayan  peoples  in  every  case 
supports  this  view.  They  are  neither  a  com- 
7  97 


GREATER    AMERICA 

mercial  nor  industrial  race  by  instinct,  and,  al 
though  agriculture  has  been  their  one  avocation, 
they  employ  to  the  present  day  the  most  primitive 
tools.  All  the  progress  made  by  Malayans  in  any 
of  their  habitats  may  be  traced  directly  to  Hindoo, 
Arab,  or  European  influence,  and  especially  to 
actual  discipline  on  the  part  of  the  dominant  race. 
The  intense  aristocratic  prejudice  with  which  the 
race  is  permeated  lost  its  picturesqueness  under 
the  Spaniards  through  the  destruction  of  tribal 
organization,  but  was  retained  and  intensified  in  a 
contempt  for  commercial  and  industrial  pursuits. 
The  Chinese  and  their  half-breeds  became  the 
merchants  and  petty  traders  of  the  islands  and 
also  the -only  skilled  workmen.  They  swelled  the 
ranks  of  local  politicians  and  undermined  the 
social  and  commercial  fabric  of  society  with  their 
secret  societies  and  their  talent  for  intrigue. 

The  Filipino  has,  therefore,  practically  no 
status  in  the  world  of  labor.  He  has  hitherto 
been  despised  as  an  economic  factor.  Apart  from 
his  innate  prejudice  against  labor,  he  is  handi 
capped  by  many  things.  His  physique,  like  that 
of  many  a  race  of  mixed  blood,  is  poor.  The 
savage  tribes  of  the  interior,  who  have  not  mingled 
their  blood  with  that  of  Chinese,  Japanese,  Arabs, 
Europeans,  negroes,  and  others  (as  has  the  coast- 
bred  Filipino),  are  of  infinitely  finer  physique. 
Moreover,  the  Filipino  has  not,  like  the  Japanese, 
the  advantage  of  a  bracing  climate  during  part 
of  the  year.  The  winter  is  pleasant  in  Manila, 

98 


GREATER    AMERICA 

and  even  more  so  in  other  places  on  the  coast, 
while  some  of  the  hill  country  is  probably  healthy 
all  the  year  round,  but  the  climate  generally  is  of 
the  damp,  enervating  character  which  predisposes 
to  diseases  of  chest  and  lungs,  and  at  certain 
seasons  is  as  trying  and  unhealthy  in  the  valleys 
and  coast  towns  (where  work  has  to  be  done) 
as  in  any  other  tropical  country.  The  mixed 
blood  of  the  Filipinos,  and  especially  the  white 
strain,  which  is  widely  diffused,  makes  them  more 
susceptible  to  climate  than  a  pure  race  long  ac 
climatized  would  be.  Joined  to  physical  dis 
ability,  the  enervating  effects  of  climate,  and 
aristocratic  prejudices  of  great  antiquity,  is  the 
radical,  uncompromising,  deeply  rooted  indolence 
of  all  Malayan  people.  The  Burmese — physically 
strong,  active,  and  by  no  means  lacking  in  ca 
pacity —  suffer  from  this  same  complaint,  which 
is  nothing  but  sheer  indolence — partly  the  effect 
of  climate,  but  having  its  roots  deep  in  the  na 
tional  character. 

The  Filipino  is,  therefore,  a  bad  tradesman;  if 
he  condescends  to  such  an  ignoble  pursuit,  he 
usually  leaves  the  details  to  his  women-folk.  He 
has  the  makings  of  a  fair  artisan  in  such  trades  as 
do  not  require  much  physical  strength  or  sustained 
effort,  but  as  a  laborer  he  is  subject  to  two  great 
drawbacks — physical  incapacity  and  moral  weak 
ness.  He  is  unreliable  to  the  last  extent,  and  is 
subject  to  fits  of  inconsequence  —  the  child  of 
caprice,  to  whom  the  warmth  of  the  sun  and  the 

99 


GREATER    AMERICA 

coolness  of  the  shade  will  always  be  temptations 
to  shirk,  and  whose  lack  of  foresight  makes  it  irk 
some  to  work  to-day  that  he  may  eat  to-morrow. 
How  much  this  Oriental  characteristic  has  been 
aggravated  by  Spanish  influence  can  hardly  be 
estimated,  but  it  is  quite  certain  to-day  that  for 
one  man  who  will  steadily  set  to  work  to  build  a 
wall  there  are  twenty  who  will  meet  to  discuss  its 
necessity,  its  probable  cost,  the  legal  aspect  of  the 
question,  and  its  bearing  on  local  or  national 
politics. 

The  evidence  collected  by  Americans  as  to 
Filipino  workmen  is  interesting  but  in  the  high 
est  degree  inconclusive.  Some  officials  repoit  the 
"flattest  failure"  in  the  attempt  to  get  unskilled 
labor  performed,  even  at  high  wages;  others  re 
port  that,  under  an  improved  system  of  payment 
and  patient  supervision,  Filipinos  have  proved 
most  satisfactory  in  certain  classes  of  work.  The 
standard  by  which  they  judge,  however,  appears 
in  all  cases  to  be  that  of  the  work  performed  un 
der  them  by  local  Chinese  coolies,  whom  they  re 
placed  by  Filipinos,  finding  the  latter  in  the  long 
run  more  satisfactory.  There  is  a  general  com 
plaint  against  the  Chinese  that  they  object  to 
adopt  new  methods,  whereas  the  Filipinos  are 
ready  to  be  taught.  The  question  is  whether  any 
of  the  gentlemen  who  report  in  this  sense  are 
acquainted  with  the  work  done  by  Chinese  in,  for 
instance,  Hong-Kong  or  Singapore.  It  is  quite 
probable  that,  unsuccessful  at  first  in  handling 

IOO 


GREATER    AMERICA 

their  coolies,  they  would  with  a  more  extended  ex 
perience  have  got  more  satisfactory  results.  It 
is,  of  course,  highly  desirable  that  the  Filipino 
should  be  employed  in  his  own  country,  and 
that  every  effort  should  be  made  to  fit  him  for 
an  industrial  career,  but  it  is  hardly  fair,  on  such 
slight  premises  as  can  be  afforded  by  a  few  months' 
trial,  to  pronounce  him  the  equal,  if  not  the 
superior,  of  the  Chinese  in  the  labor  market. 

The  government  pays  inflated  rates  to  secure 
Filipino  labor,  gives  its  employes  advantages  in 
the  way  of  instruction  and  supervision,  and  is 
prepared  to  be  lenient  to  shortcomings.  This  is  a 
benevolent  policy  and  theoretically  right,  but  it 
may  react  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  islands.  It 
is  impossible  for  the  commercial  community  to 
proceed  on  these  lines,  nor  will  the  provincial  and 
municipal  authorities  be  able  to  do  so.  These 
must  have  the  cheapest  labor  procurable,  and,  as 
far  as  the  mercantile  community  is  concerned, 
there  is  a  consensus  of  opinion  that  Filipino  labor 
is  not  cheap. 

The  compromise  adopted  after  considerable  dis 
cussion  has  been  to  allow  a  limited  number  of 
skilled  Chinese  laborers  to  be  imported  for  three 
or  five  years,  with  a  head- tax  of  fifty  dollars  and 
the  obligation  on  employers  to  engage  a  Filipino 
apprentice  to  work  under  each.  This  legislation, 
with  its  autocratic  interference  with  private  liber 
ty  characteristic  of  modern  democracy,  may  pos 
sibly  be  justified  on  grounds  of  expedience.  The 

101 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Filipino,  despite  the  declarations  of  his  champions, 
evidently  needs  to  be  protected  from  Chinese  com 
petition  if  he  is  to  remain  the  dominant  factor  in 
the  islands ;  but  the  question  arises — how  can  this 
artificial  standard  be  maintained? 

The  development  of  the  islands  commercially 
and  industrially,  which  depends  initially  on  the 
execution  of  costly  public  works  and  secondarily 
on  a  spirit  of  enterprise  among  its  people,  must  be 
injured  by  any  system  which  interferes  with  the 
economic  balance.  Private  enterprise  and  the  in 
troduction  of  foreign  capital  will  be  retarded  by 
this  interference  with  the  normal  conditions  of 
labor  supply.  Nor  will  this  artificial  stimulus  be 
sufficient  to  carry  the  Filipino  on  the  path  of 
material  progress,  even  were  it  possible  for  Amer 
ica  to  continue  its  present  policy.  The  suggested 
panacea  for  this  situation  seems  to  be  the  incul 
cation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  "  independence  and 
dignity  of  labor  under  a  free  government."  But, 
picturesque  as  this  phrase  may  be,  it  is  rather 
inadequate  for  the  many  problems  it  is  expected 
to  solve.  The  phrase  has  evidently  caught  the 
fancy  of  the  Filipinos,  and  " labor  unions"  have 
been  formed  in  Manila.  Their  principal  instigator 
is  officially  described  as  a  "  crack-brained  insur- 
recto,  with  political  purposes  only."  The  descrip 
tion,  however,  is  rather  euphemistic,  for  seditious 
correspondence  was  found  among  the  archives  of 
the  president,  who  was  in  close  communication 
with  the  ladrones.  It  is  a  significant  circumstance 

102 


GREATER    AMERICA 

that  Manila,  the  headquarters  not  only  of  govern 
ment  but  of  political  parties,  is  still,  as  it  has  al 
ways  been,  the  refuge  of  rebels  and  ladrones,  who 
come  in  whenever  closely  pressed  or  in  want  of 
funds.  This  circumstance  would  lead  one  to  re 
gard  with  distrust  the  formation  of  any  leagues 
or  unions,  and  the  more  so  that,  as  already  said, 
it  has  so  far  been  found  impossible  to  get  any  hold 
on  the  secret  societies  which  exist  throughout  the 
islands. 

The  "  dignity  of  labor,"  therefore,  is  rather  a 
weak  reed  to  lean  on  if  it  can  only  be  advanced 
by  unions.  The  Filipino  has  not  yet  reached  the 
stage  of  being  an  efficient  or  reliable  laborer ;  he  is 
in  his  infancy  still,  and  must  be  cajoled,  bribed, 
and  protected.  It  is,  therefore,  folly  to  talk  of 
his  " combining"  or  " learning  the  spirit  of  co 
operation  "  at  this  stage.  He  will  pick  up  the 
catch- words  fast  enough,  and  may  even  organize 
a  strike  for  higher  wages,  if  the  government  pro 
ceeds  too  fast  with  his  education.  The  example 
of  Americans  is  to  be  one  of  the  most  potent  in 
fluences  in  his  regeneration ;  and  there  is  no  doubt 
that  in  the  use  of  machinery,  the  learning  of 
modern  business  methods,  and  in  other  ways  he 
will  profit  greatly.  But  in  the  department  in 
which  his  labor  is  most  needed,  and  in  which  he 
has  so  far  proved  most  unsatisfactory — that  of 
hard,  unskilled,  daily  labor — he  cannot  learn  the 
dignity  of  the  pursuit  from  white  example,  because 
the  white  man  cannot  perform  such  tasks  in  the 

103 


GREATER    AMERICA 

tropics.  There  is  no  doubt  that  every  Filipino 
would  be  willing  to  have  the  white  man's  job  of 
supervising,  but  it  will  be  difficult  for  him  to 
appreciate  the  "dignity"  of  his  own  position. 

The  most  hopeful  policy  is  that  of  raising  the 
standard  of  life  by  improvements  in  dwelling- 
houses,  sanitation,  and  so  forth,  which  will  bring 
home  to  the  Filipino  the  advantages  of  a  regular 
wage  at  a  rising  scale.  The  next  generation,  with 
improved  education,  will  be  even  more  amenable 
to  such  practical  considerations,  and  in  time  the 
people  may  attain  to  a  sound  economic  position 
which  will  make  genuine  co-operation  possible. 
The  greatest  danger  they  have  to  fear  is  to  be  made 
the  tools  of  the  politicians;  and  until  they  have 
reached  a  higher  level,  socially  and  economically, 
they  cannot  appreciate  their  own  interests  or  pro 
tect  them.  It  is  a  cruel  kindness  to  affect  to  put 
political  power  into  the  hands  of  such  a  democ 
racy  as  this,  and  the  experiment  can  lead  to  noth 
ing  but  misunderstanding  and  confusion,  which 
will  become  chaos  the  minute  the  strong,  guiding 
hand  and  open  purse  of  America  are  withdrawn. 

It  is  obvious,  whatever  side  of  the  question  is 
raised,  that  there  is  a  vast  amount  of  practical 
work  to  be  done  in  the  direction  of  providing  the 
islands  with  some  of  the  elements  of  civilization. 
Every  new  country  occupied  by  white  men  turns 
its  attention  first  to  public  works,  being  aware 
that  on  these  depend  the  prosperity  and  progress 
for  which  they  hope.  In  conquered  countries, 

104 


GREATER    AMERICA 

such  as  India  and  Burma,  or  a  protectorate  like 
Egypt,  it  has  been  found  the  wisest  policy  to 
begin  at  once  with  the  improvement  of  com 
munications,  thus  providing  employment  for  the 
natives,  disciplining  them  in  habits  of  work,  and 
opening  the  way  for  future  trade. 

It  was  natural  to  expect  that  some  such  policy 
would  have  actuated  America  in  the  Philippines, 
and  that  the  rest  of  the  world  would  have  had 
an  object  -  lesson  in  such  a  matter  from  an  in 
tensely  practical  nation,  whose  public  works  are 
acknowledged  to  be  models.  Circumstances  have, 
of  course,  been  adverse.  Cholera,  famine,  cattle 
disease,  and  brigandage  have  followed  in  the  wake 
of  a  devastating  war;  but,  at  the  same  time,  it  is 
surprising  to  find  how  little  has  been  done.  The 
establishment  of  an  elaborate  system  of  govern 
ment,  the  organization  of  a  civil  service,  the  ex 
penditure  of  a  vast  amount  of  time  and  money  in 
planting  American  school-teachers  all  over  the 
islands  seem  to  have  engaged  all  the  available 
energy. 

It  is,  perhaps,  more  astonishing  still  that  an 
illiberal  policy  should  have  been  pursued  towards 
foreign  capital  and  foreigners.  It  was,  of  course, 
only  natural  and  right  that  America  should  es 
tablish  her  own  banks  and  should  protect  the  in 
terests  of  her  nationals  in  every  way,  but  the 
attempt  made  by  stretching  a  point  of  law  to 
prevent  an  English  bank  from  even  bringing  in  a 
clerk  is  but  one  case  out  of  many  in  which  British 


GREATER    AMERICA 

bankers  and  merchants  have  been  hampered  in 
their  business.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that 
the  British  community,  in  whose  hands  some  of 
the  most  important  industries  have  hitherto  been, 
are  laboring  under  a  natural  sense  of  injustice,  in 
creased  by  the  fact  that  inexperienced  officials  fre 
quently  make  matters  worse  than  they  need  be. 
In  the  adjacent  British  colonies  no  discrimination 
is  practised  against  Americans. 

The  question  of  trade  expansion  in  the  Philip 
pines  is  not  at  present  one  on  which  any  very 
definite  information  can  be  obtained.  The  Amer 
icans  point  to  a  great  increase  both  of  exports  and 
imports  since  their  occupation,  but,  apart  from 
the  fact  that  no  very  reliable  data  are  to  be  had  of 
trade  in  Spanish  times,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  the  comparison  loses  much  of  its  significance 
owing  to  the  military  and  civil  occupation  and  the 
artificial  stimulus  thereby  provided.  In  speak 
ing  of  "  in  creased  trade"  also,  it  has  to  be  taken 
into  account  that  revolution  in  the  Philippines 
had  reduced  the  islands  to  a  very  low  ebb  just 
before  the  American  occupation.  The  snapping 
of  all  links  with  Spain  is  another  misleading  circum 
stance,  since  most  of  the  trade  with  that  country 
has  now  gone  to  swell  the  bulk  of  traffic  with  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States,  without 
involving  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  total. 
Notwithstanding  the  optimism  natural  to  the  of 
ficial  view,  the  foreign  community,  American  and 
European,  are  unanimous  in  declaring  that  the 

106 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Philippines  are  far  from  being  in  a  promising  con 
dition  commercially.  The  United  States  must 
supply  the  chief  markets  for  Philippine  products, 
and  a  higher  measure  of  reciprocity  than  that  at 
present  granted  is  universally  demanded.  Agri 
culture  is  the  one  resource  of  the  people  —  the 
only  possible  pursuit  under  present  conditions— 
and  agriculture  is  described  (officially)  as  being 
"wofully  depressed."  Tobacco  and  sugar  are  the 
most  important  products  of  the  archipelago,  and, 
as  in  Cuba,  the  barriers  against  these  in  the  United 
States  markets  are  likely  to  prove  serious  obsta 
cles  and  retard  the  prosperity  of  the  islands.  The 
importance  of  China  as  an  outlet  for  Philippine 
produce,  and  the  possibilities  of  Manila  as  a  second 
Hong-Kong  or  Singapore  must  be  largely  affected 
by  the  result  of  the  dispute  between  Japan  and 
Russia.  Commercial  treaties  with  China,  such 
as  have  been  recently  executed  by  the  United 
States,  should  vitally  influence  the  development 
of  the  Philippines,  but  the  power  of  China  to 
execute  them  is  dependent  on  a  very  doubtful 
question:  whether  the  Oriental  is  to  retain  his 
position  in  the  East,  or  whether  he  is  to  fall  ir 
retrievably  under  the  heel  of  the  Slav.  To  put 
it  more  plainly — the  intensely  protectionist  and 
monopolistic  policy  of  Russia  makes  her  aggression 
a  menace  not  only  to  the  Oriental  but  to  every 
power  which  is  interested  in  the  commercial 
development  of  the  Far  East. 

The   introduction   of   capital   into   the   Philip- 

107 


GREATER    AMERICA 

pine  islands  for  the  development  of  industries 
seems  to  be  an  essential,  if  any  progress  is  to 
be  made;  but  in  view  of  the  modern  develop 
ment  of  capitalism  in  America,  it  was  felt  de 
sirable  to  make  restrictions  which  would  prevent 
the  creation  of  Trusts  and  secure  the  Filipinos 
a  proper  share  in  the  exploitation  of  their  own 
country.  Laudable  as  was  this  design,  like  that 
of  excluding  the  Chinese,  it  is  undoubtedly  in 
strumental  in  preventing  the  development  of  the 
country.  American  capitalists  no  longer  care  for 
the  smaller  forms  of  enterprise;  nor  are  the  con 
ditions  favorable  to  these.  Political  power  is  ex 
ploited  for  the  support  of  all  great  undertakings, 
and  can  only  be  commanded  by  those  operating 
on  a  great  scale.  The  Trusts  feed  the  machine  and 
the  machine  feeds  the  Trusts,  and  there  is  no  place 
in  modern  America  for  anything  small  or  modest. 

The  difficulty  is  to  reconcile  the  conflicting 
interests  of  the  Filipinos.  If  they  are  to  be  set 
among  the  really  free  nations,  they  must  become 
prosperous  and  industrious  as  soon  as  possible; 
and  how  to  accomplish  this  without  resource 
either  to  Chinese  labor  or  the  American  capitalist 
is  a  problem  enough  to  puzzle  the  wisest.  Com 
promise  only  is  possible,  just  as  compromise 
alone  has  adjusted  the  relations  between  democ 
racy  and  imperialism.  But  compromises  are  slow 
in  working,  uncertain  in  their  tendencies,  and  it  is 
impossible  to  foresee  what  the  future  will  bring. 

To  go  back  to  the  material  progress  of  the 

1 08 


GREATER    AMERICA 

islands,  we  find  that  after  three  years  of  actual 
civil  government  —  though  many  parts  of  the 
archipelago  were  pacified  earlier — not  one  yard 
of  railway  has  been  begun;  only  one  wagon-road 
is  in  process  of  construction ;  no  canals  or  deepen 
ing  of  rivers  have  been  undertaken,  nor  any  im 
provements  of  harbors,1  except  at  Manila;  while 
the  inter-island  communication  has  only  recently 
been  facilitated  by  the  purchase  of  fifteen  small 
coasting  steamers.  The  office  of  chief  consulting 
engineer  for  the  archipelago  was  only  organized 
in  October,  1902,  and  the  provision  made  to  se 
cure  improvement  of  public  works  in  the  prov 
inces  has  proved  entirely  inadequate,  because  the 
extremely  low  salaries  offered  to  the  provincial 
engineers  could  not  attract  competent  men,  and 
also  because  those  who  were  fairly  competent  had 
no  stimulus  or  encouragement  to  bestir  themselves. 
Efforts  have  been  made  to  improve  sanitation  in 
the  chief  towns,  but  nothing  permanent  will  be 
accomplished  in  that  direction  without  the  most 
sweeping  reforms  and  strict  discipline.  The  open 
ing  of  communications  would  have  been  far  more 
useful  than  the  spread  of  democratic  theories  or 
arguments  about  the  "dignity  of  labor."  Relief- 
works  are  badly  needed  in  many  districts,  but 
these  can  only  be  profitably  carried  out  by  an  ex 
perienced  and  properly  organized  Public  Works 

1  A  naval  base  is  badly  needed  in  the  Philippines,  and  a  site 
has  been  chosen  at  Subig  Bay,  but  the  necessary  legislation  is 
still  in  abeyance. 

109 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Department.  The  functions  of  this  department 
should  have  begun,  immediately  peace  was  re 
stored  in  any  district,  by  the  preparation  of  sur 
veys.  Unfortunately,  the  uncertainty  which  pre 
vailed  as  to  the  course  which  America  would  take 
led  to  a  makeshift  government,  a  hastily  organized 
net- work  of  bureaus,  and  a  lack  of  forethought  and 
provision  for  the  future. 

Thus  legislation  on  the  subject  of  Chinese  labor 
and  of  franchises  has  been  already  subject  to 
revision,  and  will  probably  need  further  modifica 
tion.  Much  still  remains  to  be  done  to  render  the 
judicial  system  satisfactory  and  to  secure  the  up 
rightness  of  courts ;  commercial  prosperity  has  not 
been  placed  on  a  sound  basis,  nor  has  agriculture 
received  the  necessary  stimulus. 

The  work  of  criticism  is  easy,  and  it  was  inevi 
table  that  a  great  number  of  serious  blunders  should 
be  made  at  the  outset.  When  we  remember  the 
character  of  the  control  exercised  at  Washington 
and  the  absence  of  any  machinery  for  dealing 
adequately  with  these  serious  problems,  it  can 
hardly  be  wondered  at  that  the  executive  in  the 
Philippines  has  failed  in  many  respects.  There 
have  been  displayed  by  American  officials  in  the 
Philippines  a  devotion,  ability,  and  disinterested 
ness  which  reflect  the  highest  honor  on  them 
selves  and  their  country ;  but  the  conditions  under 
which  they  held  office,  and,  above  all,  the  demands 
made  on  them  by  public  opinion  in  America,  have 
seriously  hampered  them  in  constructive  work, 

no 


GREATER    AMERICA 

What  was  wanted  was  less  idealism  and  more 
common -sense — a  curious  criticism  to  make  on 
American  achievements,  but  nevertheless  true.  If 
the  average  American  could  see  in  the  expansion 
of  his  race  its  true  significance,  if  he  could  rid 
himself  of  the  idea  that  he  alone  possesses  the 
touch- stone  of  freedom,  if  he  were  less  concerned 
with  the  ethics  of  government  and  more  with  its 
practical  justice  and  incorruptibility — if,  in  fact, 
he  ceased  to  masquerade  as  the  apostle  of  liberty 
and  were  content  to  appear  simply  as  a  peace-and- 
order  -  loving  Anglo  -  Saxon,  he  would  immensely 
simplify  the  task  he  has  set  himself.  By  all  means 
let  him  strive  after  his  ideal  democracy.  He  can 
find  abundant  material  for  reform  in  his  own 
continent.  Let  him  do  all  he  can  to  adjust  the 
relations  between  man  and  man  in  the  manner 
most  perfectly  consonant  with  liberty  and  equality. 
But  let  him  not,  in  a  blind  effort  to  prove  his  own 
adherence  to  a  shibboleth  to  which  he  gives  the 
lie  every  day  in  his  dealings  with  negroes  or 
Indians,  force  the  Filipino  along  the  path  that 
leads  to  anarchy. 

Common-sense  says  that  the  Filipinos  wanted 
peace,  good  government,  and  commercial  pros 
perity.  America  has  given  them  political  institu 
tions  and  legislation.  Filipinos  wanted  education ; 
Americans  are  determined  to  give  them  that.  Un 
fortunately  they  have  forgotten  that  obedience  is 
the  first  lesson,  and  that  one  must  not  begin  to 
rule  until  one  has  learned  to  obey. 

in 


CHAPTER  V 

CARIBBEAN  EXPANSION:    CUBANS  AND  THEIR  AMER 
ICAN  FRIENDS 

THE  present  condition  of  Cuba  and  her  possi 
bilities  for  the  future  are  little  understood  on 
the  British  side  of  the  Atlantic,  though  a  less 
confused  conception  undoubtedly  prevails  in  the 
United  States.  In  theory,  we  have  the  edifying 
spectacle  of  a  tiny  nation,  goaded  to  desperation 
by  the  cruelty  of  their  masters,  turning  on  them, 
and,  after  a  life-and-death  struggle,  being  rescued 
by  the  strong  arm  of  a  disinterested  neighbor, 
who,  after  finishing  the  fight  and  setting  the 
Cuban  house  in  order,  departs  with  streaming 
banners  for  his  own  country,  followed  by  blessings 
from  Cuba  Libre.  We  expect,  then,  to  see  this 
new  republic  settling  down  comfortably  under  the 
protecting  wing  of  her  liberty-loving  neighbor,  and 
becoming  a  good  and  prosperous  little  country. 

Before  one  can  put  the  lights  and  shades  into 
this  very  impressionist  sketch,  however,  it  is  nec 
essary  first  to  understand  to  a  certain  extent  the 
character  of  the  Cubans  and  the  conditions  of 
life  in  the  island,  and  also  to  appreciate  the  cir 
cumstances  which  drove  the  Cubans  to  rebellion 

112 


GREATER    AMERICA 

and  the  exact  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  her  little  neighbor.  No  palliation  need  be 
sought  for  the  abuses  of  Spanish  government,  no 
unnecessary  cynicism  displayed  as  to  American 
disinterestedness,  in  order  to  show  that  the  ordi 
nary  view  of  Cuban  affairs  is  hardly  a  true  one. 

It  is  not  unusual,  especially  in  America,  to  hear 
the  Cubans  spoken  of  as  if  they  were  a  people 
similar  to  the  American  colonists  at  the  time  of 
the  Revolution,  and  as  if  they  achieved  their  in 
dependence  after  a  similar  struggle.  Apart,  how 
ever,  from  the  superficial  resemblance  arising  from 
the  fact  that  they  are  a  white,  or  nominally  white, 
race,  that  they  revolted  successfully  against  a 
European  monarchy,  and  that  their  rebellion  was 
largely  the  result  of  economic  exactions  on  the 
part  of  the  mother-country,  there  is  little  re 
semblance.  The  Cubans  are  not  only  widely  dif 
ferent  in  character  but  also  in  their  circumstances. 

To  take  first  the  most  important  question  of 
race.  The  Cubans  are  a  Latin  people,  that  being 
the  principal  and  dominant  race  in  the  island,  and 
the  one  whose  civilization,  manners,  language,  and 
character  color  the  whole  life.  Two  generations 
in  the  island  go  to  make  a  true  Cubano ;  but  there 
can  still  hardly  be  said  to  be  a  Cuban  race.  The 
Cuban  may  be  of  Latin  or  negro  stock,  or  perhaps 
combine  the  two  with  a  dash  of  Indian  blood ;  and 
if  we  speak  of  the  whole  Cuban  people  as  a  "  race," 
or  even  as  a  nation,  we  are  evidently  beside  the 
mark.  Although  the  process  of  fusing  many 


GREATER    AMERICA 

peoples,  till  lately  mostly  of  kindred  and  Northern 
stock,  is  said  to  have  evolved  a  national  type  in 
the  United  States,  there  is,  in  fact,  a  good  deal  of 
imagination  even  about  this  "  American  type," 
which,  before  the  recent  influx  from  eastern 
Europe,  already  varied  to  a  considerable  degree, 
according  to  climatic  conditions  and  the  original 
stock  with  which  each  region  was  peopled.  A 
small  island  like  Cuba,  shut  out  as  far  as  possible 
by  restrictive  barriers  from  the  rest  of  the  world, 
save  its  mother-country,  from  which  it  received 
a  constant  reinforcement,  might  seem,  at  first 
sight,  to  have  more  chance  of  evolving  a  national 
type,  but  it  is  far  more  probable  that  a  type 
evolved  under  such  circumstances  would  remain 
fundamentally  true  to  the  racial  conditions  to 
which  it  owed  its  origin. 

The  original  stocks  were  three — Spanish,  negro, 
and  Indian;  but  the  last  was  early  extinguished, 
and  only  its  traces  now  remain,  although  it  is 
quite  possible  to  distinguish  them  in  some  of  the 
half-breed  people.1  The  two  great  races  of  Cubans 
are,  therefore,  the  White  and  the  Black,  and  be 
tween  them  is  a  large  and  growing  mulatto  class, 
of  all  shades.  No  rigid  line  separates  the  Spaniard 
from  the  negro,  so  far  as  intermarriage  is  con- 

1  It  may  be  well  to  note  here  the  mixture  of  races  in  Spanish 
America.  These  were:  (i)  European  Spaniards,  (2)  Creoles 
(children  of  Spanish  parents),  (3)  Indians  (indigenous),  (4) 
negroes  (of  African  race),  (5)  mestizos  (children  of  whites 
and  Indians),  (6)  mulattoes  (children  of  whites  and  negroes), 
(7)  zamboes  (children  of  Indians  and  negroes). 

114 


GREATER    AMERICA 

cerned;  and  still  less  from  the  Cuban  creole,  with 
whom  he  has  always  intermarried  freely.  There 
is  no  race  prejudice  —  only  class  distinction  —  in 
Cuba,  and  many  colored  people  are  placed  by 
their  circumstances  on  a  footing  of  equality  with 
whites.  Here  lies  one  essential  difference — a  very 
wide  one — between  the  Cuban  and  the  American. 
The  prevalence  and  strength  of  class  distinctions 
is,  however,  a  strong  feature  in  all  Spanish-Amer 
ican  countries  and  owes  its  existence  to  the  early 
conditions  of  colonization  and  to  the  inequalities 
of  wealth  caused  by  the  exploitation  of  natural 
resources.  It  is  only  of  recent  years  that  the 
United  States  has  offered  the  spectacle  of  great 
fortunes  co-existing  with  poverty  and  misery,  but 
this  was  from  the  first  one  of  the  elements  of  social 
life  in  Spanish  colonies,  where  the  strong  enriched 
themselves  at  the  expense  of  the  weak.  This 
radical  difference  in  the  fabric  of  society  cannot 
be  altered  by  legislation  or  wholesale  reforms. 

The  Spaniards  always  occupied  a  unique  posi 
tion.  As  the  dominant  race,  in  the  early  days 
especially,  their  peninsular  birth  gave  them  a 
social  status,  increased  by  the  fact  that  they  were 
government  officials,  wealthy  planters,  or  business 
men.  The  Cuban  aristocracy  was  chiefly  made 
up  of  planters,  who  frequently  bought  titles — 
the  Spanish  " grandees"  who  owned  property  sel 
dom  lived  on  the  island  —  and  society  was  suf 
ficiently  catholic  to  include  every  one  of  means 
and  education.  A  very  pleasant  society  it  was, 


GREATER    AMERICA 

despite  the  formality  and  etiquette  which  the  cus 
toms  of  the  old  country  prescribed.  Lavish  expen 
diture,  open  hospitality,  charming  courtesy,  easy 
gayety,  and  a  considerable  degree  of  refinement 
were  the  rule.  The  men  were  educated  abroad — 
in  Spain,  France,  or  the  United  States;  the  women 
were  celebrated  for  grace  and  beauty;  and,  while 
the  commercial  prosperity  lasted,  heavy  taxes  and 
governmental  abuses  were  little  felt  by  the  in 
fluential  classes.  Even  the  negro  slaves  enjoyed, 
on  the  whole,  an  easy  lot.  Although  no  attempt 
was  made  to  educate  or  elevate  them,  the  easy 
going  habits  of  the  country  made  for  their  hap 
piness,  and,  as  in  the  Southern  States,  the  house 
hold  negroes  were  more  pets  than  slaves. 

Despite  the  exactions  of  venal  Spanish  officials, 
then,  the  three  component  parts  of  Cuban  life 
were  fairly  harmonious  until  the  decline  of  com 
mercial  prosperity  put  another  strain  on  their 
relations.  The  Cuban  Creole  and  the  peninsular 
Spaniard  were  brothers  in  feeling  as  well  as  blood, 
but  at  the  same  time  a  process  was  at  work  which 
tended  to  differentiate  them,  and  with  the  birth 
of  Cuban  independence  as  a  sentiment,  which  took 
place  about  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
began  the  true  evolution  of  the  modern  Cuban. 
The  growing  distrust  ripened  into  a  family  quar 
rel,  until,  at  last,  feeling  became  so  bitter  that  a 
Cuban  would  spit  after  mentioning  the  very  name 
of  Spaniard,  and  the  consequent  breaking-off  of 
ties  naturally  led  to  an  exaggeration  of  all  points 

116 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  difference  between  the  Creole  and  the  peninsular 
man.  Even  so,  it  would  have  been  difficult  for  a 
stranger,  in  many  cases,  to  distinguish  the  native- 
born,  and  it  is  impossible  to  overlook  the  fact  that, 
racially  and  congenitally,  the  white  Cubans  are 
Spanish. 

The  modifications  of  the  Anglo  -  Saxon  race  on 
the  American  continent  have  hardly  produced  one 
type,  but  rather  several  types,  of  which  the  most 
that  we  can  say  is  that  they  differ  in  some  par 
ticulars  from  the  English  one.  These  modifica 
tions  are,  however,  more  mental  than  physical,  and 
if  we  set  aside  social  and  political  differences 
arising  out  of  different  conditions  and  influences, 
we  shall  find  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  breeds  true, 
whether  in  America,  Australia,  or  Great  Britain. 
We  can  confidently  expect  of  him  a  certain  mor 
al  standard,  a  large  share  of  practical  common- 
sense,  an  unquenchable  energy  and  ambition,  and 
a  lack  of  artistic  instinct.  The  fundamental  char 
acteristics  of  each  race  will  be  similarly  observed 
in  their  several  migrations,  and  are  singularly  ex 
emplified  in  the  colonial  evolution  of  the  great 
Latin  nations. 

In  Cuba,  despite  a  certain  amount  of  reinforce 
ment  from  the  mother-country,  a  marked  physi 
cal  modification  has  taken  place.  The  Cubano  is 
slighter,  smaller,  and  darker  than  the  true  Span 
iard,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  in  physique, 
at  all  events,  he  has  deteriorated.  This  is  the 
natural  effect  of  a  tropical  climate  on  white  races 

117 


GREATER    AMERICA 

and  their  descendants,  accentuated  doubtless  by 
the  early  marriages  which  seem  the  natural  con 
sequence  of  'life  in  tropical  countries,  where  the 
women  mature  early.  Notwithstanding  physical 
modification,  the  Cubano  remains  in  character  and 
proclivities  very  Spanish,  the  chief  change  in  this 
respect  being  merely  an  exaggeration  of  certain 
traits.  Negro  blood  brings  its  own  inevitable 
tendencies  and  limitations,  and  the  Indian  strain 
has  undoubtedly  helped  to  give  Cubans  their 
character  for  amiability;  but  the  main  charac 
teristics  may  without  exception  be  traced  back 
to  Spain.  As  regards  the  mingling  of  Spanish 
and  colored  blood,  it  can  only  be  said  that,  al 
though  there  have  been  exceptional  individuals  of 
the  mulatto  or  mestizo  class,  the  result  as  a  whole 
is  deterioration  from  a  moral  as  well  as  a  physical 
point  of  view.  The  predisposition  to  disease  in 
half-breeds  between  white  and  colored  races  is  a 
recognized  fact;  and  it  has  been  specially  noted 
in  the  West  Indies  that  a  contagious  malady  proves 
more  fatal  to  the  slightly  colored  class  than  to  any 
other.  The  half-breeds  lack  the  virility  and  stay 
ing  power  of  the  pure  races.  Their  mental  and 
moral  qualities  are  a  delicate  subject  for  dis 
cussion.  Englishmen  have  always  felt  a  strong 
prejudice  in  this  respect,  even  in  the  case  of 
so  refined  and  cultivated  a  people  as  the  Hindoos.1 

1  In  a  letter,  only  published  after  his  death,  and  written  at 
the  request  of  a  Japanese  statesman,  the  late  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer  gives  expression  to  this  antipathy  for  fusion  between 

118 


GREATER    AMERICA 

This  objection  is,  of  course,  founded  on  race  prej 
udice,  but  it  has  been  confirmed  by  experience, 
which  shows  that,  despite  brilliant  exceptions,  the 
half-breed  is  as  a  class  unreliable,  superficial,  in 
clined  to  be  tricky,  to  reproduce  the  worst  features 
of  both  parents,  and,  even  under  the  most  favor 
able  conditions,  to  degenerate  in  physique.  The 
race  question  is  further  complicated  in  Cuba  by 
the  fact  that  in  this  case  the  colored  element  is 
negro.  Hitherto  the  negro  problem  has  troubled 
Cuba  but  little,  but  in  the  near  future,  when  the 
simultaneous  introduction  of  American  prejudices 
and  individual  rights  begin  to  clash,  there  will 
inevitably  arise  some  very  curious  situations.  The 
jealousy  of  the  genuine  negro  towards  his  colored 
half-brother,  which  is  so  strong  a  factor  in  Hayti, 
is  certain  to  gain  ground  in  Cuba.  Despite  the 
fact  that  the  mulatto  as  a  class  is  undesirable, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  almost  every  individual  of 
the  negro  race  who  has  risen  to  real  eminence  has 
owed  something  to  a  white  strain.  It  is  the  brill 
iance  of  these  exceptions  which  makes  the  rule 

races  far  apart  in  characteristics  and  civilization.  He  says: 
"The  physiological  basis  of  this  experience  (the  physical 
deterioration  of  half-breeds)  appears  to  be  that  any  one 
variety  of  creature  in  course  of  many  generations  acquires  a 
certain  constitutional  adaptation  to  its  particular  form  of 
life,  and  every  other  variety  similarly  acquires  its  own  special 
adaptation.  The  consequence  is  that,  if  you  mix  the  con 
stitution  of  two  widely  divergent  varieties  which  have  severally 
become  adapted  to  widely  divergent  modes  of  life,  you  get  a 
constitution  which  is  adapted  to  the  mode  of  life  of  neither  .  .  . 
there  arises  an  incalculable  mixture  of  traits,  and  what  may 
be  called  a  chaotic  constitution." 

119 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  inferiority  so  much  more  evident,  and  at  the 
same  time  casts  a  serious  doubt  on  the  wisdom  of 
popular  government  for  Cuba.  Popular  govern 
ment — unless  it  is  a  farce,  as  it  so  often  is — means 
the  ascendency  of  the  masses  and  not  of  the 
brilliant  exceptions.  Both  as  regards  colored  and 
black  Cubans  this  is  to  be  regretted. 

The  experience  of  Britain  in  the  West  Indies 
inculcates  the  lesson  of  caution,  and,  according 
to  most  French  authorities,  the  broad  powers  of 
self-government  granted  to  the  French  West  Ind 
ian  colonies  are  by  no  means  an  assured  success. 
"As  regards  politics,"  Leroy-Beaulieu  says,  "we 
have  introduced  French  liberty  into  our  colonies; 
we  give  them  civil  governors ;  we  admit  their  rep 
resentatives  into  our  parliament.  .  .  .  All  these 
reforms  are  excellent  in  themselves.  It  is  un 
fortunately  to  be  feared  that  they  will,  in  practice, 
result  in  abuses,  and  that  unless  the  mother- 
country  is  very  watchful  those  free  powers  which 
she  has  granted  to  her  colonies  will  become  pow 
ers  of  oppression."1 

The  proportions  of  the  population  seem  to 
show,  however,  that  the  whites  are  sufficiently 
numerous  to  outweigh  all  others.  Roughly  speak 
ing,  one-half  are  white,  one-sixth  mixed,  and  one- 
third  black,  with  a  few  Chinese.  Strict  analysis 
would  undoubtedly  reduce  the  numbers  of  the  first 
considerably  and  add  them  to  the  second.  A  re- 

1  Colonization  chez  les  peuples  modernes. 

120 


GREATER    AMERICA 

markable  influx  of  white  immigrants,  however,  is 
taking  place,  though,  unfortunately,  it  is  by  no 
means  permanent.  During  the  last  six  months  of 
1900,  of  a  total  of  fifteen  thousand,  twelve  thou 
sand  were  Spanish,  one  thousand  from  the  United 
States,  and  nine  hundred  were  from  Mexico.1  The 
negro  population  would  probably  have  been  a 
good  deal  larger  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  during 
the  years  of  emancipation  great  mortality  was  the 
rule.  But,  though  the  blacks  will  increase  more 
rapidly  under  the  new  conditions,  it  seems  highly 
probable,  if  not  certain,  that  the  white  element 
will  have  no  difficulty  in  maintaining  its  superior 
ity.  This  element  is  Spanish  by  race,  traditions, 
and  customs.  Its  civilization  is  Spanish,  and  by 
every  tie  of  feeling  and  sentiment,  by  mental, 
moral,  and  social  affinity,  it  is  bound  to  the  land 
which  gave  it  birth,  although  politically  the 
connection  is  severed.  This  fact  is  not  forgotten 
by  the  Cubans.  Gratitude  to  the  United  States 
for  her  intervention  on  their  behalf  and  a  desire 
to  emulate  her  in  the  paths  of  progress  have  by 
no  means  bridged  the  gulf  between  the  Latin  and 
Anglo-Saxon  races. 

In  order  to  understand  the  position  of  Cuba  to 
day,  we  must  gain  a  clear  idea  of  the  Cubans,  and 


1  During  three  years  ending  December  31,  1901,  fifty-four 
thousand  Spaniards,  two  thousand  Chinese,  thirteen  thou 
sand  from  other  countries  entered  Cuba.  Many  Galicians  and 
Canary- 1  slanders  came  for  the  year  only.  The  Asturians  en 
ter  clerical  service  and  the  Catalans  are  skilled  workmen. 


121 


GREATER    AMERICA 

especially   of   the   white   Cubans,    who   must   in 
evitably  constitute  the  ruling  class. 

The  Cuban,  as  already  said,  is  the  heir  not  only 
of  Spanish  civilization  but  of  Spanish  character, 
which  has  filtered  down  to  him  through  corrupt 
channels.  In  no  case  has  he  developed  any 
traits  which  are  not  typically  Spanish,  and  from 
various  causes  he  has,  on  the  whole,  an  average 
record  far  lower  than  that  of  his  peninsular 
forebear.  The  causes  may  be  briefly  stated  as 
being,  first,  physical  deterioration,  the  result  of 
climate;  secondly,  moral  deterioration  (in  1899 
the  percentage  of  lawful  marriages  was  only  15.7), 
partly  climatic  and  partly  the  result  of  circum 
stances;  and  thirdly,  mental  deterioration,  owing 
to  defective  educational  opportunities,  the  extent 
of  which  may  be  realized  when  we  read  that  even 
after  the  American  occupation  57  per  cent,  of  the 
population  were  illiterate.  The  last  two  causes 
were,  more  or  less,  the  inevitable  result  of  Spain's 
mistaken  colonial  policy,  and  her  repressive  meas 
ures  had  undoubtedly  a  great  effect  in  quenching 
ambitions  which  would  have  led  Cubans  on  the 
path  of  progress.  Nevertheless,  the  upper  classes 
in  Cuba  enjoyed  during  a  period  of  their  history 
a  prosperity  which  has  left  its  mark  to  this  day, 
and  which  opened  to  them  opportunities  of  self- 
development.  They  also  enjoyed,  against  the  de 
sire  of  their  masters,  a  freer  intercourse  with  the 
United  States  than  had  any  other  Latin- American 
colony.  They  received  immigrants  with  advanced 

122 


GREATER    AMERICA 

ideas  from  the  French  islands,  from  Europe,  and 
even  from  Louisiana.  Altogether,  it  is  hardly  fair 
to  represent  them  as  having  been  entirely  cut  off 
from  the  rest  of  the  civilized  world. 

It  is  true  that  there  have  been  distinguished 
Cubans  in  Europe  —  such  as  Jose  de  Heredia, 
elected  to  the  French  Academy;  and  Suner,  the 
well-known  dramatist  in  Italy — and  that  some 
have  held  office  in  Spain.  But  in  Cuba  we  find 
lawyers  and  doctors  by  the  hundred  (some  very 
skilful),  but  no  administrators;  scientists,  but  no 
inventors;  poets,  but  (with,  perhaps,  a  couple  of 
exceptions)  no  engineers;  politicians,  but  few 
business-men;  orators,  but  no  skilled  laborers; 
musicians,  but  no  hotel-keepers.  It  must  be  re 
membered  that  to  French  immigrants  the  Cubans 
owed  the  development  of  the  sugar-cane,  which 
was  the  foundation  of  their  prosperity.  Other 
French  settlers  introduced  apiculture,  long  a  most 
profitable  industry ;  indigo  owed  its  cultivation  to 
the  Spaniard  Las  Casas,  and  to  this  day  business- 
houses  are  in  Spanish,  American,  German,  and 
British,  rather  than  Cuban,  hands.  In  the  ranks 
of  the  leaders  of  Cuban  independence  some  of  the 
most  distinguished  names  were  those  of  peninsular 
Spaniards ;  and,  in  judging  the  achievement  of  any 
eminent  man  in  Cuba,  it  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  two  generations  at  least  must  be  born  in  the 
island  before  we  can  fairly  assume  that  the  type  is 
a  Cuban  one. 

Three   salient   characteristics   of   the   Spaniard 

123 


GREATER    AMERICA 

have  taken  deep  root  on  Cuban  soil,  being  fostered 
by  the  conditions  of  life  in  the  tropics.  They  are 
thi  aristocratic  bias,  the  love  of  political  theory, 
intrigue,  and  oratory,  and  the  natural  indolence 
both  of  mind  and  body.  To  these  we  may  add  a 
natural  gayety  which,  to  the  Northerner  mere 
frivolity,  characterizes  all  children  of  the  Sunny 
South.  On  the  whole,  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
the  main  defect  in  Cuban  character — the  result  of 
heredity  fostered  by  environment — is  a  lack  of 
practical  capacity.  The  greatest  drawback  to 
Cuban  progress  is  the  scarcity  of  agricultural  labor 
and  the  practical  non-existence  of  skilled  labor. 

Such  being  the  main  characteristics  of  the  peo 
ple  of  Cuba,  we  will  now  turn  to  the  effect  which 
propinquity  to  the  United  States  has  had  on  her 
history.  It  is  a  natural  outcome  of  the  geo 
graphical  and  economic  conditions  of  Cuba  that 
from  the  earliest  period  of  American  independence 
the  relations  between  the  island  and  the  continent 
should  have  been  very  close. 

Shortly  before  the  American  colonies  gained 
their  independence  an  event  happened  in  Cuba 
which  had  considerable  effect  in  opening  her  ports 
to  trade,  and  thus  permitting  a  greater  freedom 
of  intercourse  with  the  continent.  This  was  the 
British  occupation  of  Cuba,  in  1762,  as  the  result 
of  the  Family  compact,  Florida  being  also  ceded 
to  Britain.  Although  the  occupation  was  short 
lived,  it  gave  a  great  impetus  to  her  ports  and  to 
the  upper  and  wealthier  classes.  The  restoration 

124 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  Cuba  to  Spain,  in  1814,  restored  the  old  regime 
of  monopoly,  repression,  and  isolation,  and  the 
secession  of  Mexico,  in  1821,  severed  a  connection 
which  had  brought  Cuba  a  large  part  of  her 
revenue.  But  the  era  of  prosperity  which  had 
set  in  continued  till  1825,  and  Cuba,  while  it 
lasted,  was  oblivious  of  other  considerations. 
Ports  were  opened  and  the  cultivation  of  sugar 
became  enormously  profitable.  Under  these  con 
ditions  no  restrictions  or  disadvantages  could 
outbalance  the  wave  of  prosperity,  and  during 
the  palmy  days  of  the  West  Indian  islands  Cuba 
was  the  richest  of  all.  It  is  hard  for  any  one 
acquainted  with  the  West  Indies  of  to-day  to  re 
construct  this  golden  age.  Coming  across  a  de 
serted  palace  in  the  midst  of  wild  scenery,  in  which 
the  sugar  culture  can  hardly  be  traced,  we  note 
the  marble  columns,  the  decaying  floors,  once 
richly  inlaid,  the  stately  staircase  with  broken 
balusters,  and  it  is  almost  impossible  to  realize 
how  comparatively  short  is  the  period  which  has 
turned  this  home,  once  the  abode  of  wealth  and 
luxury,  into  a  haunt  for  birds  and  beasts.  No 
where  is  the  contrast  more  marked  than  in  Cuba, 
where  war  has  destroyed  what  remained  after  a 
long  period  of  economic  depression. 

The  halcyon  days  lasted  for  nearly  half  a 
century,  and  it  is  not,  perhaps,  surprising  that  in 
the  early  days  of  the  American  Republic  Cuba 
would  have  been  welcomed  into  the  Union. 
Annexation  was  freely  talked  about,  despite  the 

I25 


GREATER    AMERICA 

fact  that,  during  the  Napoleonic  period  in  Spain 
and  the  independence  of  the  American -Spanish 
colonies,  Cuba  had  remained  stanch,  earning  there 
by  the  title  of  " loyal  Cuba."  It  is  hardly  to  be 
questioned  that  at  this  time  Cuba  herself,  so  far 
as  she  possessed  an  individuality,  would  have 
resisted  any  attempt  to  annex  her.  The  policy, 
therefore,  of  the  United  States  was  to  preserve 
Cuba  from  European  control.  Early  in  the  last 
century,  in  1809,  Jefferson  wrote:  "I  would  im 
mediately  erect  a  column  on  the  southernmost 
limit  of  Cuba  and  inscribe  on  it  a  ne  plus  ultra 
as  to  us  in  that  direction."  And  Madison,  soon 
after,  expressed  similar  views.1  In  1823,  John 
Quincy  Adams  delivered  himself  of  his  famous  in 
struction  to  the  minister  at  Madrid  to  the  effect 
that  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  are  "  natural  append 
ages  of  the  North  American  continent,"  and  the 
former  "  an  object  of  transcendent  importance  to 
the  commercial  and  political  interests  of  our 
Union."  He  pointed  out  the  commanding  posi 
tion  of  the  island,  the  safe  and  commodious  harbor 
of  Havana,  fronting  a  long  seaboard  destitute  of 
these  advantages,  and  the  economic  dependence 
on  the  United  States.  And,  in  conclusion,  he 
added:  "  Looking  forward  ...  for  half  a  century, 
it  is  scarcely  possible  to  resist  the  conviction  that 

1  The  United  States,  he  wrote  in  1810,  "could  not  be  a 
satisfied  spectator  at  its  falling  under  any  European  govern 
ment,  which  might  make  a  fulcrum  of  that  position  against 
the  commerce  and  security  of  the  United  States." — Madison's 
Works,  vol.  ii.,  p.  488. 

126 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  annexation  of  Cuba  to  our  republic  will  be  in 
dispensable  to  the  continuance  and  integrity  of 
the  Union  itself."  At  this  time  Jefferson  ad 
vocated  the  "  peaceful  acquisition  "  of  Cuba.  "  It 
is  better,  then,"  he  wrote,  "to  lie  still  in  readi 
ness  to  receive  that  interesting  incorporation  when 
solicited  by  herself,  for  certainly  her  addition  to 
our  confederacy  is  exactly  what  is  wanted  to  round 
our  power  as  a  nation  to  the  point  of  its  utmost 
interest!"1  In  direct  sequence  to  this  declaration 
is  the  action  of  Clay,  two  years  later,  in  warning 
France  and  other  powers  off  Cuba  and  Puerto 
Rico,  this  being  actually  the  first  application  of 
the  doctrine  identified  with  Monroe. 

It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  this  develop 
ment  of  interest  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
should  pass  unheeded  by  the  Cubans.  Prosperity 
had  taught  them  much,  too.  The  sons  of  rich 
planters  went  to  France  or  the  United  States  for 
education,  and  came  back  full  of  the  newest  and 
most  revolutionary  ideas.  Rebellions  became  fre 
quent,  and  in  1835  Cubans  claimed  from  Spain 
representation  in  the  Cortes,  and  the  contempt 
with  which  the  request  was  refused  burned  deep 
into  their  souls.  From  this  period  may  be  dated 
the  growth  of  the  movement  for  Cuban  indepen 
dence.  Repression  became  more  and  more  the 
order  of  the  day,  though  one  or  two  of  the  Captains- 
General — Tacon,  for  instance — introduced  reforms 

1  Madison's  Works,  vol.  vii.,  p.  299. 
127 


GREATER    AMERICA 

and  kept  things  together  for  a  time.  In  1840  and 
1843,  however,  it  became  certain  that  Cuba  would 
not  be  permitted  to  achieve  her  ends  by  enlisting 
the  support  of  any  European  power,  for  the  United 
States  assured  Spain  that,  in  the  event  of  any 
attack  on  her  West  Indian  possessions,  she  would 
have  the  assistance  of  "the  whole  naval  and 
military  resources"  of  the  North  American  Re 
public. 

"Until  1845  ti16  Monroe  Doctrine  was  applied  to 
prevent  acquisition  by  any  other  European  power, 
but  shortly  after  came  a  development  of  the 
doctrine,  due  to  the  expansionist  spirit  recently 
roused  by  the  Mexican  war.  The  acquisition  of 
Cuba  was  now  desired  not  merely  by  the  South,  as 
an  extension  of  the  slave  States,  but  also  by  a 
section  in  the  North,  on  account  of  its  command 
ing  position  regarding  the  isthmus,  then  coming 
into  importance  as  the  route  to  California,  the  new 
El  Dorado.  Attempts  to  purchase  Cuba  were, 
therefore,  made  by  Polk,  who  at  the  same  time 
developed  the  Monroe  Doctrine  elsewhere  (in 
Yucatan),  apparently  with  the  view  of  showing 
Spain  the  precarious  nature  of  her  footing  in 
American  waters.  Spain,  however,  had  no  desire 
to  sell,  and  clung  tenaciously  to  the  last  remnant 
of  her  great  American  possessions — "the  country 
would  prefer  to  see  it  sunk  in  the  ocean"  were  the 
words  used.  Her  method  of  retaining  Cuba  was 
the  time -honored  one  of  increasing  her  vigilance, 
preventing  intercourse  with  the  rest  of  the  world, 

128 


GREATER    AMERICA 

and  decreasing  the  privileges  of  her  subjects,  the 
natural  result  being  the  crystallization  of  Cuban 
discontent  into  a  distinct  attempt  at  independence. 
The  abortive  Lopez  expedition,  in  1851,  enjoys 
the  distinction  of  being  the  first  blow  actually 
struck  in  the  cause  of  Cuba  Libre,  although  the 
issues  were  hardly  so  clear  at  the  time.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  this  expedition  was — unofficially, 
of  course — actively  fostered  in  the  United  States, 
and  that  the  ringleaders  of  Cuban  revolt  from  this 
time  onward  found  a  sympathetic  asylum,  a  base 
of  organization,  and  a  free  field  for  the  ventilation 
of  their  grievances  in  the  territory  of  their  great 
neighbor.  A  few  years  later,  in  1854,  a  fresh  card 
was  played  in  the  Ostend  manifesto,  which  was 
in  fact  a  deliberate  attempt  to  force  a  quarrel  on 
Spain,  and  in  this,  as  in  all  previous  declarations  as 
regards  Cuba,  it  was  the  necessity  of  that  island  for 
the  welfare  of  the  United  States  which  was  alleged 
as  a  reason  for  detaching  it  from  Spain.  It  is 
right  to  add  that  this  proposed  action  was  re 
pudiated  by  the  United  States  government.  That 
so  much  persistence  was  shown  was  largely  due 
to  the  anxiety  of  the  Southern  leaders  to  increase 
the  number  of  slave  States;  but  many  of  the 
Northern  statesmen  were  agreed  as  to  the  desira 
bility  of  acquiring  the  island.  These  diplomatic 
efforts  were  renewed  from  time  to  time  until  the 
civil  war  absorbed  all  energies  of  both  parties, 
and  in  the  reconstruction  period  the  sentiment  of 
retrenchment  and  peaceful  reform  was  so  strong 
9  129 


GREATER    AMERICA 

that  the  expansionists  had  to  curtail  their  am 
bitions.  This  period  saw  a  change  in  the  attitude 
of  the  United  States.  The  chief  motives  for  ac 
quisition  had  been  removed  by  the  abolition  of  sla 
very — with  the  consequent  elimination  of  the  slave 
States  —  and  by  the  rapid  opening  of  the  trans 
continental  railways,  which  rendered  the  isthmus 
route  to  the  Pacific  for  the  time  being  of  less  value. 
The  United  States  now  asked  merely  for  im 
proved  conditions  and  freer  commercial  inter 
course.  There  was  little  reference  to  Spanish 
misgovernment  or  Cuban  liberty  in  those  days. 
Cuba  herself,  however,  was  going  from  bad  to 
worse  in  economic  depression  and  official  thraldom. 
The  same  circumstances  which  ruined  the  sugar 
industry  throughout  the  West  Indies  were  in 
operation  here,  and  from  1868  to  1878  there  raged 
a  bitter  guerilla  war — a  guerra  chiqmta,  as  the 
Cubans  termed  it — waged  by  the  Creole,  or  native, 
party,  in  which  the  last  ties  of  sentiment  which 
bound  the  Cubans  and  Spaniards  were  cruelly 
rent.  During  this  war,  in  1873,  the  Virginius 
incident1  aggravated  the  situation,  and  soon  after 
Spain  was  given  to  understand  that  the  United 
States  did  not  "meditate  or  desire  the  annexation 

1  The  Virginius,  a  vessel  with  United  States  registry  and 
colors,  carrying  contraband  of  war,  was  captured  by  the 
Tornado,  a  Spanish  war -vessel,  and  taken  to  Santiago  de 
Cuba,  where  the  captain,  entire  crew,  and  four  passengers 
were  executed.  The  capture  was  not  made  in  Cuban  waters, 
but  it  was  found  that  the  vessel  was  the  property  of  certain 
Cubans  and  controlled  by  them,  and  the  incident  was  arranged 
peaceably. 

130 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  Cuba  to  the  United  States,  but  its  elevation 
into  an  independent  republic  of  freemen,  in  har 
mony  with  ourselves  and  with  the  other  republics 
of  America."1  A  certain  measure  of  reform  was 
accomplished,  on  paper.  Spain  granted  the  once- 
coveted  representation  in  the  Cortes,  but  only  to 
nominees  of  the  Captain-General — a  restriction 
which  nullified  any  possible  usefulness.  A  large 
number  of  Cubans  now  left  the  island,  principally 
for  the  United  States,  where  they  kept  alive  the 
embers  of  independence. 

In  1892  a  reciprocity  treaty  was  debated  be 
tween  Spain  and  the  United  States  which  would 
have  helped  to  restore  the  fallen  fortunes  of  the 
Cuban  planters.  Its  rejection  plunged  the  island 
in  despair.  In  1895  the  final  revolution  broke  out, 
which,  notwithstanding  reforms  promised  in  the 
usual  Spanish  way  (in  1895  and  again  in  1897), 
reduced  Spain  to  the  last  extremity  and  led  to  the 
intervention  of  the  United  States  in  1898  and  the 
final  emergence  of  Cuba  Libre — though  sadly  muti 
lated  and  crippled. 

foreign  Relations,   1874-75,  p.  859. 


CHAPTER  VI 

CARIBBEAN   EXPANSION— CUBA  AND  THE  UNITED 
STATES 

A  GLANCE  at  the  sequence  of  events  in  brief 
outline  of  one  aspect  of  Cuban  history  will  show 
that  the  growth  of  the  spirit  of  independence  as  a 
national  sentiment  was  certainly  largely  influenced 
by  economic  conditions.  The  decay  of  the  staple 
industry  of  Cuba,  owing  to  a  competition  in  which 
she  was  hampered  by  her  European  parent,  brought 
home  to  the  people,  as  mere  misgovernment  had 
never  done,  the  egotism  of  Spain  in  dealing  with 
her  colonies,  and  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves 
put  the  finishing- touch — or,  rather,  a  series  of 
touches,  for  it  was  a  slow  process  in  Cuba — to  the 
distress  and  discontent  of  the  people. 

The  prosperity  of  their  great  neighbor,  added 
to  her  frequent  overtures,  encouraged  the  Cubans 
in  the  belief  that  the  United  States  would  lend 
them  her  countenance,  and  the  question  became 
the  more  pressing  when  the  high  -  tariff  policy 
practically  completed  the  barrier  between  Cuba 
and  prosperity.  The  development  of  the  Southern 
States  as  sugar-producing  countries  made  them 
Cuba's  natural  competitors,  but  on  what  unequal 

132 


GREATER    AMERICA 

terms!  The  market  of  the  United  States  is  the 
natural  one  for  Cuban  produce,  but  there  was 
no  prospect  of  being  able  to  use  it.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  sugar  and  tobacco  form  three- 
fourths  of  Cuban  exports,  and  for  the  former 
there  is  practically  no  room  now  in  Europe,  flooded 
as  it  is  with  beet  sugar. 

The  condition  of  the  people  under  circumstan 
ces  which  reduced  the  incomes  of  the  large  estates 
and  wiped  out  the  small  ones  was  lamentable. 
The  large  towns  still  contained  many  families 
of  wealth  and  position,  and  some  large  planta 
tions  whose  owners  had  the  means  and  fore 
sight  to  set  up  improved  machinery  were  able  to 
make  small  profits;  but  the  majority  of  men  saw 
no  prospect  for  themselves  and  their  families  but 
emigration.  Meanwhile  the  emancipated  negroes 
retired  in  large  bodies  to  the  woods  and  moun 
tains,  where  they  retrograded — and,  indeed,  some 
times  reverted  to  a  state  almost  of  savagery.  The 
poor  whites — a  very  large  class  in  Cuba,  and  one 
that  is  on  the  increase — must  have  felt  severely 
the  effects  of  the  general  depression ;  but  it  must 
be  remembered  that  in  a  country  like  Cuba,  blessed 
with  a  fertile  soil,  constant  sunshine,  and  a  clement 
climate,  people  who  have  to  keep  up  no  appear 
ances  can  live  in  ease  and  can  without  exertion  pro 
vide  themselves  with  the  necessities  of  food  and 
shelter.  The  white  peasantry  are  infected  with 
the  inertia  of  the  tropics,  and,  despite  their  white 
blood,  are  little  more  civilized  than  the  negroes. 


GREATER    AMERICA 

They  are  absolutely  ignorant,  no  form  of  public 
instruction  having  been  prescribed  by  Spain,  and 
their  children  run  about  naked — as,  indeed,  do  the 
children  of  poor  whites  in  most  Latin-American 
countries.  Moreover,  as  workmen — if  they  are  to 
be  persuaded  to  work  at  all  —  they  are  unreliable 
and  unsatisfactory. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  is  natural  that  all 
Cubans  with  a  spark  of  ambition  should  flock  to 
the  cities,  despite  the  fact  that,  as  a  rule,  they 
possess  little  industrial  or  commercial  ability.  The 
modern  tendency  to  forsake  the  land  and  crowd 
into  cities  is  deplored  even  in  countries  whose  fut 
ure  as  well  as  present  prosperity  depends  on  the 
development  of  manufactures  and  trade.  How 
much  more,  therefore,  in  an  island  like  Cuba, 
economically  entirely  dependent  on  the  products 
of  her  soil.  The  extent  to  which  she  is  dependent 
on  agriculture  may  be  realized  from  the  fact  that 
she  has  no  manufactures,  except  for  the  most 
elementary  local  wants,  and  that  mining  is  of  the 
most  primitive  character,  and,  in  view  of  the 
probable  resources  and  neighboring  competition, 
is  not  likely  to  become  important.  The  labor 
question  is,  therefore,  a  serious  one.  At  present 
the  island  has  under  four  per  cent,  of  its  available 
area  under  cultivation  and  supports  a  population 
of  but  one  million  five  hundred  thousand,  whereas, 
if  properly  developed,  it  could  easily  maintain 
fifteen  million  by  agriculture  alone.  In  view  of 
the  inadequacy  of  the  local  labor  supply,  it  is  un- 


GREATER    AMERICA 

fortunate  that  of  the  considerable  number  of 
immigrants  who  come  into  Cuba  so  few  remain. 
Many  of  the  immigrants  belong  to  the  Spanish 
peasantry,  and  would  be  good  settlers  if  they  could 
be  induced  to  settle.  Although  opinions  differ 
as  to  their  value  as  laborers  compared  with  the 
Cubans,  there  is  no  doubt  that,  on  the  whole,  they 
practise  the  virtues  of  sobriety,  frugality,  and 
steadiness  common  to  their  nation,  and  that  they 
are  in  these  respects  superior  to  the  Cubans. 

The  general  conditions  of  labor  in  Cuba  are 
unfavorable  to  the  rise  of  a  prosperous  peasantry. 
In  addition  to  inherent  defects,  the  Cubans  are 
handicapped  by  the  after-effects  of  slavery,  which 
will  be  felt  for  a  long  time  to  come,  and  also  by 
the  store  system,  which  encourages  them  to  run 
into  debt,  and  makes  them  in  consequence  de 
pendent  on  their  employer.  The  labor  question 
in  Cuba  is  not  a  social  problem ;  it  is  as  yet  merely 
a  matter  of  supply  and  demand,  but  it  is  com 
plicated  by  the  presence  of  the  black  and  colored 
population.  With  the  infusion  of  fresh  ideas  re 
garding  labor  and  the  remodelling  of  society  by 
American  standards  will  come  an  inevitable  strain 
upon  the  relations  of  the  two  races  of  which  the 
laboring  population  is  composed.  If  any  form  of 
modern  socialism  were  to  find  any  real  foothold 
on  Cuban  soil  this  situation  would  be  aggra 
vated,  since  it  is  one  of  its  vital  principles  that 
the  strong  should  be  handicapped  to  equalize  the 
opportunities  of  the  weak,  and  the  black  popula- 


GREATER    AMERICA 

tion  would  act  as  a  drag  on  the  whole  body  of 
workers. 

With  a  people  in  the  condition  of  the  Cubans  at 
the  successful  close  of  the  struggle  for  independence 
there  was  obviously  only  one  course  to  be  taken, 
and  the  United  States  took  it.  The  enforcement 
of  law  and  order  and  the  working  of  the  whole 
social  and  political  machinery  could  only  be  ac 
complished  by  placing  one  man  in  authority.  The 
military  governors  of  Cuba  were  able  in  the  short 
time  at  their  disposal  to  accomplish  some  much- 
needed  reforms ;  but  it  would  have  been  impossible 
to  evolve  order,  much  less  to  carry  out  measures 
of  reform,  had  affairs  been  left  in  the  hands  of  the 
Cubans  themselves.  The  period  of  military  gov 
ernment  was  a  most  valuable  object-lesson  and 
gave  the  late  revolutionary  party  time  to  organize 
itself  and  to  take  over  the  reins,  when  the  time 
came,  with  a  fair  show  of  preparedness  and  com 
petency. 

The  American  legacy  to  Cuba  was  highly 
characteristic,  both  in  its  practical  utility  and  its 
unpractical  attempt  to  harmonize  the  irreconcil 
able  elements  of  Latin-tropical  life  with  Anglo- 
Saxon  ideals.  The  first  and  most  important 
efforts  were  in  the  direction  of  education  and 
sanitation.  The  latter  is  a  subject  which  a 
military  governor's  powers  gave  him  peculiar 
facilities  for  dealing  with.  In  cities  like  Havana 
only  drastic  measures  are  of  any  use,  and  by 
means  of  these  the  city  was  cleansed  of  the  most 

136 


GREATER    AMERICA 

flagrant  abuses  and  the  public  health  vastly  im 
proved.  Scientific  investigations  as  to  the  spread 
of  tropical  diseases  also  resulted  in  great  im 
provement  in  the  health  conditions  of  the  chief 
Cuban  ports,  and  the  sanitary  standard  set  should 
prove  of  the  greatest  advantage  to  the  whole 
island.  In  this  respect  it  is  interesting  to  com 
pare  the  work  done  in  Havana  and  in  Manila.  In 
the  latter,  sanitation  has  been  but  tentatively  at 
tempted,  apparently  with  the  desire  to  respect  the 
private  rights  of  citizens;  and  the  civil  author 
ity  has  been  unable,  despite  considerable  trouble 
and  expenditure,  to  effect  any  radical  reform.  In 
the  matter  of  railways  and  other  public  works 
Cuba  has  also  profited  by  a  vigorous  military 
administration,  which  did  not  pause  to  consider 
whether  such  measures  should  not  be  initiated 
by  the  people  themselves.  There  were  only  some 
six  hundred  miles  of  disconnected  lines  of  rail 
way  when  the  Americans  began  their  occupation, 
and  when  they  left  there  were  one  thousand  five 
hundred  miles  in  working  order,  the  railway  sys 
tem  binding  the  two  ends  of  the  island,  which 
had  been  unconnected  before  save  by  coasting 
steamers.  Roads,  however,  were  neglected,  as, 
indeed,  they  are  in  the  United  States  itself. 

Education  was  the  most  important  reform  at 
tempted,  and  to  this  General  Wood  devoted  a 
large  sum,  considered  by  many  to  be  out  of  all 
proportion  to  other  necessary  work.  The  need 
was  crying.  Cuba  had  practically  no  public 


GREATER    AMERICA 

education  at  all,  and  the  task  was  to  create  an 
entire  system  without  any  previous  foundation  on 
which  to  build.  No  one  save  a  military  governor 
could  have  faced  the  situation  in  the  same  way. 
The  first  step  was  the  arbitrary  apportionment  of 
a  generous  sum  out  of  the  scanty  revenue;  the 
second  the  enforcement  of  compulsory  education; 
and  the  third  the  provision  of  schools  and  teachers. 
The  last  was  naturally  a  Herculean  task.  It  was 
accomplished  by  the  same  arbitrary  method — a 
truly  military  way  of  dealing  with  the  problem— 
which  laid  it  down  that  the  first  thing  was  to  start 
a  school  and  find  a  teacher;  the  second  to  go  into 
details  of  management.  School  districts  being 
arbitrarily  settled,  a  local  school-board  was  got 
together,  school-houses  were  built  or  constructed 
out  of  old  ones,  teachers  of  some  sort  were  pro 
vided  at  fixed  wages,  and  thus  a  nucleus  was  form 
ed.  The  control  being  vested  in  the  military 
governor  himself,  he  was  able  to  correct  mistakes 
as  he  went  along,  to  alter  the  system  here,  weed 
out  and  reject  at  will,  and  so  gradually  increase 
the  standard  of  efficiency,  while  all  the  time  little 
Cubans  were  getting  some  sort  of  education,  which 
was  presumably  better  than  none  at  all. 

The  difficulty  of  procuring  trained  teachers  was 
not  met,  as  in  the  Philippines,  by  the  importation 
of  an  army  of  American  school-marms  and  mas 
ters.  It  was  realized  that  the  teachers  must  be 
Cuban  if  they  were  to  work  effectively,  and  that, 
with  proper  American  supervision,  they  would  im- 

138 


GREATER    AMERICA 

prove  in  ratio  with  the  growing  capacity  of  their 
pupils.  Educational  facilities  were  given  in  Amer 
ican  colleges  to  selected  Cubans,  and  these  were 
sent  back  to  leaven  the  whole  lump.  Enormous 
sums  had,  of  course,  to  be  spent  in  equipping  the 
schools  and  providing  text-books,  but  the  general 
system  seems  to  have  been  to  utilize  as  far  as  possi 
ble  any  available  material,  and  not  to  expect  im 
mediate  perfection.  Normal  education  was  left 
to  take  care  of  itself.  The  first  thing  was  to  place 
primary  instruction  within  the  reach  of  every 
child;  and  it  is  possible  that  the  first  generation 
of  literate  Cubans  will  benefit  from  the  fact  that 
their  brains  were  not  expected  to  suddenly  cope 
with  all  the  refinements  of  a  modern,  up-to-date 
education. 

The  main  fault  of  this  system  has  been  its  ex- 
pensiveness.  The  generous  impulse  which  led  to 
a  wholesale  establishment  of  schools  led,  of  course, 
to  a  certain  number  of  mistakes,  all  costing  money ; 
and  the  responsibilities  incurred  in  equipping  the 
teachers,  together  with  the  provision  of  numerous 
school-houses,  form  a  considerable  item  in  the 
expenditure  of  so  poor  a  country  as  Cuba.  Having 
begun  on  this  scale,  however,  it  will  fatally  impair 
the  efficiency  of  the  system  if  retrenchment  is  at 
tempted;  and  yet  it  is  no  longer  possible,  without 
the  exercise  of  arbitrary  power  by  the  President, 
to  insure  the  appropriation  of  so  large  a  propor 
tion  of  the  revenue  to  education.  Other  depart 
ments,  especially  the  public  works,  cry  out  with 

139 


GREATER    AMERICA 

good  reason  for  their  share,  and  vested  interests 
must  be  considered.  The  second  danger  is  that 
the  party  system  will  affect  educational  policy  and 
control.  The  inspectors,  on  whom  efficiency  large 
ly  depends,  are  chiefly,  if  not  entirely,  American, 
and  educational  progress  will  be  seriously  curtail 
ed  and  efficiency  destroyed  by  changes  in  the 
personnel  or  breaks  in  the  continuity  of  their 
control. 

Both  these  evils — lack  of  funds  and  uncertainty 
of  party  government — are,  of  course,  aggravated 
by  the  economic  conditions. 

The  legislative  efforts  of  the  United  States  in 
Cuba  are  legacies  of  far  more  doubtful  value. 
Cuba  already  possessed,  in  the  Spanish  law,  a 
highly  elaborated  system  of  admitted  wisdom, 
framed  by  Latin  legislators  for  their  own  people. 
It  was  not  the  Spanish  laws  which  were  to  blame 
for  abuses  in  Cuba,  but  the  maladministration  of 
them.  In  any  case,  an  arbitrary  tampering  with 
the  established  laws  of  a  community  cannot  fail 
to  be  mischievous,  since  it  strikes  at  the  root  of 
social  life,  manners,  and  religion,  probably  the 
natural  outcome  of  race  and  climate.  An  example 
of  this  may  be  found  in  the  invalidation  (for  a 
period)  of  religious  marriage  without  the  civil 
ceremony.  The  present  condition  of  law  in  Cuba 
is  naturally  one  of  confusion;  American  methods 
of  procedure  grafted  on  the  old  foundation  of 
Latin  jurisprudence.  It  is  to  be  regretted,  first, 
because  the  simpler  the  law  the  easier  its  applica- 

140 


GREATER    AMERICA 

tion,  and  because  the  Cubans  understood  their 
old  code  far  better  than  they  can  any  new  one; 
secondly,  because  the  example  set,  during  the 
United  States  occupation,  of  unnecessary  legisla 
tion  will  not  be  lost  on  a  Latin  people  like  the 
Cubans,  naturally  too  much  given  to  theorizing 
and  experimenting. 

The  legacy  which  the  United  States  did  not 
leave  was  that  of  restored  economic  balance. 
Cuba  began  her  independence  as  a  country  drained 
of  money,  with  a  declining  agriculture,  a  rural 
population  hurrying  away  to  the  cities,  and  a 
greatly  increased  rate  of  living. 

As  regards  the  general  national  sentiment,  it 
may  be  said  that  it  was  in  favor  of  independence, 
and  therefore  welcomed  the  departure  of  American 
troops,  as  it  had  welcomed  their  arrival.  A  great 
deal  has  been  said  and  written  about  the  affection 
of  the  Cubans  for  their  American  brothers  and 
their  gratitude  for  deliverance.  It  was  a  wise 
man,  however,  who  remarked  out  of  the  depths  of 
his  knowledge  of  human  nature  that  gratitude  is 
a  keen  sense  of  favors  to  come.  Although  the 
bulk  of  the  population  rejoices  in  deliverance  from 
Spain,  it  also,  being  ignorant  as  well  as  poor, 
expects  very  shortly  a  substantial  increase  in  pros 
perity — some  new  departure  which  will  restore 
the  palmy  days  of  Cuba.  Unless  that  comes  there 
will  be  discontent,  as  well  as  poverty,  intrigues,  and 
even  rebellion,  since  despair  is  a  hard  master;  and 
there  will  be  plenty  of  politicians  ready  to  assure 

141 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  people  that  another  change  of  government 
would  secure  the  desired  improvement. 

The  better -educated  Cubans,  and  the  members 
of  the  government  particularly,  must  see  the 
issue  more  plainly,  and  are,  indeed,  on  the  horns 
of  a  dilemma.  The  exact  political  status  of  the 
island  as  a  "protected  republic"  is  no  secret  to 
them,  and  they  realize  that  the  United  States  has 
a  hold  which  no  effort  on  their  part  will  loose. 
It  is  not  likely,  after  all  that  has  happened,  that 
she  will  abate  one  jot  of  her  claims  on  them  or 
permit  a  rapprochement  with  any  other  country. 
On  the  other  hand,  they  have  known  all  along 
that  the  key  to  the  situation  lay  in  the  economic 
question,  and  that  on  reciprocity  with  the  Unit 
ed  States  depends  the  prosperity  of  Cuba,  and 
therefore  her  future.  There  is  undoubtedly  a 
party,  especially  among  those  Cubans  who 
throughout  the  rebellion  preserved  a  somewhat 
neutral  attitude,  and  therefore  kept  their  business 
or  property  together,  who  would  welcome  annexa 
tion  to  the  United  States  on  any  terms  because 
of  the  economic  advantages.  But  the  Latin- 
American  is  not,  as  a  rule,  commercial  in  his  aims, 
nor  is  he  practical,  and  the  majority  would  un 
doubtedly  view  with  great  hostility  anything 
which  threatened  their  rights  as  a  nation.  There 
is  at  least  one  section,  whose  voice  is  unheard, 
who  would  bitterly  resent  incorporation  within 
the  Union — the  negroes. 

The  sordid  American  view  (that  of  the  party 

142 


GREATER    AMERICA 

which  regards  Cuba  in  the  same  light  as  did  Jeffer 
son  and  Adams)  is  undoubtedly  that,  placed  in  this 
awkward  position  and  daily  becoming  more  em 
barrassed  and  confused,  Cuba  will  herself  ere  long 
ask  for  incorporation  as  a  State,  an  eventuality 
which  would  leave  no  room  for  inconvenient  crit 
icism  as  to  "  grasping  imperialism."  Thus  would 
be  fulfilled  the  advice  given  by  Jefferson  eighty 
years  before,  to  "lie  still,  in  readiness  to  receive 
that  interesting  incorporation  when  solicited  by 
herself."  The  Democrats,  who  oppose  all  annexa 
tion  of  territory  involving  a  colonial  government, 
and  who  are  averse  to  admitting  alien  and  inferior 
colored  races,  do  not  have  the  same  objection  in 
the  case  of  Cuba,  believing  that  its  people  will 
soon  graduate  for  American  citizenship.  If  Cuba 
became  a  State,  in  their  opinion,  a  stream  of  emi 
gration  from  the  United  States  would  soon  Amer 
icanize  the  country.  The  capabilities  of  the 
Cubans  for  self-government  on  State  lines  have 
yet  to  be  demonstrated,  but,  judging  from  ex 
perience  in  all  other  Latin- American  countries,  it 
will  be  a  long  time  before  they  are  able  to  initiate 
any  government  which  will  not  eventually  become 
either  autocratic  or  oligarchic.  That  white  immi 
gration,  even  on  a  large  scale,  will  change  the 
character  of  the  Cuban  populace  is  an  expectation 
equally  contradicted  by  experience.  The  history 
of  the  British  in  Canada  and  of  the  Anglo-Amer 
icans  in  Louisiana  certainly  does  not  support  the 
idea. 

143 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  vexed  question  of  reciprocity,  which  arises 
inevitably  in  connection  with  every  part  of  Greater 
America  (and  this  includes  her  protectorates  and 
those  States  in  which  she  has  practically  estab 
lished  "spheres  of  influence"),  is  peculiarly  acute 
in  the  case  of  Cuba,  which  is  absolutely  dependent 
economically  on  the  United  States.  After  serious 
opposition  a  certain  measure  of  reciprocity  has 
been  granted,  but,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Philippines, 
the  reduction  in  tariffs  has  been  too  partial,  too 
carefully  adjusted  to  protect  vested  interests  in  the 
United  States,  to  be  of  real  and  permanent  benefit 
to  the  quondam  Spanish  colonies.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  these  were  in  grave  economic 
difficulties  before  they  began  the  wars  which  have 
still  further  reduced  them  to  poverty.  The  snap 
ping  of  bonds  with  Europe  practically  throws 
them  helpless  upon  the  markets  of  the  United 
States,  and  it  is  doubly  hard  for  them,  in  their  im 
poverished  and  backward  condition,  to  compete 
with  highly  organized  and  protected  industries. 

One  thing  is  certain — without  American  energy 
and  capital  Cuba  cannot  be  developed,  and  with 
out  the  fullest  measure  of  reciprocity  and  a  secure 
and  stable  government  this  capital  will  not  be 
invested  in  the  island  to  any  appreciable  extent. 

The  situation  will  be  seen,  even  from  this  brief 
and  partial  examination  of  a  few  of  its  aspects,  to 
be  full  of  difficulty.  Sen  or  Palma  began  his  career 
as  President  under  most  unfortunate  auspices,  and, 
unlike  the  most  successful  ruler  which  Latin- 

144 


GREATER    AMERICA 

America  has  yet  produced — President  Diaz — he 
was  no  longer  in  the  prime  of  life  when  he  took 
office.  He  is,  of  course,  honest,  enlightened,  well 
intentioned,  and  progressive,  and,  having  spent 
so  much  of  his  life  in  the  United  States,  he  is 
conversant  with  the  political  anomalies  of  that 
country  and  their  possible  effect  on  his  own.  He 
is,  in  effect,  practically  the  nominee  of  the  pro 
tecting  republic,  a  fact  which  carries  its  disad 
vantages,  so  far  as  the  support  of  his  own  people 
is  concerned. 

Will  he  be  able,  in  the  teeth  of  economic  de 
pression,  which  his  government  is  unable  to  re 
lieve  ;  of  the  necessity  for  taxation  to  maintain  the 
reforms  instituted  by  the  military  governor;  and 
of  the  growth  (on  Latin- American  lines)  of  demo 
cratic  principles  fostered  by  the  United  States- 
will  he  be  able,  under  all  these  circumstances,  to 
keep  his  country  contented  and  united?  All  these 
queries  apply  to  any  successor  of  Palma;  and,  in 
deed,  the  President  of  the  Cuban  Republic,  under 
any  circumstances,  has  no  bed  of  roses.  There 
are  few  Cubans  so  capable  of  filling  the  position 
as  the  present  one. 

Should  he  fail  and  revolutions  break  out,  the 
protector,  of  course,  steps  in.  Should  he  yield 
to  economic  pressure  and  decide  to  ask  for  ad 
mission  to  the  Union,  he  will  earn  eternal  obloquy 
from  a  large  section  of  his  countrymen,  and  will 
probably  witness  again  the  horrors  of  war.  Under 
whatever  circumstances,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the 

145 


GREATER    AMERICA 

farce  of  Cuban  independence  can  be  prolonged 
much  further.  There  are  men  who  shed  their 
blood  in  the  late  war  to  whom  this  saying  is  a 
harsh  one,  but  the  best  friends  of  Cuba  can  only 
hope  that  she  will  secure  the  benefits  of  incorpo 
ration  while  there  is  still  an  opportunity  to  se 
cure  the  privileges.  Cuba  depends,  has  always 
so  largely  depended,  on  the  economic  factor ;  is  so 
incapable  of  working  out  her  own  salvation  with 
out  a  helping  hand  in  her  commercial  affairs, 
that  no  future  is  possible  which  is  not  built  on  a 
basis  securing  a  free  intercourse  with  the  United 
States.  Stability  of  government  is  hard  to  es 
tablish  without  prosperity,  and  prosperity  will  not 
come  without  the  assistance  of  the  United  States. 
After  all,  a  worse  fate  might  befall  a  Latin-Amer 
ican  republic  than  to  become  part  of  the  great 
Western  democracy.  Of  the  other  side  of  the 
shield  —  the  results  of  such  an  incorporation  on 
the  United  States  herself — we  must  speak  later. 

Expansion  into  the  Caribbean  is  so  important 
to  the  United  States,  and  so  full  of  significance  as 
to  her  future,  that  it  cannot  be  discussed  here. 
In  the  next  chapter  it  will  be  further  considered. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  NEW  AMERICAN  SPHERE 

WHEN  the  United  States  crossed  the  Pacific, 
and  established  herself  on  the  confines  of  Asia 
simultaneously  with  her  occupation  of  Cuba  and 
the  annexation  of  Puerto  Rico,  it  was  generally 
felt  that  she  had  embarked  on  a  career  of  active 
expansion  which  could  not  be  suddenly  checked. 
What  would  be  the  next  step? 

Many  circumstances  pointed  to  the  absorption 
of  Mexico  as  the  logical  sequence  of  events.  Al 
ready  more  than  half  the  area  of  original  Mexico 
had  passed  to  the  United  States,  and  the  formation 
of  new  and  progressive  communities  on  her  frontier 
and  an  economic  conquest  might  be  expected  to 
lead  to  a  closer  union.  The  story  of  Texas  is  still 
fresh,  and  might  be  repeated.  To  the  subject  of 
Mexican  independence  we  must  return  later,  it 
being  sufficient  to  note  here  that  circumstances 
have  led  the  United  States  again  to  non-contiguous 
expansion.  Instead  of  the  anticipated  slow  but 
steady  extension  of  United  States  control  south 
ward  through  Mexico,  thence  to  the  Central  Amer 
ican  republics,  and  then  to  the  West  Indies,  we 
find  that  the  oversea  acquisitions  came  first,  that 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  canal  question  has  involved  the  second  step 
in  Central  America,  and  that  Mexico  will  be  re 
served  for  a  later  stage  in  the  process  of  expansion. 

There  is,  both  in  the  British  Empire  and  the 
United  States,  a  very  excusable  vagueness  as  to 
the  Central  American  republics.  They  are,  in 
fact,  all  one  country,  colonized  by  the  same  race, 
having  the  same  religion,  language,  customs,  and 
peculiarities.  The  architecture,  social  etiquette, 
and,  above  all,  the  moral  atmosphere  of  all  pseudo- 
Spanish  colonies  are  almost  identical  —  every 
where  one  feels  one  is  in  the  land  of  manana  and 
noontide  siestas.  The  Central  American  republics 
enjoy  similar  climatic  conditions — the  hot,  low- 
lying,  unhealthy  coast  lands,  subtropical  zone,  and 
the  healthy,  cool  highlands,  on  which  are  situated 
the  principal  cities  founded  by  Spanish  colonists. 
Guatemala,  Honduras,  Salvador,  Nicaragua,  Costa 
Rica,  and  the  republic  of  Panama  (which  politi 
cally,  though  not  physically,  belonged  to  the  South 
American  republic  of  Colombia) — these  are  names 
with  which  Europeans  and  North  Americans  are 
familiar  chiefly  on  account  of  their  numerous  rev 
olutions  and  internecine  strife. 

Although  so  near  to  the  North  American  con 
tinent  and  the  populous  West  Indian  isles,  these 
republics  are  difficult  of  access.  Few  natural 
harbors  exist  on  their  coasts,  and  little  has  been 
done  to  provide  artificial  harborage ;  steamer  com 
munication  is  indifferent,  and  railway  connection 
between  the  republics  there  is  none.  There  are 

148 


GREATER    AMERICA 

several  lines  from  the  coast  inland,  which  are  all 
intended  eventually  to  link  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific,  but  none  are  completed  save  the  one  at 
Panama  (an  American  line),  and  another  at 
Tehuan  tepee,  both  being  handicapped  by  lack  of 
harborage  at  either  end.  The  population  of  the 
Central  American  republics  is  very  small,  only 
some  three  and  a  half  millions,  including  a  con 
siderable  number  of  semi-civilized  Indians  and 
the  negroes  on  the  Caribbean  coast  lands.  The 
resources  of  the  republics  have  been  hardly  touch 
ed.  All  are  rich  in  minerals,  and  their  highland 
districts  are  white  men's  countries,  adapted  to 
cultivation  of  all  sorts.  The  crying  need  of  all 
is  stability  of  government,  without  which  the 
foreign  capital  and  enterprise  to  develop  the  re 
sources  and  provide  communications  cannot  be 
induced  to  come  to  the  country.  Nor  is  it  suf 
ficient  that  one  republic  should  enjoy  peace  to 
insure  its  prosperity.  Costa  Rica  has  been  quietly 
governed  for  some  years  past  and  has  made 
notable  progress,  but  when  her  short  boom  in 
coffee  came  to  an  end  she  was  plunged  almost  into 
bankruptcy  and  could  not  continue  the  public 
works  she  had  initiated.  It  is  essential  to  the  true 
progress  of  countries  so  intimately  connected,  geo 
graphically  and  racially,  as  are  the  central  states 
of  America,  that  general  peace  and  security  should 
reign  and  that  communications  from  north  to 
south  should  be  opened.  Their  present  condition 
of  mutual  distrust,  of  isolation  save  by  sea,  and 

149 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  constant  political  disturbance  cannot  continue 
permanently.  Central  America  has  become  to  the 
western  hemisphere  what  the  Balkan  States  have 
long  been  to  Europe.  Russia,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  United  States,  on  the  other,  are  rapidly 
becoming  the  arbiters  of  this  continual  menace 
to  the  peace  of  their  respective  continents.  The 
analogy  need  not  be  pursued;  it  is  sufficiently 
suggestive  in  outline. 

It  is  one  of  the  strangest  developments  of  the 
Spanish  colonial  system  that,  although  she  stamp 
ed  her  own  characteristics  so  strongly  wherever 
she  went,  and  although  her  revolted  children  are 
indisputably  brothers  by  blood,  tradition,  ap 
pearance,  language,  and  customs,  yet  they  offer 
the  most  singular  examples  of  internecine  war 
fare.  The  Latin- American  republican,  who  likes 
to  imagine  himself  the  peer  of  the  United  States 
citizen,  who  refers  to  "  Independence  Day "  with 
the  same  swelling  pride,  and  would  have  you 
believe  that  his  people  were  on  all-fours  with  the 
revolting  British  colonies,  should  ask  himself  why 
—in  face  of  the  Union  of  the  North  American 
colonists,  despite  great  differences  of  nationality, 
creed,  and  even  interests  —  he  and  his  Latin- 
American  brothers  have  never  effected  the  slight 
est  degree  of  federation,  but  hate  each  other  with 
deadly  hatred.1 

1  Carlos  Selva,  an  able  Nicaraguan,  in  speaking  of  the  in 
stability  of  Latin-American  governments,  says:  "Where  are 
the  liberties,  the  guarantees,  the  rights  of  the  Spanish-Amer- 


GREATER    AMERICA 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  prevailing  spirit 
which  saved  the  Northern  Union  from  disintegra 
tion  was  not  sentiment — that  made  for  disunion 
— but  a  sturdy  common-sense,  which  is  part  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  heritage.  What  is  the  heritage  of 
the  Latin- American  ? 

Spaniards  have  never,  whatever  may  have  been 
their  faults,  laid  themselves  open  to  the  charge 
of  lacking  character.  Strongly  marked  traits — 
masterful  passions  and  obstinate  prejudices — have 
distinguished  them  throughout  their  history,  and 
they  are  the  heirs  of  not  only  a  Roman  but  of 
an  Oriental  civilization.  The  typical  Spaniard 
is  courteous  and  ceremonious,  as  befits  the  de 
scendant  of  a  long  line  of  civilized  forefathers 
accustomed  to  social  amenities.  He  is  sober,  re 
garding  intoxication  as  uncouth  and  finding  in  it 
no  subtle  humor,  as  does  the  Anglo-Saxon.  He  is 
imaginative,  possessing  the  artistic  temperament, 
for  he  belongs  to  a  race  foremost  in  art  and  litera 
ture  and  still  imbued  with  a  deep  sense  of  beauty 
both  of  form  and  color.  He  is  a  born  orator, 
having  the  facility  for  words  which  characterizes 

lean  citizen?  They  exist  in  the  constitutions,  but  only  there. 
These  are  generally  made  very  liberal,  leaving  nothing  to  be 
desired — nothing  except  their  fulfilment." 

As  a  corollary  to  this  view  we  have  in  a  recent  work  by 
Senator  Cabot  Lodge  the  statement  that,  as  a  consequence  of 
the  movement  started  by  the  American  Revolution,  the  "en 
tire  continental  empire  of  Spain  in  the  Americas  broke  off  and 
became  democratic." 

The  admirers  of  democracy  can  hardly  be  grateful  to  Mr. 
Lodge  for  this  pronouncement. 


GREATER    AMERICA 

all  Latins  and  the  love  of  hyperbole  which  the 
Moors  bequeathed.  He  loves  intrigue,  is  caught 
by  a  theory,  captivated  by  a  phrase,  adores  the 
abstract,  and  enjoys  intellectual  subtleties.  Spain 
—perhaps  the  worst-governed  country  in  Europe 
—is  a  land  of  politicians  and  orators,  and  has  had 
written  constitutions  which  were  almost  models 
of  their  kind.  Nothing  illustrates  so  well  the 
divorce  in  Spanish  minds  between  the  abstract 
and  concrete.  An  essential  Spanish  characteristic 
is  bravery,  but  their  very  courage  is  unpractical 
and  of  far  less  service  to  the  military  commander 
than  a  blind,  unpicturesque  obedience  to  discipline. 
" Spaniards,"  said  Ferdinand  of  Aragon,  "were 
ever  a  nation  of  warriors,  and  also  most  undis 
ciplined;  everybody  wants  to  be  in  command  and 
nobody  consents  to  obey.  Every  Spaniard  knows 
how  to  fight;  none  knows  how  to  command  him 
self  or  others." 

In  comparing  modern  Spain  with  that  country 
in  its  palmy  days,  it  is  difficult  to  gauge  the  degree 
of  deterioration  in  national  character  due  to  a 
period  of  extraordinary  prosperity  which  was  the 
result  not  of  legitimate  commerce  or  industry  but 
of  colonial  speculation  and  exploitation.  Those 
who  know  the  peasantry  of  Spain,  who  were 
not  sharers  in  these  days  of  wild  extravagance 
and  idle  opulence,  will  recognize  in  them  the 
sterling  qualities  of  patience  and  sobriety,  viril 
ity  and  hardihood,  which  may  yet  prove  the  sal 
vation  of  their  country,  despite  the  legacy  be- 

152 


GREATER    AMERICA 

queathed  by  their  past  and  the  burdens  imposed 
by  corrupt  politicians  and  an  emasculated  aris 
tocracy. 

The  aristocratic  bias  of  Spanish  character  must 
not  be  passed  over.    The  wave  of  revolution  which 
swept  across  Europe,  uprooting  autocratic  institu 
tions  and  giving  new  form  to  the  aspirations  of  a 
people  who  had  just  shaken  off  the  last  shackles 
of  feudalism,  made  but  little  headway  in  Spain. 
The  Bourbons  were  expelled,  and  a  popular  con 
stitution  was  enacted,  which  would  have  secured 
the  fullest  rights  and  individual  liberties  of  the 
people.     Universal  suffrage  was  introduced  and  a 
popular  representative  chamber  established,  with 
powers  equal  to  the  Senate.     The  vital  principle 
— that  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation — was  pro 
claimed,  but  this  democratic  constitution  was  fa* 
from  being  successful.     Strong  as  is  the  power  of 
the  hereditary  aristocracy  in  Spain,  there  is  no 
doubt  that,  having  won  this  initial  victory,  the 
proletariat  coald  have  maintained  its  position  if 
there  had  been  any  genuine  national  enthusiasm 
for   the   measures   introduced.     Instead,    we   see 
the    speedy    downfall    of    the    constitution,    the 
abdication  of  its  elected  king,  Amadeus  of  Savoy, 
and  the  erection,  after  a  short  period  of  republican 
government  and  anarchy,  of  another  constitutional 
monarchy,  which  restored  the  Bourbons  and  all 
their  traditions. 

This  constitution  was  shorn  of  all  the  elements 
of  popular  government.     The  king  is  the  chief 


GREATER    AMERICA 

executive,  and  the  Cortes  is  composed  of,  first, 
the  hereditary  nobility,  land-owners,  and  men  of 
high  position;  secondly,  of  one  hundred  members 
nominated  by  the  crown  for  life;  and,  thirdly,  of 
one  hundred  and  thirty  members  elected  by  state 
corporations  and  the  largest  tax  -  payers.  Al 
though  local  autonomy  exists,  as  it  has  always 
done  in  Spain,  and  municipalities  are  nominally 
independent,  the  government  provides  a  check  on 
all  matters.  The  country  is  divided  into  prov 
inces,  which  elect  deputies,  in  ratio  with  the  pop 
ulation,  to  deal  with  all  affairs  outside  politics; 
and  the  civil  Governor  of  each  province,  a  state- 
appointed  official  who  owes  his  position  to  political 
influence,  has  practically  supreme  power  and  re 
sponsibility. 

It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  the  checks  provided 
prevent  any  popular  power,  but  it  is  a  remarkable 
fact  there  has  been  no  real  opposition  to  this 
autocratic  form  of  government.  The  people  as  a 
whole  are  not  only  ignorant,  but  apathetic.  Social 
ism  and  democracy  are  little  heard  of  save  in  con 
nection  with  municipal  elections  and  in  a  few  sea 
port  towns,  the  resort  of  turbulent  spirits  of  all 
nations.  Although  the  recent  elections  showed 
victories  for  the  republicans,  the  reason  is  chiefly 
that  only  the  professional  agitators  and  their  fol 
lowing  take  any  part  in  them.  The  mass  of  the 
people  are  not  affected  at  all  by  these  modern 
tendencies,  despite  that  undoubted  interest  in 
matters  political  which  makes  every  fonda  a  cen- 

154 


GREATER    AMERICA 

tre  of  fierce  discussion  on  any  night  of  the  week, 
Spain  is,  indeed,  a  land  of  political  intrigue,  but 
it  centres  round  the  figures  of  pretenders  to  the 
throne,  and  is  singularly  devoid  of  the  spirit  of 
enlightened  patriotism  and  desire  for  genuine  po 
litical  reform.1  The  Spanish  politician  who  rises 
from  the  ranks  to  high  position  is  likely,  as  in 
Russia,  to  become  more  autocratic  than  the  aris 
tocrats.  A  case  in  point  is  that  of  Sefior  Canovas 
del  Castillo,  who  was  born  of  middle-class  parents 
and  made  his  way  by  the  sheer  force  of  brilliant 
attainments.  He  is  in  many  respects  a  typical 
Spaniard  of  the  best  class  —  strong,  courageous, 
cultivated,  witty,  a  fine  orator,  with  great  per 
sonal  charm,  faithful  to  his  friends,  but  at  heart 
an  absolutist,  a  Spaniard  of  the  Middle  Ages,  a 
modern  Cardinal  Ximenes.  It  was  Canovas  who 
prolonged  the  Cuban  struggle.  "  To  the  last  dollar 
and  the  last  man,"  was  his  ultimatum. 

When  we  turn  to  her  quondam  colonies  we  find 
the  main  characteristics  of  Spain  and  her  people 
reproduced  with  remarkable  fidelity ;  and,  far  apart 
as  were  these  colonies  scattered  over  two  hemi 
spheres,  cut  off  by  immense  distances  from  the 

1  Lest  this  should  seem  too  harsh  an  estimate,  the  following 
words,  spoken  by  Don  Francisco  Silvela,  ex-Prime-Minister  of 
Spain,  to  the  correspondent  of  a  Havana  paper,  and  translated 
in  the  Spectator  of  January  30, 1904,  may  be  quoted:  "No  re 
public  is  possible  without  republicans,  and  no  great  country 
without  great  patriots.  Patriotism  is  disappearing  in  Spain 
.  .  .  the  Spaniard  of  to-day  is  either  a  bull-fighter  or  desires  to 
become  one — anything,  in  fact,  except  a  Spaniard." 


GREATER    AMERICA 

mother-country,  they  yet  present,  both  in  outward 
appearance  and  in  the  character  of  their  people,  a 
remarkable  resemblance  to  one  another  and  to  the 
old  country. 

Britons  are  accused  of  carrying  their  own 
customs  wherever  they  go,  and  of  establishing  in 
every  quarter  of  the  globe  their  bath-tubs  and 
cricket-grounds,  regardless  of  aesthetic  fitness.  The 
Spaniard  went  a  great  deal  further.  He  came  in 
many  cases  to  stay,  married  a  native,  built  his 
house  solidly,  as  was  the  custom  of  the  old  country, 
and  imposed  his  own  civilization  without  reserve. 
The  Church  largely  aided  in  this  work  by  the 
policy  of  making  proselytes  at  the  point  of  the 
sword;  and  so,  while  a  British  colony  may  boast 
nothing  more  characteristic  than  a  tin  tabernacle 
and  a  bungalow  (a  comfortable  adaptation  of  the 
native  hut),  the  Spaniards  had  always  imposing 
palaces,  churches,  solid  houses,  colonnades,  plazas, 
and  pleasure  alamedas.  The  churches  are  of  one 
invariable  type — two  squat  towers  and  a  porch 
between,  with  a  large,  empty  nave.  The  houses 
are  on  the  Moorish  pattern  so  familiar  in  southern 
Spain,  with  the  central  patio,  or  open  space,  and 
the  outside  walls  blank  and  bare  save  for  a  few 
r^/a-guarded  windows.  In  one  respect  the  travel 
ler  has  the  sameness  of  Spanish  colonies  forced  on 
his  notice.  The  hostelries,  unless  kept  by  a  for 
eigner,  are  invariably  bad  and  can  only  be  matched 
in  the  peninsula  itself.  The  amusements  of  the 
people  are  equally  invariable — fiestas,  cock-fights, 

156 


GREATER    AMERICA 

music  and  dancing,  dominoes,  cards,  and  gam 
bling. 

The  influence  of  the  Church  has,  of  course,  had  a 
great  deal  to  do  with  preserving  the  character  of 
Spanish  colonial  social  life.  The  religious  pro 
cessions  and  ceremonials,  the  -fiestas,  the  numerous 
saints'  days,  have  been  initiated  by  the  priests, 
and  it  is  due  to  the  natural  tendencies  of  tropical 
people  that  their  more  sensuous  side  has  been 
exaggerated.  The  divorce  of  Church  and  State, 
which  has  taken  place  in  all  Central  American 
countries,  has  not  greatly  shaken  the  influence  of 
the  Church  on  the  lives  of  the  people.  Indeed,  the 
flexibility  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  is  no 
where  more  forcibly  illustrated  than  in  Spanish 
America,  where  she  is  undoubtedly  a  living  force 
in  all  matters,  even  in  those  states  which  are  most 
anti-clerical.  To  this  subject  we  must  return  later, 
with  reference  to  the  part  played  by  the  Church 
in  South  America;  it  is  only  necessary  here  to  re 
mark  the  strong  hold  which  the  priests  have  over 
all  people  of  Spanish  blood,  and  the  fact  that  the 
conservatism  of  the  Catholic  Church  has  been  in 
strumental  in  maintaining  the  outward  as  well  as 
the  inward  resemblance  of  the  colonies  to  the 
mother-country. 

If  Spanish  origin  is  so  deeply  marked  in  the 
outward  aspects  of  life — as  in  architecture,  man 
ners,  amusements,  or  religious  observances  —  it 
seems  reasonable  to  conclude  that  the  Latin- 
American,  despite  a  slight  difference  in  physique, 


GREATER    AMERICA 

can  hardly  be  expected  to  develop  any  traits 
foreign  to  his  race.  The  Latin  peoples  have,  it 
is  true,  on  the  whole,  suffered  more  modification 
in  foreign  environment  than  the  Anglo-Saxon, 
despite  their  conservatism  in  outward  matters, 
but  this  is  due  chiefly  to  their  intermarriage  with 
the  natives  of  the  country  or  with  Africans,  and 
not  to  the  influence  of  any  foreign  civilization. 
In  character,  therefore,  the  Latin-American  is  a 
Spaniard,  affected  by  a  strain  of  Indian  or  some 
times  negro  blood,  by  a  hot  climate,  and  by 
peculiar  conditions  of  education. 

It  is  a  serious  question  whether  the  North  Amer 
icans,  supposing  that  Central  America  and  Mexico 
are  to  pass  under  their  control,  will  be  able,  as 
colonists,  to  retain  their  energy,  virility,  and 
practical  natures.  As  controllers,  administrators, 
overseers,  they  would  have  constant  reinforce 
ment  from  a  Northern  climate;  but  as  colonists, 
even  in  Mexico,  they  seem  to  suffer  from  climatic 
conditions  sufficiently  to  modify  the  national  type. 
Nor  are  they  able,  as  are  the  Germans,  to  endure 
patiently  an  exile  in  Latin- American  countries. 
They  are  antipathetic  to  their  neighbors;  they 
chafe  and  fret  at  the  slowness  and  inertia  around 
them.  Their  one  idea  is  to  be  able  to  leave  as 
soon  as  possible  and  return  to  a  civilization  to 
which  their  natures  are  better  attuned.  The  Eng 
lishman,  and  still  more,  the  German,  goes  to  for 
eign  countries  to  make  a  living;  the  American 
goes  to  get  rich — a  very  different  matter.  Under 

158 


GREATER    AMERICA 

these  circumstances  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  Latin 
America  is  to  be  "  Americanized,"  except  in  a  few 
externals.  Will  ''American  civilization"  (by 
which  is  meant  that  of  the  United  States)  be  able 
to  stand  against  that  much  older  type  which  has 
fitted  into  climatic  and  racial  peculiarities  so  as 
to  almost  become  part  of  the  soil?  There  is  no 
question  that  the  United  States  can  control,  pro 
tect,  or  govern  alien  races  if  she  chooses;  but  can 
she  incorporate  them  in  the  nation,  or  must  they 
remain  forever  "  dependencies,"  anomalies  in  her 
system? 

It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  the 
Union  is  composed  not  only  of  Ohios  or  Maines, 
but  includes  also  Louisiana  and  Florida,  and  that 
the  change  from  Yankee  to  Texan  is  gently  grad 
uated,  so  as  not  to  be  too  startling. 

The  subject  of  Pan-Americanism,  which  arises 
naturally  out  of  these  questions,  must  be  reserved 
for  a  future  chapter.  We  are  at  present  concern 
ed  with  the  most  backward  part  of  the  Latin- 
American  race  only.  It  is  hard  to  understand 
why  Central  America  should  have  become  dis 
tinguished  in  this  unfavorable  way.  Nothing 
geographical  or  climatic  is  sufficient  to  explain  the 
phenomenon,  while  proximity  to  the  United  States 
ought  to  have  been  in  their  favor.  As  far  as 
Panama  is  concerned,  however,  the  canal  projects, 
upon  which  all  dreams  of  future  greatness  were 
built,  have  been  answerable  for  a  great  deal  of 
demoralization. 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  Spanish  war  and  the  opportunities  offered 
to  the  United  States  by  it  made  a  great  difference 
in  the  canal  policy  of  that  country,  and  it  is  inter 
esting  to  notice  that,  as  soon  as  she  made  up  her 
mind  irrevocably  as  to  the  canal,  she  began  to  be 
precipitated  on  that  path  of  expansion  marked 
out  for  her  by  destiny.  Having  decided  on  the 
Panama  route  and  settled  the  difficulties  as  to 
control  entirely  in  her  own  favor,  she  was  met 
by  a  sudden  check  from  the  Colombian  govern 
ment.  Their  motives  in  refusing  to  ratify  the  ca 
nal  treaty  were  of  the  most  mixed  description.  A 
proportion  of  one  of  real  patriotism,  not  desiring 
to  alienate  territory,  to  two  of  selfish  cupidity,  and 
four  of  ignorance  worked  on  by  party  interests, 
will  probably  give  a  sufficiently  true  idea  of  their 
stand-point.  Without  entering  into  the  question 
of  the  justification  of  the  United  States'  action  on 
the  grounds  of  treaty  rights,  and  without  applaud 
ing  the  course  actually  taken,  which  was  certainly 
open  to  objection  on  some  grounds,  the  writer  feels 
bound  to  say  that  in  the  interests  of  the  world  at 
large,  and  in  particular  of  the  American  nation,  it 
was  well  to  terminate  as  soon  as  possible  the  intol 
erable  condition  of  affairs  in  Panama.  To  have 
secured  the  necessary  rights  and  guarantees  for  the 
construction  of  the  canal  without  friction  would 
have  been  a  diplomatic  victory  worthy  of  achieve 
ment  ;  but  such  victories  are,  in  fact,  little  in  keep 
ing  with  the  genius  of  the  American  people.  In 
the  long  run,  the  effect  would  have  probably  been 

160 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  same.  The  canal  is  essential  to  American 
unity  and  progress,  but  it  must  bring  in  its  train 
certain  elements  of  discord.  The  United  States  is 
now  irrevocably  involved  in  the  domestic  politics 
of  the  Central  American  republics,  and  especially 
— a  matter  of  far-reaching  consequence — of  a  re 
gion  which  politically  belonged  hitherto  to  South 
America.  Apart  from  this,  the  energy  to  be 
focussed  on  Panama,  the  developments  which 
will  follow,  and  the  growth  of  American  interests 
in  that  quarter,  will  render  it  necessary  to  secure 
an  amount  of  harmony  in  Central  America  which 
has  not  been  possible  hitherto.  Great  Britain  has 
had  experience  of  the  unexpected  lengths  to  which 
the  protection  of  "  a  mere  strip  of  land  "  intersect 
ed  by  a  canal  may  lead  her. 

The  writer  has  always  held  that,  on  account  of 
its  geographical  position,  forming  practically  part 
of  the  future  seaboard  of  the  United  States,  the 
canal  should  be  built  and  controlled  by  her.  Its 
functions  in  uniting  east  and  west  are  of  the  great 
est  importance  to  the  American  nation,  and  in  the 
development  of  the  vast  Pacific  and  in  the  fortunes 
of  the  Far  East  this  great  channel  of  communi 
cation,  between  the  producing  countries  of  the 
Pacific  and  Far  East  and  the  manufacturing 
centres  of  the  United  States,  must  be  a  powerful 
factor.  Distance  is  being  annihilated  all  over  the 
globe;  the  isolation  of  the  Orient,  with  its  teem 
ing  millions,  is  a  thing  of  the  past;  and  the  vast 
latent  forces  lying  dormant  in  the  Pacific  area  will 
ii  161 


GREATER    AMERICA 

shortly  be  brought  within  reach  of  the  manufact 
uring  nations  of  Europe  and  North  America.  To 
Britain,  with  its  overwhelming  interest  in  ocean 
traffic,  the  canal  will  be  of  great  value,  bringing  us 
thousands  of  miles  nearer  to  the  Pacific  shores  of 
the  New  World;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
it  will  benefit  the  United  States  in  an  infinitely 
greater  degree  than  Europe.  It  will  divert  little 
or  no  European  traffic  from  the  Suez  Canal,  but  it 
will  confer  an  immeasurable  impetus  to  the  man 
ufactures  and  trade  of  the  United  States,  ^ill 
greatly  stimulate  her  mercantile  marine  and  ship 
building  industry,  and  will  provide  a  most  power 
ful  incentive  towards  developing  her  navy.  The 
canal  will  complete  an  equatorial  belt  of  naviga 
tion  round  the  world  through  the  gateways  of 
Suez  and  Panama;  will  do  away  with  the  geo 
graphical  obstacles  involved  by  the  circumnaviga 
tion  of  Cape  Horn;  will  place  the  ocean  coasts  of 
the  United  States  nine  thousand  miles  closer  to 
each  other;  will  move  the  neutral  competing  zone 
of  the  United  States  and  Britain  from  the  Pacific 
coast  of  South  America  to  western  Australia,  and 
from  the  Pacific  coast  of  North  America  to  with 
in  the  coast-line  of  China;  and  will  bring  Japan, 
northern  China,  Russia  on  the  Pacific,  Australasia, 
and  Hong-Kong  as  near  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard 
as  they  are  now  to  western  Europe. 

Great  as  will  be  the  effect  on  the  economic  position 
of  the  United  States  of  the  channel  from  ocean  tc 
ocean,  it  is  mainly  on  account  of  its  strategic  value 

162 


GREATER    AMERICA 

that  it  has  been  so  warmly  advocated  by  the 
supporters  of  American  expansion.  It  is  generally 
maintained  that  the  command  of  such  an  inter- 
oceanic  highway  will  double  the  power  of  the 
States  for  offence  and  defence.  'The  nation 
which  controls  this  canal,"  says  a  distinguished 
American  naval  officer,  "  may  issue  hence  squad 
rons  in  the  height  of  vigor  and  discipline,  striking 
blows  upon  both  oceans."  "With  this  canal," 
said  a  United  States  Senator,  "  we  could  move  our 
ships-of-war  upon  short  lines  with  abundant  fuel, 
and  concentrate  a  fleet  in  three  weeks  upon  our 
Western  coast  that  we  could  not  assemble  in  three 

months  by  doubling  Cape  Horn To  the  United 

States,  in  a  political  and  strategic  view  and  as  a 
seaway  to  our  Pacific  coasts,  this  canal  is  of  greater 
importance  than  the  Suez  Canal  is  to  Great  Brit 
ain."  Such  being  the  view  taken  of  the  strategic 
importance  of  the  canal  in  the  United  States,  let 
us  now  consider  briefly  its  strategic  value  to  Great 
Britain. 

First  and  foremost,  the  vast  changes  which  have 
been  taking  place  in  the  Pacific  and  in  the  Far 
East  of  Asia  emphasize  the  value  of  an  alternative 
route  for  Britain  to  India,  the  China  Sea,  and 
Australasia.  Our  main  line  of  communication 
with  the  East — the  Mediterranean  and  Suez  Ca 
nal — is  open  to  attack  along  the  whole  route  from 
the  English  Channel  to  the  Red  Sea;  and  the 
advent  of  Russia  on  the  Pacific,  her  aspirations 
for  ports  on  the  Persian  Gulf  and  even  on  the 

163 


GREATER    AMERICA 

policy  and  the  strength  of  his  hand.  His  best 
measures  were  the  opening  of  communications, 
which  he  accomplished  by  the  lavish  grant  of  con 
cessions,  for  which  a  price  has,  of  course,  to  be  paid; 
the  strengthening  of  his  army,  and  the  consolida 
tion  of  his  finances.  By  means  of  a  well-equipped 
army  and  good  railways  he  controls  the  people, 
and  the  rehabilitated  credit  of  the  country  has  led 
to  foreign  investments  and  economic  development. 
At  first  chiefly  English  and  French,  the  trade  and 
financial  development  have  gradually  been  pass 
ing  into  American  hands,  and  at  present  it  is 
roughly  estimated  that  about  five  hundred  million 
dollars  are  invested  by  the  United  States  in  the 
country,  and  the  amount  is  increasing  annually 
at  an  extraordinary  pace.1 

While  there  has  been  a  great  advance  in  the 
material  progress  of  Mexico,  that  country  does 
not  present  the  spectacle  of  a  nation  in  which  all 
classes  are  making  strides  towards  a  more  ad 
vanced  civilization.  It  is  said  that  eighty-five  per 
cent.,  at  least,  are  illiterate.  The  republican  ideal 
of  a  peasant-proprietor  class,  growing  in  prosper 
ity  and  education  towards  an  equality  of  oppor 
tunity  with  their  wealthier  brethren,  is  as  far  off 
from  Mexico  as  ever.  The  large  preponderance  of 


1  This  is  the  consular  estimate  for  January  i,  1903.  But 
there  are  a  number  of  American  corporations  representing 
large  investments  which  do  not  issue  statements  of  their  cap 
ital;  and  the  total  is  probably  not  less  than  seven  hundred 
million  dollars  gold. 

166 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Indians  in  the  lowest  stratum  of  society  is  one 
drawback,  many  of  these  living  in  their  old  tribal 
organization  and  hardly  civilized  at  all.  There 
has  been  a  Juarez,  it  is  true,  but  only  one.  In 
this  benign  climate,  a  winterless  land,  the  masses 
are  not  inclined  to  work.  The  fluctuations  of  the 
currency  have  also  been  a  great  drawback  to  prog 
ress,  and  are  the  subject  of  an  American- Mexican 
commission.  The  system  of  government,  like  all 
democratic  systems,  is  extremely  costly  and  will 
be  difficult  to  maintain.  Heavy  taxation  is  nec 
essary,  and  the  position  of  the  peon  is  rendered 
more  unfortunate  by  the  system  of  hacienda  stores, 
to  which  he  becomes  indebted  and  is  practically 
a  slave  until  he  can  work  off  his  debt.  Though 
not  exactly  legal,  this  system  is  widely  prevalent. 
Taxation  has  always  been  a  heavy  burden  on 
the  Mexican  people,  and  one  of  the  unfortunate 
features  has  been  the  taxation  of  industries  and 
cultivated  ground.  The  alcabalas,  or  inter-state 
customs,  which  have  been  recently  abolished— 
officially  at  least — were  heavy  burdens;  but  the 
chief  difficulty  in  the  way  of  economic  develop 
ment  has  been  the  tariff  policy  of  the  United 
States.  The  duties  have  been  considerably  de 
creased  and  a  free  zone  established  on  the  Mexican 
frontier,  but  the  custom-houses  between  the  coun 
tries,  with  their  delays  and  inconveniences,  caused 
to  a  large  extent  by  maladministration,  are  a 
serious  obstacle  to  trade.  As  Mexico  is  becoming 
almost  entirely  dependent  economically  on  the 

167 


GREATER    AMERICA 

United  States,  she  is  naturally  very  much  handi 
capped  by  a  system  of  restrictive  tariffs.  The 
only  basis  for  a  reciprocity  treaty,  however,  is  the 
free  admission  of  sugar  and  coffee  into  the  United 
States  in  return  for  food  stuffs  and  manufactures, 
and  this  solution  would,  of  course,  be  inimical  to 
the  vested  interests  which  are  responsible  for  the 
opposition  to  reciprocity  here  as  in  the  Philippines 
and  Cuba.1 

It  is  of  peculiar  interest,  at  this  period  of  British 
economic  development,  to  consider  whether  any 

1  "To  British  North  America  the  United  States  supplies  52 
per  cent,  of  the  total  imports  for  consumption;  to  Mexico, 
equally  adjacent,  but  speaking  another  language  than  our 
own,  40  per  cent.;  to  the  Central  American  states,  next  re 
moved  by  distance,  though  readily  reached  by  water  and  now 
being  tapped  by  railways,  35  per  cent.;  to  Colombia,  a  trifle 
farther  removed,  but  equally  accessible  by  direct  water  trans 
portation,  33  per  cent.;  to  Venezuela,  equally  accessible,  27 
per  cent. ;  to  the  West  Indies,  which  lie  in  close  proximity,  but 
which  have  been  up  to  the  present  time  controlled  by  com 
mercial  nations  whose  policy  in  many  cases  has  been  to  retain 
their  commerce  for  their  own  people,  20  per  cent.;  to  the 
Guianas,  also  readily  reached  by  water,  25  per  cent,  of  the  im 
ports  of  British  Guiana,  17  per  cent,  of  those  of  Dutch  Guiana, 
and  but  less  than  6  per  cent,  of  those  of  French  Guiana. 

"Up  to  this  point  the  study  of  the  growth  of  commerce  be 
tween  the  United  States  and  other  American  countries  it 
fairly  satisfactory.  Beginning  with  52  per  cent,  of  the  import 
trade  of  Canada,  40  per  cent,  of  that  of  Mexico,  and  ranging 
on  downward  along  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  Caribbean  Sea,  a 
fairly  satisfactory  share  of  the  commerce  of  those  countries  is 
enjoyed  by  the  people  of  the  United  States,  though  it  will  be 
conceded  that  her  people  have  a  right  to  expect  a  larger  share 
of  the  commerce  of  the  countries  lying  so  near  at  hand,  espe 
cially  in  view  of  the  fact  that  our  purchases  from  them  are 
much  larger  than  our  sales  to  them." — BUREAU  OF  STATISTICS, 
WASHINGTON  (1821-1900). 

1 68 


GREATER    AMERICA 

change  from  our  free-trade  policy  might  not  lead 
to  modification  in  existing  tariffs  throughout  the 
world.  That  its  first  effect  would  be  to  reduce  the 
American  tariff  wall  cannot  be  doubted,  and  this 
would  naturally  have  great  results  in  Latin  Amer 
ica. 

What  will  happen  in  Mexico  when  Porfirio  Diaz 
(already  past  the  Biblical  limit  of  the  span  of  life) 
lets  fall  the  sceptre  he  has  so  successfully  wielded? 
We  are  told  that  his  successor  has  been  already 
chosen — every  precaution  has  been  taken  for  his 
"  election  " — but  we  have  no  guarantee  that  every 
generation  will  produce  a  Diaz.  There  is  no  prin 
ciple  to  guide  either  government  or  opposition; 
the  personal  factor  has  been  supreme,  and  often 
tyrannical  in  its  manifestation,  and  while  there 
is  no  question  that  this  form  of  government,  with 
its  many  drawbacks,  has  been  the  most  successful 
evolved  by  Latin- American  people,  it  is  not  a  de 
mocracy,  nor  can  it  be  regarded  as  a  training- 
school  for  constitutional  politicians,  nor  has  it  the 
permanence  of  an  hereditary  monarchy. 

Mexico  remains  an  unsolved  problem,  but  one 
with  which  Greater  America  is  deeply  concerned 
and  must  ultimately  help  to  unravel.  That  it 
forms  already  part  of  the  new  American  sphere  of 
influence  can  hardly  be  denied.  From  the  United 
States  border  a  constant  stream  of  influence  is 
trickling  down  through  Mexico;  or,  to  change  the 
metaphor,  the  United  States  is  shooting  out 
tentacles  in  every  direction  on  her  southern  boun- 

169 


GREATER    AMERICA 

dary.  Whereas  formerly  the  cry  was  "  Accretion, 
not  colonization,"  rfe  is  now  "  Absorption,  not  an 
nexation,"  but  the  Mexicans  may  well  ask  "  What's 
in  a  name?"  It  can  never  be  forgotten  that  a 
great  part  of  Mexico  is  already  under  the  Stars 
and  Stripes.  The  actual  occupation,  with  sover 
eign  rights,  of  the  canal  strip  will  act  as  another 
centre  from  which  United  States  influence  must 
spread  still  more  tangibly,  and,  as  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  involves  its  adherents  (or  rather  expo 
nents)  more  and  more  in  the  meshes  of  Latin- 
American  affairs,  the  question  will  be,  where  will 
the  "American  sphere"  end?  A  boundary  -  line 
—the  latest  of  several — has  already  been  found 
for  it  by  sanguine  expansionists  in  the  Amazon 
River,  but  as  this  includes  in  the  sphere  a  large 
part  of  Brazil,  the  subject  becomes  at  once  in 
volved  in  that  of  Pan-Americanism,  and  must  be 
considered  in  a  later  chapter. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  CONTROL  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN 

NOWHERE,  perhaps,  does  history  afford  a  sadder 
lesson  in  the  evil  effects  of  the  human  lust  for  gold 
than  in  the  story  of  this  beautiful  sea,  the  blue 
Caribbean,  studded  with  countless  islands,  each  a 
gem  of  tropical  beauty.  Nature  has  done  every 
thing  for  this  favored  region;  man  has  been  the 
destroyer  of  its  peace.  From  time  to  time,  as  if 
in  rebellion  against  the  evils  which  were  disfiguring 
her  beauty,  the  earth-mother  has  revenged  herself 
by  one  of  those  sudden  cataclysms  which  have 
devastated  whole  islands;  and  it  is,  perhaps,  a 
fitting  though  a  terrible  sequence  in  the  long  chain 
of  tragedy  that  the  last  few  years  should  have 
seen  the  greatest  catastrophe  of  all  and  the  whole 
sale  destruction  of  one  island.  It  is  as  if  these 
beautiful  gems  of  the  Caribbean  were  placed  under 
some  baneful  spell  by  reason  of  the  evil  passions 
of  by-gone  generations  and  as  a  retribution  for  the 
cruel  fate  which  Western  conquerors  meted  out  to 
the  gentle,  harmless  aborigines. 

No  one  who  has  ever  visited  these  lovely  islands 
can  fail  to  retain  an  image  of  their  exquisite  beauty, 
and  he  will  find  it  difficult  to  decide  as  to  the  rival 


GREATER    AMERICA 

claims  of  each  to  be  considered  the  queen.  Set 
in  a  sea  whose  sapphire  blue  deceives  one  with  an 
aspect  of  placid  loveliness,  by  no  means  justified 
by  its  treacherous  currents  and  contrary  winds, 
the  coral  strands  are  fringed  with  palms  and  co 
coa-nuts;  mountains  of  indescribable  beauty  and 
grandeur  rise  tier  on  tier  till  they  melt  into  an 
azure  sky;  flowers  and  foliage  of  radiant  beauty 
clothe  every  ravine.  In  the  brilliance  of  tropical 
sunlight  there  is  nothing  lacking  to  complete  the 
charm  of  the  scene. 

Amid  this  bounteous  nature,  however,  man  has 
moved  like  a  destroyer.  The  races  now  in  occupa 
tion  of  the  soil — white  and  black — are  singularly 
out  of  the  picture.  No  one  familiar  with  the 
tropical  East  can  have  failed  to  notice  how  per 
fectly  the  peoples  are  assimilated  to  their  own 
environment.  Their  clothes  and  dwellings,  their 
very  figures  and  faces,  seem  to  have  an  artistic 
relation  to  the  background  in  which  they  are  set, 
and  even  in  the  case  of  a  fantastic  civilization  like 
that  of  China  one  feels  little  sense  of  discrepancy; 
it  has,  in  truth,  grown  up  from  the  soil  and  drawn 
its  color  from  the  character  of  the  surrounding 
country  and  the  skies  above.  It  is  not  a  mere 
sense  of  picturesqueness  which  leads  one  to  abhor 
the  banalities  of  Western  settlements  in  the  East, 
but  a  feeling  that  they  are  out  of  key  with  nature. 
Architecture  which  in  northern  climes  seems  right 
and  suitable,  and  therefore  aesthetically  correct, 
appears  grotesque  in  the  lands  of  eternal  sunshine. 

172 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Englishmen  have  to  a  certain  extent  realized  this, 
and  have  compromised  in  their  dwellings  to  secure 
modern  sanitation  without  a  sacrifice  of  artistic 
fitness.  But  in  their  personal  appearance  and 
manners  they  can  never  fail  to  appear  as  stran 
gers  in  these  countries.  They  are  the  growth  of 
an  alien  civilization,  and  whether  it  be  better  or 
no,  it  certainly  does  not  have  that  relation  to  nat 
ure  —  that  indefinite,  subtle  connection  with  the 
scenery,  the  sky,  or  the  flora  which  an  indigenous 
civilization  possesses. 

The  West  Indies  present  this  anomaly  in  a  most 
striking  manner ;  nowhere  do  we  find  an  indigenous 
civilization,  nowhere  do  the  people  seem  to  be  in 
intimate  relationship  with  their  habitat.  On  a 
Saharan  desert,  with  a  fierce,  tropical  sun  bleach 
ing  the  sand  on  which  his  shadow  is  cut  in  deepest 
cobalt,  the  glowing  black  of  the  negro,  his  fierce 
freedom  of  gesture,  the  barbaric  note  of  blood-red 
in  his  scarf,  and  the  glint  of  white  in  his  teeth  and 
eyeballs  make  a  never-to-be-forgotten  picture — a 
perfect  harmony.  Here,  however,  he  is  still  un 
civilized,  wild  as  his  own  bare  country,  free  as  its 
scorching  sunlight. 

In  the  West  Indies  we  find  a  different  being. 
Set  in  a  background  of  tropical  luxuriance,  and  at 
the  same  time  half  converted  to  a  civilization 
which  is  foreign  both  to  him  and  to  the  country, 
the  negro  is  nothing  but  a  travesty  of  his  white 
masters.  His  language  is  the  debased  coin  of 
Spanish,  French,  or  English;  his  clothing  their 


GREATER    AMERICA 

discarded  finery,  or  rags  of  his  own  devising  on  the 
same  model.  His  home  is  as  devoid  of  originality 
as  it  is  of  artistic  beauty.  It  is  a  shelter — noth 
ing  more.  It  is  a  significant  fact  that  the  curio- 
hunter  in  the  West  Indies  can  find  nothing  in 
teresting  save  the  Carib  baskets,  woven  by  the 
descendants  of  the  aborigines,  or  some  barbaric 
bead- work  of  no  originality  or  beauty.  The  negro 
is  far  behind  the  Fiji- 1  slander  in  decorating  his 
house,  the  summit  of  his  ambition  being  to  pur 
chase  American  "  rockers/' 

In  speaking  thus  of  the  West  Indian  negro  it  is, 
of  course,  the  outward  aspect  of  the  peasantry 
we  are  considering;  and  it  must  be  acknowledged 
that  from  a  pictorial  and  aesthetic  point  of  view, 
the  poor  black  is  in  all  respects  preferable  to  the 
poor  white.  The  cotton  clothes  of  the  black 
"mammies"  are  often  clean  and  stiffly  starched, 
and  a  touch  of  color  is  imparted  in  the  turban, 
which  is  added  to,  in  the  French  islands,  by 
multicolored  kerchiefs  and  skirts,  making  up  a 
bright  and  effective  costume.  The  present  ten 
dency,  however,  is  to  dress  more  and  more  in  the 
cast-off  fashions  of  white  folks,  and  to  abandon 
the  turban  for  the  trimmed  hat,  but  the  effect  of 
clean  cotton  dresses  is  still  sufficiently  flower-like 
to  make  a  not  unpleasing  note  in  the  landscape. 
The  tendency  of  the.  poor  whites  is  to  a  slatternly 
neglect  of  house  and  person,  which  is  far  more 
reprehensible,  both  from  a  moral  and  aesthetic 
point  of  view,  than  the  childish  vanity  of  the  blacks. 

J74 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Here,  then,  is  the  first  fruit,  apparent  to  the 
most  casual  observer,  of  European  greed  in  snatch 
ing  the  islands.  We  have  peopled  them,  but  we 
cannot  replace  the  ancient  race  which  we  ex 
terminated.  Neither  we  nor  the  negroes  are  sons 
of  the  soil,  in  the  true  sense  of  having  evolved 
there  our  character  and  civilization;  and  the  con 
sequence  is  a  permanent  divorce  between  these 
beautiful  islands  and  the  people  who  dwell  on 
them.  The  negro  has,  of  course,  found  here  a 
secure  home,  but  he  has  not  yet  recovered  from 
the  baneful  influence  of  the  system  under  which 
he  was  brought.  The  ease  with  which  life  can  be 
supported  has  also  vitiated  his  character,  never 
strenuous,  and  it  is  only  when  pressure  of  cir 
cumstances  drives  him  to  it  that  he  can  be  de 
pended  on  for  systematic  labor.  Thanks  to  the 
economic  policy  of  Europe,  the  West  Indian 
islands  have  for  many  years  past  been  driving 
many  of  their  foster-children  into  the  foreign 
labor  market,  but — and  this  is  part  of  their  curse 
— they  do  so  at  the  cost  of  their  own  prosperity. 
It  is  at  once  the  lack  of  laborers  and  the  lack  of 
remunerative  labor  that  constitutes  a  deadlock 
in  the  West  Indies  to-day.  A  people  who  were 
children  of  the  soil  might  have  wrung  from  it  a 
living  even  in  the  teeth  of  difficulties;  the  negro, 
with  sugar  gone  and  nothing  to  replace  it,  when 
he  can  no  longer  subsist  by  scratching  up  a  yam- 
patch,  must  go  elsewhere  or  starve  in  idleness. 

The  West  Indies  are  interesting  not  only  as  the 


GREATER    AMERICA 

second  home  of  a  black  race,  but  as  an  object- 
lesson  in  the  possibilities  of  peopling  the  tropics 
with  white  races.  How  far  the  perpetuation  of 
these  races  is  due  to  intermingling  with  the  negroes 
and  aborigines,  and  how  much  to  constant  rein 
forcement  from  Europe,  it  is  impossible  to  gauge; 
but  it  does  not  require  a  very  close  observation 
to  see  that,  in  different  degrees,  the  Creoles  of  all 
the  islands  are  in  many  respects  different  from,  and 
in  the  more  sturdy  virtues  inferior  to,  the  parent 
stocks.  The  Spaniard  has  in  him  a  touch  of 
Orientalism  and  has  no  race  prejudice,  facts  which 
have  helped  him  in  the  task  of  assimilation.  The 
Creoles  live  a  sort  of  hot-house  existence  and  have 
the  characteristics  of  exotic  rather  than  of  tropical, 
indigenous  plants. 

Nowhere  do  we  see  the  growth  in  a  West  Indian 
island  of  a  community  whose  social  and  political 
life  has  made  independent  progress  towards  the 
goal  of  individual  enlightenment  and  liberty. 
Many  of  the  islands  have  now  attained  to  the 
dignity  of  self-government,  and  two  have  achieved 
independence.  Hayti  is  an  interesting  study  and 
a  most  striking  example  of  a  Black  Republic,  as  it 
has  now  been  over  a  century  in  the  enjoyment  of 
a  democratic  constitution.  It  was,  of  course,  the 
black  element  in  that  island  which  overthrew  the 
dominion  of  Europe,  and  the  victory  was  one  of 
matter  over  mind.  There  is  no  need  to  recapitu 
late  the  reasons  which  left  the  white  population 
at  the  mercy  of  the  blacks,  nor  the  methods  by 

176 


GREATER    AMERICA 

which  the  Black  Republic  was  founded.  Right 
and  wrong  are  inextricably  interwoven  in  all  such 
cases,  and  there  may  be  instances  in  which  the  end 
may  excuse,  though  not  justify,  the  means.  What 
is  Hayti  to-day,  after  the  long  sequence  of  crimes 
of  which  her  history  is  made  up  ?  Apologists,  both 
white  and  black,  are  found  who  try  to  put  a  good 
complexion  on  the  condition  of  the  island,  their 
chief  reason  being  to  justify  or  to  avert  condemna 
tion  of  the  republican  institutions  on  which  its 
government  is  founded.  It  is  significant,  how 
ever,  that  the  warmest  friend  can  say  no  more 
than  that  the  evil  reports  are  exaggerated.  Can 
nibalism,  they  declare,  does  not  now  exist,  and 
voodoo  worship  is  on  the  decline;  but  they  can 
furnish  no  explanation  for  a  state  of  affairs  in 
which  the  accusations  that  are  current  receive 
credence.  The  plain  evidences  of  corruption  and 
anarchy  are  enough  for  our  purpose,  without  any 
examination  of  the  darker  sides  of  social  and  polit 
ical  life,  and  these  are  incontrovertible. 

The  checkered  history  of  Haytian  rulers  is  worth 
recording.  Of  these,  one  was  assassinated,  one 
killed  himself,  one  was  exiled,  many  were  deposed, 
four  fled,  one  was  shot,  three  abdicated,  and  only 
one  died  peaceably  in  office.  The  trade  of  the 
country  has  declined  to  a  mere  fraction  of  what  it 
once  was;  there  are  not  more  than  ten  miles  of 
railway;  there  are  no  public  hospitals,  save  one 
kept  by  Sisters  of  Charity ;  no  sanitation ;  no  pub 
lic  works,  save  the  palaces  built  by  rulers  for 

177 


GREATER    AMERICA 

themselves  with  forced  labor.  The  army  is  a 
laughing-stock  to  European  visitors,  and  the  whole 
business  of  government  is  kept  up  on  a  scale  of 
tawdry  grandeur.  Foreigners  are  not  allowed  to 
acquire  land,  and  there  is  only  a  handful  of  whites 
in  a  population  of  blacks  and  mulattoes.  We  can 
not  find  that  anything  is  done  to  provide  enlight 
ened  public  instruction,  and  religious  teaching  is 
certainly  handicapped  by  the  darkest  supersti 
tions. 

Much  the  same  state  of  affairs  exists  in  San 
Domingo,  the  Dominican  Republic,  which  em 
braces  the  eastern  two  -  thirds  of  the  island  of 
Hayti,  the  chief  difference  being  that  the  dialect 
spoken  in  Spanish.  At  the  time  of  writing,  an 
archy  is  supreme,  trade  is  at  a  stand-still,  and  it  is 
becoming  more  and  more  certain  that  action  must 
shortly  be  taken  to  protect  European  and  Amer 
ican  interests.  The  American  naval  commander 
reports  that  at  a  recent  date  no  fewer  than  four 
separate  movements  (which  might  be  dignified 
with  the  name  of  revolutions)  were  in  process 
simultaneously. 

This  condition  prevails  in  an  island  which  was 
not  only  proverbially  fertile  and  rich,  but  had  been 
the  focus  of  influences  emanating  from  the  most 
cultivated  and  refined  capital  of  Europe.  Hispan- 
iola,  in  the  French  period,  was  in  many  respects 
ahead  of  her  sister  islands,  and  the  many  excellent 
qualities  of  the  French  colonists  had  combined  at 
once  to  make  it  not  only  one  of  the  richest,  but 

178 


GREATER    AMERICA 

one  of  the  first  in  the  refinements  of  civilization. 
It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  writer  is  plac 
ing  responsibility  for  failure  entirely  on  negro 
shoulders.  The  long  series  of  blunders  and  in 
justices,  of  crimes  and  follies,  of  which  the  West 
Indian  isles  have  been  the  scene  have  their  root 
deep  in  the  past,  and  for  the  most  part  we  of  the 
Old  World,  and  the  unfortunate  races  whose  fate 
is  bound  up  with  ours,  have  but  blindly  followed 
a  destiny  to  which  the  lusts  of  our  forefathers 
condemned  us.  On  northern  soil  man  is  suf 
ficiently  master  of  his  fate  to  break  through  the 
bonds  woven  for  him  and  make  a  new  world  for 
himself,  but  in  the  West  Indies  he  must  remain 
forever  a  slave,  not  only  to  his  own  weaker  self, 
but  doomed  to  toil  forever,  to  roll  back  the  stone 
which  his  fathers,  in  ignorant  passion,  threw  down. 
The  recent  establishment  of  another  independent 
republic  in  the  Caribbean  opens  questions  of  wide 
importance.  Cuba  is  considered  elsewhere  more 
fully;  it  is  sufficient  here  to  say  that  she  has  been 
given  her  freedom  on  terms  which  merely  make 
it  a  matter  of  time  as  to  how  soon  she  becomes 
part  of  the  United  States.  Puerto  Rico  has  al 
ready  been  created  a  Territory,  with  free  access  to 
the  markets  of  the  United  States,  but  with  no 
claims  to  Statehood  or  to  American  citizenship  for 
her  people.  Nevertheless,  the  supreme  court  has 
just  decided  that  Puerto  Ricans  are  not  aliens, 
since  he  is  either  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  or 
of  no  country  at  all,  Hence  it  follows  that  while 

J79 


GREATER    AMERICA 

he  is  a  citizen  in  the  sense  of  being  amenable  to 
United  States  laws,  and  entitled  to  protection,  he 
is  not  a  citizen  as  regards  constitutional  rights. 
This  is  an  example  of  the  confusion  which  arises 
from  the  attempt  to  reconcile  democratic  theory 
with  imperial  practice.  Civil  government  in  Puer 
to  Rico  was  organized  in  1900.  The  insular  gov 
ernment  (American)  practically  controls  the  whole 
system,  but  Puerto  Ricans  have  local  autonomy 
and  are  clamoring  for  more  complete  self-govern 
ment,  desiring  to  have  all  duties  and  functions 
vested  in  municipalities  as  far  as  possible,  in  order 
that  they  may  obtain  control.1 

So  long  as  capable  and  disinterested  Americans, 
uninfluenced  by  local  politics,  are  at  the  helm,  the 
present  condition  of  affairs  will  continue.  But  if 
they  were  to  be  removed,  what  guarantee  is  there 
that  the  party  dissensions  so  characteristic  of 
Spanish  America  will  not  return  with  all  their  at 
tendant  evils?  And  if  Puerto  Rico  were  to  be 
come  a  Territory  with  a  claim  to  Statehood,  what 

1  The  central  government  having  been  established,  the 
legislative  council  (with  an  American  majority)  set  to  work 
to  organize  details.  Revenue,  education,  and  local  govern 
ment  were  reformed,  but  the  guiding  hand  of  the  central 
government  was  apparent  in  all  these,  although  every  effort 
was  made  to  give  local  autonomy  and  responsibility  to  munic 
ipal  officials.  A  code  of  laws  was  drawn  up  and  police  and 
other  regulations  enforced.  Judicial  reforms  were  introduced. 
Finances  are  rigidly  supervised  by  an  American  treasurer. 
The  official  selections  have  been  made  without  party  bias, 
and  administrative  heads  have  endeavored  to  introduce  the 
"merit"  system  in  the  civil  service. 

1 80 


GREATER    AMERICA 

is  to  prevent  the  initiation  of  all  the  evils  of  polit 
ical  life  existing  in  the  United  States? 

In  this  new  advance  of  the  Americans  into  the 
Caribbean  we  see  a  significant  circumstance  affect 
ing  the  future  of  that  region.  Few,  if  any,  of  the 
West  Indian  islands  have  not  changed  hands  more 
than  once  since  their  discovery  to  the  Western 
world,  and  one  of  the  things  most  certain  in  the 
future  is  that  their  checkered  career  as  political 
pawns  is  not  yet  ended.  Here  we  find  the  direct 
result  of  the  policy  adopted  by  the  early  con 
querors,  and  we  realize  the  full  extent  of  the 
blighting  influence  of  that  policy  upon  these 
islands.  They  have  been  in  the  past,  and,  now 
that  their  brief  day  of  intrinsic  value  seems  to  be 
setting,  will  again  become  nothing  more  than 
pawns  in  the  game  of  world  politics.  It  would 
have  been  impossible  so  to  regard  them  had  they 
been  peopled  by  a  truly  indigenous  race.  Even 
the  patriotism  of  a  Creole  population  like  that  of 
Cuba  is  partial,  disturbed  by  other  influences,  and 
rather  a  sentiment  than  a  national  heritage. 

Before  pursuing  any  further  the  subject  of  West 
Indian  possibilities,  it  may  be  well  to  give  a  brief 
resume  of  the  actual  state  of  affairs,  political  and 
economic. 

At  present  the  British  islands  contain  the  bulk 
of  the  population,  some  three  millions,  of  whom 
not  more  than  two  per  cent,  are  white.  The  British 
islands  have  varying  forms  of  colonial  government, 
all  on  the  crown-colony  pattern,  providing  differ- 

181 


GREATER    AMERICA 

ing  degrees  of  local  autonomy  and  representative 
government.  Economically  they  are  decadent. 
No  fresh  industry  on  any  adequate  scale  has  re 
placed  sugar,  and,  in  face  of  the  over-production 
of  that  article  in  other  parts  of  the  world,  it  is 
impossible  to  see  how  the  industry  can  ever  be 
revived.  Its  downfall  might  have  been  delayed 
by  judicious  methods  in  the  early  period  of  de 
cadence,  but  the  most  drastic  measures  would 
not  avail  now,  and  the  one  hope  is  the  creation  of 
fresh  industries. 

As  for  the  condition  of  the  negro  race  under 
these  circumstances,  it  is  one  of  the  curious  anoma 
lies  with  which  every  student  of  world  affairs  is 
familiar.  By  every  law  of  civilization  the  negroes 
ought  to  be  in  a  bad  way.  They  should  suffer 
with  the  whites.  Economic  depression  is  supposed 
always  to  fall  first  on  the  lowest  strata  of  society. 
Indifferent  government  (and  the  government  of 
some  of  the  West  Indian  islands  has  been  very 
indifferent)  should  first  affect  the  well-being  of 
the  poorest,  as  they  are  the  least  able  to  defend 
themselves.  The  contrary  has  been  the  case  in 
the  British  West  Indies.  The  muddles  of  govern 
ments,  the  decline  of  prosperity,  the  increase  of 
taxation  to  support  heavy  public  works  neglected 
in  palmy  days — all  these  have  fallen  with  crushing 
force  on  the  white  planter.  They  have  wrecked 
his  home,  and  they  have  driven  him  in  despair 
from  the  islands,  but  they  have  left  the  negro 
practically  unharmed.  Poor  he  is,  but  in  the 

182 


GREATER    AMERICA 

bounteous  West  Indies  he  need  not  feel  hunger  or 
cold.  The  land  left  by  the  white  planters  has 
gradually  fallen  into  the  hands  of  black  squatters, 
and  with  the  wide  area  available  they  are  able  to 
shift  their  yam  or  potato  patch  as  soon  as  the  soil 
seems  exhausted. 

Froude,  in  a  memorable  book  full  of  mistakes, 
but  lit  up  throughout  with  those  inimitable  flashes 
of  insight — those  touches  of  sympathetic  descrip 
tion  which  give  his  work  a  living  value  lacked 
by  that  of  more  scientifically  accurate  writers — 
has  given  us  a  picture  of  the  happy  West  Indian 
black.  It  may  be  an  exaggeration,  but  the  im 
pressions  of  a  man  like  Froude  are  worth  a  good 
deal  as  evidence,  and  are  borne  out  by  many  others 
of  less  eminence.  There  are  problems  in  the  Brit 
ish  West  Indies  —  there  is  poverty,  there  must  be 
misery — but  the  writer  can  unhesitatingly  affirm 
that,  were  he  a  negro,  it  is  in  these  islands,  rather 
than  in  any  other  part  of  the  world,  that  he  would 
prefer  to  have  his  lot  cast.  The  British  have,  so 
far  as  in  their  power  lay,  done  what  they  could 
to  ameliorate  the  lot  of  their  black  subjects.  The 
natural  orderliness  of  the  Anglo  -  Saxon  has  led 
him  to  establish  the  essentials  of  civilization.  Law 
and  justice  are  firm  and  incorruptible,  markets  are 
easy  of  access  and  well  regulated,  good  roads  have 
been  made  wherever  possible,  and,  in  fact,  the 
negro  lives  his  primitive  life  under  conditions  made 
easy  by  the  protecting  care  of  a  higher  civilization. 
The  race  prejudice  which  keeps  white  and  black 

183 


GREATER    AMERICA 

apart  has  not  prevented  the  ruling  race  from 
dealing  fairly  and  generously  with  the  subject 
one.  Froude  thought  they  were  going  too  far  in 
this  respect.  He  foresaw  the  time  when  the  few 
remaining  whites  would  refuse  to  be  governed  by 
a  black  majority  and  would  leave  altogether,  and 
thus  the  democratic  principle,  just  struggling  into 
birth,  would  rid  the  island  of  the  white  element  so 
badly  needed  to  leaven  the  whole  lump.  Since  his 
time,  however,  there  has  been  little  progress  in 
that  direction.  The  eyes  of  Britain  were  opened, 
and  a  halt  was  called  in  that  march  on  which  she 
was  urging  all  her  colonies.  It  was  realized  that 
the  race  question  must  count  for  something  in 
matters  of  government ;  and  while  many  mistakes 
have  been  perpetuated  on  the  islands,  there  has 
been  a  genuine  attempt  to  legislate  in  a  dis 
criminating  manner  for  the  backward  race.  The 
responsibility  of  ruling  the  negro  has  not  been 
altogether  shifted  on  to  his  own  unaccustomed 
shoulders.  In  the  larger  islands  a  certain  amount 
of  progress  has  been  made,  and  for  them  it  seems, 
indeed,  as  if  the  worst  crisis  were  over.  The 
growth  of  the  fruit  industry  is  a  hopeful  sign,  and 
also  the  advance  in  means  of  public  education  and 
a  slow  but  perceptible  improvement  in  the  moral 
status  of  the  negro. 

It  must  be  understood  by  all  who  would  ap 
preciate  the  West  Indian  problems  that  a  con 
dition  of  contented  poverty,  readiness  to  work, 
if  well  paid  and  overlooked,  and  even  a  disposi- 

184 


GREATER    AMERICA 

tion  among  the  better  class  to  become  useful  citi 
zens  and  efficient  government  employes,  go  side 
by  side  with  a  most  primitive  morality  among 
the  great  bulk  of  the  population.  Until  this  de 
fect  is  remedied— and  that  can  only  be  by  white 
influence,  example,  and  discipline  —  any  talk  of 
•democratic  principles  in  the  islands  is  criminal 
folly.  A  sham  democracy  is  more  degrading  than 
any  other  form  of  government,  since  it  inevi 
tably  leads  to  the  predominance  of  the  most 
unscrupulous.  A  true  democracy  in  the  British 
West  Indies  would  mean  the  ascendency  of  the 
lower  class  of  negro,  with  his  inferior  moral  and 
mental  standard,  over  his  superior  brothers  and 
the  handful  of  whites  who  could  not  leave  the 
islands.  It  would  be  a  mere  mob  rule. 

No  tampering  with  constitutions  or  rearrange 
ment  of  the  political  grouping  would  be  of  any  real 
assistance  to  the  islands.  It  might  secure  more  ef 
ficiency  here  or  reduce  a  little  extra  taxation  there, 
but  it  would  not  touch  the  root  of  the  matter, 
which  is  the  economic  problem.  We  must  return 
later  to  that  question,  but  first  must  glance  at  the 
condition  of  those  islands  belonging  to  other  Euro 
pean  powers — the  French,  Dutch,  and  Danish  West 
Indies. 

The  French  islands  number  two  of  the  most 
considerable  of  the  Antilles — Martinique  and  Gua 
deloupe.  Even  before  the  recent  disasters  which 
have  depopulated  the  former,  these  islands  con 
tained  only  some  four  hundred  thousand  souls. 

185 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Many  of  the  British  Antilles,  of  course,  were 
originally  colonized  by  the  French,  and  remain  to 
this  day  Gallic  not  only  in  language  but  in  many 
other  characteristic  features  of  their  civilization. 
Dominica,  one  of  the  largest  as  well  as  the  most 
beautiful  of  this  chain  of  islands,  is  an  example  of 
this.  The  protective  tariffs  of  the  mother- country 
have  helped  to  prolong  the  life  of  the  sugar  in 
dustry  in  the  French  colonies,  and  it  has  been  to 
this  alone  that  they  owed  their  apparent  superior 
ity  to  the  British  islands,  which  has  led  not  a  few 
observers  to  pronounce  in  favor  of  the  French 
rather  than  the  British  mode  of  government  in  the 
West  Indies.  In  other  respects  the  French  and 
British  islands  differ  considerably.  The  former 
contain  a  larger  proportion  of  half-breeds,  the 
color-line  being  less  strictly  drawn.  Whether  this 
is  in  itself  an  advantage  is  a  matter  of  opinion. 
In  one  respect  it  cannot  fail  to  be  a  drawback, 
since  a  pure  black  population  will  increase  in 
numbers  and  retain  its  fine  physique  far  better 
than  a  colored  race.  The  political  system,  admired 
by  Sir  Charles  Dilke,  is  founded  on  the  granting, 
through  universal  suffrage,  of  representation  in 
the  central  government.  He  speaks  of  the  prog 
ress  made  by  individual  blacks  under  this  more 
liberal  treatment,  but  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the 
instances  with  which  he  points  his  remarks  are 
taken  from  British  islands -- Barbadoes  and  Ja 
maica.  French  observers  themselves  are  less  san 
guine  as  to  their  succcess  in  the  West  Indies. 

z  86 


GREATER    AMERICA 

It  is  significant  that  the  local  administration  of 
Guadeloupe  absorbs  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  annual 
value  of  the  products  of  the  island,  while  in 
Martinique,  before  the  recent  catastrophes,  there 
were  one  thousand  four  hundred  fonctionnaires  to 
some  fourteen  thousand  eligible  voters.  Leroy- 
Beaulieu  says:  "The  deputies  whom  Martinique 
and  Guadeloupe  send  to  our  parliament  serve  only 
to  represent  the  malice,  ignorance,  and  prejudice 
of  the  blacks.  The  weak  executive  power  in 
France  allows  itself  to  be  intimidated  by  these 
deputies,  and  sends  out  to  the  colonies  cowardly 
and  incapable  governors  whose  indecision  of  char 
acter  feeds  the  more  or  less  barbarous  hopes  of  the 
negro  majority.  .  .  .  The  hatred  for  the  negro  in 
these  islands  is  complicated  by  the  hatred  of  the 
poor  for  the  rich."1  M.  Maurice  Ordinaire,  in  his 
study  of  modern  colonization,  makes  an  interesting 
comparison.  "  The  Briton  admits  that  individuals 
of  another  race,  living  under  other  climes,  may 
have  different  wants  and  ideas  from  those  held 
by  himself.  He  does  not  pretend  to  '  assimilate ' 
brethren  of  all  colors,  whose  brains,  for  the  pres 
ent,  at  least,  are  not  quite  as  well  developed  as 
his  own.  Neither  does  he  think  that  he  has  ful 
filled  his  whole  duty  towards  them  and  assured 
their  happiness  forever  when  he  grants  them  polit 
ical  rights  which  they  do  not  know  how  to  make 
use  of.  He  thinks  quite  the  contrary,  that  for 

1  Colonization  chez  les  peuples  modernes. 
187 


GREATER    AMERICA 

primitive  societies,  such  as  colonies  are,  there  are 
more  urgent  liberties  than  a  mere  formal  and  os 
tentatious  franchise  (franchise  cT  ap  par  at) ,  and  that 
the  primary  benefit  to  be  conferred  upon  them  is 
a  regime  which  develops  their  initiative,  teaches 
them  responsibility,  and  favors  their  economic  as 
cendency."  1 

From  these  quotations  and  from  the  evidence  of 
other  writers  one  gathers  that,  although  the  com 
mercial  prosperity  of  the  French  islands  may  be 
superior,  there  are  many  rifts  within  the  lute. 
The  absence  of  friction  between  blacks  and  whites, 
the  general  content  and  peacefulness  which  pre 
vail  in  the  British  islands,  and  the  immunity  from 
party  politics  which  they  are  not  able  to  appreci 
ate,  would  be  poorly  exchanged  for  the  fictitious 
privilege  of  electing  seven  deputies  and  four  sena 
tors  to  parliament. 

The  efforts  made  to  improve  the  actual  condi 
tion  of  the  people  have  been,  as  is  not  unusual 
in  Catholic  countries,  mainly  due  to  the  Church. 
Public  instruction,  public  works,  and  sanitation 
make  a  better  show  on  paper  than  in  reality  if 
the  eyes,  ears,  and  nose  of  an  ordinary  traveller 
may  be  trusted.  From  one  point  of  view — the 
aesthetic  -  -  the  superiority  of  the  French  West 
Indies  is  undoubted.  Some  of  the  colored  Creoles 
have  a  reputation  for  beauty  which  is  well  deserved, 
and  until  recent  years  there  were  to  be  seen  every- 

1  Questions  diplomatique 's  et  coloniales.     June,  1900. 
188 


GREATER    AMERICA 

where  quaint  and  distinctive  costumes,  the  result 
of  French  influence  and  taste  on  the  color-loving 
negroes.  Unhappily,  the  beauty  and  daintiness  of 
these  childlike  people  have  their  dark  side  in  the 
shameful  passions  to  which  they  owe  their  origin 
and  their  inheritance  of  moral  as  well  as  physical 
fragility.  None  but  the  ignorant  sentimentalist 
will  prefer  the  spectacle  of  a  French  West  Indian 
city,  with  its  picturesque  vice,  its  graceful,  multi 
colored  people,  and  its  general  air  of  charm, 
gayety,  and  lightly  concealed  squalor,  to  that  of, 
for  instance,  Barbadoes,  where  a  pure  black  race 
• — devoted  to  the  soil;  simple-minded,  if  ignorant; 
independent,  if  poor;  contented,  peaceful,  indus 
trious,  and,  in  a  word,  wholesome — are  living  their 
own  lives  according  to  the  light  vouchsafed  them 
and  leaving  no  legacy  of  sin  or  disease  to  future 
generations. 

Little  need  be  said  of  the  Dutch  and  Danish 
West  Indies.  The  former  have  only  about  fifty 
thousand  inhabitants,  and  the  trade  is  so  small 
that  the  islands  do  not  even  pay  the  expenses  of 
government.  The  Danish  islands  have  a  popula 
tion  of  thirty  thousand,  and,  in  view  of  a  steadily 
declining  trade  and  the  desire  of  the  United  States 
to  acquire  the  islands,  it  seems  impracticable  that 
a  country  like  Denmark  can  continue  to  support 
the  burden  of  a  useless  and  expensive  dependence. 
And  yet  the  fate  of  the  Danish  islands  is  not  quite 
so  clear  as  it  seems,  as  will  be  shown  in  a  future 
chapter. 

189 


GREATER    AMERICA 

What  is  to  be  the  future  of  the  West  Indies? 
What  power  will  control  the  Caribbean,  for  which 
Great  Britain  and  France  fought  so  long  and 
desperately?  It  is  undoubtedly  on  an  economic 
basis  that  the  struggle  will  very  largely  be  decided. 
But  from  a  strategic  point  of  view  the  islands  seem 
likely  to  resume  their  ancient  importance,  for  the 
opening  of  the  trans-isthmian  canal  will  immensely 
increase  their  strategic  and  political  value. 

The  actual  bearing  of  the  canal  question  on 
American  expansion  is  discussed  elsewhere,  but  it 
is  necessary  here  to  glance  briefly  at  the  effect  it 
has  had  on  the  control  of  the  Caribbean.  In  a 
previous  chapter  we  have  seen  how  unlikely  it  is 
that  Cuba  can  long  remain  outside  the  Union, 
even  under  the  guise  of  a  protectorate.  Mean 
while,  Puerto  Rico  is  already  a  Territory — nomi 
nally,  at"  least — and  the  desire  for  more  islands  in 
the  West  Indies  is  only  checked  by  the  fact  that 
there  are  none  whose  owners  are  willing  to  part 
with,  or  too  weak  to  retain,  them. 

The  Caribbean  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  have 
often  been  described  as  an  American  Mediter 
ranean.  The  Gulf  is  absolutely  dominated  by  the 
United  States.  The  Caribbean  is  enclosed  by  a 
chain  of  islands,  of  which  one — Cuba — blocks  the 
entrance  to  the  Gulf,  being  only  a  short  distance 
on  either  side  from  the  American  main-land.  Thus 
Cuba,  the  largest,  richest,  and  most  highly  civilized 
of  all  the  West  Indies,  occupies  a  commanding 
position  as  regards  the  American  main -land,  es- 

190 


o;>. 


' 

x-   or 


UNIVERSIT 


GREATER    AMERICA 

pecially  that  most  important  point,  the  mouth  of 
the  Mississippi.  Either  as  a  base  of  supplies,  a 
strategic  point,  or  a  rendezvous  for  commerce, 
the  Mississippi  is  of  paramount  importance.  The 
United  States  has  in  Pensacola  and  Key  West  sup 
plementary  strategic  points,  but  the  importance 
of  these  is  rendered  double  by  the  fact  that  they 
are  practically  guarded  by  Havana,  the  finest  city 
of  the  West  Indies,  and  called  by  the  Spaniards, 
not  inappropriately,  "  the  key  of  the  New  World." 
Cuba  is  well  provided  on  all  sides  with  harbors, 
and  the  improvements  in  internal  communications 
made  during  the  American  occupation  have  tied 
these  together  and  greatly  increased  their  value. 

It  is  obvious  that  these  natural  advantages 
cannot  be  fully  utilized  by  the  United  States  so 
long  as  Cuba,  though  protected,  remains  a  weak, 
independent  republic,  backward  in  civilization  and 
hampered  with  all  kinds  of  internal  problems,  the 
greatest  being  undoubtedly  that  of  evolving  a 
stable  government  out  of  most  unstable  material. 
But  how  long  will  the  present  condition  of  affairs 
continue?  Already,  as  if  to  forestall  the  con 
clusion,  the  Americans  have  recently  provided 
themselves  with  a  point  d'appui  on  the  island,  im 
portant  positions  (Guantanamo  and  Bahia  Honda), 
some  forty  miles  east  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  on  a 
lease  not  dissimilar  to  that  of  Germany  in  Kiao- 
chau.  The  Isle  of  Pines,  which  was  reserved  to 
herself,  is  more  suitable  for  a  sanatorium  than  a 
strategic  point,  and  has  been  restored  to  the  sov- 

191 


GREATER    AMERICA 

ereignty  of  Cuba.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
Cuba  supplies  the  lack  of  harbors  which  is  one  of 
America's  greatest  difficulties  in  these  waters. 
The  whole  Gulf  of  Mexico  is  practically  devoid 
of  any  harborage,  and  even  the  littoral  of  Central 
America  is  without  natural  harbors  until  we  reach 
the  Chiriqui  lagoon  and  Carthagena. 

Turning  to  the  Caribbean  and  canal,  we  see  that 
Cuba  commands  one  of  the  principal  entrances 
to  the  ocean,  the  Windward  Passage,  which  lies 
between  Cuba  and  Hispaniola  (the  island  which 
consists  of  the  two  republics  of  Hayti  and  San 
Domingo).  Under  present  political  conditions  His 
paniola  may  be  regarded  as  a  negligible  quan 
tity.  The  next  channel  is  the  Mona  Passage, 
between  Hispaniola  and  Puerto  Rico.  The  ac 
quisition  of  the  latter  does  not  provide  the  Amer 
icans  with  a  strong  strategic  point,  being  deficient 
in  harborage,  but  it  secures  to  them  a  most  con 
venient  jumping-off  place;  and  very  near,  on  the 
other  side  of  the  passage,  is  a  fine  position,  Samana 
Bay.  The  future  of  Hispaniola,  with  its  two  black 
republics,  is  still  obscure,  but  it  is  certain  that  it 
will  not  be  possible  much  longer  to  ignore  this  blot 
on  the  civilization  of  the  Western  World ;  and  the 
Americans,  being  unable,  by  the  destiny  they  have 
marked  out  for  themselves,  to  permit  any  other 
power  to  intervene,  will  eventually  have  to  control 
this  island  more  or  less  directly.  The  position  was 
to  have  been  neatly  rounded  off  by  the  acquisition 
of  St.  Thomas  and  the  other  Danish  islands,  a 

192 


GREATER    AMERICA 

process  which  would  not  be  long  delayed  if  the 
only  obstacle  were  a  dwindling  sentiment  on  the 
part  of  a  small  handful  of  the  Danish  people. 
These  islands  command  yet  again  a  third  route 
into  the  Caribbean  from  Europe.  Having  regard 
to  the  extraordinary  rapidity  with  which  the 
United  States  has  advanced  on  her  path  of  expan 
sion  and  the  difficulties  she  has  encountered  and 
overcome,  it  is  possible  that  most  of  us  may  live 
to  see  the  changes  indicated,  and  with  these  three 
islands  —  Cuba,  Hispaniola,  and  Puerto  Rico- 
lying  so  compactly  together,  either  in  her  posses 
sion  or  under  her  control,  the  Caribbean  will  in 
deed  become  almost  an  American  lake. 

There  is  one  crumpled  rose-leaf,  however,  in  the 
bed  which  America  is  preparing — one  obstacle  to 
her  unfettered  sway  in  these  waters.  That  ob 
stacle  is  the  island  of  Jamaica.  A  glance  at  the 
map  shows  that  it  occupies  such  a  position  as  to 
nullify  the  importance  of  some  of  the  American, 
or  potentially  American,  points  of  vantage.  Its 
situation  in  the  centre  of  the  Caribbean  is  also 
in  its  favor.  But  the  most  important  point  is  that 
it  belongs  to  Great  Britain,  whose  superiority  in 
naval  strength  helps  largely  to  outweigh  the  dis 
advantage  it  suffers  through  isolation  from  neigh 
boring  islands  or  the  main-land.  Though  inferior 
in  resources  to  Cuba,  and  economically  largely  de 
pendent  on  the  United  States,  Jamaica  as  a  British 
outpost  in  the  centre  of  the  Caribbean  has  great 
strategical  importance.  As  a  military  station  it 
13  193 


GREATER    AMERICA 

has,  moreover,  the  great  advantage  of  healthy  and 
easily  accessible  highlands.  As  a  naval  base  it  is 
also  favored,  Kingston  being  one  of  the  best  har 
bors  in  the  West  Indies.  Captain  Mahan  is  of 
opinion  that,  taking  everything  into  consideration, 
the  superior  size  and  resources  of  Cuba  would  give 
her  an  overwhelming  advantage  over  Jamaica ;  but 
he  leaves  out  of  consideration  the  health  question, 
and  it  is  notorious  that  disease  killed  far  more  men 
than  bullets  in  the  Cuban  war.  Another  point  in 
favor  of  the  smaller  island  is  the  presence  of  an 
industrious  peasantry,  devoted  to  the  British 
crown — a  different  condition  to  that  of  sparsely 
inhabited  Cuba,  with  its  mixed  races,  pulling  dif- 
erent  ways,  and  not  remarkable  either  for  their 
loyalty  or  industry. 

Great  Britain  has  one  other  highly  fortified 
post  in  St.  Lucia,  which,  though  some  distance 
from  Jamaica,  serves  as  an  important  link  in 
communications  and  as  a  coaling-station,  and  is 
provided  with  a  useful  adjunct  in  Barbadoes. 
With  Trinidad  to  the  south  and  Antigua  and 
Dominica  to  the  north,  these  islands  are  well 
outside  the  American  sphere,  but  exercise  an 
important  influence  on  the  Caribbean.  There  is 
another  British  colony  on  the  Caribbean  littoral, 
which  is  little  considered,  and,  indeed,  despite  its 
size  and  the  apparent  advantages  of  its  position, 
it  is  of  little  real  importance,  possessing  no  harbor, 
and  the  scantiest  population.  It  should  be  advan 
tageously  disposed  of  to  the  United  States. 

194 


GREATER    AMERICA 

With  the  transference  of  the  Danish  islands  to 
the  United  States  there  would  remain  only  the 
French  islands,  Martinique  and  Guadeloupe,  and 
the  Dutch  Cura9oa  group.  Of  the  former,  Marti 
nique  may  now  be  considered  negligible,  owing 
to  the  volcanic  catastrophe  which  overwhelmed  it 
and  the  abandonment  by  France  of  the  Panama 
canal.  The  Dutch  islands  are  economically  stag 
nant,  but  in  any  case  will  not  be  allowed  to  pass 
to  any  other  power.  These  islands  are  of  the 
greater  strategical  importance  as  Colon,  the  At 
lantic  terminus  of  the  canal,  is  indefensible. 

It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that,  so  far  as  can  be 
done,  America  has  made  every  provision  to  insure 
that  the  main  routes  to  the  isthmus  from  the  At 
lantic  should  be  under  her  control.  The  wisdom  of 
such  a  provision  does  not  require  to  be  elaborated, 
but  there  is  an  interesting  side  of  the  question 
which  can  only  be  touched  on  here.  What  use  can 
America  make  of  the  advantages  she  has  gained 
in  the  Caribbean  by  her  policy  of  expansion  unless 
she  is  prepared  to  embark  on  a  naval  programme 
commensurate  with  it?  No  longer  is  her  sea 
board  confined  to  her  own  territory;  she  has  an 
extended  littoral;  she  has  a  Pacific  island  de 
pendency  on  the  one  side  and  a  Caribbean  sphere 
on  the  other.  To  this  subject  we  must  return. 

While  the  United  States  has  been  expanding, 
economically  and  politically,  in  the  Caribbean,  the 
British  islands  have  been  for  some  time  credited 
with  a  desire  for  amalgamation  with  their  great 


GREATER    AMERICA 

neighbor.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  this  desire  is 
strictly  limited  and  is  purely  on  economic  grounds, 
for  the  bulk  of  the  population — the  negroes — who 
are  not  suffering  as  much  as  the  white  planters 
(in  many  cases  are  not  aware  that  they  are  suf 
fering  at  all)  —  are  far  from  wishing  to  become 
American  citizens.  They  are  perfectly  aware 
that  as  British  subjects  they  enjoy  a  position  of 
respectability,  a  degree  of  justice  and  freedom, 
and  even  an  amount  of  self-government,  which 
would  be  denied  to  them  in  the  democracy  of 
Greater  America.  The  desire  for  amalgamation 
with  America  may,  therefore,  be  expected  to  de 
crease  with  the  exodus  of  white  men  from  the  West 
Indies;  it  has  already  undergone  considerable 
modification  even  in  that  dwindling  white  minor 
ity  since  they  realized  that  American  domination 
would  mean  the  loss  of  that  last  shred  of  prestige 
which  their  position  as  a  ruling  class  gives  them, 
even  among  the  wreck  of  their  fallen  fortunes. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Americans  have  never  been 
desirous  of  shouldering  the  burden  of  government 
in  these  islands,  where  order  is  admirably  main 
tained  by  the  British,  where  life  and  property  are 
safe,  and  where  trade  is  free  to  the  world.  Jamaica 
they  would  not  object  to  have,  but  Jamaica  is  the 
one  island  which  is  not  languishing.  As  for  the 
others,  while  America  can  have  markets  without 
responsibility,  she  is  not  likely  to  want  more.  The 
American  business-men  who  are  fast  taking  up  the 
fruit  trade  are  not  discontented  with  the  state  of 

196 


GREATER    AMERICA 

affairs,  having  every  liberty  and  far  less  inter 
ference  from  government  than  in  their  own  coun 
try,  even  if  they  do  complain  of  the  general 
"sleepiness." 

The  situation  resolves  itself  at  first  sight  into  an 
impasse.  Great  Britain  apparently  cannot  help 
her  island  colonies.  America  does  not  want  them; 
and  they  are  by  no  means  unanimous  in  the  desire 
for  a  change  of  master.  Still,  they  are  powerless 
to  help  themselves,  and  unless  they  can  do  so  the 
islands  must  become  black,  and  gravitate,  slowly 
but  surely,  into  the  American  orbit.  The  great 
American  Republic  seems  to  loom  up  on  the 
horizon  whichever  way  we  turn,  and  patriotic 
Britons  and  West- Indians  alike  may  be  pardoned 
if,  like  Froude,  they  sometimes  feel  that  all  is  lost 
in  the  Caribbean,  so  far  as  the  British  Empire  is 
concerned,  and  that  nothing  remains  save  to  beg 
the  United  States  to  "pick  up  the  pieces." 

But,  as  has  been  said  already,  the  trans-isthmian 
canal  at  once  sends  up  the  value  of  the  West 
Indies  strategically,  and,  by  diverting  a  great 
stream  of  traffic  through  the  Caribbean,  gives 
them  fresh  opportunities  for  economic  develop 
ment.  For  the  British  islands  another  possibility 
arises  in  the  rapid  growth  of  Canada.  There 
seems  no  valid  reason  why  Canada  should  not  be 
to  the  British  West  Indies  what  the  United  States 
will  shortly  be  to  Ctiba.  These  countries  are 
complementary  to  each  other,  and  in  the  new 
phase  of  imperial  policy  we  may  find  the  key  to 

197 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  situation  in  a  commercial  bond,  though  not 
perhaps  in  a  political  one,  as  was  first  suggested. 
The  failure,  hitherto,  to  secure  this  bond  between 
the  northern  Dominion  and  the  tropical  colonies 
need  not  be  taken  as  a  sign  that  such  a  thing  is 
impossible.  We  believe  that  we  are  about  to  em 
bark  on  a  new  era  in  our  history  and  to  stake  every 
thing  on  a  grand  effort  to  bind  our  scattered  empire 
together  in  such  a  way  that  every  unit  will  partici 
pate  in  the  advantages.  There  should  be  no  Cin 
derella  in  our  imperial  family.  The  conception  is 
such  a  grand  one  that  it  may  well  excite  the  ridicule 
of  politicians,  who  are  too  sure  of  their  own  om 
niscience  to  have  imagination.  The  power  of  a 
great  idea,  a  great  conception,  is  quite  beyond  the 
limitations  of  mere  statistics.  As  regards  the  Car 
ibbean,  the  question  is  a  crucial  one.  We  must 
turn  over  a  new  leaf  or  be  willing  to  lose  our  share 
of  power  in  the  region  with  which  our  naval  glories 
are  inextricably  associated. 


CHAPTER  IX 
PAN-AMERICANISM   IN  THE  SOUTHERN   CONTINENT 

MR.  ELAINE  is  generally  credited  with  the 
paternity  of  the  Pan- American  movement,  but 
the  claim  might  well  be  advanced  on  behalf  of 
Bolivar,  the  "  Liberator."  It  is  probable,  how 
ever,  that  these  two  men  would  have  put  a  very 
different  interpretation  on  the  expression  "  Pan- 
American."  Elaine  desired  the  political  ascen 
dency  of  his  own  republic,  which  was  to  assume 
the  attitude  of  protector,  but  avoid  annexation, 
except  in  the  case  of  Canada.  Bolivar,  on  the 
contrary,  wished  to  give  the  Latin- American  re 
publics  a  more  equal  position  by  a  contractual 
engagement  with  the  United  States,  which  would 
assure  to  them  their  independence.  Since  that 
period  there  has  been  no  approximation  of  the 
ideals  of  the  two  continents ;  on  the  contrary,  each 
has  been  strengthened  in  its  own  peculiar  view  of 
the  exact  nature  of  Pan-Americanism  which  is 
necessary  to  its  own  development. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  expression  "  Pan-Amer 
ican  "  does  not  imply  the  ascendency  of  any  one 
race  of  Americans,  and  although  it  has  of  late 
years  become  usual  for  the  United  States  citizens 

199 


GREATER    AMERICA 

to  be  spoken  of  as  " Americans"  and  regarded  as 
the  people  par  excellence  of  the  New  World,  yet  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  southern  continent, 
and  even  a  great  part  of  the  northern  one,  are 
inhabited  by  other  peoples  equally  American,  but 
in  some  cases  widely  different  in  race,  thought, 
ideals,  civilization,  language,  and  religion  from  the 
inhabitants  of  the  United  States. 

The  Dominion  of  Canada,  occupying  one-third 
of  the  northern  continent,  must  naturally  be  the 
first  element  to  be  considered  in  any  scheme  of 
Pan- Americanism ;  but  it  is  of  so  much  importance 
that  it  must  be  dealt  with  separately.  We  will 
first  consider  the  relations  of  the  Central  and 
South  American  republics  to  their  great  neighbor. 

It  has  already  been  said  that  the  destiny  of  the 
United  States,  having  taken  her  into  the  Caribbean 
and  on  to  the  isthmus  of  Panama,  will  compel  her 
to  intervene  in  Mexico  and  to  adopt  a  protective 
attitude  towards  Central  America,  and,  in  involv 
ing  her  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  backward 
republics,  will  lead  to  their  gradual  absorption. 

The  republics  of  South  America  are,  however, 
governed  by  different  conditions.  The  southern 
continent  is  hardly  inferior  in  area  or  resources 
to  the  northern  one,  and,  despite  the  heat  of  the 
equatorial  region,  it  affords  ample  space  for  the 
growth  of  a  great  white  population.  That  it  re 
mains  to  so  large  an  extent  unexploited  is  due 
chiefly  to  the  unfortunate  incapacity  of  Latin 
peoples  to  found  stable  governments  or  succeed  in 

300 


S>3         3> 

»fl?fl 

rff 

H 

=*    P 

5      > 
*      % 

0 

g 

5"  S 

z,       CC 

£.2    -t^S    ro  3- 

1  g.'S 

s    ^ 

-_j 

,J 

g-  o  *  *  »  I? 

§=  £;?££ 

IP  III 
"|  II? 

Projected 
Location,  Int 
\u  (Surveys  M 

Showin 
ORTATIC 

i  in  Oaeratiol 

^ 

^a 

bd 

e 

QD 

*5                           5" 

=0 

1? 

t^09 

H 

H 

g      ,       ? 

i    \ 

l! 

1 

S3 

HH 

H 

\ 

«  • 

a   j 

H 

S 

at  'i 

n 

OD 

<r  &Bwc\ 


GREATER    AMERICA 

any  practical  enterprise.  The  Spaniards  content 
ed  themselves  from  the  first  with  taking  as  much 
as  they  could  out  of  the  country  without  any  at 
tempt  to  secure  its  permanent  prosperity. 

In  every  respect,  indeed,  the  colonization  of 
South  America  has  differed  from  that  of  the 
United  States.  The  northern  immigrants  pushed 
steadily  on,  westward  over  the  Alleghanies,  south 
ward  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  organizing  as  they 
went,  keeping  in  touch  with  one  another,  opening 
communications.  It  was  not  sentiment  which 
bound  them  together,  but  practical  common- 
sense  and  the  presence  of  a  common  danger.  Their 
fierce  Indian  foes,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
pressure  from  Europe,  on  the  other,  made  them 
realize  the  importance  of  homogeneity,  and  their 
very  weakness  apart  led  to  their  strength  in  com 
bination.  The  Spanish  colonies,  however,  had  no 
such  incentives  to  combination.  They  were  hand- 
fuls  of  white  men  planted  among  subdued  and 
often  gentle  native  peoples,  holding  little  com 
munication  with  one  another.  The  East  and  West 
had  no  connection  save  through  Europe — no  in 
tercourse,  no  mutual  interests.  When  one  after 
the  other  shook  off  the  yoke  of  the  mother- country 
one  might  have  expected  a  rapprochement  between 
the  different  Latin  colonies;  but  the  demon  of 
political  unrest  was  too  strong.  Intrigue,  faction, 
and  party  fights  became  the  occupation  of  the 
ruling  class,  and  these  were  fostered  by  Europe. 
The  natural  incapacity  of  the  hot-headed  Latin 

201 


GREATER    AMERICA 

for  self-government,  of  which  we  have  already 
spoken,  had  not  been  modified  by  his  colonial 
training,  and  the  principles  of  democracy  were 
rendered  futile  by  the  presence  of  Indian  popula 
tions  which  could  not  understand  them  and  were 
not  to  be  allowed  on  equality  with  their  white  mas 
ters.  As  has  been  well  said,  "  The  American  Con 
stitution  was  reproduced  in  south  latitudes,  but 
the  inward  grace  of  enlightened  public  opinion  is 
lacking."  l  It  was  an  attempt  to  pour  new  wine 
into  old  bottles,  and  the  result  is  still  visible 
in  a  generous  waste  of  what  might  be  good 
vintage. 

A  brief  glance  at  the  various  republics  is  neces 
sary  before  we  consider  the  possibility  of  the  Pan- 
American  bond. 

Colombia  and  Venezuela  are  extreme  examples 
of  the  vicious  effects  of  democratic  theories  work 
ing  on  unprepared  soil.  It  is  remarkable  in  the 
history  of  each  that  the  only  periods  of  peace  or 
security  enjoyed  have  been  under  the  usurped 
authority  of  some  dictator.  Guzman  Blanco,  in 
Venezuela,  and  Nunez,  in  Colombia,  serve  as  ex 
amples  of  this.  Bolivar,  the  bright  star  of  Latin- 
American  independence,  was  a  Venezuelan,  but 
enjoyed  a  great  deal  of  obloquy  from  his  com 
patriots  on  account  of  his  aristocratic  birth,  and 
died  of  a  broken  heart  in  hiding  near  Santa  Marta. 
Miranda,  another  Venezuelan  patriot,  worthy  of 

1  Tropical  America,  by  I.  N.  Ford. 
202 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  chivalry  of  old  Spain,  died  in  a  dungeon  at 
Ceuta,  the  Spanish  penal  settlement  in  Morocco. 

Perhaps  the  most  remarkable  difference  in  the 
North  and  South  American  republics  is  the  respect 
shown  by  the  former  to  her  Constitution,  and  the 
invariable  custom  of  the  latter  to  " amend"  it  on 
every  occasion.  It  is  a  radical  difference  in  the 
conception  of  laws.  The  Anglo-Saxon  has  no  nat 
ural  turn  for  legislation  or  for  the  theory  of  politics. 
The  Anglo-American  is  even  content  to  turn  the 
whole  business  over  to  paid  politicians.  To  the 
Latin- American,  however,  this  business  of  politics 
is  the  breath  of  life,  and  he  has  a  profound  belief 
in  the  efficacy  of  legislation  to  reform  all  evils. 

Notwithstanding  all  this,  the  Latin- American  is 
also  curiously  apathetic  about  the  actual  working 
out  of  his  political  theories.  Just  as  the  Spaniard, 
who  will  wrangle  all  day  and  all  night  in  a  wine 
shop  over  the  merits  of  a  candidate  for  election, 
will  not  trouble  to  go  to  the  polling-station  in  the 
morning,  so  the  Latin- American,  having  fomented 
a  revolution,  will  regard  its  progress  with  indiffer 
ence  and  is  little  interested  in  its  effects,  except  in 
their  parochial  aspect.1 

1  Bolivar  feared  unrestricted  suffrage,  especially  in  Latin 
America;  he  believed  in  equality  of  civic  rights,  but  not  in 
equality  of  right  to  govern.  Under  his  constitution,  adapted 
to  local  conditions,  there  were  to  be  a  President,  elected  for  life 
or  during  good  behavior;  a  national  legislature  or  Congress, 
with  a  Senate  and  House,  the  former  an  hereditary  body  or 
elected  for  long  terms,  the  latter  every  two  years  by  vote 
of  the  people;  an  independent  judiciary,  for  life  or  during 
good  behavior. 

203 


GREATER    AMERICA 

In  Venezuela,  since  the  achievement  of  inde 
pendence,  eighty  years  ago,  there  have  been  fifty 
revolutions  (ten  successful),  and  each  turn  of 
Fortune's  wheel  has  meant  a  fresh  tinkering  of  the 
constitution.  Under  such  circumstances  stability 
of  government  is  obviously  impossible,  the  only 
safeguard  being  the  imposition  of  some  more  or 
less  arbitrary  will  on  the  people.  This  pressure 
must  eventually  come  from  outside  --  since  the 
stock  of  Latin  -  American  dictators  seems  to  be 
running  short — and  from  which  quarter  it  is  not 
difficult  to  prophesy. 

The  paucity  of  the  population  of  Ecuador 
(which,  on  an  area  the  size  of  Germany,  supports 
some  one  and  a  half  million  people)  and  the  heat 
of  the  climate  on  this  Pacific  slope  have  not 
prevented  her  achieving  a  record  in  her  own  way. 
In  thirty  years — from  1830  to  1860 — she  had  seven 
distinct  constitutions,  and  every  year  witnessed 
some  "  amendment"  or  "  reform." 

Her  neighbor,  Peru,  is  more  interesting  from 
many  causes.  Its  area  is  equal  to  that  of  France 
and  Austria  -  Hungary  combined.  The  Indians, 
who  are  a  large  majority  in  a  population  of  some 
three  millions,  were  the  heirs  of  a  civilization 
bequeathed  to  them  by  the  Incas,  possessed  a 
great  system  of  roads  and  canals,  from  the  Cor 
dilleras  to  the  coast,  and  offered  considerable  op 
position  to  the  Spaniards.  They  are  now  a  partly 
subject  race,  having  no  share  in  the  government, 
and  their  Latin  masters,  who  pride  themselves  on 

204 


EACH  SQUARE  REPRESENTS 
A  POPULATION  OF  25,000 
•CITIES  OVER  100,000  POP. 


DIAGRAM    SHOWING    DENSITY    OF    POPULATION 
IN    SOUTH    AMERICA 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  purity  of  their  Castilian  blood,  have  exhibited, 
with  the  graces  of  their  ancestors,  their  most  fatal 
traits  of  obstinacy  and  non-progressiveness.  De 
vastated  by  the  war  with  Chili,  bankrupt,  crushed, 
racked  with  internal  dissensions,  Peru  is  trying, 
with  the  aid  of  British  energy  and  capital,  to  re 
habilitate  herself.  In  the  day  of  prosperity  she 
provided  herself  with  the  best  railway  system  in 
South  America,  and  although  constructed  with 
great  improvidence  and  little  foresight,  it  may  yet 
prove  of  value  in  the  future  development  of  a 
country  undoubtedly  rich  in  mineral  resources. 

Bolivia  is  the  least  accessible  of  South  Ameri 
can  republics,  now  that  its  ports  are  absorbed  by 
Chili  or  Peru.  The  immense  mineral  wealth  of 
the  country  is  discounted  by  the  lack  of  com 
munications,  and  the  white  and  half -white  popu 
lation  is  too  small  to  render  progress  likely.  In 
disputes  with  Peru  and  Brazil,  Bolivia  has  already 
got  the  worst  of  it,  and  will  probably  decline  still 
more.  A  curious  situation  has  arisen  through  the 
action  of  the  government  in  granting  a  large  tract 
of  land  on  the  disputed  Brazilian  border  to  an 
American  syndicate,  with  power  to  maintain  an 
armed  force — a  dangerous  precedent  in  many  ways. 

The  most  interesting,  in  some  respects,  of 
South  American  republics  is  that  of  Chili,  whose 
expansion  in  late  years  has  been  remarkable.  Al 
though  cut  off  from  the  interior  by  the  Andes,  it 
has  extended  its  territory  by  spreading  down  the 
whole  coast.  The  Indian  population  numbers 

205 


GREATER    AMERICA 

fifty  thousand,  of  which  the  Araucanians,  formerly 
fierce  warriors,  are  now  quite  peaceable  and  settled, 
while  the  Fuegians  are  dying  out.  The  Chilians 
proper  are  a  hardier  and  more  energetic  race  than 
other  Latin-Americans.  They  are  for  the  most 
part  of  pure  stock,  live  on  the  sea-coast  or  adjacent 
mountains,  and  have  kept  in  touch  with  Europe  by 
a  system  of  excellent  steam  communication.  They 
are  said  to  exhibit  more  genuine  patriotism  and 
to  have  a  truer  conception  of  national  ideals  than 
some  of  their  neighbors,  and,  in  any  case,  they 
have  been  successful  in  war  and  progressive  in 
peace.  They  never  fell  under  the  influence  of 
the  French  conceptions  of  democracy,  and  escaped, 
therefore,  some  of  the  more  baneful  effects  of  the 
doctrines  of  Rousseau  and  other  apostles  of  the 
revolutionary  period.  The  country,  when  con 
quered  by  Spain,  was  already  fairly  advanced  in 
civilization  and  possessed  village  organizations  and 
settled  laws  as  to  right  and  property.  After  the 
revolt  the  government  was  at  first,  under  the  guise 
of  republicanism,  entirely  controlled  by  the  aris 
tocratic  and  clerical  element,  and  Chili  has  been 
through  her  fair  share  of  political  disturbances. 
Balmaceda,  the  leader  of  the  Liberal  party  in 
1866,  introduced  many  reforms,  but  came  to  grief 
in  an  attempt  to  establish  himself  as  a  military 
dictator.  The  revolution  which  ended  in  his 
suicide  showed  that  the  Chilians  were  not  prepared 
to  be  governed  by  military  cabals,  and  since  then 
Chili  has  not  witnessed  other  than  party  warfare 

206 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  a  bloodless  character.  Her  government  re 
mains,  however,  more  representative  than  demo 
cratic,  and  a  certain  stability  of  public  opinion 
is  assured  by  the  presence  of  a  large  foreign 
community — British,  French,  Spanish,  Italian,  and 
German  —  whose  interests  are  all  in  favor  of  a 
settled  government.  The  government,  being  oli 
garchic  rather  than  aristocratic,  has  been  hard  on 
the  peasantry,  who  do  not  own  the  soil  and  are 
practically  in  the  condition  of  serfs.  They  are 
exceedingly  poor,  and  emigrate  in  large  numbers, 
despite  the  growing  prosperity  and  prestige  of 
their  country.  Public  education  is  liberally  pro 
vided  for  in  Chili,  far  in  advance  of  any  other 
South  American  country,  a  fact  in  itself  eloquent 
of  the  superiority  of  the  people.  The  mineral 
wealth  of  the  country  is  its  chief  resource,  but  the 
agricultural  and  pastoral  industries  have  increased 
and  great  attention  has  been  paid  to  communica 
tions,  Chili  being  the  first  South  American  repub 
lic  to  embark  on  railways,  and  possessing  some 
fifteen  thousand  miles  of  public  roads.  Half  the 
national  debt  is  held  in  Britain,  and  that  country 
is  paramount  in  commerce  and  in  the  development 
of  nitrate,  which  is  the  principal  industry. 

The  Argentines  consider  themselves  the  Yankees 
of  the  southern  hemisphere,  or  did  so  in  the  period 
of  their  short  but  phenomenal  prosperity.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  they,  in  common  with  all  Hispano- 
Americans,  are  lacking  in  the  steady  judgment 
and  moral  balance  of  the  New-Englanders.  This 

207 


GREATER    AMERICA 

has  been  strongly  illustrated  both  in  their  political 
and  commercial  dealings.  The  revolution  of  1890, 
brought  about  by  real  abuses,  failed  to  remedy 
them,  because  of  the  lack  of  capacity  on  the  part 
of  the  leaders.  The  boom  in  commercial  matters, 
though  undoubtedly  inflated  by  European  specu 
lation,  would  not  have  led  to  the  crash  which 
succeeded  it  but  for  the  utter  lack  of  foresight  and 
prudence  among  the  Argentines  themselves.  They 
plunged  recklessly  into  expense,  piled  up  the 
national  debt,  inflated  the  currency,  endeavored 
in  everything  to  imitate  the  United  States,  re 
gardless  of  their  own  circumstances  (as,  for  in 
stance,  in  building  a  magnificent  federal  city),  and 
finally  collapsed  into  chaos. 

The  prosperity  of  the  Argentine  was,  indeed, 
not  due  to  their  own  initiative,  but  to  European 
immigration  and  capital.  The  Argentine  con 
ceives  it  his  mission  to  direct  the  energies  of  others, 
and  despises  labor.  Immigration  is  conducted  on 
a  large  scale,  the  government  assisting  the  immi 
grant  in  every  possible  way,  taking  charge  of  him 
until  he  reaches  his  colony  or  the  hacienda  where 
he  is  to  live.  The  best  labor  is  recruited  from 
Italian  immigrants,  and  they,  together  with  the 
large  commercial  settlements  of  Germans,  keep 
themselves  apart,  with  the  result  that  there  is  little 
homogeneity  about  the  people  of  the  Argentine. 
The  country,  moreover,  is  so  vast  in  extent,  being 
equal  to  about  one- third  of  Europe,  and  with  a 
very  sparse  population  (under  five  millions  in 

208 


GREATER    AMERICA 

1900),  that  a  large  section  remains  undeveloped 
and  lends  itself  peculiarly  to  the  settlement  of 
isolated  communities  and  to  the  springing-up  of 
small  independent  states. 

The  great  asset  of  the  Argentine,  however,  is  the 
wonderful  waterway  of  the  river  Plate,  with  its 
fertile  valleys.  The  possibilities  of  this  great  river 
are  unmeasured.  It  has  a  more  extensive  system 
of  navigation  than  any  in  the  world,  and  more 
miles  of  open  way  than  all  the  rivers  of  Europe 
combined,  or  even  than  the  whole  Mississippi 
system.  The  tide  reaches  two  hundred  and  sixty 
miles  inland,  and  vessels  of  twenty  -  four  feet 
draught  can  ply  at  any  time  of  the  year  as  far 
inland  as  one  thousand  miles,  literally  steaming 
right  through  the  cornfields.  Vessels  of  lighter 
draught  can  penetrate  some  three  thousand  miles, 
and  a  moderate  expenditure  would  enable  a  vessel 
of  four  thousand  tons  to  reach  even  the  very 
heart  of  Brazil.  There  are  one  hundred  and  ten 
million  sheep  (more  than  in  Australia  and  New 
Zealand)  and  twenty-five  million  cattle,  two-thirds 
of  the  number  in  the  United  States.  Despite  ev 
ery  drawback,  there  is  no  doubt  that  as  a  food- 
producing  country  the  Argentine  must  occupy  a 
foremost  place  in  the  economics  of  the  western 
hemisphere.  Stability  of  government,  the  reha 
bilitation  of  national  finances,  and  the  devotion 
to  public  works  and  communications  of  part  of 
the  money  squandered  on  revolutionary  projects 
would  soon  restore  the  fortunes  of  the  country. 

209 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Uruguay  was  originally  a  dependency  of  Brazil, 
but  broke  away  in  1825.  It  has  an  extremely 
despotic  government,  and  suffers  from  military 
cabals  and  political  assassinations. 

Brazil  is  another  of  these  South  American  coun 
tries  whose  area  and  possibilities  are  so  vast  as  to 
stagger  the  imagination.  Its  present  population 
of  some  fourteen  millions  is  only  about  4.5  to  the 
square  mile,1  the  coast  being  practically  the  only 
settled  region.  The  presence  of  the  negro  element 
makes  Brazil  different  from  her  sister  republics. 

The  early  Portuguese  conquerors  of  Brazil,  amal 
gamating  with  the  Indians,  were  remarkable  for 
energy  and  daring.  Their  cruel  treatment  of  the 
natives,  however,  caused  here,  as  in  the  West 
Indies,  the  extermination  of  the  latter  and  the 
consequent  scarcity  of  labor,  which  led  to  the 
introduction  of  negroes.  As  the  race  -  line  has 
never  been  carefully  drawn  by  Portuguese,  the 
black  strain  is  strong  in  Brazil,  but,  as  is  invaria 
ble  in  all  Latin- American  countries,  there  is  a  ten 
dency  for  the  purer-bred  inhabitants  to  constitute 
an  aristocracy.  The  southern  Brazilian,  who  is 
the  descendant  of  early  colonists  and  Indians  and 
has  little  negro  blood,  is  jealous  of  his  position. 
Geographically,  economically,  and  even  racially, 
he  is  nearer  to  the  Argentine  than  to  tropical 
Brazil,  and  the  unity  of  the  country  is  threatened 
by  these  race  questions,  which  are  aggravated  by 

1  According  to  the  census  of  1890,  that  of  1900  showed  a 
decrease ;  this,  however,  is  considered  to  be  unreliable. 

2TO 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  presence  of  considerable  bodies  of  indepen 
dent  German  communities,  holding  aloof  from 
national  life.  Of  these,  however,  we  must  speak 
later. 

The  Brazilians  exhibit  great  apathy,  as  a  people, 
on  the  subject  of  government,  the  revolutions  being 
chiefly  the  work  of  military  cabals.  The  condition 
of  the  country  is  not  unlike  that  of  the  Argentine, 
the  extravagance  of  an  irresponsible  government 
having  plunged  it  into  financial  crises.  The  public 
debt  is  enormous,  amounting  to  some  two  hundred 
millions  sterling;  but  the  resources  of  the  country 
are  vast  and  as  yet  little  exploited.  This  state  of 
affairs,  financially,  is  due  to  enormous  military 
expenditure,  as  well  as  to  speculation,  reckless 
guarantees,  and  other  unsound  enterprises.  Little 
is  spent  on  education,  and  communications  are 
in  a  very  inchoate  condition.  Although  there  are 
many  schemes,  some  half -finished,  for  railways, 
there  is  no  uniform  plan  and  not  even  a  uniform 
gauge.  Despite  all  this,  trade  is  bounding  forward, 
and  the  imports  increase  rapidly  even  in  the  teeth 
of  heavy  duties,  England  being  the  principal  par 
ticipator.  No  description,  however  brief,  of  the 
South  American  states  would  be  complete  without 
a  reference  to  the  immense  power,  both  for  good 
and  evil,  wielded  over  their  destinies  by  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church.  In  speaking  of  Central  America 
we  have  already  noted  the  flexibility  of  the  Church, 
which  has  enabled  her  to  retain  her  hold  of  the  peo 
ple  despite  the  separation  of  Church  and  State. 

211 


GREATER    AMERICA 

This  has  taken  place  in  all  the  progressive  coun 
tries,  and  in  Chili,  the  Argentine,  and  Uruguay  par 
ticularly  the  result  has  been  most  beneficial.  There 
is  a  higher  tone  in  religious  services,  better  music, 
more  sense  of  fitness  in  decoration,  and  far  more 
purity  of  doctrine.  The  educational  work  insti 
tuted  by  the  Jesuits  is  now,  particularly  in  Chili, 
under  the  care  of  the  State,  and  the  Church  is 
called  upon  to  rise  to  higher  levels  with  the  im 
proved  intelligence  of  her  children.  In  the  more 
backward  republics,  and  even  in  Brazil,  with  its 
negro  element,  the  level  of  religious  teaching  is  ex 
tremely  low;  debasing  superstitions  are  the  rule, 
and  at  its  best  the  Church  is  still  in  the  darkness  of 
medievalism.  This  criticism,  curiously,  applies 
also  to  Peru.  It  is  doubtful  whether  any  other 
form  of  Christianity  could  supplant  the  Roman 
Catholic.  The  people  might  be  attracted  by  a 
simpler  form  of  doctrine,  but  would  be  repelled  by 
any  lack  of  ritual,  which  supplies  a  real  want  in 
their  color-loving  lives.  As  a  rule,  the  Spanish- 
American  who  lapses  from  his  Mother-Church  be 
comes  indifferent  to  religion,  and  it  is  to  be  feared 
that  any  rude  interruption  of  their  religious  con 
victions  would  lead  the  mass  of  the  people  from 
superstition  to  disbelief.  There  is  little  chance  of 
such  an  interruption,  while  the  South  American 
states  remain  independent,  but  it  must  be  remem 
bered  that  the  Church  in  those  countries  would 
view  with  distrust  any  attempt  at  "  Americaniza 
tion  " ;  any  wholesale  influx  of  new  or  democratic 

212 


GREATER    AMERICA 

ideas;  any  infusion  of  that  spirit  of  freedom  of 
thought  as  well  as  action  which  is  associated  with 
the  United  States.  Religious  toleration  is  now 
established  in  the  more  progressive  countries,  but 
the  Roman  Catholic  Church  remains  one  of  the 
predominant  factors  in  political  as  well  as  social 
life,  and  that  factor  is  strongly  in  favor  of  retaining 
the  ties  which  bind  South  America  to  Europe,  and 
against  any  Pan-American  scheme  which  would 
mean  the  domination  of  a  non-Catholic  power. 

Chili,  the  Argentine,  and  southern  Brazil  may 
be  considered  the  most  important  factors  in  the 
southern  continent,  and  of  these  the  Argentine, 
by  reason  of  its  unique  resources,  and  Chili,  be 
cause  of  its  virile  people  and  military  and  naval 
supremacy,  are  the  coming  countries.  Brazil  lacks 
cohesion,  and  is,  besides,  handicapped  by  a  large 
area  of  torrid  zone  and  by  the  negro  element. 

What  are  the  possibilities  of  a  Pan-American 
bond  which  would  unite  these  three  great  re 
publics  with  their  weaker  sisters  and  their  northern 
neighbor? 

In  1826  the  first  Pan-American  congress,  in 
spired  by  Bolivar,  had  as  its  aim  the  union  of  the 
American  States  and  the  organization  of  an  army 
and  navy  to  resist  the  encroachments  of  the  Holy 
Alliance  and  to  secure  the  freedom  and  indepen 
dence  of  the  remaining  Spanish  colonies. 

The  period  ending  with  the  civil  war  certainly 
did  not  encourage  the  Pan-American  movement, 
including,  as  it  did,  the  episode  of  the  acquisition 

213 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  Texas,  the  Mexican  war  (with  the  spoliation  of 
half  its  territory),  the  filibustering  expeditions  of 
Walker,  the  Ostend  manifesto,  and  the  constant 
designs  on  Cuba. 

The  development  of  the  United  States  policy 
of  Pan -Americanism  has  been  subsequent  to  the 
civil  war,  and  mainly  in  the  last  quarter-century. 
From  the  outset  the  scheme  of  commercial  union, 
which  was  the  principal  feature,  broke  down,  be 
cause  of  the  objection  to  admit  sugar  free.  The 
question  of  reciprocity  between  the  United  States 
and  South  America  is  now  scarcely  a  practical  one. 
The  main  products  of  South  America,  besides 
minerals,  are  food-stuffs — corn,  meat,  and  dairy 
produce — and  these  are  now  competing  with  the 
products  of  the  northern  continent.  In  the  West 
Indian  markets  and  those  of  the  neighboring  states, 
Chili,  Argentine,  and  Uruguay  are  likely  to  super 
sede  the  food-stuffs  from  the  northern  continent, 
and  the  excellent  steam  communication  with  Eu 
rope  makes  it  possible  for  them  to  compete  there 
also.  South  American  ports  are,  indeed,  in  closer 
touch  with  Europe  than  with  the  United  States. 
Trade  with  the  latter  country  has,  in  fact,  been 
somewhat  on  the  decline,  and  suffers  a  great 
disadvantage  from  the  conditions  of  transpor 
tation.  European  ships,  sailing  from  Liverpool 
and  Antwerp,  are  able  to  discharge  manufactures 
at  Brazil  and  in  the  river  Plate,  where  they  load 
coffee  and  other  produce  for  the  United  States, 
and  take  thence  a  cargo  for  Europe.  This  sys- 

214 


GREATER   AMERICA 

tern,  together  with  a  better  understanding  of  the 
peculiarities  of  the  South  American  markets  on 
the  part  of  Europe,  makes  direct  trading  between 
New  York  and  Brazil,  for  instance,  difficult.  It 
also  removes  any  pressure  which  might  cause  the 
weaker  republics  to  sigh  for  commercial  union 
with  the  United  States.  They  are,  therefore,  not 
conscious  of  any  advantage  which  it  would  be  in 
her  power  to  offer  them.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
reciprocity  treaties  were  actually  negotiated  be 
tween  the  United  States,  Brazil,  and  Spain  in 
Cuba,  but  were  never  effective.  This  is,  of  course, 
the  merest  outline  of  the  economic  situation,  and 
it  would  be  incomplete  without  a  mention  of  the 
possible  changes  to  be  wrought  by  the  canal, 
which,  among  other  things,  will  undoubtedly  bring 
the  manufacturing  cities  of  the  Eastern  States  into 
closer  touch  with  the  Pacific  slopes.1 

1  "Of  the  total  imports  of  all  South  America,  87  per  cent,  is 
taken  by  the  countries  bordering  upon  the  two  oceans,  and 
but  13  per  cent,  by  those  bordering  upon  the  Caribbean. 
Marching  down  the  eastern  coast  of  South  America,  we  find 
Brazil  importing,  in  1899,  goods  to  the  value  of  over  $105,000,- 
ooo,  of  which  the  United  States  supplied  about  10  per  cent.; 
Uruguay  and  Paraguay,  $26,000,000,  of  which  our  share  was 
less  than  7  per  cent.;  and  Argentina,  $112,000,000,  of  which 
about  10  per  cent  was  from  the  United  States;  while  a  tour  of 
the  Pacific  coast  shows  importations  into  Chili  of  $38,000,000; 
Peru,  $8,500,000;  Bolivia,  $11,600,000;  and  Ecuador,  $7,000.- 
ooo ;  the  proportion  from  the  United  States  averaging  about 
10  per  cent.  Thus  the  northern  coast  of  South  America, 
fronting  on  the  Caribbean  Sea,  imports  goods  to  the  value 
of  $36,000,000,  of  which  we  supply  an  average  of  25  per  cent. ; 
the  eastern  coast,  fronting  upon  the  Atlantic,  $275,000,000, 
and  the  Pacific  coast,  $60,000,000,  of  which  our  proportion  is 

215 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Arbitration  has  always  been  one  of  the  most 
cherished  goals  of  Pan- Americanism,  and  the  de 
sire  of  the  United  States  naturally  has  been  that 
she,  as  the  head  of  the  American  hegemony,  should 
act  as  arbitrator.  This  scheme,  however,  broke 
down  from  the  very  beginning,  owing  to  the 
jealousies  and  warlike  tendencies  of  the  Latin- 
American  peoples.  It  is  notable  that  in  recent 
times,  in  three  distinct  cases,  European  powers 
have  been  called  upon  to  arbitrate  in  South 
America,  and  that  not  the  slightest  disposition  has 
been  evinced  to  appeal  to  Washington  except  as  a 
protection  against  European  claims. 

There  have  been  altogether  four  Pan-American 
conferences.  The  one  initiated  by  Bolivar  at 
Panama  was  a  complete  fiasco,  the  United  States, 
Chili,  Brazil,  and  Buenos  Ay  res  being  unrepre- 

in  each  case  about  10  per  cent.  In  1868  our  sales  to  the  coun 
tries  lying  south  of  us  were  20  per  cent,  of  our  total  exports;  in 
1878,  a  little  less  than  10  per  cent.;  in  1888,  a  fraction  above 
10  per  cent;  in  1898,  but  7  per  cent. ;  and  in  1901  about  9  per 
cent,  of  our  total  exports.  An  examination  of  our  list  of  pur 
chases  from  the  Central  and  South  American  countries  seems 
to  increase  the  anomaly  presented  by  their  small  purchases 
from  us.  Of  Brazil  we  are  by  far  the  largest  single  customer 
in  her  chief  articles  of  export,  coffee  and  rubber,  while  from 
Argentina  and  Chili  our  purchases  of  wool  and  hides  are  also 
heavy,  and  for  the  tropical  products  of  the  other  countries  of 
South  America — sugar,  spices,  fruits,  dye-woods,  cabinet- 
woods,  textiles,  and  chemicles — the  United  States  offers  a 
constant  and  rapidly  increasing  market.  From  the  coun 
tries  of  South  America  the  United  States,  in  1901,  purchased 
goods  valued  at  $110,329,667,  while  her  sales  to  them  in 
that  year  were  but  $44,770,888,  less  than  one-half  of  her 
purchases  from  them."  —  BUREAU  OF  STATISTICS,  WASH 
INGTON. 

216 


GREATER    AMERICA 

sented.  A  sort  of  offensive  and  defensive  alliance 
was  entered  into  by  the  delegates,  but  only  Colom 
bia  ratified  the  agreement.  Next  year,  when  the 
United  States  delegates  did  attend  a  meeting, 
those  from  the  southern  and  central  republics 
were  too  much  employed  in  cutting  one  another's 
throats.1  The  next  conference  was  not  held  till 
1883,  when  a  number  of  delegates  from  the  Span 
ish-American  states  assembled  at  Caracas,  and  an 
other  body  at  Buenos  Ayres,  with  no  practical  re 
sult.  It  was  in  1889-90  that  all  the  American 
republics  met  in  conclave  at  Washington,  on  the 
invitation  of  the  United  States  President.  Of 
their  two  main  objects,  commercial  union  and 
arbitration,  we  have  already  spoken;  incidentally, 
a  variety  of  other  subjects  came  under  discussion, 
but  the  results  were  meagre.  They  included  the 
survey  for  an  intercontinental  railway ;  a  monetary 
commission,  which  led  to  the  Brussels  conference, 
but  to  nothing  more ;  and,  finally,  to  the  establish 
ment  at  Washington  of  a  Bureau  of  American  Re 
publics  for  the  collection  and  dissemination  of  in 
formation  concerning  those  countries.  This  last  is 
practically  the  only  part  of  the  Pan-American 
scheme  which  has  yet  been  carried  through.  In 
1902  the  city  of  Mexico  was  the  scene  of  a  further 
meeting,  at  which  all  the  South  American  repub 
lics  were  represented.  Their  conclusions  are  said 

1  Clay  upheld  the  solidarity  of  the  interests  of  all  the  Amer 
ican  republics,  and  wished  it  to  assume  a  concerte  form  in  the 
congress  of  Panama. 

217 


GREATER    AMERICA 

to  have  been  "  pacific,  if  not  unanimous."  The 
chief  result  of  their  deliberations  seems  to  have 
been  an  agreement  to  refer  cases  affecting  private 
claims  to  arbitration,  while  ten  of  the  nineteen  na 
tions  represented  agreed  to  make  arbitration  com 
pulsory  in  controversies  which  do  not  "  affect  their 
independence  or  national  honor."  The  United 
States  did  not  participate  in  this  decision.  More 
practical  results  were  arrived  at  in  the  discussion  of 
matters  such  as  extradition,  copyright,  sanitary 
laws,  and  other  circumstances  affecting  interna 
tional  intercourse;  and,  to  insure  the  effectiveness 
of  all  these  decisions,  it  was  decided  to  call  another 
conference  in  five  years'  time  to  consider  them  in 
the  light  of  experience. 

While  it  is  obviously  useful  for  the  young  Amer 
ican  republics,  on  the  eve  of  a  wide  development, 
to  discuss  all  these  questions  which  have  been  set 
tled  by  usage  and  international  law  between  older 
nations,  yet  they  cannot  be  in  any  way  considered 
as  steps  in  the  direction  of  closer  union.  Very 
different  estimates  of  the  value  of  these  confer 
ences  are  held  in  the  Anglo-American  and  Latin- 
American  countries.  While  writers  in  the  United 
States  declare  that  a  great  advance  has  been  made 
in  republican  government,  elements  so  discordant 
having  been  brought  to  agreement  on  important 
subjects,  a  Mexican  statesman  laments  that  Span 
ish-Americans  should  be  thus  encouraged  in  the 
expression  of  vague  and  lofty  sentiments  when  real 
mutual  interests,  the  bed-rock  of  united  action, 

218 


GREATER    AMERICA 

are  lacking.  It  is  impossible  not  to  feel,  with  this 
distinguished  Latin- American,  that  anything  which 
directs  the  energies  of  his  people  towards  academic 
discussion  or  oratory  is  to  be  deplored. 

The  interests  of  the  South  American  republics 
are  above  everything  commercial,  and  it  is  of 
vital  importance  to  them,  in  retaining  their  in 
dependence,  that  they  should  not  only  become 
as  far  as  possible  self  -  supporting,  but  should 
be  economically  independent  of  any  one  power. 
Europe,  therefore,  with  several  powers  as  com 
petitors,  is  a  better  field  than  the  United  States 
would  be,  especially  as  South  America  is  com 
plementary  to  Europe,  but  would  be  to  a  great 
extent  an  intruder  in  North  American  markets. 
From  a  variety  of  causes,  moreover,  the  United 
States  has  failed  to  establish  herself  as  the  rival  of 
Europe  in  South  America.  Her  trade  is  declining 
while  that  of  Europe  increases.  It  is  remarkable 
that  there  is  no  United  States  bank  in  all  South 
America,  all  the  banks  being  English  or  German 
with  the  exception  of  a  small  French  one.  A  cer 
tain  number  of  concessions  for  railways  and  pub 
lic  works  are  obtained  by  Americans,  but  at  a 
certain  stage  they  almost  invariably  pass  into  Eu 
ropean  hands.  Americans,  in  dealing  with  South 
American  trade,  avoid  doing  business  with  the  na 
tives,  and  work  entirely  through  the  agency  of 
English,  German,  Portuguese,  or  Italian  houses. 
Their  objection  to  the  natives  is  their  unbusiness 
like  habits,  and  the  want  of  security,  but  the  true 

219 


GREATER    AMERICA 

reason  is  the  characteristic  impatience  of  the 
United  States  citizen  and  his  desire  to  make  a  for 
tune  at  once.  He  is  not  prepared  to  play  a  wait 
ing  game,  to  give  long  credit,  and  to  possess  his 
soul  during  interminable  delays.  It  is  therefore 
not  surprising  that,  while  Europe  has  invested — 
in  government  bonds,  railroads,  banks,  gas  com 
panies,  dock  companies,  and  similar  ventures — 
not  less  than  one  billion  dollars  (two  hundred 
million  pounds) ,  the  United  States  capital  invested 
probably  does  not  exceed  ten  to  fifteen  million 
dollars  (two  to  three  million  pounds  sterling) .  Eu 
ropean  capital  holds  the  place  in  South  America 
which  United  States  capital  has  gained  in  Mexico 
and  the  West  Indies,  and  the  general  conclusion 
from  all  this  is  that  the  southern  continent  must 
be  considered  as  far  from  being  an  open  field  for 
American  commercial  expansion.  Intellectually 
and  socially,  there  is  more  sympathy  with  the  Old 
World. 

Politically,  Pan-Americanism  is  inextricably  in 
terwoven  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  although 
we  have  said  that,  for  Elaine,  at  least,  it  meant  the 
political  paramountcy  of  his  own  country,  yet  the 
fine  shades  which  have  been  read  into  the  pro 
nouncement  of  the  unconscious  Monroe  deserve 
some  more  detailed  discussion. 

It  is  important  to  note,  first,  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  however  interpreted,  is  a  matter  of 
policy  and  not  of  international  law.  It  was  orig 
inally  designed  in  Europe,  but  has  been  used  by 


220 


GREATER    AMERICA 

all  successive  American  politicians  to  give  au 
thority  to  whatever  policy  seemed  most  likely  to 
secure  the  ascendency  of  the  United  States  and 
further  her  prosperity.  The  fundamental  prin 
ciple  underlying  every  interpretation  of  Monroe's 
famous  message  is  the  very  ancient  and  trite  one 
that  might  is  right.  The  United  States  at  a  very 
early  period  "  bluffed  "  successfully  in  this  matter, 
and  now  that  her  position  is  really  strong  and 
secure  she  lays  the  flattering  unction  to  her  soul 
that  she  is  only  acting  "  consistently  "  in  her  high 
handed  attitude.  There  is  nothing  new  in  the 
history  of  nations  in  all  this.  Britain  has  fre 
quently  made  use  of  similar  hypocrisies.  Russia 
is  a  past-mistress  in  the  art.  Diplomacy  was  in 
vented  to  make  such  situations  possible  without 
vulgar  jars  between  nations.  It  is  just  as  well, 
however,  to  recognize  the  truth.  "Hands  off, 
Europe!"  is  the  plain  meaning  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  and  the  United  States  is  prepared  to 
back  it  by  force  if  necessary.  She  feels  strong 
enough  in  her  position  as  the  wealthiest,  most 
progressive,  and  rapidly  increasing  nation  in  the 
western  hemisphere  to  maintain  herself  as  prac 
tically  a  sovereign,  or,  to  put  it  less  bluntly,  as 
"the  head  of  the  American  hegemony." 

Although  the  situation  is  simple  enough  in  out 
line,  it  becomes  difficult  in  detail.  We  have  al 
ready  seen  that  such  matters  as  arbitration  and 
commercial  union,  which  should  surely  be  possible 
without  a  hegemony,  have  so  far  proved  im- 

221 


GREATER    AMERICA 

practicable.  American  statesmen  repudiate  the 
idea  that  the  United  States  desires  to  establish  a 
protectorate  of  all  Latin-American  republics,  and 
yet  in  practice,  if  the  doctrine  is  carried  to  its  log 
ical  conclusion,  that  is  what  they  are  bound  to  do. 
The  difficult  thing  about  a  loosely  defined  policy 
of  such  wide  possibilities  is  its  inevitable  growth 
to  inconvenient  proportions.  It  began  with  the 
mere  statement  that  Europe  was  not  to  colonize 
on  the  American  continent  or  be  permitted  to 
intervene  in  her  affairs.  This  was  enlarged  by 
Polk  to  mean  that  not  only  aggression  or  inter 
vention  by  Europe  was  forbidden,  but  the  transfer 
of  territory,  the  establishment  or  acquisition  of 
dominion,  even  if  voluntarily  made.1  The  third 
development,  chiefly  formulated  by  Elaine  in  1881, 
went  further  than  fixing  the  inviolability  of  the 
American  continents;  it  abrogated  to  the  United 
States  certain  rights  over  territory  of  other  Amer 
ican  peoples — i.e.,  in  the  isthmus — and  as  arbitra 
tor  of  disputes.  The  fourth  interpretation — un 
defined,  perhaps,  as  yet,  but  inferred — is  simply 
the  right  of  the  United  States  to  be  regarded 
as  paramount  in  the  whole  of  the  western  hemi 
sphere,  a  right  which  she,  believing  it  to  be  nec 
essary  to  her  national  interests,  is  prepared  to 
uphold. 

The  slight  sketch  we  have  given  of  the  growth 
and  decline  of  Pan-Americanism  is  conclusive  of 

1  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  1903,  by  Whitelaw  Reid. 
222 


GREATER    AMERICA 

one  fact  —  that,  so  far  as  the  South  -  American 
continent  is  concerned,  this  liberal  interpretation 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  made  by  the  United 
States  on  her  own  authority.  She  is,  in  fact, 
assuming  a  position  by  right  of  strength  which  is 
not  accorded  her  unanimously  by  her  weaker  sis 
ters.  South  America,  while  ready  to  invoke  her 
when  convenient,  is  not  prepared,  by  joining  an 
"American  hegemony,"  to  forfeit  any  of  her  ini 
tiative  or  to  loosen  the  bonds  which  tie  her 
to  Europe,  where  her  republics  stand  on  equal 
terms  with  independent  powers,  in  favor  of  a 
subordinate  position  in  the  family  of  American 
States. 

From  the  European  point  of  view  the  position 
presents  great  difficulties.  If  the  United  States 
is  determined  to  spread  her  mantle  over  the  two 
continents,  what  will  happen  in  the  event  of 
complications  between  any  Latin-American  state 
and  Europe?  We  have  already  had  an  instance 
of  what  is  likely  to  happen ;  but  Venezuela  cannot 
be  an  indefinite  precedent,  nor  is  it  possible  that 
the  Latin-American  politicians  of  the  more  irre 
sponsible  sort  can  continue  to  regard  the  doc 
trine  as  a  dispensation  of  Providence  to  secure 
immunity  for  their  misdeeds.  Mr.  Roosevelt  has 
declared  that  his  country  has  not  the  slightest 
wish  to  assume  responsibility  for  Spanish-Amer 
ican  misconduct,  and  that,  in  the  event  of  a  re 
public  having  a  misunderstanding  with  Europe, 
the  quarrel  must  be  settled  between  them  "by 

223 


GREATER    AMERICA 

any  one  of  the  usual  methods."1  Unfortunately, 
power,  without  responsibility,  though  an  ideal 
state,  is  not  easily  attained  in  a  too  -  imperfect 
world.  The  reference  of  the  Venezuela  claims  to 
The  Hague  tribunal  will  evoke  a  far-reaching  de 
cision  on  the  subject  of  "pacific  blockade."  The 
question  is  whether  such  action  on  the  part  of 
creditor  nations  is  to  constitute  a  preferential 
claim  on  their  part.  If  so,  there  will  obviously 
be  a  great  temptation  to  European  powers  to  em 
ploy  the  " pacific  blockade"  whenever  they  have 
a  difficulty  in  collecting  their  debts,  and,  when 
the  chronic  financial  troubles  of  South  American 
republics  are  considered,  it  is  evident  that  a  very 
serious  situation  may  arise.  If,  however,  the 
"  pacific  blockade  "  is  not  to  constitute  a  preferen 
tial  claim,  by  what  means  are  European  nations 
to  seek  redress  for  non-recognition  by  independent 
states  of  freely  incurred  obligations?  Whichever 
way  the  decision  goes  the  responsibility  of  the 
United  States  seems  to  be  increased;  since  she 
stipulated  (in  1899)  that  nothing  in  The  Hague 
convention  is  to  be  construed  as  implying  a  re- 
linquishment  by  her  of  her  traditional  attitude 
towards  purely  American  questions.  Therefore, 
she  is  either  in  the  position  of  sanctioning  action 
on  the  part  of  Europe  which  may  lead  to  a  direct 
violation  of  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
or  she  must  assume  herself  the  task  of  keeping  the 

1  American  Ideals,  1897. 
224 


GREATER    AMERICA 

recalcitrant  states  to  the  fulfilment  of  their  obliga 
tions.  In  the  latter  case  she  must  become  either 
a  debt  collector  and  board  of  correction,  or  an  in 
ternational  bankruptcy  court.1 

The  practical  question  is,  how  far  south  is  the 
United  States  prepared  tc  follow  this  doctrine,  and 
in  this  matter  she  has  to  consult  merely  her  real 
national  interests.  It  is  a  foolish  ebullition  of 
spread-eagleism  which  insists  on  the  unbounded 
sovereignty  of  the  United  States  in  the  western 
hemisphere.  A  great  nation  is  never  greater  than 
when  it  recognizes  its  true  limitations,  and  the 
United  States  has  to  strain  herself  to  the  utmost 
to  be  successful  in  what  she  has  already  under 
taken.  Whatever  the  fate  of  Pan- Americanism, 
it  is  certain  that  a  complete  revolution  of  pre 
vailing  conditions  must  take  place  before  the 
United  States  can  occupy  the  place  she  claims  in 
the  southern  continent.  Whether  she  will  be 
wise  to  pursue  the  will-o'-the-wisp  of  an  "  Amer 
ican  hegemony  "  is  a  question  which  deeply  affects 
the  future  of  Greater  America. 

1  To  obtain  an  idea  of  the  indebtedness  of  the  South  Amer 
ican  republics  and  their  financial  position,  the  reader  is  re 
ferred  to  Appendix  B. 
ij 


CHAPTER   X 
CANADA  AND   PAN-AMERICANISM 

IT  is  obvious  that  the  expression  "  Pan- Amer 
icanism  "  will  never  be  more  than  a  fafon  de  parler 
unless  the  great  country  of  Canada,  becoming  de 
tached  from  the  British  Empire,  can  be  included 
in  a  federation  of  American  republics.  It  is  sig 
nificant  that  one  naturally  thinks  of  federation 
rather  than  of  annexation,  since  it  is  not  very 
long  ago  that  the  latter  expression  was  heard 
freely  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  The  growth 
of  imperialism  in  the  mother-country  has  made 
it  almost  impossible  to  realize  the  frame  of  mind 
in  which  British  statesmen  spoke  of  the  annexa 
tion  of  Canada  by  the  United  States  as  inevitable, 
and  at  the  same  time  there  is  a  far  less  certain 
note  among  Americans  themselves  as  to  their 
manifest  destiny  in  becoming  undisputed  masters 
of  the  whole  northern  continent.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  forcible  projects  have  been  al 
together  abandoned,  and  that  the  United  States 
relies  on  an  economic  conquest  and  on  the  growing 
strength  and  prosperity  of  the  Dominion,  which 
will  cause  her  to  become  independent  of  Britain, 

226 


GREATER    AMERICA 

when  she  will  be  bound  to  seek  admittance  into 
the  American  family. 

There  are  two  or  three  main  points  in  the  view 
taken  by  the  United  States  which  must  be  briefly 
stated.  She  is  conscious  of  her  own  superiority 
in  wealth  and  progress  over  Canada,  and  is  con 
vinced  that  the  latter  owes  her  comparative  back 
wardness  to  the  baneful  effect  of  her  " colonial" 
position.  An  average  American  is  certain  that 
Canada  has  only  to  "cut  the  painter"  in  order  to 
become  in  all  respects  as  prosperous  as  the  United 
States.  Incidentally,  he  is  also  convinced  that 
independence  of  Great  Britain  would  mean  de 
pendence  on  the  United  States,  and  in  this  he  is 
probably  correct.  It  is  impossible  to  dissociate 
these  two  ideas,  so  that  in  no  case  can  the  Amer 
ican  view  be  considered  disinterested.  The  po 
tential  value  of  Canada  to  the  American  Republic 
is  hardly  to  be  questioned,  especially  since  the 
opening  of  the  Northwest,  but  there  may  well  be 
two  opinions  as  to  the  advantages  to  be  reaped 
by  Canada  from  a  political,  or  even  a  commercial, 
union  with  her  great  neighbor. 

Without  discussing  in  detail  the  relations  be 
tween  Canada  and  the  United  States  in  the  past, 
it  is  necessary  to  recall  the  main  features  of  their 
intercourse.  First  we  have  invasion  by  the  new 
born  republic  and  a  long  period  of  hostility,  in 
which  the  religious  and  racial  antipathies  of  the 
French  of  Lower  Canada  and  the  Puritans  of  New 
England  played  a  great  part.  After  1812  actual 

227 


GREATER    AMERICA 

hostilities  ceased,  except  for  the  abortive  Fenian 
invasions  in  1866  and  1870.  The  commercial  re 
lations,  however,  were  strained  in  proportion  as 
actual  aggression  subsided.  Until  the  middle  of 
the  nineteenth  century  the  British  American  col 
onies  had  the  advantage  of  British  preferential 
tariffs,  which  did  as  much  for  the  timber  trade  in 
Canada  as  for  sugar  in  the  West  Indies.  To  this 
period  belongs  the  activity  in  Canadian  ship 
yards  which  is  now  quite  a  thing  of  the  past. 
The  adoption  of  free-trade  by  the  mother-country, 
followed  as  it  was  by  a  period  of  great  progress 
and  prosperity,  which  owed  much  to  the  dis 
coveries  of  science  and  to  European  conditions, 
was  felt  by  the  Canadians  as  inimical  to  their1 
interests.  The  negotiation  of  a  reciprocity  treaty, 
in  1854,  with  the  United  States  by  Lord  Elgin 
(who  was  said  to  have  floated  it  on  "seas  of 
champagne")  was,  however,  a  great  stimulus  to 
the  struggling  British  and  French  communities, 
providing,  as  it  did,  for  a  free  exchange  of  the 
products  of  river,  field,  wood,  and  mine.  In  the 
then  condition  of  communications  with  the  moth 
er-country  this  was  most  important ;  but,  even  so, 
the  desire  for  protection  of  Canadian  industries 
led  to  the  formation  of  a  protection  association 
in  1858,  and  the  Gait  tariff  was  framed,  despite 
protests  from  England.  Thus  began  the  local 
control  of  tariff  conditions.  The  American  civil 
war,  which  dislocated  commerce  in  the  States, 
proved  a  great  stimulus  to  Canada,  which  enjoyed 

228 


GREATER    AMERICA 

a  period  of  prosperity,  at  first  little  disturbed  by 
the  abrogation  of  the  reciprocity  treaty  in  1866, 
since  the  Canadian  tariff,  though  low,  was  sufficient 
for  the  protection  of  local  interests.  But  when 
American  industries  began  their  career  of  phe 
nomenal  success  and  expansion,  the  Canadians, 
who  had  not  the  same  stimulus,  felt  the  need 
either  for  more  protection  or  for  commercial  union. 
They  saw  two  great  streams  of  economic  pros 
perity,  in  their  mother-land  and  the  neighbor 
republic,  both  passing  them  by.  Canada,  more 
over,  was  at  this  time  in  the  throes  of  political 
change.  Responsible  government  in  1864  proved 
ineffective,  and  was  finally  succeeded,  in  1867, 
by  federation.  Public  opinion  being  then  for  the 
first  time  divided  less  on  racial  and  more  on 
political  lines,  Canada  entered  on  a  more  coherent 
phase  of  her  history.  Protection,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  reciprocity  with  the  United  States,  on  the 
other,  were  keenly  discussed,  but  the  doubts  en 
tertained  by  the  Conservative  party  as  to  the 
ultimate  results  of  the  latter  on  Canadian  na 
tionality  led  to  a  protection  policy  during  the 
whole  period  of  Sir  John  Macdonald's  ministry. 
In  1891,  pressure  brought  to  bear  by  the  Liberals 
under  Mr.  (now  Sir  Wilfrid)  Laurier,  who  made 
" unrestricted  reciprocity"  the  battle-cry,  led  to 
the  despatch  of  a  delegation  to  Washington.  The 
United  States,  however,  declined  any  terms  save 
those  of  a  common  tariff  against  the  world.  In 
1896  a  joint  high  commission  met  to  discuss  a 

229 


GREATER   AMERICA 

number  of  disputed  points  between  Canada  and 
the  United  States,  but  the  latter  declined  to 
consider  the  question  of  reciprocity.  Rebuffed 
thus  in  his  efforts  to  obtain  reciprocity,  Sir  Wilfrid 
Laurier  openly  stated  in  Parliament,  "There  will 
be  no  more  delegations  to  Washington  "  in  search 
of  reciprocity,  and  the  Canadian  government 
forthwith  made  British  preference  and  the  cultiva 
tion  of  the  British  market  the  centre  of  its  policy 
as  regards  external  trade.  The  results  of  an  in 
dependent  attitude  speak  for  themselves. 

The  question  of  sentiment  has  been  freely  can 
vassed  in  connection  with  Canada,  and  must,  of 
course,  play  a  great  part  in  her  relations  with 
Britain.  There  are,  however,  several  interesting 
features  about  this  question,  and  not  least  is  the 
fact  of  its  very  recent  development.  In  the 
early  years  of  the  United  States  independence 
the  avowed  intention  of  the  revolted  colonies 
to  take  Canada  at  the  point  of  the  sword 
united  the  British  and  French  in  that  country. 
The  settlement  of  a  number  of  fugitives  from  all 
parts  of  the  revolted  provinces,  the  United  Empire 
Loyalists,  imparted  a  spirit  of  devotion  to  the 
flag  for  which  these  people  had  sacrificed  their 
homes  and  come  to  a  land  believed  to  be  in 
perpetual  winter.  During  the  years  which  follow 
ed,  the  presence  of  a  large  French  population  in 
Lower  Canada  had  a  twofold  influence.  It  large 
ly  prevented  amalgamation  between  colonists  on 
either  side  of  the  border-line,  the  religious  question 

230 


GREATER    AMERICA 

alone  being  sufficient  to  do  this,  and  it  prevented 
Canada  from  attaining  within  her  own  borders 
that  homogeneity  which  is  essential  to  the  devel 
opment  of  a  true  national  spirit.  If  Canada  re 
mained  colonial  in  spirit,  as  well  as  in  fact,  she 
owed  it  to  the  jealous  antipathies  of  the  French 
Canadians,  who,  in  their  anxiety  to  guard  their 
own  idiosyncrasies,  effectually  barred  the  way  to 
a  wider  and  fuller  national  existence.  How  well 
they  have  succeeded  is  notorious.  They  have 
preserved  language,  traditions,  habits  of  mind  and 
thought,  and,  above  all,  the  prejudice  and  super 
stition  of  their  sturdy  northern  French  forebears. 
The  peasantry  are,  as  a  rule,  densely  ignorant, 
dominated  by  their  priests,  whose  influence,  if 
patriarchal,  is  conservative  and  opposed  to  mod 
ern  education  and  progress.  They  are  the  best 
of  settlers,  farmers  and  agriculturalists,  and  the 
upper  classes  are  brilliant  in  the  learned  professions 
and  arts ;  but  they  are  the  antithesis  of  the  Anglo- 
American,  and  are  not  likely  to  rival  him  in  com 
mercial  progress.  Their  sentiments  towards  Great 
Britain  are  the  fruit  of  peculiar  circumstances. 
Under  her  flag  they  enjoy  the  utmost  freedom, 
and  they  are  not  discontented,  as  are  some  other 
Canadians,  with  the  economic  position  of  the 
country  as  compared  with  the  United  States. 
But,  intellectually,  their  sympathies  go  rather  to 
the  country  whose  language  and  literature  are 
theirs,  and  although  they  may  be  loyal  to  Britain, 
it  is  a  matter  not  of  sentiment  but  of  interest  and 

231 


GREATER    AMERICA 

convenience.  As  Canadians  they  are  more  con 
sistent,  desiring  the  independence  of  the  country 
and  its  freedom  to  work  out  its  own  salvation,  but 
above  everything  they  are  jealous  to  preserve  their 
own  influence  on  its  affairs.  Their  loyalty  to  the 
Dominion,  therefore,  need  not  be  questioned,  but 
the  imperialist  ideal,  unless  it  can  be  made  to 
appeal  to  their  self-interest,  will  fall  on  deaf  ears. 
What  do  the  arguments  about  the  past  glories  of 
the  empire,  the  ties  of  blood,  or  the  common 
heritage  in  literature  and  tradition,  mean  to  a 
people  who  are  intensely  conservative  of  their 
French  blood  and  habits? 

At  the  same  time  it  is  hard  to  see  what  induce 
ments  the  American  Republic  could  offer  which 
would  persuade  the  French  Canadians  to  come 
under  the  Stars  and  Stripes.  The  peculiar  form  of 
autonomy  which  they  possess  would  be,  to  say  the 
least,  considerably  modified  by  the  Americaniza 
tion  of  the  Canadian  provinces.  Their  numerical 
advantages  would  be  lost,  their  influence  out 
weighed,  and,  above  all,  the  paramountcy  of  the 
Church,  which  is  an  extraordinary  factor  in  French- 
Canadian  politics,  would  be  seriously  threatened. 
The  liberty  accorded  to  religion  in  the  United 
States  is  undeniable,  but  the  spirit  of  American 
democracy  is  wholly  opposed  to  the  exercise  of 
priestly  authority  in  political  affairs,  and  the 
Canadian  cures  are  well  aware  of  this.  When 
one  remembers  the  very  large  proportion  of  Ro 
man  Catholics  in  Lower  Canada,  it  is  impossible 

232 


GREATER    AMERICA 

to  discount  the  religious  factor  in  the  question  of 
Canadian  relations  with  the  United  States. 

While  French  immigration  to  Canada  stopped 
some  forty  years  ago,  so  that  the  French  popula 
tion  has  had  a  period  of  crystallization,  constant 
intercourse  with  the  mother-country,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  United  States,  on  the  other,  has 
introduced  new  and  incongruous  elements  into 
Canada.  The  prevailing  type,  however,  may  be 
generally  said  to  be  more  akin  to  the  American 
than  the  British,  which  is  only  natural.  The 
conditions  of  life  approximate  far  more  near 
ly  on  the  continent  on  both  sides  of  the  bor 
der,  and  climatic  and  physical  conditions  are 
similar. 

It  becomes  increasingly  difficult  to  estimate  the 
exact  degree  of  the  sentimental  bond  between 
Canada,  as  a  whole,  and  the  mother  -  country. 
There  are,  of  course,  extremists  on  both  sides — 
men  whose  intense  loyalty  to  the  crown  and 
capabilities  for  sacrifice  to  the  cause  of  imperial 
unity  are  their  most  vital  characteristics;  and 
others  who  declare  openly  that  the  old  country  is 
played  out,  that  they  owe  it  nothing  and  can  gain 
nothing  by  allegiance  to  an  obsolete  form  of  gov 
ernment.  Public  opinion,  too,  is  of  all  shades, 
varying  in  different  parts  of  the  country,  but  in 
one  respect  there  has  been  ever  since  federation 
a  bond  of  unity  between  all  sections  which  grows 
steadily  in  strength.  This  is  the  sentiment  of 
Canadian  patriotism — an  increasing  pride  and  be- 

233 


GREATER    AMERICA 

lief  in  their  own  country  and  a  desire  to  set  her 
firmly  among  the  nations. 

The  progress  and  expansion  of  the  last  decade 
have  bred  self-confidence.  No  longer  does  the 
Canadian  sigh  for  the  crumbs  that  fall  from  the 
United  States  table.  Already  he  looks  forward 
to  a  period  in  which  he  will  be  as  strong  and 
prosperous  as  his  neighbor;  and  as  the  tide  of 
immigration  turns  steadily  towards  his  vast,  un 
populated  regions,  he  feels  confident  that  a  few 
more  years  will  make  Canada  great  not  only  in  size 
and  resources  but  in  population  and  power.  It 
is  not  unreasonable  that  the  loyal  Canadians 
should  put  Canada  first  and  the  empire  next,  and 
it  must  be  confessed  that  the  policy  of  the  mother- 
country  has  sometimes  strained  their  patriotism 
to  the  utmost.  The  important  point  is  to  realize, 
as  far  as  possible,  the  extent  to  which  Canada  will 
find  it  to  her  own  interest  to  remain  within  the 
British  Empire.  Given  a  sound  backbone  of  tra 
dition  and  sentiment,  what  are  the  practical  con 
siderations  which  will  weigh  with  a  Canadian  who 
desires  first  of  all  the  prosperity  of  his  own 
country  ? 

They  are  twofold  in  character  —  political  and 
commercial.  The  former  include  the  consideration 
of  what  Canada  avoids  by  being  under  the  British 
flag.  She  is  spared  the  full  burden  of  defence,  for 
whatever  may  be  said  by  the  Little  Canadians 
and  the  opponents  of  militarism,  it  would  be  im 
possible  for  Canada,  as  an  independent  republic, 

234 


GREATER    AMERICA 

to  escape  from  the  modern  tendency  which  is 
arming  every  nation  to  the  teeth.  This  prevalent 
tendency  is  not  confined  to  Europe.  Nor  could 
Canada  presume  on  her  isolation — isolation  at  this 
period  of  world-history  is  mythical.  It  has  been 
recently  urged  that  so  far  as  defence  is  concerned 
Canada  would  be  no  worse  off  without  the  mother- 
country,  this  argument  being  founded  on  the  idea 
that  the  only  power  who  would  or  could  attack 
her  is  the  United  States,  and  that  Britain  is  both 
unprepared  to  oppose  the  United  States  in  any 
case,  and  incapable  of  garrisoning  the  Canadian 
frontier.  The  propounder  of  this  argument  for 
gets  that  frontiers  are  not  the  only  points  of  at 
tack;  that  naval  warfare  in  the  Caribbean  decided 
the  fate  of  Europe,  and  that  trade  expansion  in 
modern  times  must  inevitably  be  defended  by  a 
fleet.  The  United  States,  Russia,  and  Germany 
are  all  becoming  strong  naval  powers.  How  could 
an  independent  Canada  hold  her  own  with  them? 
As  an  independent  nation  she  might  form  a 
defensive  alliance  with  the  United  States,  but  she 
could  hardly  secure  this  without  taking  some  of 
the  burden  on  her  own  shoulders,  and  would  there 
fore  be  launched  on  that  career  of  "militarism" 
which  she  is  so  anxious  to  avoid.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  the  day  of  isolation,  of  freedom 
from  European  entanglements,  is  over  for  North 
America;  and  Canada,  as  part  of  the  British 
Empire,  actually  avoids,  instead  of  incurring,  the 
responsibilities  which  international  relations  im- 

235 


GREATER    AMERICA 

pose.  That  she  is  anxious  to  control  more  fully 
her  own  foreign  relations  is  perhaps  not  un 
natural  when  we  remember  the  mistaken  policy 
of  the  past.  That  some  people  even  desire  to 
make  their  own  treaties,  looking  to  Britain  to 
enforce  them,  is,  perhaps,  a  sign  of  the  times; 
but  the  true  statesmanship  of  the  country  sees  the 
inconsistency  of  the  attitude,  and  will  concentrate 
its  efforts  rather  on  the  building  up  of  a  genuine 
imperial  policy  and  securing  adequate  colonial 
representation  in  all  cases. 

To  turn  to  the  commercial  aspect  of  the  situa 
tion,  it  may  be  premised  that  whatever  may  be 
the  arguments  for  or  against  commercial  union 
with  the  United  States,  it  must  not  be  concluded 
that  consolidation  of  interests  is  always  an  un 
mixed  blessing.  In  national  as  well  as  in  business 
affairs  the  Trust  may  become  a  power  for  evil. 
This  would  apply  with  equal  force  to  commercial 
union  with  the  mother-country  were  it  not  that 
her  geographical  circumstances  and  her  extraor 
dinarily  diversified  interests  make  a  monopolistic 
policy  impossible  to  her.  So  far  the  failure  to 
obtain  reciprocity  with  the  United  States  has 
decided  Canada  to  develop  her  trade  on  inde 
pendent  lines,  with  the  result  that  it  has  more  than 
doubled  in  the  last  seven  years.  But  owing  to 
the  proximity  of  the  United  States  and  the 
facilities  of  transportation  afforded  by  the  rail 
ways  across  the  border,  converging  on  American 
ports,  and  to  the  neglect  of  Canada  and  the 

236 


GREATER    AMERICA 

mother -land  to  open  the  country  and  settle  it 
up,  the  balance  of  trade  is  greatly  in  favor  of 
the  United  States.  While  the  exports  to  that  coun 
try  are  seventy  million  dollars  and  the  imports  over 
one  hundred  and  twenty  millions,  the  exports  to 
Great  Britain  are  one  hundred  and  five  million 
dollars  and  the  imports  only  forty-nine  millions. 
The  exports  to  Great  Britain  form  57  per  cent,  of 
the  total,  against  34  per  cent,  to  the  United  States, 
while  the  imports  are  respectively  only  24  against 
60  per  cent.  There  is,  therefore,  a  credit,  as  re 
gards  British  trade,  in  favor  of  Canada  of  fifty-six 
million  dollars  annually,  while,  on  the  contrary, 
in  the  United  States  trade  the  credit  is  against 
Canada  to  the  extent  of  fifty  million  dollars  an 
nually.  It  is  significant  that  the  United  States 
trade  with  Canada's  population  of  six  millions 
is  greater  than  with  the  fifty-four  millions  in 
Mexico  and  Central  and  South  America.  It  is, 
therefore,  obvious  that  whatever  may  be  the  in 
ducements  towards  a  commercial  union  with  the 
United  States,  they  cannot  at  present  outweigh 
those  in  favor  of  retaining  and  expanding  the  trade 
with  the  mother-country.  Later  on  we  must  re 
turn  to  the  subject  with  a  view  to  its  effect  on 
Canadian  development. 

The  advantage  of  unrestricted  trade  with  the 
mother-country  Canada  has  hitherto  shared  with 
other  nations,  but  the  turning-point  in  Britain's 
commercial  history  has  now  arrived,  and  in  the 
near  future  we  may  be  able  to  point  to  a  distinct 

237 


GREATER    AMERICA 

and  tangible  advantage  which  our  colonies  will 
possess  over  their  rivals  in  our  markets.  The  im 
mense  revolution  in  public  opinion  in  Great  Brit 
ain  as  regards  the  self  -  governing  dependencies 
has  certainly  knit  closer  the  bonds  of  empire,  and 
those  bonds  are  not  altogether  sentimental  ones. 
It  is  to  our  interest  to  retain  the  colonies,  though 
we  have  been  some  time  in  realizing  it,  but  it  is 
to  their  interest  to  stay  with  us,  and  we  are  power 
ful  enough  to  make  that  interest  still  stronger. 

As  has  been  said  already,  recent  years  have 
witnessed  a  remarkable  growth  of  what  is  known  as 
the  Imperialist  spirit.  There  is  still  a  good  deal  of 
misapprehension  on  this  subject,  and  it  would  be 
well  if  we  could  clear  away  the  idea  that  Imperial 
ism  is  founded  entirely  on  sentiment.  Sentiment 
plays  a  part  in  practice,  but  it  is  just  as  well  to 
reckon  without  it  in  theory;  then  one  is  on  the 
safe  side.  The  modern  school  of  Imperialism  owns 
as  its  adherents  some  hard-headed  business-men, 
and  is,  in  fact,  founded  on  the  solid  rock  of  self- 
interest  and  self-preservation.  We  of  the  mother 
land  do  not  ask  any  sacrifices  of  our  colonies  in  aid 
of  Imperialism;  we  have  exacted  them  before,  and 
even  recently,  but  they  have  been  the  fruit  of  an 
essentially  non-imperial  policy.  We  do  not  desire 
to  drag  them  into  European  wars,  nor  to  restrict 
their  autonomy,  nor  to  sap  their  independence  in 
any  way.  None  of  these  measures  would,  in  our 
opinion,  be  advantageous  either  to  them  or  to  us, 
since  their  prosperity,  progress,  and  contentment 

238 


GREATER    AMERICA 

are  as  essential  in  our  eyes  as  in  their  own.  It  is 
merely  a  question  of  the  long  and  the  short  view, 
and  just  as  the  keenest  business-man  is  he  who 
can  look  farthest,  the  best  Imperialist  is  he  who 
looks  to  the  future  and  permanent  prosperity  of 
every  part  of  Greater  Britain  rather  than  to  a 
temporary  advantage  for  one  or  other  section. 
Young  countries — little  versed  in  world  affairs, 
inexperienced,  often  slaves  of  a  democracy  which 
cannot  see  beyond  its  own  nose — find  a  difficulty 
in  taking  this  view  of  their  affairs;  but  in  the  case 
of  Canada  the  alternative  to  Imperialism  is  so 
plain  that  a  decision  is  forced  on  her.  Great  Britain 
has  a  great  part  to  play  in  this  matter,  and  in  the 
fervor  of  her  new  Imperialism  she  may  play  it 
well.  If  Britons  had  only  the  sturdy  self-con 
fidence  and  belief  in  their  own  destiny  which  ani 
mate  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  they  would 
not  contemplate  the  secession  of  Canada  for  one 
moment. 

We  believe  that  with  our  help  Canada  can  be 
come,  if  not  economically  independent  of  the 
United  States,  at  all  events  so  placed  that  she 
can  obtain  advantageous  terms  with  that  country. 
She  will  be  enabled  to  hold  her  own  without  be 
coming  a  part  of  the  hegemony  of  the  North 
American  continent — a  hegemony  in  which  she 
could  only  play  a  subordinate  part.  There  is  nat 
urally  a  strong  objection  held  in  Canada  to  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  its  extreme  form.  If  the 
doctrine  is  to  mean  merely  that  there  is  to  be 

239 


GREATER    AMERICA 

no  new  territorial  acquisition  in  America  by  any 
European  power,  then  there  can  be  no  objection. 
That  is  a  protection  to  Canada.  But  should  an 
attempt  be  made  to  exercise  control  or  authority 
in  the  hemisphere  over  countries  independent  of 
the  United  States,  the  doctrine  would  then  be 
come  intolerable. 

We  have  seen  how  the  expansion  of  the  United 
States,  while  bringing  the  advantages  of  a  superior 
civilization  to  tropical  countries,  has  superimposed 
the  problems  of  a  modern  democracy  on  those  of  a 
less  advanced  stage  of  social  evolution.  It  has  also 
introduced  alien  problems  into  the  home  govern 
ment;  and,  in  effect,  we  see  a  country,  nominally 
under  the  most  simple  and  direct  form  of  govern 
ment — the  will  of  the  people — in  reality  manipu 
lated  by  the  most  complex  and  expensive  machine 
in  existence.  Canadians,  though  enjoying  to  the 
full  every  right  of  local  autonomy  and  citizenship, 
have  so  far  been  spared  many  of  the  undesirable 
sides  of  American  political  life — the  recklessness 
in  expenditure,  the  terrible  corruption,  the  Spoils 
System,  and  the  complications  of  the  "machine." 
They  are  spared  much  of  the  interference  with 
labor  conditions,  which  is  one  of  the  gravest 
problems  in  the  United  States;  they  are  spared 
the  evils  of  the  elective  judicial  system;  and, 
being  assured  of  fairness  and  impartiality  in  their 
courts  and  a  less  procrastinating  method  of  pro 
cedure,  they  do  not  resort  to  lynch  law.  They 
have,  moreover,  the  advantage  of  more  uniform 

240 


GREATER    AMERICA 

codes,  which  obviate  the  disorder  and  incon 
venience  arising  from  a  multiplicity  and  variety 
of  State  laws.  A  permanent  Civil  Service  main 
tains  a  regular  and  able  administration.  Under 
a  monarchical  form  they  are  able,  in  fact,  to 
control  their  own  government  absolutely.  In  the 
United  States  the  election  of  a  President  practical 
ly  settles  the  policy  of  the  country,  not  merely  on 
great  but  on  small  matters  also,  for  four  years. 
The  Canadian  government  can  be  overthrown  and 
replaced  in  forty -eight  hours,  and  holds  office 
practically  only  so  long  as  it  has  the  confidence 
of  the  people.  As  for  the  direction  of  foreign 
affairs  and  relations,  those  prerogatives  are,  in 
truth,  as  much  under  popular  control  in  the  one 
country  as  in  the  other.  The  Canadians  would 
not  gain  any  real  and  practical  accession  of  liberty 
by  changing  their  flag.  They  are  free  also  from 
foreign  entanglements  and  race  problems,  in  all 
of  which  the  British  Empire  bears  its  burden 
without  assistance  from  Canada,  save  what  she 
chooses  to  give  at  critical  times.  An  inclusion  in, 
or  federation  with,  the  Union  would  necessitate 
a  full  share  in  all  continental  and  even  some  over 
sea  problems.  There  is  a  great  repugnance  in 
Canada  to  a  country  with  a  vast  black  problem — 
blacks  with  votes,  to  balance  theirs — instead  of,  as 
now  within  the  empire,  blacks  without  votes.  To 
leave  the  British  Empire  for  the  American  fed 
eral  empire  would,  therefore,  be  not  altogether  a 
change  for  the  better;  and  although  a  time  may 

16  241 


GREATER    AMERICA 

arrive  when  Canada  is  strong  enough  to  be  in 
dependent  of  either  the  United  States  or  Great 
Britain,  she  has  certainly  not  yet  arrived  at  that 
stage. 

But,  although  the  Americanization  of  Canada 
may  seem  neither  imminent  nor  desirable  to  us,  it 
may  appear  quite  otherwise  to  men  born  and 
bred  under  the  Stars  and  Stripes  who  are  now 
pouring  over  the  border  into  the  Dominion.  This 
immigration  from  the  United  States  has  amount 
ed  to  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  in  the 
last  few  years,  and  equalled  last  year  that  from 
Great  Britain.  Of  these  immigrants,  however, 
some  were  returning  Canadians,  or  children  of 
Canadians,  while  others  were  recent  emigrants  to 
the  United  States  of  alien  origin.  Over  seventy 
per  cent,  become  naturalized,  that  being  necessary 
for  the  holding  of  government  lands.  The  simple 
reason  for  this  immigration  is  the  cheapness  and 
fertility  of  land  in  the  Canadian  northwest  and 
the  fact  that  most  of  the  good  United  States 
lands  have  been  taken  up.  So  much  is  this  the 
case  that  artificial  irrigation  is  already  widely 
applied  over  considerable  areas  and  will  be  greatly 
extended  as  the  land  pressure  increases. 

Canada  has  three  hundred  and  twenty  million 
acres  still  available  in  the  northwest,  and,  besides, 
an  enormous  territory  in  British  Columbia  and  the 
east,  the  extent  of  which  cannot  at  present  be 
estimated,  all  within  the  zone  of  wheat.  At  a 
moderate  estimate  the  Dominion  could  support  a 

242 


GREATER    AMERICA 

population  of  at  least  a  hundred  millions;  but  it 
is  quality  and  not  quantity  which  should  be  the 
desideratum. 

Unless  these  wheat-growing  lands  are  to  be  pre 
empted  by  the  United  States,  we  must  be  pre 
pared  to  increase  the  tide  of  immigration  from 
Britain.  The  United  States  immigrants  are,  of 
course,  given  a  strong  handicap  from  the  first. 
They  are  accustomed  to  the  sort  of  life  they  will 
lead  in  their  new  home,  being  largely  of  pioneer 
stock,  and  they  have  no  sea  journey  or  uprooting 
from  age-long  traditions  to  face.  The  British 
immigrant  has  other  disqualifications.  He  is  too 
often  city-bred,  for  the  agricultural  population  of 
Britain  has  dwindled  to  a  point  when  laborers 
are  at  a  premium;  and,  therefore,  it  is  the  over 
crowded  urban  centres  which  need  to  be  depleted. 
The  promoter  of  British  immigration  has,  there 
fore,  to  expect  a  certain  percentage  of  failure,  but 
there  has  been  a  distinct  improvement  lately  in 
this  respect.  Of  the  steady  stream  which  has 
been,  for  years,  pouring  overseas,  too  large  a 
part  used  to  be  absorbed  in  the  United  States. 
The  tide  has  now  turned  in  favor  of  Canada;  an 
improvement  in  the  quality  of  immigrants  is 
rendered  possible  by  the  prospects  afforded  in 
the  Canadian  northwest,  and,  despite  the  influx  of 
American  farmers,  there  is  a  hopeful  prospect  of 
maintaining  the  ties  of  blood  with  the  mother- 
country. 

This  is  the  situation   at  a  time  when  Great 

243 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Britain  is  asked,  not  to  reverse  her  whole  commer 
cial  policy,  as  is  sometimes  stated,  but  to  recon 
sider  it  in  detail.  The  bearing  of  this  momentous 
question  on  Pan  -  Americanism  in  the  northern 
continent  may  not  be  clear  to  some  people,  who 
deny  either  the  necessity  for  action  or  the  efficacy 
of  the  measures  proposed.  The  writer  has  tried 
to  make  plain  the  grounds  on  which  he  founds  his 
belief  that  action  of  some  kind,  both  to  stimulate 
Canada's  progress  and  to  knit  her  closer  to  us, 
is  of  urgent  necessity.  Upon  our  relations  with 
Canada  in  the  present  depends  the  trend  of  her 
future  development.  Upon  the  amount  of  influ 
ence  with  her  which  we  retain  depends  that  to  be 
exercised  by  the  United  States.  This  is  not  the 
place  in  which  fiscal  policy  can  be  discussed,  but 
there  is  an  aspect  of  the  question  which  must  be 
considered.  Canada  must  have  reciprocity  either 
with  us  or  with  the  United  States.  The  latter 
has  hitherto  refused  it,  apparently  on  the  prin 
ciple  of  all  or  none ;  but  her  attitude  as  to  tariffs 
must  in  any  case  undergo  a  modification  before 
long,  and,  far  from  being  inclined  to  retaliate  upon 
Britain,  should  the  latter  embark  upon  a  system 
of  preference,  she  is  far  more  likely  to  make  the 
best  of  the  situation  and  come  to  terms.  If  Great 
Britain  persists  in  her  present  commercial  policy, 
however,  she  will  see  a  reciprocity  treaty  between 
Canada  and  the  United  States,  obtained  by  the 
sacrifice  of  purely  British  interests  in  the  Do 
minion,  and  the  consequence  would  be  not  only 

244 


GREATER    AMERICA 

closer  commercial  union  but  the  beginnings  of 
political  assimilation.  When  two  countries,  so 
closely  united  by  propinquity  and  by  many  points 
of  character  as  Canada  and  the  United  States,  be 
come  one  for  purposes  of  commerce,  the  result  is 
inevitable.  It  has  been  said  already  that  this 
would  not  be,  in  the  writer's  opinion,  for  the  truest 
interests  of  Canada,  nor  desired  by  loyal  Cana 
dians,  but  the  strengthening  of  the  commercial 
bond  would  mean  the  constant  increase  of  the 
American  stake  in  the  country,1  the  exploitation 
of  its  resources  by  people  politically  non- British, 
and  the  swamping  of  the  Canadian  by  his  wealthier 
and  more  powerful  cousins  across  the  border. 

It  is  said  by  some  opponents  of  fiscal  reform  that 
Canada  cannot  afford  to  put  any  restrictions  on 
her  trade  with  the  United  States,  since  the  latter 
could  crush  her  by  retaliation.  As  the  Canadians 
take  far  more  from  the  United  States  than  they 
send  to  her,  this  is  not  a  very  conclusive  argument ; 
but  the  strongest  point  in  the  case  for  closer  com 
mercial  union  with  Great  Britain  is  the  fact  that 
the  British  Empire  is  an  unrivalled  market  for 
Canadian  produce. 

1  The  amount  of  American  capital  invested  in  Canada 
cannot  be  estimated  with  any  approach  to  accuracy.  It 
is  found  in  large  amounts,  stretching  across  the  continent 
from  Cape  Breton  to  Vancouver  or  to  Alaska,  and  would, 
according  to  a  good  authority,  "run  into  the  hundreds  of 
millions"  (dollars).  A  considerable  portion  is  invested 
originally  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  enterprises  to  such  a 
stage  of  development  as  will  induce  British  capitalists  to 
buy  at  an  enhanced  price. 

245 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  actual  attitude  of  Canadians  towards  the 
reciprocity  question  is  hardly  less  involved  than 
that  of  their  sentiment  for  Great  Britain,  with 
which,  of  course,  it  is  closely  connected.  Generally 
speaking,  it  may  be  said  that  the  manufacturing 
interest  is  solidly  in  favor  of  reciprocity  with  Great 
Britain.  As  Britain  would  aim  particularly  at 
the  protection  of  agricultural  industries,  the  food- 
supply  question  being  the  basis  of  any  rearrange 
ment  of  her  fiscal  system,  there  is  every  reason  to 
believe  that  the  scheme  will  appeal  to  a  wide  circle 
of  Canadians.  The  northwest,  at  present  cut  off 
from  communications  except  southward,  and  with 
a  large  element  of  American  citizens  as  a  make 
weight,  is,  perhaps,  inclined  to  favor  American 
reciprocity ;  and  a  section  in  the  northeast,  whose 
trade  is  largely  with  New  England,  shares  these 
views.  The  French  element  is  uncertain,  inclined 
to  oppose  anything  which  strengthens  the  ties 
with  Britain,  but  more  averse  still  to  the  increase 
of  United  States  influence.  Taking  all  these  di 
verse  views  and  interests  into  consideration,  it 
is  clear  that,  at  present,  the  country  as  a  whole 
still  looks  to  Great  Britain  for  that  support  which 
will  enable  her  to  continue  the  work  of  self- 
development. 

There  is  one  agency  at  work,  silently,  unob 
trusively,  which  is  tending  to  strengthen  Amer 
ican  influence  in  Canada — namely,  the  dependence 
of  the  Dominion  on  the  American  press,  supple 
mented  by  the  service  supplied  by  the  cable 

246 


GREATER    AMERICA 

agencies.  These  naturally  supply  news  dealing 
with  American  topics  and  tinged  with  American 
ideas,  for  the  cabled  news  is  prepared  primarily 
for  consumption  in  the  United  States.  It  is  dif 
ficult,  no  doubt,  to  combat  this  influence,  in  view 
of  the  capital  and  enterprise  of  the  American  press 
and  news  agencies,  but  a  direct  service  of  news, 
dealing  with  affairs  from  the  British  stand-point, 
is  one  of  the  measures  which  would  help  to  develop 
the  Dominion  on  British  lines.  There  should  also 
be  a  more  enlightened  policy  on  the  part  of  the 
British  post-office,  which  actually  puts  such  a 
tax  on  English  periodicals  sent  to  Canada  that  the 
Canadian  market  is  supplied  with  American  edi 
tions  of  the  English  illustrated  papers  and  maga 
zines,  all  crammed,  of  course  with  American  ad 
vertisements. 

In  this  work  the  matter  of  communications  is 
of  equal  importance  with  that  of  commercial  union. 
Is  the  stream  of  progress,  the  route  of  trade,  to 
flow  east  and  west  or  north  and  south  ?  Railways 
must  largely  decide  this.  At  present,  it  must  be 
confessed,  the  railway  system  is  very  greatly  de 
pendent  on  the  United  States,  and  closely  linked 
to  it.  The  defective  steam  communication  with 
Great  Britain  has  been  responsible  to  a  great  ex 
tent  for  the  settlement  of  so  large  a  proportion  of 
British  immigrants  on  United  States  soil.  Not 
merely  has  the  superiority  of  the  lines  to  New 
York  and  Boston  drawn  great  numbers  of  immi 
grants  to  settle  in  the  United  States,  but  many 

247 


GREATER    AMERICA 

intending  to  go  to  Canada  have  been  diverted  by 
the  railway  companies  on  landing  at  the  American 
ports.  With  improved  lines  of  fast  steamers  and 
increased  activity  on  the  part  of  Canadian  emigra 
tion  agents  in  Britain,  we  may  expect  to  see  a 
steady  increase  in  the  stream  which  has  set  in  from 
the  old  country  direct  to  Canada. 

It  is,  perhaps,  of  even  greater  importance  to 
be  able  to  convey  immigrants,  on  landing,  straight 
to  the  new  lands  which  await  them.  Too  often 
they  drift  into  the  large  cities  or  towns,  and  a  good 
settler  is  lost.  Eastern  Canada  is  now  in  process 
of  development  as  a  manufacturing  centre,  and  its 
interests  are  widely  different  from  those  of  the 
centre,  northwest,  and  west,  which  are  essentially 
agricultural,  mineral,  and  forest  lands.  The  Ca 
nadian  Pacific  Railway  has  done  something  to  tie 
together  the  different  sections,  but  it  deals  only 
with  a  comparatively  narrow  belt,  and  in  such  a 
vast  territory  a  single  line  is  altogether  inadequate. 
The  "  Inter-Colonial "  line  (one  thousand,  three 
hundred,  and  thirty- three  miles  in  length) ,  built  to 
bind  together  the  outlying  Atlantic  provinces  to 
the  rest  of  the  Dominion,  has  accomplished  the 
business  for  which  it  was  built.  Confederation 
could  never  have  been  carried  through  without  it. 
There  has  often — but  not  always — been  a  de 
ficiency  of  earnings ;  but  that  is  because  it  has  been 
worked  as  a  State  railway  for  national  ends.  The 
results  have  been  worth  ten  times  the  sacrifice.  The 
principal  proposals  for  opening  up  the  Dominion 

248 


GREATER    AMERICA 

are  those  for  the  Canadian  Northern,  the  Grand 
Trunk  Pacific,  and  the  Trans  -  Canada  railways. 
The  directions  of  these  may  be  best  seen  by  a  ref 
erence  to  the  sketch  map.     Of  the  three  only  one 
is  at  present  in  active  construction — the  Canadian 
Northern,  of  which  one  thousand,  four  hundred 
miles  are  completed.     A  bill  has  now,  however, 
passed   the   federal    Parliament   for   the   second, 
and  this  line,   which  will  be  nearly  four  thou 
sand  miles  long,  gives  an  important  alternative 
transcontinental  line.     The  most  far-reaching  of 
these  projects  is,  however,  the  Trans-Canada  line, 
which,  stupendous  as  it  may  seem,  running  to  a 
large  extent  through  territory  now  unpopulated, 
would  undoubtedly  possess  the  greatest  economic 
and  strategic  value;  tapping,  as  it  would,   that 
great  northwest  to  which  the  future  of  Canada  so 
largely  belongs,  providing  a  route  at  a  safe  distance 
from  the  international  boundary,  and  encounter 
ing  few  engineering  difficulties,  except  in  crossing 
the  Rockies.     In  these  days  of  rapid  construction 
such  an  enterprise,  even  preceding  settlement,  is 
not  so  fantastic  as  it  may  seem.     Until,  by  means 
of  such  lines  as  these,  Canada  is  really  opened  to 
immigration  from  the  east  as  well  as  the  south, 
and  her  prosperity  insured  by  bringing  her  produce 
within  reach  of  the  European  markets,  there  will 
undoubtedly  be  a  critical  period  in  Canadian  his 
tory.     For  the  opening  of  communications  from 
east  to  west,  Canada  enjoys  a  great  advantage 
over  her  neighbor  republic  in  the  possession  of  fine 

249 


GREATER    AMERICA 

ports  both  on  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific,  and  splen 
did  coal  supplies  on  either  seaboard;   still  more 
in  her  wonderful  system  of  water-communication 
—the  finest  in  the  continent — the  St.  Lawrence, 
with  the  Great  Lakes,  and  possible  canals  to  com 
plete  the  efficiency  and  cheapness  of  these  lines  of 
transport.     American  wheat  traffic  is  already  be 
ginning  to  be  deflected  to  Montreal,  and  improve 
ments  will  increase  the  tendency.     The  conflicting 
elements  in  Canadian  affairs  seem  to  be  summed 
up  in  this  matter  of  north  and  south  versus  east 
and  west.     It  is  generally  assumed  that  Canada  is 
fighting  against  nature  in  the  effort  to  develop  on 
latitudinal  lines.     There  are,  however,  two  strong 
magnets   drawing   Canadian   trade   from   east   to 
west.     One  is  the  recently  opened  and  rapidly 
developing   Pacific  region,   with   the   Orient  and 
Australasia.     Canada  possesses  admirable  ports  on 
the  Pacific  coast,  an  advantage  over  the  United 
States,  which  has  none  farther  south  than  Puget 
Sound,  save  San  Francisco.     On  the  other  hand 
is  the  magnet  of  the  European  market,  which  is 
complementary  to   Canada,   whereas  the   United 
States  is  to  a  great  extent  her  competitor.     The 
different  sections  of  Canada  are  precisely  similar 
in    conditions   to   the    corresponding   States   just 
across  the  frontier.     Ontario  differs  from  Manito 
ba,  but  is  similar  in  products  to  New  York.     Man 
itoba  is  different  from  British  Columbia,  but  re 
sembles  Dakota  and  Minnesota,  while  Washington 
and  Oregon  resemble  British  Columbia.     To   de- 

250 


\ 


ib 


110 


no  100 


50 


110 


Longitude  West          100          from  Green  wi 


.;; 


Map  Showing-  Existing  &  Projected 
TRANS-CANADA  RAILWAYS 


70 


GREATER    AMERICA 

stroy  the  frontier  -  line  would  be  to  concentrate 
trade  in  the  older  and  better-established  American 
cities  and  to  deplete  the  rising  Canadian  ones. 

As  it  is,  the  United  States  farmer  will  probably 
emigrate  in  larger  numbers  to  this  virgin  soil; 
the  capitalist  will  continue  his  attempt  to  gain 
control  of  industries  and  communications;  and 
propinquity  may  even  prove  too  strong  a  factor 
for  the  young  Canadian  nationality  to  resist. 
But,  as  Canada  has  successfully  escaped  assimi 
lation  during  her  lean  years,  when  the  amazing 
prosperity  of  her  neighbor  was  balanced  against 
her  own  poverty  and  the  indifferent  attitude  of 
the  mother-country,  there  is  ground  for  confidence 
in  the  breasts  of  loyal  Canadians  now  that  she  is 
herself  on  the  crest  of  the  wave  and  now  that  Great 
Britain  is  at  last  awakening  to  the  true  Im 
perialism. 

What,  therefore,  are  the  chances  for  Pan- 
Americanism  on  the  northern  continent?  It  is  a 
difficult  question  to  answer,  depending  as  it  does 
on  so  many  alternatives.  The  main  point,  how 
ever,  is  the  strength  of  Canadian  sentiment — not 
what  is  usually  called  loyalty,  but  the  honest 
determination  of  Canadians  to  work  out  their 
salvation  on  their  own  lines.  They  have  far 
more  chance  of  doing  so  under  the  wing  of  Great 
Britain  than  as  a  younger  sister  of  the  United 
States,  and  it  is  the  loyalty  of  Canadians  to  their 
own  country,  the  growth  of  a  Canadian  nation 
ality,  which  should  preserve  the  Dominion  for 

2S1 


GREATER    AMERICA 

a  glorious  future  as  part  of  a  Federated  Greater 
Britain. 

When  one  remembers  the  size  to  which  the 
American  Republic  has  already  grown,  the  rapid 
growth  of  "problems"  which  it  has  to  face,  and 
the  probability  that  it  will  be  drawn  still  farther 
into  the  arena  of  world  politics,  it  seems  far  better 
for  Canada  (and  for  the  United  States  also)  that 
she  should  become  a  prosperous  and  independent 
nation,  bound  by  links  of  blood  and  interest,  but 
not  by  political  ties,  to  her  great  neighbor,  and 
destined,  perhaps,  to  be  one  day  a  partner  in  a 
great  federation  of  the  English-speaking  peoples 
—the  mightiest  union  the  world  has  ever  seen. 


CHAPTER  XI 
HOW  GREATER  AMERICA  IS  GOVERNED 

THE  term  " United  States  of  America"  has 
ceased  to  be  an  accurate  description  of  the  coun 
tries  over  which  the  Stars  and  Stripes  float.  Like 
"United  Kingdom,"  it  applies  merely  to  the 
central  and  dominating  body,  the  seat  of  empire; 
and  Greater  America  comprises  almost  as  wide  a 
range  of  governments  as  Greater  Britain  itself. 

Broadly  speaking,  the  American  empire  is  com 
posed  of  States,  Territories,  dependencies,  and  pro 
tectorates,  but  there  is  no  uniform  plan  even  with 
in  these  limits.  The  two  main  features  which 
distinguish  each  is  the  differing  degree  in  which 
they  enjoy  control  of  their  domestic  affairs  and 
the  nature  of  their  relations  to  the  federal  gov 
ernment.  All  States,  being  entitled  to  two  Sen 
ators  each,  and  representation  in  the  House  in  pro 
portion  to  their  population,  are  on  equal  terms. 
Their  relations  to  the  federal  government  are 
somewhat  difficult  to  define.  To  an  American 
they  are  so  much  a  matter  of  course  that  he  does 
not  pause  to  consider  them,  while  a  Briton  tries 
in  vain  to  find  for  them  an  analogy  in  his  own 
experience.  States  are  far  more  than  English 

253 


GREATER    AMERICA 

counties,  and  yet  far  less  than  sovereign  bodies. 
Their  independence  is  based  on  the  Constitution, 
which  was  framed  with  the  express  purpose  of  rec 
onciling  them  to  a  federal  form  of  government, 
and  yet,  as  Hamilton  foresaw,  the  tendency  has 
been,  while  retaining  the  letter  of  independence, 
to  forfeit  the  spirit. 

According  to  the  Constitution,  the  government 
consists  of  three  separate  authorities — the  execu 
tive,  the  legislative,  and  the  judicial.  The  exec 
utive  power  is  vested  in  the  President,  holding 
office  for  a  term  of  four  years,  elected  not  by  the 
qualified  voters,  but  by  a  number  of  electors 
appointed  by  each  State.  The  two  elective  legis 
lative  bodies,  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  which  constitute  the  Congress,  were 
created  with  the  express  purpose  of  drawing  the 
States  together.  The  Senators,  elected  by  the 
legislatures  of  the  States,  without  reference  to  the 
number  of  voters,  hold  office  for  six  years,  one- 
third  going  out  every  two  years.  They  can  hardly, 
therefore,  be  regarded  as  a  popular  body.  Their 
influence  was  expected  to  bring  about  a  fusion  of 
State  into  national  interests  (which  it  has  actually 
accomplished),  and  a  continuity  of  policy  which 
would  have  been  impossible  with  a  more  popular, 
easily  swayed,  and  often  -  changed  body.  The 
office  of  Senator  is  one  that  is  much  sought  after 
for  various  reasons,  and  carries  with  it  a  certain 
position,  despite  the  general  contempt  of  better- 
class  Americans  for  any  form  of  political  life.  The 

254 


GREATER    AMERICA 

House  of  Representatives  numbers  at  present 
three  hundred  and  eighty-six,  elected  for  terms 
of  two  years.  Electors  selected  in  each  State 
meet  on  a  certain  day  and  vote  for  the  President 
and  Vice- President,  but  each  elector  is  pledged  in 
advance  to  support  the  candidates  selected  by 
the  party.  The  form  of  casting  votes  is,  therefore, 
a  farce.  A  majority  of  the  electors  elects  the 
President,  not  a  majority  of  the  popular  votes. 
The  prevalent  idea  in  Europe  that  the  President 
is  elected  by  a  plebiscite  is  about  as  far  from  the 
truth  as  possible.1  The  creation  of  a  body  of 
selected  electors  to  vote  for  the  President  was 
intended  to  remove  that  function  from  popular 
influence  and  insure  that  the  choice  should  be 
made  by  men  qualified  to  judge.  In  practice  it 
has  merely  strengthened  the  hands  of  parties  work 
ing  the  machine. 

The  functions  of  the  federal  government  are  so 
carefully  laid  down  and  so  distinct  from  those  of 
the  States  that  since  the  civil  war,  which  turned 
far  more  on  a  question  of  State  privileges  than  on 
the  actual  point  of  slavery  or  non-slavery,  there 
has  been  little  friction.  The  States  have  the  most 
complete  control  of  their  domestic  concerns,  and 

1  This  description  of  elections  in  the  United  States  is,  of 
course,  elementary.  The  British  reader  can  find  in  more 
detailed  works  a  full  account  of  a  most  complicated  system, 
the  American  reader  knows  all  that  is  necessary  of  it.  It  is 
hardly  possible  for  any  one  not  a  professional  politician  to 
follow  the  actual  working  of  each  part  of  the  "machine" 
and  appreciate  their  relation  to  one  another. 

25S 


GREATER    AMERICA 

are  legally  empowered  even  to  misgovern  them 
selves,  if  they  desire,  with  the  simple  proviso  that 
they  may  not  discriminate  in  tariffs  against  other 
States  and  that  the  federal  government  has  the 
power  to  interfere  in  cases  of  riot  or  disorder. 
Police  and  judiciary  are  distinct  in  each  State, 
a  fact  which  is  answerable  for  many  anomalies  in 
social  conditions.  The  English  reader,  who  is 
shocked  at  outbreaks  of  lynching,  at  the  escape 
of  a  murderer  from  justice  because  of  his  high 
position  in  the  State,  and  at  other  circumstances 
which,  if  they  occurred  in  Europe,  would  argue  a 
rotten  condition  of  the  entire  judicial  and  police 
system  of  the  country,  must  understand  that  these 
blemishes  are  due  chiefly  to  local  conditions,  and 
that,  deplorable  as  they  are,  they  must  not  be 
taken  as  indicative  of  the  whole  tone  of  Ameri 
can  society.  A  very  serious  drawback  to  true 
progress  and  a  higher  form  of  civilization  is, 
however,  found  in  the  differences  which  exist  be 
tween  the  constitutions  of  the  various  States.1 
Some  are  merely  inconvenient;  others  are  dis 
tinctly  vicious  in  their  influence;  and  all  should 
by  degrees  disappear  under  a  broader  and  more 
national  system.  They  are  the  more  anachronis- 

1  Examples  of  the  differences  in  laws  between  the  States  are 
found  in  those  relating  to  marriage,  aliens,  the  ballot,  census, 
constitutions,  corporations,  courts  and  judges,  duelling, 
education,  Governorships,  salaries  of  State  officials,  divorce, 
insolvency,  libel  and  liberty  of  the  press,  statutes  of  limita 
tions,  and  other  minor  matters.  The  tenure  of  office  varies 
greatly. 

256 


GREATER    AMERICA 

tic  because,  despite  these  attempts  to  maintain 
State  individuality,  there  is,  in  fact,  little  of  the 
real  spirit  of  State  patriotism.  A  sentiment  which 
would  inspire  a  man  to  labor  for  the  better  ad 
ministration,  or  the  social  and  educational  prog 
ress,  of  his  own  State  is  far  less  common  than  it 
might  be,  and  is  chiefly  replaced  by  a  desire  to 
make  the  most  out  of  the  State  by  obtaining  those 
privileges  and  preferments  which  it  is  within  her 
right  to  bestow.  State  politics  have  dwindled— 
the  average  man  feels  little  interest  in  them;  like 
every  other  branch  of  political  life,  they  have  been 
delegated  to  the  professional,  and  so  engulfed  in 
the  huge  machine  of  party  government.  State 
elections  are  fought,  not  on  State  platforms,  which 
might  secure  candidates  pledged  to  local  reforms, 
but  on  the  wider  national  issues,  and  more  par 
ticularly  in  the  interests  of  the  next  Presidential 
election.  This  decay  of  the  State  is  due  to  two 
causes — first,  the  awakening  after  the  civil  war  of 
a  more  truly  national  spirit,  fostered  by  freer 
communication  and  approximation  of  interests; 
secondly,  the  increase  of  national  questions,  and 
more  particularly  the  oversea  expansion  of  the 
past  decade,  which  has  inevitably  strengthened 
this.  Americans  were  a  long  time  emerging  from 
their  colonial  period — many  of  the  States  are  little 
more  than  colonies  even  yet;  but  the  assumption 
of  imperial  functions  has  had  a  wonderful  effect  in 
uniting  the  people  of  all  sections;  and  the  focus 
of  their  attention  has  become,  not  the  local  ar- 
17  257 


GREATER    AMERICA 

biter  of  provincial  concerns,  but  the  great  fed 
eral  power,  which  derives  from  themselves,  and 
which  they  feel  is  playing  a  grand  part  in  af 
fairs  of  wider  importance  and  more  vital  inter 
est.  Coincident  with  this  growing  sentiment  of 
nationality  has  been,  by  a  curious  anomaly,  the 
growth  of  the  party  system.  The  Constitution 
precludes  the  working  of  parties  in  Congress  in 
the  method  to  which  Britons  are  accustomed.  It 
was  not  intended  that  any  group  of  men  in  the 
federal  government  should  be  able  to  rule  the 
others,  and  yet  the  party  system,  on  one  basis  or 
another,  was  inevitable.  It  has  assumed  in  the 
United  States  the  most  insidious  form — that  of 
patronage. 

As  early  as  1835,  when  De  Tocqueville  visited 
the  country,  there  was  evident  that  apathy  as 
regards  public  affairs  which  has  become  so  strik 
ing  a  feature  of  American  life.  With  the  modern 
phase  of  industrialism  this  is  even  more  marked. 
The  earlier  stages  of  American  history  found  peo 
ple  too  busy  to  devote  time  to  public  affairs,  and 
so  professional  politicians  began  their  work.  We 
have  already  seen  how  constant  immigration 
tended  to  keep  up  this  aloofness,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  to  supply  ready-made  politicians,  on 
the  other.1  In  the  later  stages  we  find  America 
saddled  with  the  results  of  this  movement,  in  the 
shape  of  a  huge  monopolistic  machine,  through 

1  The  American  People,  chapter  i. 

358 


GREATER    AMERICA 

whose  instrumentality  the  whole  body  politic  is 
kept  in  motion,  and  whose  levers  are  vested  inter 
ests  and  patronage.  Aloofness  of  the  better-class 
citizens  has  become  a  habit  accentuated  by  dislike 
and  contempt  for  the  methods  of  the  "  machine." 
All  nominations  are  made  by  and  through  the 
''machine" ;  all  appointments  are  held  for  the  term 
only  during  which  a  certain  party  can  maintain 
its  majority  in  the  electoral  college.  Party,  which 
to  all  outside  observers  seems  singularly  unob 
trusive  in  Congress,  has  in  reality  secured  a  control 
which  is  all  but  absolute;  and  as  there  are  prac 
tically  only  two  parties — Republican  and  Demo 
cratic — it  is  obvious  that  a  host  of  minor  points  of 
disagreement  must  be  sacrificed  to  attain  party 
unity.  The  work  of  legislation  for  so  vast  a 
territory  as  the  United  States  alone,  and  the 
adequate  protection  of  all  the  interests  involved, 
are  enough  to  absorb  the  time  of  the  most  care 
fully  organized  Congress.  That  body,  however, 
was  originally  almost  unorganized.  It  was  devoid 
of  the  parliamentary  machinery  for  introducing, 
forwarding,  and  despatching  business  which  is 
provided  in  Britain  by  a  ministry,  with  depart 
ments  of  specialized  information  under  its  control. 
No  member  of  the  executive  sits  in  Congress,  and, 
therefore,  no  one  responsible  for  the  carrying-out 
of  the  laws  enacted  is  in  a  position  either  to  initi 
ate  them  directly  or  to  criticise  them  when  under 
discussion.  The  President  alone  can,  and  at  times 
does,  reject  or  veto  them. 

259 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Under  a  system  by  which  all  bills  are  prac 
tically  private  members'  bills,  and  there  is  no 
guarantee  for  their  responsibility  or  importance, 
it  was  necessary,  even  from  the  point  of  view 
of  time,  to  provide  some  method  of  sifting  them. 
Accordingly  the  practice  of  committees  began, 
and  is  constantly  increased.  Man}7  of  them,  of 
course,  deal  with  subjects  that  overlap;  all  have 
by  degrees  become  more  and  more  subservient 
to  party  needs.  Committees  in  the  Senate  are 
nominated  by  chairmen,  each  of  whom,  although 
nominally  elected  by  vote  in  the  open  Senate, 
is  in  reality  chosen  in  secret  party  conclave, 
and,  as  the  party  majority  will  not  split  its  vote, 
the  result  is  certain.  The  Speaker  nominates 
the  committees  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
and  the  member  first  named  becomes  chair 
man.  Enormous  power,  therefore,  rests  with  the 
Speaker,  who  also  owes  his  election  to  a  party 
majority. 

This  is  no  place  in  which  to  discuss  at  length  the 
merits  or  demerits  of  the  committee  system.  All 
that  need  be  said  is  that  government  by  committee 
is  not  popular  government.  The  sense  of  the  na 
tion  is  not  represented  by  a  small  group  of  men, 
arbitrarily  selected,  often  for  the  direct  purpose 
of  either  putting  through  some  particular  measure 
or  of  quashing  the  business  in  hand.  Although 
the  committees  only  advise,  they  have  it  practi 
cally  in  their  hands  to  decide  the  fate  of  a  bill,  if 
not  by  a  directly  adverse  report,  by  one  or  other 

260 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  the  many  tactics  familiar  in  political  life.  But 
while  they  assume  this  position,  they  are  not  held 
responsible.  It  is  the  irresponsibility,  as  well  as 
the  inevitable  privacy  and  consequent  tendency 
to  corruption,  which  makes  the  committee  system 
a  good  servant  but  a  bad  master.  Committees,  it 
must  be  remembered,  take  the  place  of  the  min 
istries  in  other  countries  in  supervising  and  check 
ing  the  departments.  They  can  summon  depart 
mental  heads  before  them  and  demand  minute 
reports.  Nevertheless,  it  is  notorious  that  they 
have  frequently  failed  to  detect  the  grossest  cases 
of  peculation  and  fraud;  and  this  is,  perhaps,  not 
surprising  when  one  recollects  the  methods  on 
which  they  are  constituted  and  the  interests  they 
are  expected  to  guard. 

In  this  brief  and  meagre  description  of  the 
governmental  system  of  the  United  States  little 
has  hitherto  been  said  of  the  President,  who  is 
the  head  of  this  system.  Very  great  difference  of 
opinion  prevails  as  to  the  exact  extent  of  power 
wielded  by  the  first  citizen  of  the  United  States. 
In  attempting  to  discriminate  it  is  well  to  remem 
ber  that  written  or  constituted  authority  by  no 
means  exhausts  the  possibilities  of  the  case,  as 
has  frequently  been  shown  in  the  history  of  rulers 
of  every  kind.  Much  may  depend  on  usage,  much 
more  on  the  temper  of  the  people  ruled  and  the 
circumstances  of  the  moment,  but  most  on  the 
character  of  the  man  himself.  Therefore,  though 
the  President  may  not  de  jure  enjoy  powers  as 

261 


GREATER    AMERICA 

great  as  those  of  a  British  prime-minister,  or  even 
of  a  colonial  or  foreign  minister  (he  cannot,  for 
instance,  come  down  to  the  House  with  a  project 
for  reorganizing  the  fiscal  system  and  then  sweep 
the  country  in  a  grand  oratorical  campaign),  yet 
he  may,  in  an  emergency,  exercise  powers  equal 
to  those  of  the  constitutional  monarch  and  his 
responsible  ministry  all  rolled  into  one.  He  is  not, 
during  his  term  of  office,  dependent  on  a  party  vote 
for  his  position,  though  he  must  be  careful  not  to 
alienate  his  party,  especially  if  he  desires  re 
election.  He  cannot  directly  initiate  measures, 
but  he  can  veto  them ;  he  can  also  suggest  them  in 
his  annual  message.  He  is  the  head  of  the  army 
and  navy,  and,  although  Congress  specially  re 
serves  the  right  to  make  war,  he  can,  as  the  head 
of  foreign  affairs,  precipitate  matters  to  a  point 
where  war  is  inevitable.  Presidents,  indeed,  have 
not  always  waited  for  Congress*  when  they  have 
felt  the  sense  of  the  nation  behind  them.  In  his 
control  of  foreign  affairs  the  President  is  checked 
by  the  Senate,  which  has  the  right  of  ratifying, 
and  rejecting,  if  it  will,  all  treaties  (a  two-thirds 
majority  being  required  for  ratification),  this  be 
ing  a  part  of  senatorial  functions  which  has  as 
sumed  much  importance.  Finally,  the  President 
is  the  fountain  and  head  of  patronage,  and  this 
gives  him  enormous  influence,  despite  the  en 
croachments  on  this  domain  by  the  Senate,  which 
has  not  only  the  right  of  confirming  or  rejecting  his 
appointments,  but  also  claims,  in  the  person  of 

262 


GREATER    AMERICA 

each  Senator,  a  voice  in  all  appointments  in  their 
respective  States. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  President  is  so  hedged 
about  with  restrictive  measures  that  it  is  quite 
possible  for  a  weak,  or  even  a  malleable,  man  to 
be  entirely  under  the  thumb  of  the  Senate,  and, 
therefore,  of  the  party  majority  in  that  body. 
But  this  state  of  affairs  is  at  once  altered  if  the 
President  be  a  man  of  marked  ability,  high  char 
acter,  and  strong  convictions.  The  first  genera 
tion  of  Presidents — Washington,  Adams,  Jefferson, 
Madison — were  men  of  this  stamp.  The  second 
period  was  remarkable  rather  for  the  distinguished 
character  of  the  men  who  failed  to  attain  the 
Presidency -- Webster,  Clay,  Calhoun.  Jackson 
was  the  last  President  before  the  civil  war  who 
could  lay  claim  to  distinction  due  to  sheer  force 
of  character.  Later  came  a  long  list  of  mere 
party-men,  Lincoln — the  great  exception — being 
elected  almost  by  accident  at  a  period  of  gravest 
national  crisis.  The  generality  of  Presidents  since 
the  war  have  been  men  of  mediocre  talents  though 
high  personal  character,  it  being  the  policy  of 
the  parties  to  place  the  Presidency  as  far  as 
possible  beyond  the  reach  of  men  with  character 
or  initiative.  Roosevelt,  as  is  well  known,  was, 
with  this  object  in  view,  made  Vice-President,  a 
post  which,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  would 
have  disqualified  him  from  ever  holding  office  as 
President. 

The  point  with  which  we  are  chiefly  concerned, 

263 


GREATER    AMERICA 

however,  and  which  could  not  be  approached  with 
out  a  brief  summary  of  political  and  governmental 
conditions,  is  how  the  United  States  is  qualified 
to  deal  with  the  wide  range  of  Territories  and 
dependencies  of  which  she  is  now  mistress.  These 
variations  on  the  original  scheme  have,  of  course, 
grown  up  slowly,  and  each  case  has  been  dealt 
with  more  or  less  on  its  merits,  just  as  in  the 
British  colonial  empire.  No  difficulty  was  ex 
perienced  in  interpreting  the  Constitution  so  as 
to  fit  in  with  schemes  of  territorial  expansion, 
and  for  a  short  period  it  seemed  as  if  Congress 
was  admirably  adapted  to  meet  the  needs  of  the 
situation — to  deal  with  each  problem  in  colonial 
government  as  it  arose. 

Conditions  altered  gradually  as  the  United 
States  assumed  the  task  of  governing  people  to 
whom  it  could  not  give  representation.  As  soon 
as  it  became  obvious  that  certain  sections  of 
United  States  territory  would  not  grow  rapidly 
into  States,  but  must  remain  under  tutelage,  there 
naturally  arose  a  group  of  governmental  problems 
with  which  a  body  like  Congress,  constantly  chang 
ing,  is  fundamentally  incapable  of  dealing  ade 
quately.  There  is,  therefore,  a  tendency  to  throw 
the  decision  of  matters  on  which  Congress  has 
no  decided  views,  or  shirks  responsibility,  or  is  not 
particularly  interested,  on  to  the  shoulders  of  the 
President ;  to  which  category  belong  a  large  number 
of  questions  vitally  important  to  the  dependencies 
but  little  appreciated  by  the  federal  government. 

264 


GREATER    AMERICA 

It  must  be  remembered  that  this  state  of  affairs 
prevails  even  in  the  North  American  continent 
itself.  Arizona,  New  Mexico,  and  Oklahoma  are 
permitted  to  send  delegates  to  Washington,  but 
these  cannot  vote.  These  three  Territories  elect 
their  own  legislatures,  but  the  Governors  and 
judges  are  appointed  by  the  President;  and  Con 
gress  retains  the  power  to  annul  decisions  and  to 
legislate  direct.  The  suffrage  is  granted  on  vary 
ing  qualifications,  and  not  on  the  simple  manhood 
terms  as  in  the  States.  The  elevation  of  these 
Territories  to  the  rank  of  States  has  been  de 
bated  for  some  time  past,  but  is  opposed  on  party 
grounds,  and  there  seems  little  chance  of  a  State 
hood  bill  passing  on  its  merits. 

Alaska  is  the  extreme  example  of  Territorial 
government  on  the  American  continent.  Having 
a  small  white  population  (some  thirty  thousand), 
with  an  equal  number  of  Indians,  and  being,  more 
over,  remote  from  the  seat  of  government,  it  has 
neither  representation  nor  elective  faculties,  and 
is  practically  ruled  as  a  crown  colony  by  a  Gov 
ernor,  appointed  by  the  President,  with  supreme 
legislative  and  executive  power.  The  Indian  terri 
tory  on  various  reservations,  which  constitutes 
another  class,  has  no  single  government.  Each 
tribe  has  its  own  organization,  the  external  re 
lations  being  governed  by  treaties,  whose  inter 
pretation,  as  well  as  the  administration  of  justice, 
are  in  the  hands  of  the  federal  courts.  Residents 
are  appointed  to  overlook  the  reservations,  whose 

265 


GREATER    AMERICA 

functions  somewhat  resemble  those  of  residents  at 
the  British  Indian  native  courts. 

Hawaii,  also  classed  as  a  "  Territory,"  represents 
the  first  effort  of  the  United  States  at  oversea 
government,  and  it  must  be  noted  that  the  islands 
were  first  taken  over  as  a  protectorate  over  a 
native  monarchy,  which  became  a  republic,  and, 
finally,  both  systems  being  found  impossible,  gave 
way  to  a  form  of  government  resembling  that 
found  in  many  British  colonies.  A  Governor  is  se 
lected  by  the  President,  and  he  appoints  the  ad 
ministrative  heads  of  departments.  The  govern 
ment  regulates  the  electoral  franchise,  an  educa 
tional  test  being  exacted.  Samoa  is  dealt  with 
even  more  arbitrarily,  being  administered  by  a 
naval  officer  deputed  by  the  President,  as  are  also 
Guam,  Wake,  and  other  islands  in  the  Pacific. 

Puerto  Rico  has  a  government  almost  exactly 
like  the  crown  colony  of  Jamaica.  The  Governor 
and  executive  council  of  eleven  are  selected  by  the 
President,  five  of  the  council  being  Puerto-Ricans. 
There  is  a  house  of  delegates,  with  thirty -five 
members;  but  practically  no  power  rests  in  the 
hands  of  the  people,  nor  are  they  regarded  as 
United  States  citizens.  The  franchise  is  restricted 
by  a  small  property  qualification  and  an  easy 
educational  test,  and  there  is  no  representation  at 
Washington  except  by  a  resident  consul. 

The  cession  of  the  Philippines  to  the  United 
States  involved  her  in  problems  of  government  far 
more  difficult  than  any  she  had  yet  faced.  The 

266 


GREATER    AMERICA 

situation  was  met  by  conferring  on  the  President 
powers  similar  to  those  vested  by  Congress  in 
Jefferson  in  the  case  of  Louisiana,  and  in  Monroe 
as  regards  Florida.  The  exigencies  of  the  case 
necessitated  at  first  a  military  government,  which 
was  succeeded  in  1901  by  a  civil  government,  with 
a  head  chosen  by  the  President.  This  will,  it  is 
hoped,  be  changed  in  time  for  a  government  by  a 
popular  legislative  assembly  of  Filipinos  —  at  a 
period  not  yet  determined,  but  assumed  to  be 
within  a  few  years.  At  present  the  Governor  en 
joys  supreme  authority,  being  assisted  by  four 
departments  officered  by  Americans.  The  civil 
commission  is  formed  of  the  Governor,  the  four 
departmental  heads,  and  three  Filipinos.  Local 
autonomy,  under  certain  restrictions,  has  been 
given;  municipalities  elect  their  own  presidents, 
and  are  practically  independent;  and  the  prov 
inces  elect,  through  the  presidents,  their  own  Gov 
ernors,  who  are  answerable  only  to  the  Governor 
at  Manila.  The  finances,  however,  are  controlled, 
as  far  as  possible,  by  American  treasurers,  while 
the  public  works  are  supervised  by  American 
engineers.  It  must  be  noted  that  the  Filipinos 
had  never  before  had  the  franchise. 

At  the  end  of  the  governmental  scale,  of  which 
Samoa  represents  one  extreme,  comes  Cuba,  now 
an  independent  republic  in  name,  but  in  effect  a 
protectorate.  Cuba  has  adopted  a  constitution  of 
the  usual  Latin- American  pattern,  founded  on 
universal  suffrage,  a  proceeding  of  doubtful  wis- 

267 


GREATER    AMERICA 

dom  in  a  country  containing  such  a  varied  com 
munity  and  so  ignorant  and  unstable  a  society. 
The  United  States  controls  foreign  policy,  and 
reserves  the  right  of  intervention  under  a  wide 
range  of  conditions,  and  of  securing  coaling-sta 
tions  if  she  wishes. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  United  States  govern 
ment  is  the  head  of  a  group  of  governmental 
systems  adopted  with  a  view  to  the  needs  of 
peoples  alien  in  the  chief  conditions  of  life — in 
climate,  race,  religion,  and  customs.  So  long  as 
the  new  territory  was  continental,  so  long  as  the 
question  of  race  was  not  raised,  there  seemed  no 
reason  why  new  acquisitions  should  not  eventually 
become  States.  Alaska,  for  instance,  with  its 
great  mineral  wealth  and  a  small  and  dwindling 
native  people,  may  become  the  centre  for  a  white 
population  large  enough  some  day  to  claim  State 
hood.  There  must  always,  it  is  true,  be  a  certain 
difficulty  on  account  of  its  isolation,  and  as  a  State 
it  may  be  found  difficult  to  reconcile  the  interests 
of  Alaska  with  those  of  the  rest  of  the  Union. 
The  development  of  the  great  northwest  of 
Canada,  too,  cannot  fail  to  affect  this  Territory, 
which,  with  a  climate  in  parts  not  unlike  that 
of  northern  Europe,  a  seaboard  of  twenty-three 
thousand  miles,  and  a  river  navigable  in  a  great 
semicircle  for  two  thousand  miles,  is  undoubtedly 
destined  to  play  a  conspicuous  part  in  the  future. 
The  great  need  is  the  improvement  of  communi 
cations,  which  will  yield  ready  profits  by  reason 

268 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  the  immense  mineral  wealth  of  the  country. 
For  the  present,  the  quasi-military  rule  now  in 
force  is  certainly  the  best  for  the  rude  mining 
communities,  which  are  still  mushrooms,  but  al 
ready  these  communities  are  beginning  to  de 
velop,  and  in  the  future  it  is  not  difficult  to  fore 
see  a  serious  problem  as  to  how  this  isolated  re 
gion  is  to  be  included  as  an  actual  State  of  the 
Union. 

The  moment  we  pass  oversea,  however,  and  it 
becomes  a  question  of  tropical  countries,  fresh 
difficulties  arise.  Puerto  Rico  and  Hawaii,  as  has 
been  said,  are  governed  on  the  crown-colony  plan. 
It  is  hardly  suggested  that  there  is  any  possibility 
of  their  becoming  self-governing  or  entering  the 
Union  as  States.  Tropical  and  thickly  populated, 
they  can  never  become  true  white  man's  countries. 
Puerto  Rico,  for  instance,  has  a  population  de 
scended  from  Spaniards,  there  being  some  six 
hundred  thousand  whites,  with  very  little,  if  any, 
Indian  blood,  but  some  four  hundred  thousand 
black  and  colored.  In  religion,  dress,  and  customs 
all  are  Spanish.  The  island  most  resembling 
Puerto  Rico  in  the  conditions  of  race,  climate,  soil, 
and  government  is  Trinidad  when  taken  over  by 
the  British;  and  similar  conditions  are  found  in 
the  republic  of  San  Domingo,  on  the  east  side  of 
Hispaniola,  with  a  population  of  six  hundred  and 
ten  thousand  —  mixed,  white,  and  negro.  Both 
had  Spanish  laws  and  institutions;  in  both  were 
a  considerable  number  of  negro  slaves ;  in  neither 

269 


GREATER    AMERICA 

were  there  Indians.  The  former  became  a  British 
crown  colony  and  the  latter  an  independent  state. 
The  contrast  between  the  conditions  of  these  two 
islands  doubtless  influenced  the  United  States  in 
their  choice  of  government  for  Puerto  Rico. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  these  people  have 
no  traditions  of  self-government,  no  natural  gift 
for  organization,  and  that  their  whole  history  has 
been  an  education  in  governmental  abuses.  Al 
though  the  majority  are  of  white  descent,  they 
have  lived  too  long  in  the  tropics  not  to  lose  some 
of  the  characteristics  of  their  forefathers.  The 
success  of  Latin- Americans  in  founding  republics 
has  been  far  from  signal,  even  on  the  continent, 
where  conditions  were  more  favorable;  but  in 
small  and  densely  packed  islands,  with  a  number 
of  black  and  colored  people  in  the  lower  strata  of 
society,  it  was  impossible  to  evolve  anything  but 
class  government.  The  control  of  white  men,  of  a 
superior  grade,  more  efficient  and  enlightened  than 
any  native,  could  only  be  applied  as  it  has  been,  as 
a  supreme  authority,  allowing  the  people  every 
possible  liberty,  but  reserving  such  powers  as 
would  secure  their  order  and  well-being — even 
without  their  sanction,  if  necessary.  In  Puerto 
Rico,  therefore,  we  find  a  paternal  government, 
such  as  has  been  given  by  white  men  to  many 
colored  or  tropical  races. 

While  in  every  dependency  different  govern 
mental  systems  have  been  evolved,  in  the  Philip 
pines  alone  a  new  experiment  is  being  tried — that 

270 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  presenting  the  people  with  an  entirely  fresh 
system,  founded  on  principles  which  are  new  and 
foreign  to  them.  The  situation  was  complicated 
by  the  fact  that  an  enormous  gulf  lies  between 
the  educated  and  uneducated  Filipino.  The  for 
mer — in  a  small  minority,  met  chiefly  at  Manila 
— is  the  equal  of  the  average  American  in  many 
of  the  superficial  elements  of  civilization.  He  is 
probably  his  superior  in  artistic  perception,  ora 
tory,  and  dialectical  skill.  He  is  in  many  cases 
only  to  be  distinguished  from  a  southern  Euro 
pean  by  a  slenderness  of  physique  and  a  slight  Ori 
ental  cast  of  features.  His  peasant  cousin — they 
are  hardly  brothers  either  in  blood  or  feeling — is, 
on  the  contrary,  an  ignorant,  Oriental,  tropical 
semi-savage — the  old  Malay,  a  polite  savage,  per 
haps,  but  with  little  indigenous  civilization,  slight 
ly  veneered  with  Christianity  and  wearing  the 
travesty  of  a  shirt.  There  are  many  shades  and 
grades  between,  and  there  are  tribes  which  are 
frankly  savage  and  heathen;  others  which  are 
Mohammedan,  and,  therefore,  civilized  on  anti- 
Christian  lines.  It  is  to  this  heterogeneous  popula 
tion,  scattered  throughout  a  maze  of  islands,  that 
the  United  States  is  in  the  act  of  extending  that 
political  and  social  system  on  which  her  own 
greatness  has  been  built  up.1 

In  so  doing,  she  disregards  the  fact  that  what 

1  Self-government  is  not  actually  being  extended,  or  even 
promised,  to  the  really  uncivilized  tribes,  and  it  is  difficult 
to  see  their  place  in  the  present  scheme. 

271 


GREATER    AMERICA 

may  work  well  in  a  country  where  the  conditions 
of  life  have  from  the  first  had  a  levelling  tendency, 
and  where  equality  of  opportunity  has  led  to  a 
greater  equality  of  position  and  general  efficiency 
than  is  found  in  any  other  country,  may  work 
ill  in  the  tropics.  She  forgets  that  a  country 
where  the  conditions  of  life  made  self-help  es 
sential  to  existence,  and  which  was  pioneered  by 
the  best  of  northern  stocks,  cannot  be  regarded 
as  a  fair  parallel  for  a  tropical  country  where  life 
has  hitherto  been  easy  and  self-help  little  more 
than  plucking  the  fruit  when  it  ripens,  and  where 
three  hundred  years  of  political  dependency  have 
still  further  reduced  the  initiative  of  the  people 
as  a  mass.  She  forgets  that  there  is  no  Filipino 
nation  --  only  a  congeries  of  tribes,  no  Filipino 
country  —  only  one  thousand  seven  hundred  isl 
ands;  no  common  language,  no  communications, 
no  industries,  no  manufactures,  and  only  the  most 
elementary  agriculture.  The  Filipino  is  handi 
capped  by  racial  traditions,  by  lack  of  cohesion, 
by  bad  training,  by  climate,  and  by  poverty — a 
formidable  array  of  disqualifications;  but  it  must 
not  be  supposed  that  he  has  any  doubts  as  to  his 
capacity  for  self-government.  Americans  believe 
that  he  can  be  made  capable  of  education,  and, 
as  the  experiment  has  never  yet  been  tried,  they 
may  prove  right,  if  they  are  willing  to  prolong 
their  efforts  over  two  or  three  generations,  the  very 
shortest  period  in  which  any  revolution  of  charac 
ter  and  infusion  of  energy  can  be  accomplished. 

272 


GREATER    AMERICA 

It  must  be  remembered  that  elsewhere  educa 
tion  has  not  yet  proved  a  panacea — at  least,  not 
the  ordinary  education  of  American  school-life. 
Otherwise  we  should  not  see  the  negro  race  retro 
gressing,  as  it  has  done  in  some  ways,  under  a 
regime  which  is  turning  out  excellent  white  cit 
izens  of  the  republic.  Filipinos  may  not  possess 
the  disqualifications  which  handicap  the  negro 
race,  but  they  belong  to  the  least  progressive  of 
Oriental  peoples,  and  not  least  of  the  difficulties 
in  the  way  is  that  invisible,  unsurmountable 
barrier  which  divides  the  Oriental  from  the 
Occidental  mind.  Whether  a  system  of  govern 
ment  by  democracy,  presented  to  them  ready- 
made —  given,  not  gained  —  and  bringing  in  its 
train  some  of  the  peculiar  features  of  political 
life  in  the  United  States,  will  prove  an  unmixed 
blessing  is  extremely  doubtful.  The  subject  has 
been  discussed  more  fully  elsewhere.  Here  it  is 
merely  necessary  to  point  out  that  the  status  of 
the  United  States  in  the  Philippines  is  at  present 
that  of  a  guardian,  who  protects,  disciplines,  and 
educates  a  child,  paying  his  expenses  at  the  same 
time,  with  the  declared  intention  of  leaving  him 
to  himself  at  the  earliest  moment  possible,  while 
reserving  the  right  to  interfere  if  necessary.  There 
must  naturally  be  a  good  deal  of  difference  of 
opinion  as  to  the  "  earliest  possible  moment."  The 
Filipinos  themselves  go  further  in  their  previsions, 
fully  expecting  to  rapidly  organize  themselves  and 
to  be  received  with  open  arms  as  a  State  within 
xs  273 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  Union,  thus  becoming  the  first  Oriental  race 
to  form  an  integral  part  of  a  great  world-power. 
There  is,  of  course,  another  Filipino  point  of  view, 
in  which  the  United  States  is  to  play  little  part 
in  the  future,  but  the  archipelago  is  to  be  a  sec 
ond  (but  a  republican)  Japan.  How  far  all  these 
visions  are  from  realization  must  be  left  to  the 
reader  to  judge. 

The  advocates  of  these  views  may  point  to  Cuba 
as  an  instance  of  a  people  who,  after  a  brief  pe 
riod  of  military  government,  have  been  restored 
to  independence.  It  is,  however,  clear  from  the 
terms  on  which  that  independence  was  granted 
that  Cuba  has  become  a  protectorate  of  the  United 
States.  The  mark  of  a  protected  state  is  that  "  it 
cannot  maintain  political  intercourse  with  foreign 
powers  except  through,  or  by  permission  of,  the 
protecting  state."  Beyond  this  the  United  States, 
as  has  been  noted,  retains  the  right  to  interfere 
even  in  domestic  matters,  such  as  the  restoration 
of  order  and  sanitary  regulations,  and  to  purchase 
ports  for  coaling  and  strategic  purposes  when  they 
see  fit.  There  is  nothing  novel  in  this  relationship 
between  a  great  power  and  a  small  one;  it  is  as 
old  as  history,  although  the  term  "protectorate" 
is  a  comparatively  modern  invention.  It  is  an 
arrangement  which  naturally  finds  favor  with 
both  parties,  since  the  weak  one  retains  the 
semblance  of  independence  longer  than  it  other 
wise  might,  and  the  strong  one  obtains  all  the  ad 
vantages  of  conquest  without  the  expense  and 

274 


GREATER    AMERICA 

responsibility  of  governing.  At  the  same  time 
it  is  a  condition  which  cannot  be  permanent,  and 
simply  marks  a  transition  stage  which  will  be  of 
longer  or  shorter  duration  according  to  circum 
stances. 

There  are  two  principal  divisions  of  protected 
states.  First,  civilized  states  whose  independence 
is  guaranteed  by  treaty,  international  or  other 
wise,  such  as  Montenegro.  These  are  generally 
of  a  fairly  permanent  character,  though  there  is  at 
present  in  Europe  a  movement  towards  the  ab 
sorption  of  these  little  independent  states  in  one 
or  other  of  the  great  federated  powers.  The 
second  category  includes  uncivilized  and  semi- 
civilized  states,  and  also  those  which,  like  Cuba, 
are  unable  to  hold  their  own  against  the  modern 
civilization  of  more  powerful  nations.  Their  in 
ternal  weakness  is  an  excuse,  but  the  ambitions 
of  the  protector  are  invariably  the  prime  motive 
in  the  relations.1 


1  A  brief  survey  of  examples  of  existing  protectorates  shows 
the  wide  range  of  circumstances  under  which  the  policy  may 
be  adopted.  The  native  Indian  states — some  spoken  of  as 
"feudatory,"  "independent  and  protected,"  "mediatized,"  or 
"half  sovereign" — afford  illustrations  of  various  stages  of  the 
relationship,  and  the  Indian  princes  are  said  to  be  "under  the 
suzerainty  of  the  British  crown."  Other  British  protectorates 
in  Asia  are  the  protected  chiefs  near  Aden  and  Socotra.  In 
Africa  we  have  British  Central  Africa,  East  Africa,  Uganda, 
Zanzibar,  Somaliland,  Basutoland,  and  British  Bechuanaland. 
There  is  a  group  of  protected  Malay  states,  in  the  peninsula 
and  Borneo,  while  the  chartered  company  of  North  Borneo 
is  also  a  protectorate.  The  territories  of  all  chartered  com 
panies  must  for  practical  purposes  be  regarded  as  pro- 

275 


GREATER    AMERICA 

It  is  not  unusual  for  the  treaty  which  establishes 
the  protectorate  to  define  the  obligations  on  either 
side,  this  being  the  case  with  Sarawak,  for  in 
stance;  and  the  French  usually  expressly  provide 
for  direct  interference  even  with  internal  affairs. 
The  United  States  treaty  with  Cuba  is  framed 
rather  on  the  French  code,  except  that  the  obliga 
tions  are  all  on  the  side  of  the  protected  state. 
This,  however,  does  not  diminish  the  actual  re 
sponsibilities  of  the  protector,  who  is  bound  to 
act  in  loco  parentis  as  regards  her  protectorate  in 
any  circumstances  which  may  arise  —  complica 
tions  with  foreign  powers,  internal  disorders,  and 
so  forth. 

Brief  and  inadequate  as  this  sketch  must  nec 
essarily  be,  it  is  sufficient  to  show  the  essentially 
imperial  character  of  Greater  America.  To  cope 
with  the  varied  problems  of  government  involved, 
there  is  no  other  machinery  than  that  originally 
designed  for  the  control  of  federal  States,  all 
presumably  on  the  same  level  of  civilization, 
peopled  by  kindred  races,  and  each  possessing  a 
voice  in  federal  affairs.  Although  the  Constitution 
gave  to  Congress  power  to  deal  with  United  States 

tectorates.      Finally,  in  the  Pacific  there  are  groups  of  islands 
under  the  same  head. 

The  French  have  made  considerable  use  of  the  protec 
torate  system,  their  policy  being  to  transform  these  as  rapidly 
as  possible  into  actual  dependencies.  Of  this  Tahiti  and 
Madagascar  are  examples.  Germany  has  recently  begun  to 
adopt  a  similar  policy,  all  her  colonial  possessions,  whether  in 
Southwest  Africa,  East  Africa,  New  Guinea,  or  China,  being 
euphemistically  called  protectorates. 

276 


GREATER    AMERICA 

territory  —  an  "  elastic  clause "  which  has  been 
used  to  cover  every  phase  of  expansion — it  made 
no  provision  for  such  a  situation  as  has  now 
arisen.  It  was,  indeed,  impossible  that  the  states 
men  who  met  at  Philadelphia  to  frame  the  Con 
stitution  should  have  foreseen  a  development  of 
their  country's  power  so  remarkable  and  so  rapid 
as  has  actually  taken  place.  Whatever  may  be 
thought  on  this  subject,  it  has  become  increasing 
ly  evident  that  Americans  are  no  more  consistent 
and  logical  in  their  government  than  other  people. 
Democracy  is  essentially  opposed  to  a  system  of 
patronage,  yet  the  Spoils  System  is  the  corner 
stone  of  governmental  power  in  the  United  States. 
Democracy  is  equally  opposed  to  any  form  of 
colonial  government,  yet  her  -expansion,  which 
has  been  no  spasmodic  effort,  but  a  genuine  and 
logical  growth,  has  placed  the  United  States  in  a 
position  where  such  a  form  of  government  is  im 
perative. 

But  these  questions  of  form  and  ethics  are 
really  of  less  importance  than  that  of  actual 
efficiency.  It  can  hardly  be  denied  that  the 
purely  democratic  character  of  the  federal  gov 
ernment,  and,  indeed,  of  American  political  life 
generally,  has  disappeared,  if  it  ever  existed. 
There  remains  a  general  desire  to  approximate  as 
nearly  as  circumstances  will  permit  to  the  demo 
cratic  ideal,  and  this  involves  a  disinclination  to 
acknowledge  the  permanence  of  a  colonial  empire. 
What  is  the  result?  Not  only  a  lack  of  machinery 

277 


GREATER    AMERICA 

which  would  secure  efficiency  in  dealing  with  these 
problems,  but  a  lack  of  purpose  and  continuity 
in  policy  as  regards  dependencies,  and  a  short 
sightedness  in  the  view  taken  of  them  —  a  dis 
inclination  to  speak  boldly  of  their  future  and 
prospects.  This  difficulty  has  only  just  begun  to 
assume  serious  proportions,  but  it  will  make  itself 
more  and  more  felt,  especially  in  the  Philippines. 
The  people,  encouraged  by  irresponsible  politicians, 
will  not  settle  down  comfortably  as  American 
dependencies,  because  they  expect  a  closer  union 
with  the  United  States  or  complete  independence. 

It  is  obvious  that,  unless  the  President  be  a 
man  of  exceptional  initiative,  the  appointments 
of  colonial  officials  will  be  made  on  party  grounds, 
and  the  whole  internal  government  of  each  de 
pendency,  as  well  as  the  policy  of  the  federal 
power  towards  it,  will  take  its  color  from  party 
conflicts.1  The  injustice  of  carrying  such  conflicts 
outside  the  country  to  whose  local  conditions  they 
owe  their  birth  is  obvious,  and  for  this  reason,  if 
for  no  other,  there  should  be  some  provision  for 
the  control  by  the  federal  government  of  all  over 
sea  or  alien  dependencies  on  a  basis  of  permanency, 
impartiality,  and  a  thorough  acquaintance  with 
local  conditions. 

The  key  to  the  situation  does  not  necessarily  lie 

1  The  Philippine  Civil  Service,  except  in  the  highest  posts, 
has  been  removed,  it  is  claimed,  from  the  influence  of  the 
Spoils  System,  but  the  "highest  posts"  form  an  important 
exception. 

•         278 


GREATER    AMERICA 

in  an  extension  of  Presidential  power.  Already, 
as  has  been  said,  the  President  can  control  both 
foreign  and  colonial  policy  to  a  great  extent.  With 
so  unwieldy  a  machine  as  Congress,  summoned 
from  the  four  corners  of  the  continent,  there  will 
inevitably  arise  questions  of  moment  which  must 
be  dealt  with  by  the  Executive.  The  Panama 
affair  is  a  recent  instance.  Some  Presidents  would 
not,  perhaps,  have  shouldered  the  responsibility 
of  that  incident  as  boldly  as  Mr.  Roosevelt,  and 
certainly  few  Secretaries  of  State  could  have  put 
it  through  with  such  aplomb  as  Mr.  Hay.  The 
personal  equation  in  this  matter  was  extremely 
powerful,  and  cut  short  a  situation  which  might 
have  puzzled  the  united  wisdom  —  and  divided 
interests — of  Congress  for  many  a  month.  But, 
in  dealing  with  the  details  of  government  in  de 
pendencies,  in  deciding  the  many  difficult  points 
which  arise  in  connection  with  their  administra 
tion  and  relations  to  the  federal  power,  it  may  be 
equally  necessary  to  have  a  firm  and  immediate 
decision.  The  threads  must  be  held  in  Washing 
ton  and  the  wires  pulled  at  the  right  moment. 
But  by  whom?  The  President?  This  surely  puts 
on  his  shoulders  functions  which  he  is  not  qualified 
to  fill.  He  is  not  chosen  for  a  knowledge  of  such 
matters,  has  no  trained  advisers,1  nor  has  he  much 

1  For  instance,  in  the  recent  Chinese  crisis,  but  for  the  fact 
that  Mr.  Rockhill  happened  to  be  in  charge  of  the  Bureau  of 
American  Republics,  there  would  have  been  no  expert  adviser 
on  Far  Eastern  affairs  available  in  Washington. 

279 


GREATER    AMERICA 

opportunity  for  study.  The  Senate  and  House 
of  Representatives  are,  nominally,  the  voice  of  the 
American  people.  They  must  have  a  voice  in  all 
matters  of  actual  policy.  But  matters  of  detail 
cannot  be  decided  without  much  preliminary 
knowledge  and  careful  elucidation  of  the  subject, 
and  who  is  to  perform  this  task? 

There  is  at  present  only  one  method  of  dealing 
with  it — by  committees.  If  the  committees  were 
permanent  bodies,  composed  of  men  chosen  for 
special  knowledge  or  aptitude,  they  would  in  time 
come  to  have  a  working  acquaintance  with  their 
subject  and  a  more  or  less  consistent  method  of 
dealing  with  it;  but  then  they  would  no  longer 
form  a  part  of  the  present  Congressional  system. 
They  would  become  a  body  apart.  It  would  be 
obviously  impossible  to  dedicate  entirely  to  such 
a  task  Senators  or  Representatives  who  had  been 
elected  to  fulfil  other  and  more  general  missions. 
Representatives,  too,  change  every  two  years,  and 
Senators  every  six.  There  is  no  man  in  either 
House  whose  position  corresponds  with  that  of  the 
British  Foreign  or  Colonial  Secretary,  and  who 
can,  therefore,  bring  all  such  questions  before  the 
representatives  of  the  nation,  or  even  before  the 
committees.  In  short,  there  is  an  absence  of  all 
the  machinery  which  would  secure  to  every  coun 
try  under  the  Stars  and  Stripes  a  fair  hearing  on 
matters  of  colonial  or  Imperial  importance;  and, 
in  the  lack  of  authoritative  expression  in  Con 
gress,  it  is  doubly  hard  for  the  dependencies  or 

280 


GREATER    AMERICA 

protectorates  to  understand  their  own  position 
and  the  sentiments  of  the  United  States  towards 
them. 

In  preceding  chapters  we  have  already  touched 
on  many  problems  arising  out  of  American  ex 
pansion.  We  have  seen  that  in  the  Pacific,  in 
the  Caribbean,  and  in  Latin  America  the  United 
States  has  come  to  occupy  a  place  which  makes 
the  government  of  those  regions  more  or  less 
dependent  on  Washington.  In  this  chapter  we 
have  tried  briefly  to  show  what  Congress  is,  under 
the  present  system  of  party  management.  It  is, 
in  theory,  the  representative  body  of  the  American 
nation — the  voice  of  the  people.  In  practice,  it 
has  become  an  instrument  upon  which  the  skilful 
politician  may  play  at  will.  Federal  authority 
has  been  strengthened,  but  it  has  ceased  to  receive 
its  true  strength  from  the  popular  vote,  and  is, 
in  fact,  the  creature  of  an  oligarchy.  The  Presi 
dent  has  gained  in  power  also — that  is,  in  po 
tentialities;  but  he  must  use  that  power  accord 
ing  to  the  wish  of  the  oligarchy,  or  run  serious 
risk.  In  the  teeth  of  this  situation,  he  has,  indeed, 
become  to  a  certain  extent  more  the  representative 
of  the  people  and  the  focus  of  their  pride  and 
ambition  than  Congress.  He  can  appeal  to  them 
direct;  he  may  rise  superior  to  considerations  of 
party  if  he  feels  the  pulse  of  the  nation.  This 
personal  loyalty  would  hardly  be  possible  to  a 
mere  party  candidate,  though  it  has  been  the 
policy  of  both  parties  to  choose  a  candidate  whose 

281 


GREATER    AMERICA 

private  character  displays  the  homely  virtues 
particularly  dear  to  American  minds.  President 
Roosevelt,  by  a  concentration  of  energy,  talent, 
patriotism,  and  civic  virtue  in  one  person,  has 
appealed  to  the  nation  in  a  peculiar  way.  It 
appeared  possible  for  him  to  ignore  party  and 
take  his  authority  from  the  people  without  jeop 
ardizing  his  position.  He  has  accordingly  ex 
ercised  his  initiative  on  various  occasions,  without 
that  reference  to  party  interests  which  is  ex 
pected  of  the  party  nominee.  To  the  outside 
world  he  stands  for  all  that  is  best  in  American 
character;  for  domestic  virtue,  public  spirit, 
honesty,  fair-play,  keen  wit,  courage,  justice,  and 
virility.  He  has  offended  one  section  of  his 
countrymen  by  an  attempt  to  do  justice  to  a 
neglected  part  of  the  American  nation;  he  has 
estranged  another  by  his  action  as  regards  Panama, 
which,  whatever  its  ethical  aspect,  has  certainly 
the  merit  of  being  a  short  cut  to  a  more  satisfactory 
condition  in  that  region.  A  far  more  serious 
offence  is,  however,  his  attitude  towards  vested 
interests.  Whatever  the  estimate  now,  the  verdict 
of  posterity  will  be  in  favor  of  Roosevelt,  and  he 
will  rank  among  the  really  great  Presidents.  His 
name  will  stand  for  reform,  at  a  period  when 
reform  was  as  anathema  maranatha  to  politicians. 
He  will  be  remembered  as  a  true  leader  of  men, 
at  a  critical  period  in  the  history  of  Greater 
America;  but  it  is  still  doubtful  whether  the 
American  people  are  to  have  true  leaders,  or 

282 


GREATER    AMERICA 

whether  they  are  to  follow  a  mere  bell-wether, 
driven  by  bosses. 

The  reformer  of  American  politics  has  two  ob 
stacles  to  overcome  —  first,  the  serried  ranks  of 
party,  determined  not  to  lose  their  power  or  be 
docked  of  their  privileges;  secondly,  an  extraor 
dinary  mixture  of  apathy  and  prejudice  in  the 
nation  —  apathy  as  regards  much  which  to  an 
outsider  would  seem  to  touch  their  pride  as  well 
as  their  pockets,  and  an  invincible  prejudice  on 
certain  points. 

Keeping  in  mind  these  difficulties,  let  us  look 
at  another  of  the  main  problems  which  expansion 
has  forced  upon  the  nation. 


CHAPTER    XII 
AMERICANS    IN    THE    TROPICS 

LET  us  summarize  briefly  some  of  the  conclu 
sions  which  lead  up  to  the  hypothesis  that  Ameri 
cans  are  now  called  upon  to  assume  the  task  of  gov 
ernment  in  the  tropics.  By  a  process  of  evolution 
on  logical  and  consistent  lines — if  we  regard  her 
history  in  the  light  of  action  rather  than  profession 
—the  United  States  has  become  the  centre  of  an 
empire  governing,  in  a  variety  of  ways,  a  wide 
range  of  dependencies.  The  apparent  inconsist 
ency  of  this  position  disappears  when  we  study 
the  history  of  her  expansion  and  find  that,  from 
the  very  first,  she  has  not  hesitated  to  assume  the 
responsibilities  of  a  sovereign  power  and  to  follow 
her  destiny  by  any  path  which  seemed  shortest 
and  surest.  She  has  never  been  bound  by  the 
shibboleths  of  democracy,  and  at  every  critical 
point  in  her  history  she  has  been  able  by  the 
elasticity  of  her  Constitution  to  justify  whatever 
course  it  seemed  politic  to  take.  So  long  as  the 
government  of  dependencies  was  merely  a  matter 
of  controlling  white  communities  up  to  the  point 
when  they  could  take  the  responsibility  in  their 
own  hands,  there  was  no  particular  difficulty  to 

284 


GREATER    AMERICA 

be  faced,  but  the  government  of  alien  races  in  a 
different  stage  of  civilization,  and  with  widely  dif 
fering  theories  and  standards,  involves  a  problem 
of  extreme  difficulty  and  intricacy  which  has  been 
exercising  the  progressive  races  since  history  began. 

The  situation  is  a  simple  one  at  bottom.  The 
strong  man  will,  and  must,  rule  the  weak;  the  ed 
ucated  man  should  control  the  ignorant;  the  civ 
ilized  man  cannot  leave  the  savage  to  go  his  own 
way.  Certain  races  have  got  ahead  in  the  march 
of  progress ;  they  are  not  free  from  faults,  but  they 
have  reached  a  higher  standard  of  efficiency,  and 
in  the  nature  of  things  they  must,  when  brought 
in  contact  with  weaker  and  more  backward  races, 
control  them — in  other  words,  rule  them. 

There  is  no  space  here  to  discuss  this  time-worn 
subject;  it  is  merely  necessary  to  point  out  that 
no  people,  from  the  earliest  period  of  history,  has 
ever  achieved  greatness  without  coming  into  con 
tact  with,  and  ultimately  assuming  control  of, 
people  less  advanced  than  themselves.  At  the 
present  era,  when  distance  is  annihilated  by  the 
achievements  of  science  and  physical  barriers  are 
no  longer  sufficient  to  preserve  isolation,  we  see 
that  the  most  progressive  powers,  those  whose 
virility  is  as  marked  as  their  intellectuality,  are 
expanding  rapidly  at  the  expense  of  all  smaller 
and  less  advanced  political  and  social  organisms. 
In  the  case  of  countries  like  Finland  we  see  that 
even  advanced  civilization  and  enlightened  govern 
ment  cannot  save  a  nation  numerically  weak  from 

285 


GREATER    AMERICA 

being  absorbed  by  a  strong  neighboring  power. 
The  day  of  small,  independent  states  is  past. 
Europe  will  soon  be  a  group  of  huge  federations; 
Asia  will  be  partitioned  among  three  or  four  great 
powers,  as  Africa  has  been ;  and  the  world  will  be 
made  up  of  a  few  great  powers,  each  with  its  group 
of  dependencies. 

It  is,  of  course,  inevitable  that  the  dominant 
nations  should  be  of  northern  stock.  The  trend 
of  history  is  too  unmistakable  to  allow  any  doubts 
on  that  head.  The  tropical  races  cannot  hold  their 
own  against  people  from  the  temperate  zone;  and 
already  we  see  that  of  the  great  Oriental  states 
practically  only  one — Japan  not  in  the  tropics- 
retains  more  than  a  nominal  independence.  It 
was,  therefore,  inevitable  that  the  United  States, 
in  her  course  of  expansion,  should  sooner  or  later 
be  confronted  with  the  problem  of  the  government 
of  alien  races.  In  her  dealings  with  the  Indians 
and  negroes  she  has  always  had  two  sides  of  the 
problem  to  contend  with;  in  Hawaii  she  met  a 
third,  in  the  Caribbean  a  fourth;  in  the  Philippines 
she  has  reached  the  culminating  point  in  the  his 
tory  of  her  relations  with  alien  peoples,  when  she 
is  obliged  to  assume  the  government  of  a  tropical 
country  inhabited  by  seven  millions  of  people. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  in  this  chapter  to  discuss 
the  possibility  that  any  of  the  oversea  people  now 
under  the  Stars  and  Stripes  might  eventually  be 
able  to  govern  themselves.  At  present  there  is 
no  question  as  to  this,  the  United  States  having 

286 


GREATER    AMERICA 

adopted  in  the  various  dependencies  different 
systems  of  colonial  government,  the  main  feat 
ure  of  all  being  that  the  President  appoints  the 
governors  and  that  Congress  exercises  sovereign 
rights.  This  condition  of  affairs  must  continue  for 
an  indefinite  period,  and  meanwhile  a  large  body 
of  American  officials  are,  and  will  be,  employed 
in  the  task  of  governing  these  alien  peoples. 

The  task  was  a  novel  one  for  men  of  American 
birth.  Their  relations  with  the  two  alien  races 
on  their  own  continent  had  not  prepared  them  in 
any  way  for  this  problem.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  history  of  the  relations  between  Americans 
and  the  negroes  and  Indians  is  a  record  of  mis 
takes  and  failures  which  contrasts  ill  with  their 
brilliant  success  in  other  ways.  The  United  States, 
as  soon  as  she  awoke  to  the  position  in  which  her 
scarcely  perceived  evolution  had  placed  her,  made 
a  hurried  survey  of  the  methods  employed  by 
other  colonial  powers.  Unfortunately,  there  was 
no  country  affording  a  complete  analogy  to  the 
Spanish  colonial  possessions  when  they  fell  into 
American  hands.  The  Philippines  especially,  with 
three  hundred  years  of  nominal  Christianity  and 
civilization  and  an  extraordinary  mixture  of  racial 
peculiarities,  had  no  parallel  in  history.  Even  if 
such  a  parallel  had  existed,  the  United  States 
would  not  have  derived  much  benefit  from  the 
experience  of  others,  being  obsessed  by  the  idea 
that  she  was  destined  to  inaugurate  an  entirely 
new  system  of  dealing  with  a  conquered  tropical 

287 


GREATER    AMERICA 

people.  "We  hope  to  do  for  them,"  said  Mr. 
Roosevelt,  "what  has  never  before  been  done  for 
any  people  of  the  tropics  ...  to  make  them  fit  for 
self-government  after  the  fashion  of  the  really  free 
nations." 

Idealism  played  a  large  part  in  the  early  dealings 
with  the  Filipinos  and  in  the  conceptions  of  the 
men  sent  to  lay  the  foundations  of  future  govern 
ment.  It  is  not  surprising  that  many  mistakes 
were  made,  chiefly  through  ignorance  of  the  char 
acter  of  all  peoples  save  the  Anglo-Saxon,  with  its 
clear  standards  of  right  and  wrong.  Brought  up 
on  traditions  of  the  ennobling  influence  of  demo 
cratic  ideas,  the  sacredness  of  individual  rights, 
and  especially  of  equality,  it  was  extremely  dif 
ficult  for  the  American  to  understand  Oriental 
character.  The  first  mistake  was  to  treat  the 
Filipino  as  if  he  were  an  American  with  a  brown 
skin,  a  point  of  view  which  is  still  cherished  in 
face  of  many  disillusionment s.  This  has  been  the 
cause  of  much  discontent  among  the  Filipinos,  who 
complain  that  their  conquerors  have  not  acted 
up  to  the  promises  made  in  the  first  flush  of  en 
thusiasm.  The  reason  is  obvious — the  promises 
were  made  under  the  delusion  that  the  Filipino 
could  be  rapidly  changed,  and  that  he  was  as  con 
sistent  as  if  his  skin  were  white  and  his  habitat 
in  a  northern  latitude. 

Unfortunately,  fickleness  and  duplicity  (judged 
by  Western  standards)  are  as  invariable  among 
tropical  peoples  as  the  histrionic  and  artistic  sense 

288 


GREATER    AMERICA 

among  the  Latins.  Filipinos  inherit  both  from 
their  mixed  ancestry;  but  their  habitat  is  still 
the  tropics,  and  they  are  incapable  of  rising  above 
the  limitations  imposed  by  it.  They  have  not  the 
virility  of  a  people  constantly  reinforced  from  a 
temperate  clime,  and  they  enjoy  life  under  phys 
ical  and  climatic  conditions  peculiarly  unsuited 
for  moral  development.  The  strenuous  life  is  im 
practicable  in  these  beautiful,  isolated,  enervating 
islands.  The  prospect  of  educating  the  Filipino  up 
to  the  point  of  capacity  for  self-government  (as  un 
derstood  by  Anglo-Saxon  nations)  is  by  no  means 
promising,  but  he  will  doubtless  be  able  in  a 
comparatively  short  time  to  satisfy  outward  re 
quirements  by  wearing  American  clothes,  drink 
ing  iced  water,  and  adapting  his  own  flowery 
hyperbole  to  the  stump-orator  style  of  his  trans 
atlantic  brothers.  He  is  extremely  imitative, 
even  more  so  than  the  Japanese ;  but  he  lacks  the 
thoroughness,  persistence,  and  strong  national  feel 
ing  which  made  Japanese  reform  a  reality  and  not 
a  sham. 

The  United  States  must,  therefore,  settle  down 
to  a  considerable  period  of  colonial  government, 
if  not  a  permanent  one.  The  organization  of  a 
service  to  meet  the  demands  of  this  situation  be 
comes  an  imperative  necessity,  and,  without  dis 
cussing  here  at  length  the  details  of  such  a  ser 
vice  and  the  demerits  of  the  system  at  present 
adopted,  it  is  interesting  to  draw  a  comparison 
between  the  position  of  the  United  States  and 
19  289 


GREATER    AMERICA 

other  powers  as  regards  the  question  of  colonial 
Civil  Service. 

So  long  as  the  white  man  is  merely  called  on  to 
govern  or  organize,  in  a  climate  congenial  to  him, 
people  of  similar  race  and  instincts  to  his  own,  he 
needs  little  more  than  the  ordinary  ability  and 
training  which  would  qualify  him  for  any  post  of 
authority  at  home.  But  when  he  must  adopt  a 
mode  of  life  foreign  to  his  bringing-up,  must  sub 
mit  not  only  to  climatic  influences  but  to  constant, 
and  perhaps  exclusive,  association  with  minds  on 
a  different  level  to  his  own — when  the  social  at 
mosphere  is  as  novel  as  the  landscape  and  there 
is  nothing  to  keep  him  up  to  the  mark  save  the 
knowledge  that  is  in  him,  deterioration,  not  only 
physical  but  moral,  is  a  danger  which  cannot  be 
overlooked.  There  is  no  question  of  American 
colonization  in  the  Philippines;  even  were  the 
country  not  already  well  populated,  the  climate 
forbids  it.  The  Americans,  like  the  British,  are 
not  prone  to  mix  their  blood  with  that  of  the 
natives,  as  Portuguese  and  Spanish  have  done. 
The  government  will,  therefore,  involve  on  the 
part  of  the  governing  class  a  certain  degree  of 
exile,  only  comparable  to  that  endured  by  British 
and  French  officials  in  their  dependencies.  The 
Dutch,  in  Java,  at  all  events,  are  on  a  different 
footing.  The  widely  scattered  nature  of  British 
dependencies  and  their  distance  from  the  mother- 
country  have  made  the  task  of  government  pecul 
iarly  arduous ;  but  whatever  the  criticisms  of  the 

290 


GREATER    AMERICA 

system  may  be,  it  is  generally  conceded  that  Britain 
has  attained  greater  success  than  any  other  power. 
A  great  proportion  of  this  success  she  owes  to  the 
high  standard  of  the  officials  she  has  employed,  and 
even  those  who  criticise  her  government  of  alien 
races  allow  that  among  those  races  the  instruments 
of  that  government  are  held  in  a  repute  which 
makes  the  "  word  of  an  Englishman  "  a  sacred  oath. 
It  is  also  undeniable  that  the  British  dependencies 
have  been  of  the  greatest  value  in  providing  a 
training-school  for  her  governing  class,  and  that 
the  colonial  and  Indian  services  have  a  favorable 
influence  in  preserving  the  best  traits  of  national 
character. 

Whether  under  the  Colonial  or  Foreign  offices, 
the  entrance  to  government  service  is  always  by 
competitive  examination  on  general  lines,  followed 
by  examinations  in  native  languages.  There  are 
many  arguments  both  for  and  against  the  com 
petitive  system,  but  its  detractors  have  not  been 
able  to  devise  any  other  which  would  be  of  more 
all  -  round  usefulness.  It  is  said  that  the  in 
tellectual  test  is  not  the  best  for  many  of  the 
posts,  and  that  some  of  the  most  successful  ad 
ministrators  have  cut  a  sorry  figure  in  the  ex 
amination-room.  The  system  is  in  its  theory 
democratic,  as  opposed  to  patronage  or  selection, 
but  in  practice  it  is  now  rather  tending  the  other 
way,  as  the  tests  are  so  high  that  an  expensive 
education  and  special  cramming  are  almost  neces 
sary  to  the  candidate.  Parents,  however,  value 

291 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  position  so  much  that  they  make  sacrifices  out 
of  all  proportion  to  their  incomes  to  give  their  sons 
the  necessary  training,  so  that  the  service  is  by  no 
means  confined  to  the  wealthy  classes.  The  best 
check  on  the  tendency  of  competitive  examination 
towards  exclusiveness  is  in  a  judicious  element  of 
selection  and  of  variation  of  tests,  and  in  this 
somewhat  modified  form  the  system  is  admirably 
adapted  to  the  United  States,  where  educational 
opportunities  are  so  widely  diffused.  The  Brit 
ish  cadet  who  has  passed  successfully  through  the 
entrance  examinations  will  serve  a  long  probation 
in  India,  China,  or  one  of  the  colonies  before  he  is 
intrusted  with  any  direct  responsibilities.  During 
that  period  he  must  acquire  proficiency  in  the 
languages  and  customs  of  the  natives,  and  some 
times  in  their  laws.  The  Indian  and  colonial 
services  attract  the  best  class  of  British  youth, 
and  the  careers  are  considered  desirable  for  young 
men  of  position ;  there  is  even  a  large  class  whose 
families  have  been  connected  with  the  services 
for  generations,  so  that  there  is  always  an  ample 
supply  available. 

The  careers  of  a  majority  of  these  men  will  not 
be  brilliant,  and  the  prospects  held  out  do  not, 
on  the  surface,  seem  likely  to  attract  clever  and 
ambitious  youths.  Entrance  into  the  Indian  or 
colonial  civil  service  means  exile  from  home,  sep 
aration  from  family,  a  salary  adequate  but  by 
no  means  princely,  with  slow,  if  sure,  increase. 
His  highest  hopes  cannot  soar  beyond  a  colonial 

292 


GREATER    AMERICA 

governorship.  When  at  the  zenith  of  his  career 
he  will  receive  a  salary  which,  although  hand 
some,  will  have  to  bear  heavy  demands  in  the 
way  of  entertainment,  and  provides  no  margin. 
If  he  marries,  his  early  years  will  be  a  struggle  to 
make  both  ends  meet,  and  his  later  ones  will  in 
volve  frequent  separation  from  wife  and  children 
and  a  constant  effort  to  maintain  two  establish 
ments  in  a  manner  suitable  to  his  position.  Though 
hard  work  will  be  required  of  him,  if  he  is  to  pass 
successfully  through  the  stages  of  advancement, 
it  will  not  necessarily  accelerate  his  progress  or 
bring  a  certain  reward,  for  influence  and  luck  play 
a  considerable  part  in  the  matter.  It  must  be 
explained  that  the  influence  will  be  of  a  social  or 
family  origin,  and  seldom,  if  ever,  political  in  its 
character.  Even  in  the  appointment  of  colonial 
governors  and  viceroys,  which  are  made  by  the 
government  that  happens  to  be  in  power,  there  is 
usually  an  absence  of  party  motives,  and  although 
sometimes  regarded  in  the  light  of  rewards  for 
brilliant  services,  the  party  question  has  little  to 
do  with  them.  As  far  as  pecuniary  advantages 
are  concerned,  it  is  well  known  that  only  men  with 
large  private  fortunes  can  afford  to  accept  many 
of  the  highest  positions. 

The  colonial  career,  therefore,  seems  to  offer  little 
attraction  to  a  young  American,  who  is  not  driven 
by  force  of  circumstances  to  seek  his  fortune  abroad, 
and  who  is  brought  up  in  the  belief  that  to  "  get 
on  "  is  the  first  duty  of  man,  and  his  chief  pleasure. 

293 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  attractions,  from  the  British  point  of  view, 
are,  first,  the  social  status  which  undoubtedly 
attaches  to  government  service.  This,  unfortu 
nately,  is  far  from  being  the  case  in  the  United 
States,  where  a  government  career  neither  con 
fers  nor  confirms  a  man's  social  standing — rath 
er  the  reverse.  Nor  would  such  an  inducement 
be  a  strong  one  to  the  best  type  of  American, 
as  it  is  to  the  best  type  of  Englishman.  Sec 
ondly,  the  element  of  adventure  and  the  pros 
pect  of  a  wider  field  of  interest  in  an  unknown 
land  have  a  strong  attraction  for  the  dweller  in 
small,  overcrowded  Britain,  and  the  spirit  of  his 
forefathers  stirs  in  many  a  youth  the  desire  for 
fresh  fields  and  a  wider  life,  though  after -ex 
perience  too  often  proves  that  he  merely  exchanges 
the  narrow  circle  at  home  for  a  still  narrower  one 
abroad.  The  spirit  of  adventure  might  prove  as 
strong  an  inducement  to  the  American  as  to  the 
Englishman  but  for  the  fact  that  he  does  not  need 
to  leave  his  own  country  in  order  to  gratify  it; 
indeed,  in  leaving  the  United  States  he  turns  his 
back  on  many  opportunities  and  also  on  a  life 
of  risk  and  excitement,  of  hard  work  and  quick 
profits,  which  appeal  peculiarly  to  his  energetic, 
nervous  temperament.  The  third  and  most  serious 
consideration  to  the  Englishman  is  the  pension 
which  invariably  attaches  to  government  service, 
and  this  inducement  has  proved  strong  enough 
in  many  cases  to  weigh  against  more  tempting 
offers  of  immediate  advancement.  Rather  than 

294 


GREATER    AMERICA 

forfeit  this  small  but  sure  provision  for  old  age, 
men  have  been  known  to  refuse  good  and  even 
brilliant  offers.  The  pension  will  never,  of  course, 
be  large  enough  to  support  a  man  and  his  family 
in  affluence,  but  if  he  serves  long  enough  it  will 
make  a  decent  and  comfortable  provision  for  his 
declining  years,  and,  in  case  of  ill-health  or  break 
down,  he  will  be  secured  from  actual  want.  The 
Englishman  as  a  rule  looks  forward  with  pleasant 
anticipations  to  the  time  when  he  can  retire  to  a 
country-house,  and,  with  the  surety  of  a  small  but 
regular  income  for  the  rest  of  his  life,  can  indulge 
in  one  of  his  many  hobbies,  take  a  leading  part  in 
local  politics,  and  see  his  sons  launched  on  careers 
similar  to  his  own  in  their  moderate  expectations 
and  honorable  position. 

Such  a  provision  for  old  age  does  not  at  all 
appeal  to  an  average  young  American,  who  could 
not  contemplate  complacently  an  old  age  spent  in 
calm  retirement  on  a  reduced  income.  American 
men  do  not  think  of  old  age  in  the  same  way  as  their 
English  cousins ;  and  if  they  do,  it  is  merely  a  spur 
to  them  to  make  a  "  big  pile  "  as  quickly  as  possible. 
Death  is  provided  for  even  more  universally  than 
with  us  by  heavy  insurances,  but  no  one  who  has 
any  experience  of  the  United  States  can  fail  to 
have  been  struck  not  only  by  the  youthfulness  of 
most  men  in  responsible  positions,  but  by  the 
general  assumption  that  youth  and  middle  age  are 
the  only  periods  of  life  worth  consideration. 

The  British  government  pursues  a  wise  policy 

295 


GREATER    AMERICA 

in  granting  liberal  furloughs  to  all  officials,  and 
this  must  be  taken  not  only  as  a  compensation  and 
inducement,  but  as  a  means  of  rendering  the  man 
more  efficient.  Without  the  long  and  regular  res 
pite  from  arduous  duties  and  the  renewal  of  the 
springs  of  life  afforded  by  his  visits  home,  the 
colonial  official  could  hardly  keep  up,  physically, 
mentally,  or  morally,  to  the  standard  required. 
The  idea  of  giving  long  furloughs,  on  handsome 
pay,  is  somewhat  opposed  to  American  theories. 
The  rule  is  "no  work,  no  pay,"  and  the  liberality 
of  the  United  States  government  does  not  apply 
in  the  matter  of  official  salaries,  which  are  in 
variably,  and  even  scandalously,  inadequate. 

The  next  feature  in  the  life  of  colonial  official 
dom  which  makes  it  popular  with  Englishmen  is 
that  the  work  itself  is  congenial  to  them.  Their 
whole  training  has  made  them  self-reliant  in  the 
sense  that  they  are  prepared  to  take  responsibilities 
and  to  act  independently.  They  inherit  a  sense 
of  justice,  scrupulous  fairness,  and  esprit  de  corps 
which  are  fostered  by  public  -  school  training, 
despite  its  defects.  They  are  not  cowed  or  de 
pressed  by  solitude  if  called  upon  to  dwell  far 
from  any  of  their  kind.  Boys  fresh  from  school 
or  college  go  cheerfully  to  distant  frontier  districts 
where,  excepting  one  or  two  other  officials,  they 
may  not  see  a  white  man  for  months.  After  this 
period  of  training  they  often  go  to  a  more  complete 
isolation.  Such  conditions  would  drive  a  French 
man  crazy;  but,  though  there  are  occasional  cases 

296 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  break- down,  some  stolid  Britons  even  grow  to 
enjoy  their  isolation,  helped  by  the  natural  taci 
turnity  and  self-reliance  of  their  race  and  class. 

There  is  still,  even  in  these  days  of  luxury,  a 
certain  element  of  Spartan  discipline  in  the  lives 
of  British  boys  which  makes  it  far  easier  for  them 
in  after-life  to  enjoy  such  careers  as  these.  The 
little  chap  who,  at  eight  or  nine,  leaves  his  mother's 
arms  for  a  boarding-school,  has  to  cultivate  at 
that  tender  age  a  self-possession,  reticence,  and 
decision  which  become  second  nature  to  him  and 
lay  the  foundations  of  successful  administration  in 
later  life.  Not  only  does  the  rough-and-tumble 
of  his  school-days  make  the  boy  hard  and  self- 
reliant,  and  develop  in  him  that  knowledge  of  his 
own  powers  which  will  be  so  valuable  to  him, 
but  he  has,  naturally,  a  capacity  and  love  for 
ruling.  He  has  no  illusions  as  to  the  equality  of 
the  people  he  rules;  on  the  contrary,  he  is  firmly 
imbued  with  the  idea  of  the  superiority  of  the 
British  race  over  any  other,  white  or  black.  At 
the  same  time  he  has  no  repugnance  or  dislike  for 
"niggers,"  regarding  them  generally  with  a  sort 
of  paternal  tolerance.  He  enjoys  the  struggle  with 
prejudice  and  ignorance,  and  likes  to  evolve  order 
out  of  chaos,  feeling  himself  the  pivot  on  which 
the  whole  system  turns. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Indian  or  co 
lonial  officer  is  almost  invariably  of  gentle  birth, 
and  invariably  of  gentle  education — in  the  best 
sense  of  the  word  a  gentleman.  This  implies,  in 

297 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Great  Britain,  that  he  is  acquainted  with  the 
ordinary  etiquette  of  civilized  society,  that  he  has 
been  taught  the  self-control  and  consideration  for 
others  on  which  that  society  has  its  basis,  and  that 
he  is  not  uncouth  or  rough  in  speech,  appearance, 
or  manner.  When  we  remember  that  he  will  prob 
ably  be  sent  as  an  interloper  into  the  midst  of 
communities  civilized  and  cultivated  in  varying 
degrees,  on  lines  quite  different  to  our  own,  it  is 
easy  to  see  the  value  of  such  an  equipment.  The 
Oriental  is  peculiarly  keen  to  notice  any  lack  of 
breeding  in  the  European  he  meets,  and,  contrary 
to  the  general  belief,  he  can  appreciate  perfectly 
the  difference  between  men  who  have  and  men  who 
have  not  this  quality.  It  is  not  necessary  to  adopt 
Oriental  etiquette,  with  its  endless  ramifications; 
but  the  Indian,  Chinese,  or  Malay  is  quick  to 
notice  if  his  European  friend  is  deviating  from 
what  he  soon  learns  to  recognize  as  the  European 
standard  of  good  manners.  There  is  an  unwritten 
code  of  manners  which  well-bred  men  all  over  the 
world  practise  and  by  which  they  recognize  each 
other. 

The  desire  to  rule  is  not  implanted  in  the 
American  breast.  Indeed,  he  is  firmly  imbued 
with  principles  which  make  despotic  government 
by  one  man  repugnant  to  him,  and  although  he  is 
obliged  in  the  relations  of  daily  life  to  recognize 
that  some  must  rule  and  others  obey,  if  the  world's 
work  is  to  go  on,  he  does  not  wish  to  acknowledge 
this  or  go  to  an  extreme  and  illustrate  the  fallacies 

298 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  democracy  in  his  own  person.  Solitude  to  him 
is  almost  an  unknown  evil.  Life  in  the  United 
States  is  far  more  sociable  and  gregarious  than  in 
Great  Britain,  and  it  does  not  occur  to  a  man  that 
a  high  wall  round  his  grounds  is  absolutely  essential 
to  enjoyment  of  life.  There  is  also  a  reluctance, 
especially  among  wealthy  parents,  to  submit  their 
children  to  that  Spartan  discipline  which  is  en 
forced  on  the  richest  as  well  as  the  poorest  of 
British  boys,  and  although  this  is  largely  coun 
teracted  in  later  life  by  the  independent  spirit 
which  is  characteristic  of  American  youths  and 
their  enterprise  and  audacity,  yet  the  general  im 
pression  they  give  is  that  they  are  less  hardy,  more 
sensitive,  physically  and  mentally,  less  able  to 
endure  the  peculiar  conditions  of  life  in  the  tropics 
than  their  more  phlegmatic  English  cousins. 

Besides  the  illusory  theories  as  to  universal 
equality,  which  handicap  the  American  at  the 
outset  of  his  life  in  the  tropics  (because  they  in 
volve  friction  between  his  ideals  and  his  prac 
tice)  ,  he  has  also  to  contend  with  a  physical  repug 
nance  for  colored  people,  which  is  the  result  of  his 
home  environment.  Social  equipment  has  hither 
to  formed  no  part  of  the  requirements  for  public 
service  in  America  or  her  dependencies,  and  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  it  can  be  made  to  play  a  part 
in  the  matter.  In  a  country  where  cultivated  men 
not  unfrequently  assume  a  roughness  of  speech 
and  manner  quite  foreign  to  them,  in  order,  pre 
sumably,  to  gratify  some  curious  theory  of  demo- 

299 


GREATER    AMERICA 

cratic  equality,  it  can  hardly  be  required  that 
officials  shall  be  expected  to  acquire  external 
polish,  even  to  enable  them  to  deal  with  the  polite 
and  evasive  Oriental.  There  is  a  good  deal  of 
unnecessary  contempt,  not  only  in  the  United 
States  but  in  Great  Britain,  as  to  the  elaborate  and 
" senseless"  ceremony  prescribed  by  Oriental  eti 
quette.  There  is  frequently  a  great  deal  of  mean 
ing  underlying  these  ceremonies,  and  the  Oriental 
point  of  view  is  that,  without  these  prescribed 
forms,  there  is  a  tendency  to  relapse  into  a  license 
which  approaches  savagery.  No  one  acquainted 
with  Orientals,  the  Chinese  particularly,  can  fail 
to  be  aware  that  their  etiquette  is  of  extreme  and 
practical  use  in  daily  life.  Any  attempts  to  de 
stroy  at  one  blow  this  accretion  of  centuries  would 
have  disastrous  effects,  and  the  Europeanized 
Oriental  is  apt  to  lapse  into  the  worst  excesses 
of  his  adopted  country.  The  reaction  from  an 
artificial  standard  of  manners  and  morals  to  none 
at  all  is  too  great;  he  is  not  able  to  be  a  law  unto 
himself.  It  is,  therefore,  the  man  whose  breeding, 
natural  or  acquired,  teaches  him  to  respect  the 
laws  of  etiquette  in  others,  though  he  may  con 
form  to  entirely  different  ones  himself,  who  will  be 
able  to  influence  and  eventually  control  Orientals 
most  effectively.  This  is  peculiarly  the  case 
with  Mohammedans,  but  in  every  case  of  a  people 
whose  religion  is  inclined  to  fanaticism,  the  re 
spect  for  etiquette,  convention,  outward  forms, 
and  symbols  is  most  important.  Such  an  attitude 

300 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  mind  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  mere  indif 
ference  and  tolerance,  which  are  certainly  to  be 
found  in  excelsis  in  the  United  States.  It  really 
involves  another  abandonment  of  one  of  the 
cherished  delusions  of  the  American,  for  if  he  is 
to  govern  in  tropical  countries  among  Oriental 
peoples,  he  will  have  to  learn  that  there,  at  all 
events,  ''manners  maketh  man." 

Neither  as  a  practical  career,  then,  nor  as  an 
honorable  profession,  nor  as  an  interesting  and 
congenial  life-work,  does  the  career  of  a  colonial 
official  appeal  to  the  best  class  of  young  American. 
The  service  must,  therefore,  be  recruited  largely 
from  less  desirable  ranks.  There  are  now,  and 
will  continue  to  be,  honorable  and  distinguished 
exceptions  to  this  rule,  especially  among  the  heads 
of  departments ;  but  in  order  to  improve  the  rank 
and  file,  who,  after  all,  are  the  main  motive-power 
in  the  machine,  a  different  system  of  recruiting 
must  be  adopted  and  far  greater  inducements  held 
out. 

The  question  as  to  how  the  United  States  can 
secure  an  efficient  service  for  her  tropical  de 
pendencies  cannot  be  dealt  with  here,  but  it  may 
be  laid  down  as  a  principle  that  nothing  can  be 
done  in  the  direction  of  reform  until  the  greater 
part,  if  not  the  whole,  of  the  colonial  service  is 
removed  from  the  baneful  influence  of  the  Spoils 
System. 


CHAPTER    XIII 
PROBLEMS   OF    EXPANSION— CIVIL   SERVICE    REFORM 

OBVIOUSLY  the  first  problem  of  expansion  is  to 
provide  each  fresh  territory  or  dependency  with 
the  best  possible  form  of  government,  and  to  se 
cure  harmonious  relations  with  the  federal  sov 
ereign.  Everything  must  have  a  beginning;  it 
was  not  to  be  expected  that  systems  would  spring 
up  fully  organized  and  properly  correlated.  The 
matter,  however,  becomes  singularly  complicated 
when  the  sovereign  power,  not  being  quite  sure  of 
its  position,  is  continually  halting  between  two 
opinions;  in  the  same  breath  assuming  despotic 
powers  and  assuring  its  new  dependants  that  they 
are  to  govern  themselves.  To  be  brief,  rigid  dem 
ocratic  government  in  Greater  America  has  proved 
not  only  theoretically  but  practically  incapable  of 
dealing  with  a  colonial  empire.  Where  the  govern 
ment  has  been  most  successful  it  has  been  least 
democratic.  This  constant  warfare  between  the 
ory  and  practice  is,  however,  demoralizing.  It 
is  necessary  to  find  some  compromise  which  the 
American  nation  can  adopt,  not,  perhaps,  as  their 
ideal,  but  as  the  best  expedient,  and  one  which, 
therefore,  they  are  not  bound  to  excuse  or  cloak 

302 


GREATER    AMERICA 

under  some  specious  guise.  Having  gone  so  far 
from  the  principles  which  democracy  had  set  up 
(though  not  from  the  intentions  of  the  founders  of 
the  republic,who  were  anything  but  democrats),  in 
the  interests  of  efficiency  Americans  must  desire 
certain  changes  in  their  form  of  government  in 
order  to  fit  it  for  the  discharge  of  imperial  duties. 
First  and  foremost  comes  the  pressing  need  for 
Civil  Service  reform.  Under  any  circumstances,  a 
pure  and  efficient  Civil  Service  must  be  an  essential 
of  prosperous  government.  Americans  have  such 
an  extraordinary  facility  for  making  the  best  of  a 
bad  job  that  they  have  tolerated  a  condition  of 
affairs  which  would  have  aroused  their  phlegmatic 
cousins  to  indignation.  When  land  was  cheap, 
work  and  wages  plentiful,  and  every  one  par 
ticipating  in  a  wave  of  prosperity,  corruption  in 
the  body  politic  left  the  bulk  of  the  nation  good- 
humoredly  tolerant.  But,  although  there  is  no 
reason  to  believe  that  the  industrial  progress  of 
the  United  States  has  received  a  permanent  check, 
it  is  certain  that  she  (like  ourselves  some  little 
time  back)  has  entered  on  a  different  phase  of  her 
career.  Land  has  mostly  been  taken  up,  great 
inequalities  in  wealth  have  arisen,  disputes  be 
tween  capital  and  labor  become  more  and  more 
serious,  and  the  struggle  for  life  generally  is  taking 
on  a  sterner  aspect.  Civilization  in  America  is  no 
longer  in  the  primitive,  or  even  the  secondary, 
stage ;  and  the  more  complex  it  becomes  the  more 
it  will  depend  upon  government  for  well-being  and 

303 


GREATER    AMERICA 

security.  The  happiest  country  is  said  to  be  that 
which  is  least  governed,  but  the  saying  is  founded 
upon  a  fallacy,  otherwise  a  savage  tribe  might  be 
entitled  to  the  eulogium.  In  reality,  we  know 
that  the  conditions  of  modern  life  make  it  appli 
cable  to  a  people  whose  government  is  so  highly 
organized  that  it  works  without  friction,  so  that 
they  are  not  conscious  of  the  extent  to  which  they 
are  governed. 

The  corner-stone  of  political  and  official  life  in 
the  United  States  is  the  system  of  party  patron 
age.  Although  a  strong  reaction  has  already  taken 
place  and  a  certain  amount  been  accomplished  in 
decreasing  the  number  of  appointments  affected 
by  this  system,  there  are  still  about  one  hundred 
thousand  posts  in  the  United  States  to  be  filled 
through  it.  The  Senators  have  become  the  ar 
biters  of  patronage  in  each  State,  and  the  whole 
fabric  rests  on  party  influence.  It  is  not  only  the 
federal  offices  which  are  concerned.  The  State, 
Territorial,  and  especially  the  municipal  appoint 
ments  are  all  engineered  on  the  same  basis,  and 
the  entire  country  is  honey-combed  by  these  per 
nicious  influences. 

Apart  from  the  fact  that  appointments  for 
party  reasons  are  obviously  not  calculated  to 
secure  any  fitness  in  the  appointee,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  defeat  of  his  party  at  the 
next  election  will  at  once  throw  him  out  of  em 
ployment.  Americans  are  extremely  adaptable; 
they  seem  to  have  a  remarkable  ability  for  touch- 

304 


GREATER    AMERICA 

ing  pitch  without  becoming  altogether  defiled,  and 
many  party  appointees  would  in  time  make  good 
and  efficient  officials.  But  insecurity  of  office 
does  not  stimulate  devotion  to  duty ;  there  is  lit 
tle  inducement  to  make  a  real  study  of  the  work 
and  every  inducement  to  keep  in  with  the  party 
machine.  One  and  all  must  feel  the  temporary 
and  precarious  nature  of  their  employment  and 
the  evil  influences  of  a  constant  subservience  to 
party  interests,  and  the  temptations  of  an  official 
position  in  such  surroundings  are  very  great. 

In  1871  the  first  Civil  Service  reform  act  was 
passed,  but  remained  in  abeyance  for  lack  of 
support  until  revived  in  1883,  when  open  com 
petition  was  provided  for,  within  certain  grades 
known  as  the  classified  list.  From  the  successful 
competitors,  classed  as  "  eligible,"  appointments 
are  made  by  the  President,  with  consent  of  the 
Senate,  upon  the  basis  of  the  population  of  the 
various  States  and  Territories.  Non-competitive 
examinations  are  also  held  under  the  Civil  Service 
board,  by  which  candidates  may  qualify  for  certain 
grades  of  employment.  This  attempt,  although 
it  is  claimed  that  it  "  removed  a  vast  number  of 
offices  from  the  spoils  system,"  was  only  in  the 
nature  of  an  expedient.  It  has  undoubtedly  con 
duced  to  a  higher  standard  of  efficiency  and  se 
cured  in  the  classified  list  a  selection  of  good 
material  and  an  element  of  permanence.  But  the 
actual  appointments,  as  well  as  dismissals,  may 
still  be  influenced  by  party  considerations,  and 

3°5 


GREATER    AMERICA 

especially  does  the  system  confirm  the  power  of 
Senators  in  this  matter.  The  essentials  of  a  truly 
national  service  are  that  it  should  not  be  restricted 
or  influenced  by  any  personal  or  party  considera 
tions.  When  one  remembers  how  little  real  energy 
or  interest  is  displayed  by  the  nation  in  State  poli 
tics  it  seems  not  unreasonable  that  it  should  be 
expected  to  set  aside  State  jealousies  in  such  a 
matter  as  this;  and  were  it  not  for  the  vital  ques 
tion  of  patronage,  this  difficulty  would  soon  dis 
appear.  It  is  a  battle  against  privilege  such  as 
was  fought  and  won  in  Britain  many  years  ago. 
At  the  present  day  we  regard  it  as  an  undue  ad 
vantage  that  our  members  of  Parliament  should 
have  enjoyed  the  privilege  of  franking  letters  in 
the  old  days.  Yet  in  no  country  did  privilege  in 
the  past  exercise  such  a  profound  and  corrupt 
influence  as  in  England,  which  makes  it  the  more 
remarkable  that  no  such  prerogatives  and  per 
quisites  are  now  permitted  to  our  public  men  in 
democratic  England.  But  the  American  does  not 
object  to  the  exercise  of  patronage  or  other 
privileges  on  the  part  of  his  Senators — they  mail 
their  letters  free,  travel  free,  and  are  the  dis 
pensers  of  patronage — surely  a  striking  anomaly 
in  a  land  where  all  men  claim  equality. 

The  system  of  patronage  has  been  almost  en 
tirely  eliminated  from  the  public  service  in  Britain, 
and  so  thorough  has  been  the  process  that  we  are 
liable  to  forget  its  recent  date.  Still  we  offer  no 
opposition  to  a  method  of  recruiting  the  services 

306 


GREATER    AMERICA 

which,  though  through  open  competition,  gives 
superior  opportunities  to  a  certain  class.  The 
conditions  under  which  our  governmental  offices 
of  all  kinds  are  filled  are  such  that  a  special 
education  —  often  a  university  training  —  is  nec 
essary  for  candidates,  and  although  boys  from 
the  poorest  classes  can,  and  do,  win  their  way 
through  scholarships  and  bursaries  to  high  posi 
tions,  just  as  privates  in  the  army  sometimes  rise 
to  commissions  and  high  commands,  such  men 
must  be  of  unusual  caliber,  and  will  be  handicap 
ped  through  life  through  the  hostility  —  not  of 
their  fellow-officials — but  of  their  equals  in  birth 
who  have  become  their  inferiors  in  position.  The 
absence  of  this  ineradicable  class-feeling  is  one 
of  the  greatest  advantages  possessed  by  America, 
but  it  has  the  defects  of  its  qualities,  and  one  of 
these  is  that,  as  privileged  persons  and  dispensers 
of  patronage  may  be  recruited  from  any  section  of 
society,  the  nation  at  large  does  not  perceive  how 
far  it  is  retrograding  from  the  true  principles  of 
democracy  in  sanctioning  their  existence. 

In  one  way  the  Americans  are  certainly  en 
titled  to  boast  that  theirs  is  the  truest  ideal  of 
democracy.  Every  man  is  to  have  an  equal 
chance  of  controlling  his  own  fate;  this  is  the 
bed-rock,  and  it  is  sound  justice  and  humanity. 
Upon  this,  however,  patronage  has  been  grafted. 
Human  nature,  it  seems,  is  too  lop  -  sided  to 
maintain  an  equilibrium.  If  a  man  is  cleverer 
or  more  lucky  than  his  fellows,  if  he  gets  to 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  top  of  the  tree,  he  at  once  sets  about  un- 
equalizing  the  opportunities  of  others,  taking  away 
the  chances  of  his  enemies  and  giving  them  to  his 
friends.  The  grave  fault  in  the  American  democ 
racy  is  that,  in  the  desire  to  give  every  man  the 
length  of  his  tether,  this  human  failing  has  been 
encouraged  and  legalized.  So  deeply  rooted  is 
this  canker  in  the  body  politic  that  it  would  have 
been  a  serious  menace  to  society  were  it  not  for 
the  conditions  which  have  made  political  life  a 
thing  apart.  American  society  of  the  best  sort 
to-day  prides  itself  on  its  aloofness  from  political 
affairs,1  just  as  in  England  politics  is  an  indis 
pensable  feature  and  interest  in  all  good  circles. 
The  plainest  language  is  used  by  American  states 
men  on  the  subject,  and  nowhere  are  its  effects 
more  plainly  stated  than  in  a  recent  utterance  of 
Roosevelt's. 

"Bribe-giver  and  bribe-taker  are  equally  guilty;  both 
alike  sin  against  the  primary  law  of  the  state's  safety.  A 
question  like  this  lies  at  the  root  of  decent  and  honest 
government.  In  the  last  resort  good  laws  and  good  govern 
ment  alike  must  rest  on  the  broad  basis  of  sound  public 
opinion.  A  dull  public  conscience  and  an  easy  acquiescence 
in  corruption  infallibly  mean  debasement  in  public  life. 
Such  an  end  means  the  ruin  of  free  institutions  .  .  .  self- 
government  becomes  a  farce.  Freedom  is  not  a  gift  which 
can  tarry  long  in  the  hands  of  the  dishonest  or  of  those  so 
foolish  or  incompetent  as  to  tolerate  the  dishonesty  of 
public  servants." 

1  Even  in  De  Tocqueville's  time  this  tendency  was  noted. 

308 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  magnitude  of  the  army  of  professional 
politicians  who  are  involved  in  this  system  is 
almost  incredible.  According  to  Bryce,  a  very 
friendly  observer,  they  number  hundreds  of  thou 
sands,  including  office-holders  and  office-seekers. 

As  this  book  is  concerned  with  Greater  America 
we  need  not  further  consider  the  question  of  Civil 
Service  reform  on  the  continent  itself,  although 
that  lies  at  the  foundation  of  everything,  but 
must  see  what  is  wanted  for  the  oversea  empire. 

The  problems  of  contiguous  expansion  are  dif 
ferent  to  those  connected  with  oversea  depend 
encies,  and  the  fact  that  a  certain  form  of  gov 
ernment  has  worked  without  detriment  in  the  one 
case  cannot  be  considered  a  guarantee  for  its  suc 
cess  in  another.  If  Civil  Service  reform  is  nec 
essary  at  home,  how  much  more  is  it  needed  when 
it  affects  the  happiness  and  prosperity  of  alien 
peoples  who  have  neither  the  opportunities  nor 
the  abilities  which  enable  the  American  to  rise 
superior  to  faults  in  his  own  system. 

The  essentials  for  dealing  successfully  with  alien 
peoples  are,  first,  a  clearly  defined  and  consistent 
policy;  and,  second,  a  high  standard  among  the 
men  intrusted  with  the  task  of  government. 

It  is  difficult  in  any  form  of  government  not 
an  absolute  monarchy  to  secure  a  steady  and 
definite  policy  on  any  subject,  especially  on  matters 
of  foreign  policy,  which  cannot  be  trusted  to  the 
common-sense  or  united  interests  of  the  people. 
Foreign  affairs  in  the  United  States  have  always, 

3°9 


GREATER    AMERICA 

therefore,  been  the  especial  province  of  the  Presi 
dent  and  his  cabinet.  Then  arrives  the  point  at 
which  foreign  merges  into  colonial  policy.  Here 
again  the  exigencies  of  the  case  have  tended  more 
and  more  to  give  the  President  the  power  of 
initiating.  With  the  assistance  of  his  cabinet  and 
the  sanction  of  Congress,  he  becomes,  in  fact,  the 
arbiter  of  fate  to  these  millions  of  dependants, 
and,  if  strong  enough,  he  may  secure  to  them  for 
a  time  the  broad  outlines  of  a  steady  policy,  with 
this  important  exception,  that  the  Senate  may 
act  as  a  check  or  drag  at  any  moment  if  he  runs 
against  the  interests  they  represent. 

But  what  can  his  knowledge  be  of  the  multi 
plicity  of  detail  that  goes  to  make  up  the  history 
of  colonial  administration?  How  can  he  even 
check  and  supervise  the  officers  he  appoints?  His 
duties  in  connection  with  home  affairs  are  already 
vast;  he  has  to  keep  the  threads  of  foreign  policy 
clear;  and,  in  addition,  he  has  this  burden  of 
administrative  detail  thrust  on  him.  He  has  no 
machinery  to  help  him,  save  the  spasmodic  ef 
forts  of  committees,  chosen  apparently  with  little 
reference  to  qualifications.  Without  elaborating 
any  further  the  self-evident  fact  that  the  United 
States  is  attempting  to  rule  dependencies  without 
providing  adequate  machinery  for  the  task,  we 
may  as  well  come  at  once  to  the  point.  There 
are  only  two  courses  open  to  her.  Either  she 
must  give  self-government  to  these  dependencies, 
regardless  of  the  consequences,  or  she  must  pro- 

310 


GREATER    AMERICA 

vide   herself   with  the    necessary   machinery   for 
governing  them. 

To  follow  the  first  course  would  be,  as  all 
thoughtful  men  will  agree,  to  deliberately  shirk 
the  consequences  of  her  own  acts  by  evading  a 
responsibility  she  voluntarily  assumed,  and  to 
put  back  the  hands  of  civilization.  To  follow  the 
second  need  not,  as  Americans  sometimes  assume, 
involve  any  further  derogation  from  the  principles 
to  which  they  are  pledged.  Theory  and  practice 
are  already  far  apart,  and  they  will  suffer  no 
further  divorce  from  a  frank  recognition  of  the 
circumstances  and  an  attempt  to  adjust  them  on 
a  basis  of  common-sense. 

It  is  not  to  be  desired  that  Americans  should 
adopt  wholesale  the  methods  of  Europe;  indeed, 
there  is  no  colonial  system  extant  upon  which  she 
might  not  make  improvements.  She  has  the  ad 
vantage,  if  only  she  cares  to  profit  by  it,  of  cen 
turies  of  vicarious  experience.  She  need  not  pass 
through  the  period  of  ignorance  and  corruption, 
followed  by  sublime  indifference,  which  laid  the 
foundation  of  many  colonial  problems  in  Great 
Britain  to-day.  She  can  see  in  our  history  the 
evils  of  patronage  in  a  colonial  Civil  Service  and 
the  remedies  by  which  we  eradicated  it.  She 
need  not  abandon  her  cherished  ideal  of  making 
a  true  democrat  out  of  each  of  her  alien  subjects, 
but  she  must  recognize  that  she  must  show  him 
the  strength  as  well  as  the  beauty  of  her  ideal  be 
fore  she  can  expect  him  to  adopt  it. 

3" 


GREATER    AMERICA 

We  have  dealt  already  with  the  subject  of  the 
American  in  the  tropics,  the  difficulties  which  be 
set  him  more,  perhaps,  than  other  men,  and  the 
desiderata  for  the  foundation  of  a  colonial  Civil 
Service  worthy  of  the  United  States.  The  effort 
already  made  to  place  the  Philippine  Civil  Service 
outside  political  influence  and  on  a  permanent 
basis  is  a  step  in  this  direction,  but,  as  stated  in  a 
previous  chapter,  the  well-meant  effort  has  suffered 
from  the  truly  American  fault  of  too  great  haste. 
No  isolated  attempts  to  deal  with  the  problem 
will,  however,  be  successful,  unless  the  root  of  the 
matter  is  successfully  attacked.  Until  patronage 
is  rooted  out  at  home  the  Civil  Service  will  never 
be  satisfactory  in  any  quarter,  and,  until  the 
machinery  at  Washington  is  adequate  to  its  task 
of  administration,  no  amount  of  work  done  in 
the  dependencies  will  be  really  successful. 

For  the  control  of  the  colonial  administration 
a  permanent  department  is  now  essential.  This 
would  do  in  Washington  what  is  done  in  London 
or  Paris;  collecting  and  holding  all  the  threads  of 
government,  and,  in  the  light  of  the  fullest  in 
formation  and  knowledge  of  previous  circum 
stances,  advising  the  executive  how  to  act.  The 
functions  of  a  permanent  department  necessarily 
become  in  time  more  than  advisory  in  the  matter 
of  detail,  though  its  policy  must  on  broad  lines 
always  be  dictated  by  the  chief  of  the  executive. 
The  existence  of  this  permanent  body  in  no  way 
threatens  the  prerogatives  of  the  popular  govern- 

312 


GREATER    AMERICA 

ment,  but  it  does  secure  the  people  governed  from 
caprice,  ignorance,  and  inconsistency,  which  are 
inevitable  without  it.  The  broad  lines  of  policy 
are,  after  all,  what  the  nation  wishes  to  control; 
as  to  the  details  of  administration  it  is  at  once 
ignorant  and  indifferent. 

As  for  the  constitution  of  the  Civil  Service,  it 
has  already  been  said  that  one  of  the  greatest 
difficulties  is  the  prejudice  of  Americans  against 
any  specialized  training.  They  fear  to  create  a 
class  from  which  alone  civil  servants  can  be  re 
cruited,  and  thus  fall  under  their  pet  aversion, 
officialdom.  They  have  already,  however,  in  the 
army  and  navy,  two  branches  of  service  for  which 
special  training  is  exacted,  and  it  is  noteworthy 
that  both  of  these  enjoy  reputation  and  popularity 
among  their  countrymen.  There  seems  no  real 
reason  why  a  college,  on  similar  lines  to  West 
Point  or  Annapolis,  should  not  serve  as  a  portal  to 
the  higher  grades,  at  all  events,  of  a  Civil  Service 
destined  primarily  for  work  abroad.  The  army 
and  navy  have  already  established  the  principles 
of  permanence,  steadily  progressive  pay,  and  cer 
tain  pensions,  all  conditions  which,  of  course, 
should  be  indispensable  in  any  government  service. 
Although  the  high  general  standard  of  education 
in  America  would  help  to  reduce  the  work  neces 
sary  in  the  Civil  Service  college,  special  attention 
should  be  paid  to  the  acquisition  of  languages  and 
to  other  subjects  specially  useful  to  the  candidate 
in  the  branch  for  which  he  is  qualifying,  but  more 

313 


GREATER    AMERICA 

especially  in  the  inculcation  of  the  spirit  of  self- 
reliance,  coupled  with  strict  obedience  and  esprit 
de  corps,  which  educationists  in  America  are  per 
haps  inclined  to  overlook. 

It  would,  in  the  writer's  opinion,  have  been 
better  had  it  been  possible  to  keep  the  Philippine 
Civil  Service  on  a  national  basis.  It  would  cer 
tainly  have  attracted  a  far  higher  class  of  Amer 
ican.  The  desire  to  include  as  many  natives  as 
possible  has  led  to  a  sacrifice  of  efficiency,  and  this 
is  the  more  to  be  regretted  because,  as  the  ex 
perience  of  Britain  in  India  shows,  it  is  possible 
under  a  small  but  well-paid  and  highly  trained 
supervisory  staff  to  govern  almost  entirely  through 
natives  without  establishing  a  purely  local  Civil 
Service.  To  this  subject  —  the  employment  of 
natives — which  is  so  serious  a  problem  of  expan 
sion,  we  must  shortly  turn.  It  is  necessary  now 
to  touch  briefly  on  some  other  branches  of  Amer 
ican  Civil  Service  which  would  benefit  by  being 
placed  on  a  more  permanent  footing. 

The  American  consular  service  (organized  under 
a  law  of  1856,  under  conditions  which  have  passed 
away)  is  becoming  an  important  body.  With 
the  expansion  of  trade  and  the  extension  of  in 
fluence,  especially  into  Latin  America,  an  immense 
amount  of  interest  and  influence  comes  to  rest  in 
the  hands  of  these  men.  It  is  notorious  that  they 
are  almost  invariably  inadequate  for  the  tasks 
involved.  Many  do  not  uphold  American  dignity 
worthily,  though  they  seldom  fail  to  "spread- 


GREATER    AMERICA 

eagle"  themselves  if  occasion  offers.  They  are 
not  valuable  as  channels  of  information,  and  they 
are  not  able  to  forward  the  interests  of  their 
countrymen.  The  reason  is  simple.  They  owe 
their  appointment  entirely  to  party  influence; 
their  tenure  of  office  is  short  and  insecure,  and 
their  salaries  are  quite  inadequate.  The  consular 
service,  being  devoid  of  attractions,  has  become 
the  refuge  of  disappointed  or  broken-down  poli 
ticians  and  others  who  are  failures.  No  others 
would  attempt  to  live  in  a  foreign  country  (always 
distasteful  to  any  but  the  richest  Americans)  on 
the  wretched  pittances  given,  and  the  opportuni 
ties  for  usefulness  are  rendered  almost  nil  by 
the  fact  that,  as  soon  as  a  man  has  established 
relations  with  his  new  environment,  has  (in  many 
cases)  begun  to  speak  the  language  and  under 
stand  the  ways  of  the  people,  he  has  to  go,  un 
seated  in  the  " general  post"  which  keeps  all 
United  States  officials  forever  on  the  move.  The 
wonder  is  that,  under  these  conditions,  so  many 
men  have  risen  superior  to  circumstances  and  have 
once  more  illustrated  the  American  capacity  for 
making  the  best  of  a  bad  bargain. 

The  diplomatic  service,  despite  its  almost  in 
evitable  dependency  on  party  politics,  has  always 
presented  an  honorable  exception  to  other  branches 
of  American  public  service  in  that  it  attracts  a 
high  and  disinterested  class  of  men.  The  circum 
stances  are  peculiar.  The  representative  of  a  great 
country  at  a  foreign  court  must  support  the 

315 


GREATER    AMERICA 

dignity  of  that  country,  despite  the  fact  that  his 
government  is  far  from  lavish  in  her  allowance  to 
him.  Diplomatic  appointments  have  not  as  a 
rule  been  possible  as  " rewards,"  save  to  men 
whose  ambitions  were  of  a  purely  unmercenary 
character.  The  careers  offered  were,  therefore, 
free  from  the  taint  which  clings  to  other  offices, 
and  were,  moreover,  likely  to  attract  those  to 
whom  association  with  the  best  men  of  other 
nations,  rubbing  against  foreign  culture,  and  the 
study  of  world  affairs  would  outweigh  the  possi 
bilities  of  mere  money  -  making  in  their  own 
country.  The  proportion  of  distinguished  men 
who  have  graced  this  branch  of  American  service 
is  very  high,  and  compares  favorably  with  that  of 
any  other  country. 


CHAPTER    XIV 

PROBLEMS    OF    EXPANSION— THE    EMPLOYMENT    OF 
NATIVES 


WHEN  white  people  undertake  the  govern 
ment  of  a  tropical  country,  and  become  re 
sponsible  for  its  peace  and  well-being,  one  of  the 
first  problems  presented  to  them  is  how  to  find  a 
place  for  the  native  leaders  in  the  new  state  of 
affairs.  The  enlistment  of  prominent  men  among 
the  natives  on  the  side  of  the  conquerors  is  a 
step  of  the  greatest  importance  and  usefulness. 
Unless  something  of  the  sort  can  be  effected 
it  will  be  necessary  to  keep  the  country  per 
manently  under  a  strict  military  rule,  with  an 
immense  official  staff  to  administer  the  laws  and 
keep  order.  In  a  further  stage  of  pacification  it 
becomes  desirable  to  turn  the  warlike  energies 
which  are  found  in  every  community,  civilized  or 
otherwise,  into  a  profitable  channel  by  the  forma 
tion  of  native  troops  or  police,  whose  loyalty  to 
their  foreign  commanders,  however,  must  be  se 
cured  in  various  ways.  These  two  measures— 
the  employment  of  the  intelligent  and  leading 
natives  in  civil  capacities  and  the  enlistment  of 
the  restless  and  warlike  section  of  the  community 

317 


GREATER    AMERICA 

as  troops  and  police — are,  perhaps,  the  most  im 
portant  steps  to  be  taken  in  organizing  the  govern 
ment  of  tropical  countries,  and  upon  the  tact  and 
skill  with  which  they  are  accomplished  depend 
largely  not  only  the  success  of  the  foreign  ruler  but 
the  welfare  of  the  tropical  people  themselves.  The 
great  danger  in  organizing  a  newly  conquered 
territory  is  that  much  discomfort,  much  misunder 
standing  and  trouble  may  be  caused  by  the  whole 
sale  importation  of  raw  officials.  In  Oriental 
countries,  particularly,  it  is  impossible  for  an 
Occidental  to  acquire,  save  through  long  ex 
perience,  the  power  of  dealing  sympathetically 
and  successfully  with  natives.  A  native  official 
may  not  be  as  enlightened,  but  he  will  at  least  be 
unlikely  to  wound  the  susceptibilities  or  prejudices 
of  his  people. 

It  would  seem  natural  that  in  dealing  with  alien 
races  in  the  tropics  the  United  States  should  study 
the  work  accomplished  by  Great  Britain.  It  is  to 
be  feared,  however,  that  a  fundamental  difference 
in  the  point  of  view  of  the  two  great  Anglo-Saxon 
nations  has  led  the  younger  one  to  rash  and  hasty 
conclusions  as  to  the  elder,  which  prevent  the 
useful  experience  accumulated  in  India  and  else 
where  from  being  of  assistance  to  the  United 
States  in  her  new  departure  in  the  Pacific.  An 
extraordinary  amount  of  misconception,  founded 
chiefly  on  ignorance  of  past  history,  prevails  in 
the  United  States — and,  indeed,  in  our  own  coun 
try — as  to  British  rule  in  India.  There  is  a  gen- 

318 


GREATER    AMERICA 

eral  impression  that  we  won  our  Indian  Empire 
ruthlessly  by  the  sword,  dispossessed  the  "  native 
princes  "  either  by  force  or  fraud,  and  are  now  en 
gaged  in  governing  arbitrarily  a  subjugated  na 
tion.  This  broad  outline  of  our  relations  with  In 
dia  is  sufficiently  justified  to  gain  acceptance  for 
that  most  dangerous  kind  of  generalization — the 
half-truth.  Filled  in  by  a  vivid  imagination,  it 
may  assume  forms  which  are  a  gross  libel,  and  it 
is  the  distortion  of  the  main  facts  which  has  led 
so  many,  and  not  merely  thoughtless,  Americans 
to  dismiss  British  methods  as  contrary  to  the  spirit 
of  true  liberty  and  democracy,  and,  therefore,  as 
of  little  value  for  the  United  States. 

In  many  aspects  of  the  situation,  however,  there 
is  a  striking  likeness  between  the  problem  in  the 
Pacific  and  that  faced  by  the  British  in  India. 
The  inhabitants  of  the  Philippine  islands,  known 
as  Filipinos,  are,  as  already  said,  not  in  reality  a 
nation  or  a  people,  but  a  congeries  of  races  speak 
ing  several  different  languages  and  innumerable 
dialects,  and  scattered  through  a  number  of  islands 
often  difficult  of  access.  They  had,  when  the 
Spaniards  finally  left  the  islands,  no  settled  form 
of  government,  no  unity  of  religion  or  customs,  no 
allegiance  to  a  central  authority.  In  Spanish  days 
many  islands  even  maintained  a  savage  indepen 
dence.  They  had  no  hereditary  aristocracy  to 
whom  the  mass  of  the  people  owed  unquestioned 
obedience,  and  among  the  wilder  people  the  tribal 
organization  lingered,  but  the  Spaniards  had  done 


GREATER    AMERICA 

their  best  to  eradicate  it  for  three  hundred  years. 
The  upper  class — which  took  the  place  of  an  ar 
istocracy — was  exclusively  formed  of  half-breeds, 
who  are  to  this  day  almost  foreigners  in  traditions, 
manners,  and  appearance,  and  have  no  real  hold 
on  the  affections  or  allegiance  of  the  people.  In 
the  Mohammedan  islands  of  the  south  the  govern 
ment  of  hereditary  chiefs  survived,  fostered  by 
religious  traditions,  but  the  problem  was  com 
plicated  by  other  conditions  of  life  which  are  an 
essential  part  of  a  Mussulman  state. 

It  may  surprise  some  people  to  learn  that  all 
these  difficulties,  in  an  aggravated  form,  had  to 
be  met  in  organizing  a  stable  government  for 
India.  The  enormous  empire  which  bears  that 
name  offered  physical  difficulties  far  greater,  at 
the  time  of  conquest,  than  any  encountered  in  the 
Philippines.  The  peoples  of  that  country  are  more 
diversified  in  race,  religion,  and  customs  than  the 
inhabitants  of  the  archipelago  can  possibly  be. 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  natives  of  India 
offer  more  startling  contrasts  in  these  respects 
than  the  inhabitants  of  Europe,  and  the  nature 
of  the  country  and  climate  is  equally  varied. 

To  suppose  that  Great  Britain  conquered  this 
vast  empire  by  force  of  arms  or  fraud,  deposing 
native  governments  as  she  went  along,  is  to  pay 
a  compliment  to  her  resources  and  endurance 
which  is  not  deserved.  There  was  no  stable  gov 
ernment  in  the  country  generally  or  among  the 
innumerable  states  of  which  it  was  made  up. 

320 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  Great  Mogul  emperors,  themselves  aliens  and 
conquerors,  had  gathered  a  large  portion  of  the 
country  together  into  a  vast  empire,  governing,  as 
is  the  Oriental  manner,  in  the  loosest  way  and 
merely  enforcing  the  payment  of  a  rigorous  taxa 
tion  on  the  people.  When  this  empire  decayed 
there  was  a  general  scramble  for  the  pieces,  and 
the  East  India  Company  and  France  were  the 
keenest  competitors.  The  Mohammedan  invasion 
had  placed  on  the  thrones  of  many  of  the  native 
states  men  who  in  race  and  religion  were  as 
much  foreigners  to  the  people  they  ruled  as  were 
the  Europeans.  Nothing  resembling  a  whole 
sale  deposition  of  native  rulers  was  attempted, 
and  many  of  these  Mohammedan  governments 
were  even  bolstered  up,  while  the  British  interven 
tion  saved  the  last  remnants  of  the  really  ancient 
native  states,  whose  hereditary  institutions  go 
back  to  a  period  of  probably  over  a  thousand 
years.  It  is  not  possible  here  to  give  any  adequate 
description  of  the  means  employed  to  weld  this 
heterogeneous  mass  into  an  empire  under  one 
rule.  In  the  process  there  have  been  mistakes 
innumerable,  and  even  to-day  there  is  much  to  be 
desired  in  the  system  which  has  been  gradually 
evolved.  It  cannot,  however,  be  too  strongly 
insisted  on  that,  whatever  may  have  been  her 
original  motives,  Britain  has  for  a  considerable 
period  devoted  her  energies  with  a  single  eye  to 
the  betterment  of  the  conditions  of  life  in  the  vast 
territory  under  her  control.  Without  the  strong 

31  321 


GREATER    AMERICA 

hand  with  which  she  keeps  in  check  the  different 
races,  anarchy  and  bloodshed  would  spread  them 
selves  over  the  land.  To  quote  a  distinguished 
Mohammedan  of  northern  India:  "This  thing" 
—the  question  as  to  who  after  the  departure  of 
the  English  would  be  conquerors  —  "would  rest 
on  the  will  of  God.  But  until  one  nation  had 
conquered  another  (the  Hindoos  and  Mohamme 
dans)  and  made  it  obedient,  peace  could  not  reign 
in  the  land." 

The  subject  with  which  we  are  at  present  con 
cerned  is,  however,  not  the  right  or  necessity 
which  takes  the  Occidental  into  Oriental  coun 
tries,  but  the  methods  of  dealing  with  the  native 
population.  We  have  seen  that  in  India,  as  com 
pared  with  the  Philippines,  administrators  had  a 
more  complicated  problem  to  solve  because  the 
methods  and  traditions  of  government  varied 
more  widely  there  than  in  the  archipelago,  as  did 
also  the  character  of  the  races,  religions,  and 
conditions  of  life.  Any  attempt  to  establish  at 
once  a  uniform  and  settled  mode  of  government 
would  have  involved  not  only  an  overwhelming 
force  of  military  and  officials  to  back  it,  but  a 
great  amount  of  injustice  to  the  people.  The 
general  policy  may  be  said  to  have  been  that  of 
dealing  with  each  state  on  its  merits,  and  of 
interfering  as  little  as  possible.  In  some  cases  the 
desire  to  retain  as  far  as  practicable  the  outward 
forms  of  government  to  which  the  people  were 
accustomed  led,  indeed,  to  the  prolongation  of  a 

322 


GREATER    AMERICA 

system  of  tyranny  and  misrule  which  might  have 
been  avoided  by  more  drastic  measures.  Up  to 
the  last  few  years  there  have  been  native  rulers 
under  British  protection  whose  practices  could 
not  be  permanently  tolerated,  and  who,  per 
sisting  in  their  evil  ways,  despite  the  advice 
of  their  Residents,  have  been  deprived  of  their 
positions,  thus  affording  the  critics  of  Britain 
another  opportunity  to  denounce  her  grasping, 
unscrupulous  ambition. 

There  is,  of  course,  a  difference  in  the  position  of 
the  various  protected  native  states  which  still 
enjoy  a  varying  degree  of  independence,  but  all 
acknowledge  the  paramount  power  of  Britain  and 
her  right  to  interfere  in,  for  instance,  a  case  of 
civil  war  or  of  injustice  and  tyranny.  None  can 
maintain  a  larger  military  establishment  than  is 
approved  by  the  British  government,  nor  enter 
into  negotiations  with  another  state  or  a  foreign 
power. 

There  is  a  large  section  of  India — about  four- 
sevenths  of  the  whole  area  —  not  comprised  in 
these  native,  semi-independent  states,  which  was 
placed  at  first  under  military  rule  and  then 
organized  under  the  direct  rule  of  the  govern 
ment.  Part  of  British  India,  as  it  is  called,  was 
undoubtedly  taken  by  force,  from  those  who  had, 
however,  previously  conquered  it.  In  this  territory 
the  only  way  in  which  any  native  can  obtain  a 
position  of  authority  is  by  entering  the  Civil  Ser 
vice  and  becoming  a  servant  of  the  British  crown. 

323 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  conditions  under  which  he  may  do  this  have 
been  altered  and  revised  within  recent  years,  and 
at  the  present  moment  a  very  wide  range  of  op 
portunities  presents  itself. 

The  Civil  Service  is  divided  into  two  sections, 
for  the  management  of  the  higher  branches  of  the 
executive  and  judicial  administration.  The  first 
is  an  Imperial  service,  a  select  body  recruited  by 
competition  in  England,  but  open  to  any  British 
subject — European,  colonial,  or  native.  The  high 
class  of  men  attracted  by  this  service,  the  reason 
for  its  popularity,  and  its  general  efficiency  have 
been  noted  elsewhere.  From  this  service  the 
majority  of  the  highest  civil  offices  are  filled,  as 
well  as  a  number  of  less  important  posts  in  which 
the  younger  men  get  their  training.  The  second 
service  is  a  provincial  one,  a  huge  body  recruited 
in  the  chief  Indian  provinces,  and  consisting  al 
most  entirely  of  natives.  The  detailed  civil  ad 
ministration  of  the  country  is,  therefore,  carried 
on  almost  entirely  by  natives,  under  the  super 
vision  of  a  small  handful  of  white  men — actually 
eight  hundred  in  number,  or  one  official  to  every 
three  hundred  thousand  of  native  population  and 
each  one  thousand  two  hundred  square  miles  of 
territory.  The  general  principle  now  followed  in 
the  employment  of  natives  is  that  no  post  save 
the  very  highest  shall  be  closed  to  natives  of  proved 
ability  and  probity;  but  in  practice  there  is  little 
chance  that  a  native  will  rise  to  the  chief  executive 
and  administrative  posts.  These  are  reserved  for 

324 


GREATER    AMERICA 

men  recruited  in  England ;  and  without  the  train 
ing  of  an  English  school  or  university — not  a  mere 
literary  training,  be  it  observed — it  is  not  thought 
that  the  native  can  attain  to  the  standard  re 
quired  for  such  offices.  Few  are  likely  to  pass  this 
test  successfully.  In  the  judicial  branch  the  na 
tive  has  practically  an  open  field,  and  makes  an 
excellent  use  of  the  opportunities  offered  him. 
The  standard  of  morality  among  the  native  of 
ficials  has  improved  surely,  if  slowly,  and  in 
some  departments  is  very  high.  Three  factors 
have  contributed  to  this — better  education,  the 
example  of  Europeans,  and  the  removal  of  tempta 
tion  by  granting  salaries  on  a  very  liberal  scale. 
With  regard  to  the  latter  point  there  is  no  country 
in  Europe  —  save,  perhaps,  Britain  —  where  of 
ficials  are  so  well  paid  as  are  those  of  the  native 
Civil  Service  in  India.  They  are  infinitely  better 
paid  than  American  officials  in  the  Philippines. 
Besides  the  civil,  judicial,  and  executive  services, 
there  are  other  departments  in  India — the  Public 
Works,  Forestry,  Telegraph,  Police,  and  Education 
—all  organized  on  much  the  same  lines,  by  which 
the  majority  of  posts  are  filled  by  men  educated 
and  recruited  in  India,  and  the  minority  by  open 
competition  in  England.  This  competition  is,  in 
the  education  department,  superseded  by  selection, 
and  a  certain  degree  of  selection  influences  all  the 
services. 

It  may  seem  to  an  American  unjust  that  any 
restriction   should   be   placed   on   the   careers   of 

325 


GREATER    AMERICA 

natives  who  are  able  to  pass  the  necessary  educa 
tional  tests,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  in 
India,  as  in  all  countries,  but  more  especially  Ori 
ental  ones,  the  educational  test  is  far  from  perfec 
tion  in  bringing  the  best  men  to  the  fore.  This 
is  true  in  Britain,  where  the  growing  dislike  of 
patronage  has  made  the  competitive  examination 
almost  the  only  door  to  a  government  career,  and 
has,  therefore,  undoubtedly  excluded  a  number 
of  men  who  are  excellently  qualified  in  character 
for  such  careers.  Still,  no  superior  system  can  be 
devised,  and  the  material  available  is  of  such  good 
quality  and  the  traditions  of  the  service  have  be 
come  so  strongly  rooted  that  there  is  little  chance 
of  deterioration  in  the  general  standard.  But  in 
Oriental  countries — and  in  some  others  which  are 
not  Oriental — circumstances  have  made  politics 
and  government  more  of  a  trade  than  a  profession. 
This  is  aggravated  in  India  by  the  caste  system, 
and  we  find  there  that  the  men  of  strongest  charac 
ter,  belonging  to  the  purest  races  and  representing 
the  cream  of  native  life,  would  not  only  be  beaten 
in  any  competitive  test  by  a  quicker,  brighter,  but 
far  less  reliable  race,  but  could  hardly  be  persuad 
ed  to  submit  to  such  a  test  and  enter  upon  a  strug 
gle  which  would  involve  a  loss  of  their  dignity  and 
racial  pride. 

It  is  the  Bengali  —  the  intellectual  but  shifty, 

restless,  intriguing  element,  useless  in  time  of  war 

—who  fills  the  government  offices.     Apart  from 

his  defects,  it  would  be  absolutely  impossible  to 

326 


GREATER    AMERICA 

open  to  him  posts  which  would  make  him  prac 
tical  ruler  of  races  which  are  deeply  antagonistic 
to  him,  and  which  in  essentials  of  command  are 
his  superior.  These  submit  to  the  Englishman, 
respecting,  if  they  do  not  love  him;  but  to  an 
other  " native,"  of  a  race  they  despise  and  hate, 
they  would  give  neither  obedience  nor  respect. 

This  problem,  in  a  modified  form,  is  one  that 
meets  the  white  man  in  the  tropics  wherever  he 
goes.  Before  he  gives  any  native  power  over 
others  he  must  be  sure  of  a  good  many  things, 
about  which  it  will  be  exceedingly  difficult  to  get 
information.  It  may  be  argued,  therefore,  that 
the  best  way  is  to  allow  the  natives  to  select  their 
own  rulers,  and  to  this  alternative  we  must  re 
turn  later.  Meanwhile,  it  may  be  useful  to  sum 
up  the  principal  features  in  the  employment  of 
natives  by  Great  Britain  in  India. 

First,  the  system  has  been  gradually  evolved, 
and  every  effort  consistent  with  the  preservation 
of  British  supremacy  has  been  made  to  preserve 
to  the  aristocracy  of  the  country  their  position 
and  privileges.  Religious  customs  have  not  only 
been  tolerated  but  protected,  except  in  such  mat 
ters  as  involve  breaches  of  the  laws  of  life  and 
property.  Racial  prejudices  have  been  respected. 
Secondly,  a  wide  range  of  careers  has  been  opened 
to  natives,  always  as  the  paid  servants  of  the 
government.  Thirdly,  both  European  and  native 
officials  receive  salaries  which  should  place  them 
above  the  temptation  to  corruption.  These  sal- 

327 


GREATER    AMERICA 

aries  are  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  actual  ex 
penses  of  life  in  India,  and  are  not  regulated  by 
European  custom.  Fourthly,  it  is  recognized  that 
Britons  are,  after  all,  foreigners  in  India,  and  that 
they  rule  alien  races  who  would  probably  prefer 
to  misrule  themselves.  It  is  also  premised  that 
British  rule  is  unquestionably  the  best,  and  that 
the  best  and  highest  British  education  is  necessary 
to  manufacture  British  rulers,  so  that  the  most 
important  posts  must  be  filled  by  men  with  this 
important  qualification.  Fifthly,  this  corps  d*  elite 
must  be  spread  over  the  country,  thinly  but 
evenly,  to  secure  a  thorough  oversight  of  all  its 
affairs.  Finally,  the  government  is  centralized, 
but  not  over-centralized,  and  its  supreme  control 
lies  in  the  hands  of  a  British  viceroy,  who  is 
answerable  to  the  Parliament  and  the  crown, 
through  a  Secretary  of  State  (a  member  of  the 
cabinet),  directing  a  department  known  as  the 
India  Office,  assisted  by  the  advice  of  a  body 
called  the  Indian  Council,  drawn  from  men  of 
Indian  experience. 

Municipal  government  in  British  India  is  largely 
carried  on  by  natives,  there  being  as  many  as 
seven  hundred  and  fifty  towns  with  a  municipal 
organization,  elected  chiefly  by  the  tax -payers 
and  dealing  with  matters  of  local  interest,  such 
as  water  supply,  sanitation,  roads,  and  markets. 
It  is  very  doubtful  to  what  extent  this  municipal 
freedom  has  been  a  benefit  to  the  people,  and, 
despite  optimistic  official  reports,  there  is  a  general 

328 


UNIVERSITY 
GREATER    AMERICA 

opinion  that,  even  with  the  considerable  influence 
brought  to  bear  by  British  officials,  a  good  deal  of 
abuse  has  crept  into  the  working  of  the  system, 
especially  in  all  matters  connected  with  finance 
or  patronage.  Uninfluenced  and  uncontrolled, 
there  can  be  little  doubt  what  the  result  would  be. 

There  is,  in  fact,  considerable  discrepancy  in 
the  views  expressed  regarding  the  success  general 
ly  of  the  British  raj  in  India.  Those  who  hold  an 
unfavorable  opinion  must,  however,  be  prepared 
to  be  asked  by  what  standard  they  are  judging — 
whether  they  have  any  clear  conception  of  what 
India  was  like  before  the  British  took  it  in  hand; 
what  would  be  its  condition  were  they  to  abandon 
control.  It  must  be  remembered  that  among  the 
incontestable  benefits  bestowed  on  the  many  races 
of  the  countries  known  as  India  must  be  counted 
a  law  and  order  which  it  had  never  known  before, 
the  opening-up  of  communications,  and  the  es 
tablishment  of  native  colleges,  where  education  of 
a  far  wider  range  is  given  and  infinitely  wider  op 
portunities  than  any  native  possessed  before. 

As  regards  the  efficiency  and  high  character  of 
the  Indian  services,  it  is  often  forgotten  in  Brit 
ain,  and  is  little  known  in  the  United  States,  that 
the  present  condition  was  only  achieved  within 
recent  years,  and  that  a  long  process  of  evolution 
was  necessary  to  organize  the  branches  of  a  govern 
ment  so  wide  and  varied  in  its  operations.  As  an 
instance  of  the  slowness  of  development  which  has 
been  found  essential  owing  to  the  complicated 

329 


GREATER    AMERICA 

problems  to  be  faced,  it  may  be  mentioned  that 
the  penal  code,  now  allowed  to  be  at  once  the 
simplest  and  most  efficient  ever  devised,  was 
draughted  forty  years  before  it  passed  into  law, 
and  was  during  that  period  constantly  revised  by 
the  ablest  jurists. 

This  brief  description  of  the  British  raj  in  India 
is,  perhaps,  rather  in  the  nature  of  a  digression 
in  a  book  dealing  with  Greater  America.  It  has 
been  written,  however,  with  a  view  to  dispel  a 
few  illusions  in  the  mind  of  the  American  reader, 
and  as  affording  a  valuable  analogy  to  American 
expansion  in  the  Pacific. 

At  first  sight,  it  is  rather  the  points  of  contrast 
than  those  of  similarity  which  strike  us.  Our  own 
expansion  has  taken  place  openly  and  avowedly 
for  purposes  of  trade.  As  a  rule,  we  have  post 
poned  the  problem  of  providing  a  permanent 
government  for  our  dependencies  as  long  as 
possible.  The  Englishman  has  never  been  the 
apostle  of  a  political  theory.  American  expansion, 
on  the  contrary,  has  cloaked  itself  continually  in 
the  garb  of  a  mission  of  liberty.  In  reality  a 
hard-headed,  practical  people,  not  likely  to  go  into 
any  enterprise  without  a  sound  commercial  basis 
—driven,  moreover,  in  late  years  by  industrial 
expansion  —  the  United  States  of  America  has, 
nevertheless,  constantly  held  up  the  idealistic 
point  of  view  of  their  own  actions.  Readers  of 
this  book  will  know  that  the  writer  does  not  share 
this  view.  To  him  the  expansion  of  America  does 

330 


GREATER    AMERICA 

not  appear  either  capricious  or  altruistic.  It  has 
been  the  logical,  determined  progress  of  a  strong 
people,  who,  if  they  lack,  as  Bryce  declares,  the 
"earth-hunger"  which  has  inspired  other  nations, 
have  certainly  managed  to  disguise  their  true 
sentiments. 

In  the  Philippines,  however,  they  were  forced 
to  take  a  step  which  has  a  very  plausible  semblance 
of  disinterestedness.  Regarded  as  an  isolated  act, 
their  occupation  of  the  archipelago  has  even  a 
quixotic  aspect.  It  is,  therefore,  excusable  that 
this  point  of  view  should  have  been  taken  by 
many  people,  and  certainly  no  Briton  can  afford 
to  scoff  at  their  attitude. 

When  the  perspective  of  time  restores  to  their 
true  places  in  history  these  recent  happenings  in 
the  Pacific,  it  will,  however,  become  plain  that  in 
following  out  the  destiny  she  had  marked  out  for 
herself,  in  breaking  up  the  Spanish  colonial  empire, 
and  in  providing  for  the  development  of  her 
Pacific  coast,  America  went  but  little,  if  at  all,  out 
of  her  way  when  Dewey  steamed  into  Manila  Bay. 
Once  there,  she  was  equally  bound  to  stay.  No 
Power  with  her  aspirations  could  have  left  the 
islands;  to  do  so  would  have  been  a  retrograde 
step  not  only  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  but  in  actual 
progress  towards  that  goal  which  no  American 
disclaims. 

Having  found  her  India  rather  suddenly,  how 
ever,  America  is  disposed  to  regard  it  as  a  white 
elephant.  The  British  view  of  his  Indian  Empire 


GREATER    AMERICA 

is  an  eminently  sane  one,  and  does  not  really  clash 
with  any  American  ideals;  but  the  American  does 
not  yet  know  quite  what  to  think  about  the 
Philippines.  India  to  the  Briton  does  not  now 
mean,  as  some  Americans  still  imagine,  a  source 
of  infinite  wealth.  We  trade  with  our  empire, 
but  we  have  sunk  a  good  deal  of  money  in  it,  for 
which  we  are  not  getting  an  excessive  return. 
Far  from  being  an  actual  source  of  wealth,  we  still 
spend  a  good  deal  on  the  equipment  of  her  civil 
service.  She  pays  her  own  expenses,  and  is  in 
clined  to  grumble  that  we  force  on  her  a  policy  of 
defence  which  is  very  costly.  This  is  the  Imperial 
burden,  which  some  of  our  colonies  are  inclined  to 
shirk.  India,  however,  is  paying  for  immunity 
from  invasion  which  can  only  be  secured  by  strong 
defence. 

To  the  Briton  India  means  the  prestige  of  his 
country,  a  training-ground  of  character  for  his 
race,  a  field  of  wide  and  interesting  work,  both 
on  his  own  account  and  in  the  interests  of  the 
native  peoples.  Incidentally,  the  Briton's  view 
includes  also  the  desire,  born  of  his  innate  sense  of 
justice,  that  the  natives  should  be  allowed  every 
privilege  consonant  with  their  own  welfare.  He 
regards  their  welfare  as  of  extreme  importance, 
though  not,  perhaps,  for  any  very  altruistic  mo 
tives.  To  take  a  broad  view,  it  is  as  a  field  for 
his  energies  that  he  chiefly  regards  the  empire 
which  tradition  and  the  heroic  exploits  of  his 
forefathers  have  also  invested  with  a  glow  of 

332 


GREATER    AMERICA 

sentiment.  Enough  has  been  said  to  show  that 
his  energies  have  by  no  means  flowed  in  purely 
selfish  channels. 

Why  should  not  the  American  adopt  a  similar 
view  of  the  Philippines?  Partly  because  of  rea 
sons  set  forth  in  a  previous  chapter,1  partly  be 
cause  he  feels  bound  to  consider  the  natives  as  in 
dividuals  with  rights;  and  also  partly  because, 
thanks  to  the  demagogues,  fanatics,  and  cranks  of 
his  own  country,  he  is  still  wavering  under  the  im 
pression  that  he  is  wronging  both  the  Filipino  and 
himself  by  his  action  in  retaining  control  of  the 
archipelago.  In  any  case,  he  feels  bound  to  show 
by  his  actions  that  in  occupying  the  Philippines 
he  was  actuated  by  the  highest  motives.  These 
sentiments  may  have  little  relation  to  real  facts; 
they  may  blind  men  to  their  own  logical  position 
and  may  create  false  hopes,  but  they  are  genuine 
in  their  way  and  have  their  origin  in  the  funda 
mental  principles  of  life.  The  enlightened  British 
view  of  dependencies  is  to  make  them  prosperous 
and  give  them  the  best  government  possible.  The 
American  view  is  to  give  them  the  power  of  govern 
ing  themselves ;  and  that  then  all  these  things  will 
be  added  unto  them.  This  divergence  of  ideals 
would  apparently  make  any  approximation  of  the 
American  to  the  British  view  impossible.  It  will 
lead  the  American  who  has  read  the  foregoing 
pages,  as  a  justification  of  our  work  in  India,  to 

1  "Americans  in  the  Tropics," 
333 


GREATER    AMERICA 

reply :  "  Yes ;  you  may  be  doing  your  best,  and  your 
best  may  be  very  good  after  your  lights;  but  we 
are  bound  to  act  up  to  ours,  and  they  are  very 
different  lights,  indeed." 

Taking  this  rational  objection  into  considera 
tion,  and  remembering  the  lofty  ideal  which,  de 
spite  everything,  has  undoubtedly  had  its  place  in 
the  American  attempt  to  deal  with  the  Filipinos, 
we  are  bound  to  be  somewhat  disappointed  with 
the  results  so  far  as  we  can  trace  them.  It  must 
be  noted  that  methods  very  similar  to  those  of 
Britain  have  been  adopted,  most  successfully,  in 
Puerto  Rico.  Up  to  the  point  of  evacuation  there 
was  more  common-sense  than  idealism  displayed 
in  Cuba.  In  the  Caribbean,  therefore,  the  apostles 
of  liberty  have  not  sacrificed  efficiency  to  theory. 
There  has  been  no  question  of  placing  Puerto- 
Ricans  among  the  " really  free  peoples";  they  are 
even  denied  a  position  among  free  Americans.  We 
need  not  enlarge  here  on  the  subject  of  Cuba. 

The  Filipinos  apparently  presented  themselves 
as  better  material — there  are  more  of  them,  to  be 
sure  —  and  the  idea  of  converting  tribes  to  the 
number  of  seven  million  into  a  free,  self-governing 
" nation"  was  a  fascinating  one,  and  by  its  very 
size  appealed  to  the  American  mind.  One  of  the 
first  discoveries  of  the  conquerors,  however,  was 
that  their  task  was  much  more  complicated  than 
they  thought.  One  of  its  most  difficult  features 
was  that  which  has  exercised  Britons  in  India  so 
greatly,  and  has  only  recently  been  placed  on  a 

334 


GREATER    AMERICA 

fairly  sound  basis.  The  employment  of  natives 
in  the  government  of  their  own  country  was 
complicated  in  the  Philippines  by  a  general  igno 
rance  lit  up  with  flashes  of  precocious  ability.  At 
first  the  governmental  structure  was  piled  together 
in  an  arbitrary  and  hap-hazard  way,  but  the 
necessity  for  a  more  orderly  system,  and,  above 
all,  the  desire  of  all  honest  men  concerned  to  place 
the  Philippine  officials  out  of  the  influence  of  the 
Spoils  System,  precipitated  matters,  and  in  the 
autumn  of  1900  the  scheme  was  already  fully 
developed  and  a  Civil  Service  board  began  work. 
It  is  necessary  to  describe  in  some  detail  the  work 
ing  of  this  board,  since  it  presumably  embodies  the 
result  of  American  studies  of  existing  systems, 
modified  by  the  enlightened  principles  of  democ 
racy.  One  may  reasonably  expect  it,  if  far  from 
perfect  in  detail,  to  be  informed  by  the  spirit  of 
wide  justice  and  foresight,  full  of  provisions  to 
insure,  as  the  act  says,  "  an  honest  and  efficient 
Civil  Service  for  the  Philippines." 

The  Civil  Service  board  is  the  root  of  the  whole 
matter.  Upon  it  the  whole  structure,  in  fact, 
depends  for  its  success. 

It  is  composed  of  three  men  appointed  by  the 
Philippine  commission,  and,  although  the  com 
position  has  varied,  always  includes  one  Filipino. 
The  functions  of  this  board  are  not  comparable  to 
that  of  any  body  in  the  British  system.  Primari 
ly  an  examining  board,  it  has  also  been  intrusted 
with  the  preparation  of  reports  on  such  subjects 

335 


GREATER    AMERICA 

as  salaries,  and  is  also  a  sort  of  reference  committee 
to  which  the  heads  of  departments  must  report, 
and  which  has  a  voice  in  all  matters  relating  to 
personnel  "which  do  not  affect  the  internal  ad 
ministration  of  departments."  It  is  a  little  dif 
ficult  to  imagine  the  exact  nature  of  the  latter 
circumstances. 

The  method  of  procedure,  so  far  as  can  be 
gathered  from  the  not  very  lucid  reports,  is  to 
hold  examinations  in  every  subject  of  which  a 
knowledge  is  required  in  the  various  branches  of 
government  service.  A  certain  amount  of  con 
fusion  was  inevitable  from  the  fact  that  many 
posts  were  already  filled,  but  this  has  been  partly 
obviated  by  examination  of  the  acting  employes. 
Every  bureau  or  department,  the  provincial  ser 
vices,  and  the  municipality  of  Manila  are  now 
closed  to  all  save  candidates  who  have  passed 
the  prescribed  tests.  Examinations  are  held  in 
Manila,  Iloilo,  and  Cebu,  and  also  in  the  United 
States.  The  examinations  are  in  Spanish  and 
English,  and  while  it  is  to  be  presumed  that 
English  is  required  of  all  candidates  for  the  higher 
positions,  it  is  not  clear  exactly  where  the  line  is 
drawn.  The  highest  posts — the  heads  of  bureaus, 
executive  secretaries,  and  officials  who  require 
special  technical  or  scientific  knowledge — are  ex 
empted  from  this  rule.  Appointed  originally  by 
the  civil  commission  for  special  aptitude,  these 
officers  will  be  succeeded  by  men  drawn  from  a 
class  formed  of  the  chief  assistants  in  their  offices 

336 


GREATER    AMERICA 

and  promoted  on  merit.  The  specialists  are  re 
cruited  from  the  lists  of  the  federal  classified 
service,  and  are  transferred  for  a  time  to  the 
Philippines.  Apparently  this  was  the  only  way 
in  which  efficient  officers  could  be  secured. 

It  is  not  easy  to  define  the  exact  relations  be 
tween  the  Civil  Service  board  and  the  heads  of 
departments.  The  latter  furnish  the  board  with 
lists  of  vacancies  in  their  offices,  and  are  in  return 
furnished  with  lists  of  "  eligibles  "  from  which  they 
are  allowed  to  "  select."  As  their  choice  is  limited, 
by  the  obligation  to  prefer  a  Filipino  to  an  Amer 
ican,  and  among  Americans  those  who  have  served 
in  the  army  or  navy ;  and  as,  we  are  told,  the  lists 
sometimes  contain  not  more  than  two  names  for 
each  post  to  be  filled,  it  is  obvious  that  the  heads 
of  departments  are  somewhat  restricted  as  to  this 
"  selection."  It  is,  in  fact,  the  board  which  is  the 
appointing  authority,  and  only  the  strictest  im 
partiality  on  the  part  of  its  members  can  prevent 
the  recurrence  of  abuses  which  it  was  particular 
ly  intended  to  avoid.  The  heads  of  departments 
may  grant  leave  of  absence  on  a  fixed  schedule, 
may  vary  the  salary  of  the  employes  within  certain 
limits,  and  have,  of  course,  the  power  of  reporting 
adversely  on  unsatisfactory  work.  They  are,  more 
over,  permitted  to  select,  appoint,  and  discharge 
some  of  their  subordinates  who  are  merely  laborers 
or  unskilled  workmen. 

All  this  would,  perhaps,  have  been  an  ample 
provision  to  lay  the  foundations  of  a  Civil  Service 

337 


GREATER    AMERICA 

and  to  secure  the  freedom  of  action  of  an  executive 
head  if  the  Philippines  were  a  normally  constituted 
country  with  an  ample  supply  of  material.  As  it  is, 
the  operation  of  race  jealousy,  the  lack  of  educated 
material,  the  inordinate  ambition  of  the  mestizo 
aristocracy  make  it  difficult  to  work  this  elaborate 
Civil  Service  machine  without  mistakes  and  in 
justice,  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  odium 
of  these  descends  on  the  central  government.  It 
appears  to  the  writer  to  be,  once  more,  an  over- 
elaboration  of  machinery  to  have  created  this 
maze  of  examinations,  appointments,  promotions, 
and  reports.  The  first  step  should  have  been  to 
secure  an  able  and  permanent  body  of  officials  of 
the  higher  grades,  and  to  permit  them  to  fill  at 
their  own  discretion  all  clerical  posts,  at  all  events, 
holding  them  responsible  for  the  efficient  working 
of  their  respective  departments.  It  is  difficult  to 
see  what  good  purpose  is  served  by  the  inclusion 
in  the  lists  of  such  functionaries  as  pipe-fitters, 
letter-carriers,  or  bomber os,  and  in  practice  these 
are  controlled  entirely  by  their  departmental 
heads.  They  serve  to  swell  the  lists  of  candidates, 
however,  and  to  increase  the  technical  work  of  the 
board,  which  prides  itself  on  the  number  of  exami 
nations  it  can  hold  in  one  year,  and  is  apparently 
convinced  that  " eligible"  means  " efficient." 

Unfortunately,  no  fixed  tenure  of  service  could 
be  settled  for  officials  drafted  in  from  home,  and 
throughout  there  seems  to  run  a  presumption  that 
three  years  will  be  the  extreme  length  of  service. 

333 


GREATER    AMERICA 

"The  matter  of  return  to  the  United  States  after 
a  certain  lapse  of  time  will  always  be  considered 
by  persons  taking  service  in  the  Philippines." 
This  is,  of  course,  one  of  the  most  serious  bars  to 
efficiency.  Honesty  should  be  secured  by  the 
promotion  on  merit  system,  which,  it  is  claimed, 
is  thoroughly  carried  out  in  the  present  service. 
No  provisions,  however,  can  secure  this  unless 
both  the  Civil  Service  board  itself  and  the  chief 
officials  of  departments  are  above  suspicion. 

As  regards  the  former,  it  seems  unfortunate 
that  the  most  permanent  factor  in  its  composition 
(which  has  already  suffered  several  changes)  is 
a  Filipino  gentleman  of  extremely  checkered 
political  career.  The  first  president  was,  fort 
unately,  a  man  of  high  capacity  and  integrity, 
the  one  Filipino  against  whom  no  one  had  ever 
alleged  anything  evil;  but  there  are  not  many 
public  men  in  Manila  who  could  even  approach 
this  standard.  The  salary  paid  to  each  member  of 
the  board  (three  thousand  five  hundred  dollars)  is 
not  sufficient,  under  the  circumstances  of  life  in 
Manila,1  to  attract  able  men  of  the  best  character 
from  the  United  States,  and  the  enormous  amount 
of  clerical  and  routine  work  involved  by  placing 
so  many  posts  under  the  board  makes  it  impossible 
for  that  body  to  superintend  every  detail  in  the 
manner  which  is  essential  for  accurate  and  honest 
examination  work.  After  all,  the  examination  in 

1  The  same  criticism  applies  to  every  American  appoint 
ment  in  the  Philippines. 

339 


GREATER    AMERICA 

fixed  subjects  of  candidates  is  a  very  indifferent 
test  of  their  fitness  for  all  but  clerical  posts,  es 
pecially  in  a  case  like  this,  when  character  must 
be  the  determining  factor  in  success.  The  board, 
indeed,  expresses  in  its  report  a  doubt  as  to  the 
completeness  of  a  literary  test,  and  a  certain 
number  of  posts  are  exempted  from  it. 

The  chief  difficulty  is  to  obtain  material  at 
all  suitable  for  the  work.  In  the  year  ending 
October  i,  1902,  only  three  thousand  nine  hundred 
and  twenty -nine  candidates  competed  for  two 
thousand  posts,  and  of  these  only  two  thousand 
and  forty-four  became  eligible — a  very  small  mar 
gin.  The  natural  desire  of  the  board  to  meet  the 
demand  for  "eligibles"  must  make  it  difficult  to 
maintain  the  standard  when  the  supply  is  running 
short.  There  is  a  provision  that  temporary  em 
ployes  may  be  engaged  if  no  "eligibles"  are  to 
be  had,  and,  until  a  steady  supply  of  properly 
educated  and  qualified  men  could  be  insured, 
it  would  have  been  better  to  leave  the  lower 
grades  of  the  service  on  a  temporary  basis.  It 
is  much  easier  not  to  engage  a  man  than  to  em 
ploy  and  then  dismiss  him  with  all  the  parapher 
nalia  of  government  procedure;  and  the  Oriental 
who  has  once  tasted  office  is  a  spoiled  man  for 
life,  so  far  as  more  humble  avocations  are  con 
cerned. 

To  sum  up  the  principal  defects  in  the  Civil  Ser 
vice  system  of  the  Philippines.  First,  a  lack  of 
inducements  to  the  best  class  of  Americans,  who 

340 


GREATER    AMERICA 

could  only  be  attracted  by  a  permanent  service 
with  good  pay,  regular  furloughs,  and  either  a 
pension  or  some  other  provision  to  compensate  for 
life  in  the  tropics.  Secondly,  the  inclusion  in 
the  Civil  Service  lists  of  a  number  of  petty  posts, 
altogether  unimportant,  and  practically  controlled 
by  the  heads  of  departments,  which  leads  to  a 
multiplication  of  clerical  work  and  detail  until 
essentials  are  swamped.  Thirdly,  the  confusion 
of  functions  in  the  Civil  Service  board,  which 
ought  not  to  combine  the  duties  of  examination 
with  those  of  appointment,  reference,  and  re 
port.  Lastly,  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  a  board 
which  is  intrusted  with  such  important  functions 
could  not  have  been  composed  of  a  more  per 
manent  staff  of  officials,  men  of  weight  and  ex 
perience,  of  unimpeachable  integrity,  and  entirely 
removed  from  local  political  influence. 

When  we  compare  the  Civil  Service  of  the 
Philippines,  as  it  is  now  constituted,  with  the 
Indian  Civil  Service,  we  are  not  struck,  as  might 
have  been  expected,  with  the  superiority  of  the 
former  as  a  training-school  for  natives.  There  is 
an  evident  attempt  to  open  to  natives  every  rank 
of  service  for  which  they  are  qualified,  but  this 
is  equally  evident  in  India,  the  main  difference 
being  that  Britain  exacts  a  higher  qualification. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  difference  is  fundamen 
tal.  The  British  regard  any  phase  of  govern 
mental  work  as  requiring  training,  whereas  it 
is  the  favorite  theory  of  Americans  that  a  good 

34i 


GREATER    AMERICA 

general  education  fits  a  man  for  any  post  in 
life. 

The  most  serious  divergence  in  policy,  and 
one  which  fills  a  Briton  with  misgivings,  is  the 
severance  of  the  Philippine  Civil  Service  from 
that  of  the  mother-country.  This  may  have  been 
necessary  to  avoid  the  "  Spoils  System,"  but  it  at 
once  diminishes  the  efficiency  on  which  so  much 
depends.  It  has  been  found  necessary  hitherto 
to  fill  certain  posts  from  the  classified  lists  of 
the  United  States  in  order  to  obtain  the  right 
stamp  of  man ;  it  might  surely  be  possible,  in  the 
Civil  Service  reforms  which  are  proposed,  to  pro 
vide  a  branch  of  the  service,  specially  recruited 
and  trained  for  a  fixed  term  to  be  spent  in  the 
Philippines,  with  compensating  advantages  and 
without  the  temporary  and  uncertain  conditions 
which  attach  to  the  present  method.  Some  such 
provision  is  necessary  to  recruit  good  officers. 

No  stronger  contrast  can  be  found  between  the 
American  and  British  methods  than  in  their  ac 
tion  as  regards  judicial  reforms.  It  is  true  that 
in  this  respect  the  greatest  difference  existed  be 
tween  the  Philippines  and  any  country  conquered 
by  Britain.  Nowhere  has  it  been  our  fate  to 
take  over,  with  a  very  imperfect  civilization,  a 
highly  developed  code  and  method  of  judicial 
procedure.  To  criticise  Spanish  law  is  to  involve 
one's  self  at  once  in  the  most  difficult  problems. 
It  was  founded  on  one  of  the  most  enduring  codes 
in  history  and  has  the  sanction  of  high  authority. 

342 


GREATER    AMERICA 

It  may  be  safely  said,  however,  that,  even  if 
properly  administered,  it  had  every  possibility 
of  clashing  with  American  ideas,  and  that  in  the 
Philippines  it  was  administered  extremely  badly. 
Still,  the  groundwork  was  there,  and  there  are 
many  who  think  that  it  is  better  to  administer 
justly  the  laws  to  which  people  are  accustomed 
than  to  suddenly  plunge  them  into  a  wholly  dif 
ferent  system.  No  more  difficult  task  can  be 
imagined  than  this,  to  which  the  civil  commission, 
numbering  two  distinguished  lawyers,  applied 
themselves.  No  criticism  of  what  they  accom 
plished  can  be  attempted  in  this  book;  it  would 
be  unfair  without  an  enumeration  of  their  dif 
ficulties.  What  they  did  not  accomplish,  however, 
was  to  secure  an  upright,  incorruptible  judiciary. 
Accustomed  to  the  partialities  and  venalities  of 
his  own  State  courts,  this  does  not  shock  the 
sensitiveness  of  the  American  as  it  might,  but  he 
forgets  that  his  own  country  is  happily  in  a  far 
more  settled  condition  than  the  archipelago,  and 
that  the  Filipino  does  not  possess  his  own  nice 
discrimination  in  these  matters.  The  fault  has 
been  due  to  that  cherished  ideal  of  which  we  have 
spoken  so  often.  Rough-and-ready  but  absolute 
ly  upright  justice  would  have  been  worth  more 
to  the  Filipinos  than  years  of  legislation  or  acres 
of  bills,  and,  if  any  codification  was  necessary,  it 
should  have  been  too  simple  to  afford  any  exercise 
for  the  wits  of  the  clever  Filipino  lawyers. 

Criticisms    and   comparisons    are,    however,    of 

343 


GREATER    AMERICA 

very  little  use  at  the  present  stage  of  affairs. 
Americans  are  making  their  experiment  on  a 
grand  scale.  If  it  fails  they  will  not  be  the  first 
people  who  at  the  start  have  muddled  the  task  of 
governing  Orientals,  and  their  natural  adaptive- 
ness  and  ready  resource  will  enable  them  in  the 
long  run  to  achieve  success. 


CHAPTER   XV 
PROBLEMS   OF   EXPANSION— ARMY   AND   NAVY 

AFTER  the  campaign  of  1812-15,  with  the 
exception  of  the  Mexican  war  (1846-48)  and 
the  civil  war,  which  lasted  five  years,  the  United 
States  had  no  experience  of  war  until  the  colli 
sion  with  Spain  in  1898.  Americans  then  awoke 
to  the  fact  that  the  old  idea  of  isolation,  of  free 
dom  from  embroilment  with  foreign  powers,  was 
no  longer  compatible  with  the  new  conditions. 
They  rubbed  their  eyes  and  began  to  realize  that 
they  ought  to  have — what  they  did  not  possess — 
an  army.  Since  the  disbandment  of  the  im 
provised  volunteer  armies  of  the  civil  war,  the 
vast  majority  of  the  nation  had  never  seen  a 
soldier,  and  even  the  great  cities  had  ocular  evi 
dence  of  the  existence  of  a  national  military  force 
only  through  the  occurrence  of  an  occasional  riot 
—such  as  those  of  Pittsburg,  in  1877,  and  Chicago, 
in  1894 — or  when  some  great  national  celebration 
afforded  the  people  the  spectacle  of  a  military 
parade. 

After  the  civil  war  the  army  was  reorganized 
on  a  very  modest  scale  from  the  best  of  the  recently 
disbanded  volunteer  regiments.  The  material  was 

34$ 


GREATER    AMERICA 

good.  Both  officers  and  men  had  been  trained  in 
war,  had  learned  their  profession  in  the  stern 
school  of  experience.  In  many  respects  they  were 
a  striking  contrast  to  the  army  of  ante-bellum 
days,  which,  after  a  long  period  of  peace,  had 
fallen  into  sleepy  ways,  and,  under  the  corrupt 
ing  influence  of  party  patronage,  had  become 
thoroughly  inefficient  and  out  of  date.  From 
the  time  of  reorganization  until  the  Spanish  war 
the  American  army  consisted  of  some  twenty- 
eight  thousand  men,  mainly  engaged  in  wars  on 
the  Indian  frontiers  or  in  policing  the  new  districts 
settled  up  as  the  wave  of  westward  migration 
surged  forward.  Scattered  in  small  posts,  at  wide 
intervals,  discipline  was  difficult  to  maintain,  and 
any  such  thing  as  general  or  systematic  organiza 
tion  was  an  impossibility.  In  the  course  of  time, 
as  the  country  in  the  West  was  gradually  occupied 
and  at  the  same  time  great  cities  arose,  the  number 
of  small  posts  was  decreased  and  the  troops  were 
concentrated  on  certain  points,  where  they  would 
be  available  in  the  event  of  riots  or  serious  dis 
turbances  of  the  peace. 

The  Spanish  war  found  the  United  States  quite 
unprepared.  The  curse  of  politics  was  over  all. 
The  abuses  of  patronage  had  sapped  the  en 
thusiasm  and  spirit  of  the  service.  Rivalries 
between  the  adjutants  -  general  and  the  civilian 
Secretaries  of  War  had  brought  about  utter  con 
fusion  everywhere — no  army,  no  officers,  no  staff, 
no  plan — in  a  word,  chaos.  Equally  unprepared 

346 


GREATER    AMERICA 

and  equally  ready  to  meet  the  emergency  heroi 
cally,  the  United  States  set  aside  the  experience 
of  others,  trusting  to  the  genius  and  energy  of  the 
race  and  the  illimitable  resources  of  the  country 
to  pull  her  through.  The  failure  to  evolve  order, 
and  especially  the  difficulty  experienced  in  moving 
a  small  force  across  to  Cuba,  was,  perhaps,  the 
most  striking  feature  of  the  general  debacle,  and 
was  in  marked  contrast  with  the  powers  of  perfect 
organization  displayed  by  the  Japanese  a  few 
years  earlier  in  the  Chino- Japanese  war. 

Notwithstanding  the  difficulties  arising  from  this 
state  of  affairs,  the  campaigns  both  in  Cuba  and 
the  Philippines  were  brought  to  a  successful  con 
clusion,  though  with  the  inevitable  waste  of  life 
and  treasure  involved  by  the  absence  of  a  trained 
and  disciplined  army  under  efficient  officers.  Both 
were  subalterns'  wars ;  there  was  no  plan  of  cam 
paign;  it  was  merely  jungle-fighting,  in  scattered 
bodies,  no  concerted  action  being  possible.  The 
situation  was  saved  by  the  pluck  of  the  men,  by 
the  adaptability  and  initiative  of  the  American, 
with  a  nucleus  of  West  Point  officers,  trained 
men,  reared  in  a  school  of  iron  discipline. 

The  urgency  of  reform  —  drastic  reform  —  was 
forced  upon  the  American  government.  An  army 
had  to  be  created,  and  armies  are  not  made  in 
a  day.  A  capable  War  Minister,  courageous  and 
self-reliant,  appeared  in  the  person  of  Mr.  Root 
in  1899.  He  acted  on  the  principle  that  the 
object  of  an  army  is  "to  provide  for  war,"  the 

347 


GREATER    AMERICA 

very  contrary  of  the  theory  upon  which  the  entire 
treatment  of  the  army  had  been  based  from  the 
end  of  the  civil  war.1  There  had  been  no  or 
ganization,  no  training  as  a  whole,  and  the  service 
was  permeated  by  the  patronage  system.  This 
was  due  to  the  prevailing  impression  that  war 
was  impossible — at  any  rate,  so  remote  as  to  be 
negligible.  Able  army  officers  who  had  clamored 
from  time  to  time  for  reform  could  get  no  hearing. 
Systematic  study,  preparation  of  material  for  war, 
promotion  of  officers  according  to  capacity,  train 
ing  of  men  and  officers  in  large  bodies  were  evident 
ly  needed.  Four  important  recommendations  were 
made  —  the  establishment  of  a  war  college;  the 
attendance  of  every  officer  at  this  college  for  a 
period;  officers  from  the  line  to  serve  on  the  staff 
for  four  or  five  years  instead  of  until  retirement; 
the  modification  of  the  seniority  system.  These 
reforms  were  far-reaching,  involving  as  they  did  a 
complete  change  in  the  whole  army  organization. 
There  remained,  however,  one  reform  which  lies 
at  the  very  root  of  the  whole  question  -  -  the 
elimination  of  politics  from  the  army.2  A  prac 
tical  step  in  this  direction  was  taken  by  Mr.  Root 
when,  an  increase  of  the  army  being  imminent, 
he  made  public  the  names  of  the  senior  officers 
already  appointed,  nearly  all  regular  officers. 

1  The  same  discovery  seems  to  have  been  recently  made 
regarding  the  British  system,  judging  from  the  War  Office 
(reconstitution)  committee. 

2  Atlantic  Monthly,  April,  1902. 

348 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  fury  of  the  politicians  may  be  imagined,  but 
they  were  powerless  in  the  face  of  the  accomplished 
fact,  at  a  critical  period,  too,  when  the  nation 
took  a  serious  view  of  the  matter.  The  President, 
as  commander-in- chief  of  the  army,  followed  this 
up  by  an  attempt  to  establish  the  "  merit  system  " 
in  1901.  "  No  pressure,  political,  social,  or  personal, 
of  any  kind  "  was  to  be  permitted,  and  the  exercise 
of  such  pressure,  if  there  were  reason  to  believe 
it  to  be  instigated  by  an  officer,  would  militate 
against  him.  The  army  was  thus  assured  the 
same  footing  as  the  classified  Civil  Service  and  the 
navy,  by  the  simple  fiat  of  the  President,  who  has 
always  held  the  strongest  views  on  the  subject  of 
keeping  the  Civil  Service,  and  the  army  especially, 
free  from  politics.  Favoritism  and  patronage  had 
eaten  into  the  vitals  of  the  army,  and  it  required 
great  courage  to  attack  the  system  as  the  Presi 
dent  and  his  Secretary  of  War  did ;  but  in  justice 
it  must  be  remembered  that  they  had  the  op 
portunity  of  acting  during  a  critical  time,  which 
previous  men  had  not.  Many  had  been  the 
recommendations,  but  no  one  had  dared  to  cut 
the  Gordian  knot.  It  must  be  noted,  however, 
that  the  promotions  of  Leonard  Wood  and  Fun- 
ston  over  so  many  seniors  certainly  did  not  seem 
to  the  regular  officers  to  be  altogether  in  con 
sonance  with  the  spirit  of  the  new  reform. 

Among  the  reforms  recently  initiated  are  the 
creation  of  a  war  college,  a  general  service  and 
staff  college,  a  reserve  of  regulars,  and  a  general 

349 


GREATER    AMERICA 

staff,  on  the  pattern  of  the  most  efficient  European 
armies,  for  which  forty-two  picked  officers  have 
been  selected.1  The  office  of  general  commanding 
(commander-in-chief)  has  been  abolished  and  in 
his  place  there  is  now  a  chief  of  staff  with  a 


1  The  general  staff  consists  of  one  chief  of  staff,  who  has 
the  rank  of  lieutenant  -  general,  the  highest  grade  in  the 
American  army  at  the  present  time;  two  assistants  to  the 
chief  of  staff,  not  below  the  grade  of  brigadier-general;  four 
colonels,  six  lieutenant-colonels,  twelve  majors,  twenty  cap 
tains  or  first  lieutenants,  all  of  whom  receive  the  regular  pay 
and  allowances  of  their  rank,  with  the  exception  of  the  lieu 
tenants,  who  when  detailed  on  staff  duty  have  the  rank,  pay, 
and  allowances  of  captains  mounted.  All  officers  detailed 
to  general  staff  duty  serve  for  four  years  unless  sooner  re 
lieved,  and  on  being  relieved  they  return  to  the  branch  of  the 
army  in  which  they  hold  their  permanent  commissions,  and 
are  not  eligible  for  further  staff  duty  until  they  have  served 
two  years  with  their  regiments  or  commands,  except  in  case 
of  emergency  or  time  of  war.  The  duties  of  the  general 
staff,  as  prescribed  in  the  act,  "shall  be  to  prepare  plans  for 
the  national  defence  and  for  the  mobilization  of  the  military 
forces  in  time  of  war ;  to  investigate  and  report  upon  all  ques 
tions  affecting  the  efficiency  of  the  army  and  its  state  of  prep 
aration  for  military  operations;  to  render  professional  aid 
and  assistance  to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  to  general  officers 
and  other  superior  commanders,  and  to  act  as  their  agents  in 
informing  and  co-ordinating  the  action  of  all  the  different 
officers  who  are  subject  under  the  terms  of  this  act  to  the 
supervision  of  the  chief  of  staff;  and  to  perform  such  other 
military  duties  not  otherwise  assigned  by  law  as  may  be 
from  time  to  time  prescribed  by  the  President."  The  chief 
of  staff  under  the  direction  of  the  President  or  the  Secretary 
of  War  is  given  supervision  of  all  troops  of  the  line,  "and  of 
the  adjutant-general's,  inspector-general's,  judge  advocate's, 
quartermaster's,  subsistence,  medical,  pay,  and  ordnance 
departments,  the  corps  of  engineers,  and  the  signal  corps, 
and  shall  perform  such  other  military  duties  not  otherwise  as 
signed  by  law  as  may  be  assigned  to  him  by  the  President." 
The  office  of  general  commanding  is  abolished. 

35° 


GREATER    AMERICA 

general  staff  under  him.  The  reform  accom 
plished  is,  in  fact,  the  solution  of  the  problem 
which  the  British  government  is  attempting  to 
solve  without  creating  a  general  staff.  The 
American  Secretary  of  War  is  now  strictly  re 
sponsible  to  the  President  for  the  details  of 
military  administration,  and  he  operates  through 
the  chief  of  staff.  Every  effort  has  been  made  to 
minimize  routine  and  red  tape.  An  attempt  is 
being  made  to  evolve  something  like  order  out  of 
the  chaos  of  the  national  guard,  militia,  and 
volunteer  forces,  by  defining  the  obligations  and 
duties  of  each  branch,  by  altering  the  militia  law, 
which,  according  to  the  President,  was  "  obsolete 
and  worthless,"  and  by  an  endeavor  to  make  the 
organization  and  armament  of  the  national  guard 
identical  with  that  of  the  regular  forces.  Some 
procedure  for  raising  volunteer  forces  and  selection 
of  officers  is  to  be  prescribed  by  law  in  advance. 
Army  reform  is  not  a  popular  cry  even  in  Brit 
ain,  where  we  have  our  little  wars,  and  sometimes 
a  big  one,  to  emphasize  the  urgent  necessity  of 
keeping  the  army  efficient;  but  in  the  United 
States  it  is  even  more  difficult  to  sustain  the 
interest  of  the  public  in  such  a  movement  or  to 
obtain  the  necessary  legislation  and  appropria 
tions.  Beyond  this,  there  is  the  grave  difficulty 
of  reconciling  the  relative  interests  and  powers  of 
the  federal  and  the  State  governments,  all  branches 
of  the  forces,  except  the  regular  army,  being  under 
the  latter.  The  path  of  reorganization  does  not, 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Sandhurst.  These  officers  of  the  Indian  army  are 
also  employed  in  a  large  number  of  civil  posts  and 
in  the  political  or  diplomatic  department.  These 
details  are  given  to  show  how  careful  a  reorganiza 
tion  of  the  military  system  has  been  accomplished 
since  the  mutiny.  Other  reforms  were  the  pro 
vision  made  for  safeguarding  the  health  of  the 
European  troops,  especially  the  arrangements  for 
sending  each  battalion  serving  in  an  unhealthy 
district  to  the  hills  for  a  part  of  each  year.  This 
and  other  sanitary  precautions  are  valuable  in 
preserving  not  only  the  health  but  the  morale  of 
the  men.  The  most  remarkable  change  strength 
ening  the  military  position  has  been,  however,  in 
the  direction  of  improved  communications.  The 
conditions  prevailing  at  the  time  of  the  mutiny 
have  been  radically  altered  by  the  creation  of  a 
great  net- work  of  roads,  railways,  and  telegraphic 
communication.  Those  who  take  a  somewhat 
ghoulish  delight  in  prophesying  another  mutiny, 
and  who  speak  of  the  British  in  India  as  "  living 
over  a  volcano,"  must  overlook  these  circum 
stances  if  they  believe  that  anything  comparable 
to  the  outbreak  of  1857  is  possible  to-day. 

The  police  force  in  India  consists  entirely  of 
natives,  under  an  English  chief,  district  superin 
tendents  and  assistants.  It  is  very  seldom  nec 
essary — not  more  than  once  or  twice  a  year,  and 
generally  in  connection  with  some  religious  dis 
pute — to  call  out  even  a  small  body  of  the  military 
to  maintain  order,  a  fact  which  speaks  well  for  the 

354 


GREATER    AMERICA 

efficiency  of  the  police.  All  Britons  who  have 
had  experience  of  native  troops  or  military  police 
in  India  speak  well  of  their  loyalty  and  courage; 
and  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  in  some  of 
the  northern  regiments  the  wild  fighting  tribes 
who  have  been  organized  into  regiments  have 
transferred  their  allegiance  with  a  whole  heart  to 
their  white  officers,  and  would,  like  the  majority 
of  the  Indian  native  army,  follow  the  Sahib  any 
where  he  chose  to  lead  them. 

The  question  of  native  armies  is  of  peculiar 
importance  in  the  Philippines,  because  the  Filipino 
is  of  that  essentially  warlike  stock  —  the  Malay. 
Without  possessing  the  qualities  which  distinguish 
the  warrior  tribes  of  India,  he  has  still  a  pred 
ilection  for  fighting;  and  in  the  special  kind  of 
warfare  which  the  physical  difficulties  of  his  own 
islands  necessitate  he  is  well  versed.  The  caste 
distinction  which  was  so  grave  an  obstacle  to  the 
Indian  organization  does  not  exist  here,  nor  is 
there  the  religious  difficulty  to  combat;  but  at 
the  same  time  there  is,  perhaps,  a  greater  degree 
of  un trustworthiness,  a  lack  of  esprit  de  corps,  a 
vanity  and  instability  which  were  not  encountered 
in  India  after  the  great  initial  steps  had  been 
accomplished.  The  more  civilized  the  Filipino  the 
more  care  needs  to  be  exercised  in  placing  him  in 
any  responsible  position,  and  this  is  peculiarly  the 
case  in  military  and  police  appointments.  It  is 
essential  that  American  supervision  should  be  of 
the  closest  kind,  and  that  the  American  officers 

355 


GREATER    AMERICA 

or  instructors  should  be  of  the  highest  possible 
calibre,  both  as  to  efficiency  and  character.  A 
similar  lesson  was  learned  in  India  through  many 
failures  and  one  terrible  disaster.  The  Philippine 
police  service  was  fortunate  in  being  placed  at 
first  under  an  officer  of  the  right  stamp,  and  the 
work  it  has  done  is  a  justification  of  the  policy. 
But  there  is  a  tendency  to  expect  too  much  from 
any  body  in  the  archipelago  which  is  in  fair  work 
ing  order,  and  the  police  have  been,  like  every 
other  branch  of  the  service,  overworked.  They 
have  had  little  time  for  internal  organization  or 
drill,  and,  it  may  be  mentioned,  incidentally,  they 
are  the  worst-paid  body  in  the  service. 

A  fresh  problem  in  controlling  a  tropical  region 
will  arise  in  Panama.  Without  any  question  of 
military  occupation,  there  will  be  needed  a  strong 
police  force  to  maintain  order.  Negroes  are  the 
only  possible  material  for  such  a  force,  since  the 
country  is  very  unhealthy  for  white  men  and  the 
Colombians  are  unsuitable.  There  will  certainly 
be  a  great  drain  on  the  negro  population  of  the 
West  Indies  both  for  the  work  of  construction  on 
the  canal  and  for  police  duties.  It  would  be 
impossible  to  utilize  the  present  black  cavalry  of 
the  United  States  army,  who,  with  excellent 
fighting  qualities  are  not  suited  for  civil  duties. 
The  negro  police  may  be  recruited  from  the  South, 
but  it  is  doubtful  whether  they  would  care  for 
service  on  the  isthmus,  and  there  must  be  grave 
doubts  as  to  their  amenability  to  discipline.  The 

356 


GREATER    AMERICA 

West  Indian  negro  is  not  only  strong  physically, 
but  is  docile,  willing,  and  brave  when  disciplined 
and  led.  But  he  will  require  different  treatment 
and  handling  to  that  usually  meted  out  by  Amer 
icans  to  negroes.  He  understands  neither  the  free 
dom  of  manner  nor  the  strong  contempt  with  which 
his  race  is  treated  in  America.  It  is  again  the  ques 
tion  of  a  high  class  of  officers.  In  every  part  of 
our  own  empire  we  have  found  this  to  be  the  case, 
and  it  has  come  to  be  idiomatic  with  us  that  it 
takes  a  gentleman  to  get  on  with  "  niggers."  This 
subject  has  been  treated  of  elsewhere,  in  the 
chapters  on  the  Philippines  and  Americans  in  the 
tropics.  It  narrows  itself  down  again  and  again 
to  this :  America  has  now  to  provide  inducements 
to  the  very  best  of  her  sons  to  serve  abroad  as 
police  officers,  military  instructors,  civil  servants, 
and  so  forth.  Only  by  the  very  best  can  Greater 
America  be  worthily  served. 

To  turn  to  the  other  branch  of  the  militant 
service.  There  can  be  no  question  that  naval  ex 
pansion  is  the  dominant  note  in  world  policy  to 
day.1  Germany  heads  the  list  in  the  strenuous- 
ness  of  her  efforts,  and  is  bent  on  doubling  her  fleet 
in  the  next  decade,  and  achieving  the  Herculean 
task  of  becoming  second  only  to  Great  Britain  in 
naval  power.  Her  exertions  have  forced  on  Great 
Britain  an  unusual  activity.  We  have  adopted  a 
policy  known  as  the  " two-power  standard,"  by 


1  See  Appendix  A. 
357 


GREATER    AMERICA 

which  we  must  maintain  a  fleet  at  least  equal  to 
those  of  any  two  combined  powers.  Any  decrease 
in  the  proportion  of  our  naval  strength  would  be 
fatal  to  that  supremacy  on  the  sea  which  our  scat 
tered  empire  makes  essential.  The  present  rate  of 
naval  expansion  is  a  heavy  burden  to  us,  so  heavy 
that  it  becomes  increasingly  doubtful  whether 
this  country  can  continue,  unaided,  to  support 
it.  Russia,  although  essentially  a  land  power, 
has  adopted  a  naval  policy  which  must  sorely 
puzzle  some  of  her  ardent  admirers.  What  can 
be  her  object  in  laying  down  vessels  in  all  the  yards 
of  Europe  and  America  until  she  is  already  third 
on  the  list  in  point  of  numerical  strength.  She 
has  established  herself  on  the  Pacific  and  has 
ice-free  ports  on  the  China  Sea;  she  still  hopes 
for  an  outlet  on  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  is  work 
ing  steadily  towards  the  Baltic.  With  her  am 
bitions  we  have  now  little  to  do.  They  may, 
however,  be  briefly  summed  up  as  being  chiefly 
inimical  to  the  United  States  in  that  they  are 
essentially  monopolistic.  Anglo  -  Saxon dom  - 
however  it  may  work,  and  some  of  its  methods 
have  certainly  been  rather  indirect — is  desirous  of 
opening  the  world  for  trade,  of  bringing  freedom, 
civilization,  and  peace  to  every  part  of  the  globe. 
Russia,  with  her  programme  of  territorial  ex 
pansion,  military  achievements,  closed  ports,  auto 
cratic  government,  and  non  -  progressiveness,  is 
a  menace  to  the  world.  One  of  the  signs  of  the 
times  is  an  evident  working  compact  between 

358 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Russia  and  Germany,  and  an  interesting  side 
light  is  cast  on  this  by  the  clause  included  in  the 
Russo-German  agreement  regarding  China,1  which 
provides  that  Russia  shall  oppose  no  obstacle  to 
German  ambitions  in  South  America  and  shall 
give  her  a  free  hand  in  following  out  her  interests 
and  developing  the  material  resources  in  that 
country.2 

The  naval  question  is,  therefore,  of  even  great 
er  importance  to  a  country  which,  like  America, 
has  spread  overseas,  extended  her  seaboard,  and 
occupied  a  number  of  positions  of  strategic  value, 
if  defended  by  a  strong  fleet.  The  actual  ef 
ficiency  of  the  United  States  navy  is  liable  to  be 
over-estimated  because  of  its  success  in  the  Spanish 
war.  There  was  a  tendency,  not  unnatural  to 
people  who  tasted  for  the  first  time  in  their  lives 
the  fruits  of  victory,  to  exaggerate  their  own 
achievements.  Since  1812  the  United  States  had 
seen  no  naval  warfare,  and  the  present  generation, 
remembering  what  was  done  then,  and  also  the 
part  played  by  their  ships  in  blockading  the 
confederate  ports  during  the  civil  war,  were  apt  to 
congratulate  themselves  on  having  kept  alive  the 
naval  tradition. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the  present  navy, 
such  as  it  is,  dates  only  from  1882,  at  which  date 

1  Reinsch,  World  Politics,  p.  284. 

2  In  the  German  Diet,  in  December,   1903,  the  president, 
by  a  significant  slip  of  the  tongue,  referred  to  Russia  as  "an 
allied  and  friendly  power." 

359 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  ships  were  all  antiquated  wooden  vessels. 
The  reason  for  this  is  simple.  Before  the  civil 
war  America  was  fairly  well  provided  with  ocean 
shipping,  naval  and  mercantile  -  -  the  latter,  in 
deed,  almost  equalled  that  of  Great  Britain  in 
tonnage.  With  the  dislocation  resulting  from  the 
war  and  the  preoccupation  of  the  reconstruction 
period  came  the  restriction  which  forbade  the 
purchasing  of  vessels  in  foreign  countries.  Co- 
inciden tally,  the  introduction  of  iron  and  steam 
vessels  involved  the  entire  remodelling  of  existing 
navies.  America  did  not  attempt  to  cope  with 
this.  She  had  entered  on  a  period  in  which  the 
urgent  character  of  home  problems  and  the  ex 
haustion  of  the  nation  after  a  fratricidal  struggle 
made  warlike  preparations,  for  remote  contingen 
cies,  extremely  distasteful.  It  is  to  this  period, 
and  not  to  an  earlier  one,  that  she  owes  the  growth 
of  that  desire  for  isolation,  that  vehement  protest 
against  any  movement  which  would  bring  her  in 
contact  with  European  powers,  which  has  been 
magnified  by  some  people  into  a  national  policy 
or  tradition.  Taking  a  short  view,  shutting  their 
eyes  to  the  possibilities  which  their  own  develop 
ment  would  involve,  the  Americans  of  the  period 
echoed  a  parrot-cry  which  is  heard  now  in  another 
quarter  of  their  continent.  "  We  do  not  want  a 
navy  for  defence,"  they  said,  "for  Europe  has 
neither  excuse  nor  desire  to  attack  us,  and  if  she 
did  it  is  on  land  that  our  defence  would  be  made. 
We  do  not  want  one  for  offence,  because  we  are 

360 


GREATER    AMERICA 

self-contained  in  our  own  continent,  and  will  not 
meddle  with  Europe."  Then  came  the  era  of 
industrial  expansion,  and  all  America  was  too 
busy  money-making  to  attend  to  either  army  or 
navy. 

In  the  early  eighties,  however,  oversea  expan 
sion,  especially  in  the  Pacific,  and  the  conse 
quent  broadening  of  the  national  outlook,  aroused 
a  certain  interest  in  these  matters.  The  mer 
cantile  marine  had  dwindled  almost  to  vanish 
ing-point  ;  the  ships-of-war  are  described  as  having 
been  almost  as  inefficient  as  those  of  Alcibiades 
and  Hamilcar,  certainly  as  the  ships  of  Tromp  and 
Blake.  The  first  step  was  the  appointment  of  an 
advisory  board,  and  from  this  time  the  creation 
of  a  modern  navy  went  on  steadily,  if  slowly.  Not 
only  ships  were  needed  but  a  trained  personnel, 
and  one  of  the  steps  which  assisted  in  making  the 
small  navy  really  efficient  was  the  practice  of 
keeping  the  ships  at  sea  and  training  the  men  to 
gunnery.  To  this  fact  was  no  doubt  chiefly  due 
the  success  in  the  Spanish  war.  After  the  war 
a  complete  reorganization  of  the  personnel  took 
place  (in  1899),  the  executive  and  engineering 
branches  being  amalgamated.  Of  recent  years, 
too,  a  grand  effort  has  been  made  to  regain  the 
ground  lost  in  the  mercantile  marine.  The  ship 
ping  subsidy  bill  of  1901,  and  the  shipping  Trust 
which  followed,  have  been  powerful  instruments 
in  assisting  this,  and  the  result  is  that  last  year 
the  mercantile  marine  tonnage  for  the  first  time 

361 


GREATER    AMERICA 

in  American  history  was  over  six  millions  gross. 
Nevertheless,  a  very  large  proportion  of  American 
trade  is  still  carried  in  foreign  bottoms,  and  there 
is  practically  no  carrying-trade  with  either  the  Far 
East  or  South  America. 

The  stimulus  provided  by  subsidies  and  Trusts 
is,  of  course,  more  or  less  artificial,  and  is  on  that 
ground  open  to  criticism,  but  in  these  days  of 
forced  competition  it  is  impossible  without  some 
such  measures  to  establish  the  necessary  lines, 
which  must  be  provided  first  and  left  to  justify 
their  existence  afterwards.  The  policy  of  Ger 
many  in  this  respect  has  forced  the  pace  on  other 
nations,  and  it  is  the  experience  of  Great  Britain 
that  even  old  and  well-established  lines,  paying 
legitimate  dividends,  cannot  stand  against  those 
assisted,  as  are  German  lines,  by  a  high  degree 
of  organization  and  heavy  subsidies  from  govern 
ment. 

One  of  the  great  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the 
American  naval  and  mercantile  marine  is  the 
costliness  of  building  vessels.  America  possesses 
all  the  requisites,  and  has,  besides,  brought  the 
mechanical  side  of  the  work  to  a  high  pitch  of  per 
fection,  but  the  cost  of  labor,  and  especially  of  the 
skilled  labor,  necessary  for  a  great  deal  of  such 
work  is  a  heavy  charge.  This  should  not  prove 
an  obstacle  to  a  people  who  seem  to  find  some 
difficulty  in  disposing  of  a  yearly  surplus ;  but  the 
American,  however  rich,  desires  full  value  for  his 
money,  and  he  is,  perhaps,  hardly  yet  convinced 

362 


GREATER    AMERICA 

that  the  enormous  cost  of  these  vessels  represents 
their  actual  value  to  him  when  built. 

An  even  greater  difficulty  is  that  of  obtaining 
a  suitable  personnel.  There  is  no  pressure  of 
population  in  America,  and  very  little  of  that 
sentiment  for  the  sea  which  is  found  in  an  island 
people.  Living  on  a  great  continent,  many  thou 
sands  never  even  see  the  ocean.  Still,  there  is  a 
vast  seaboard,  which  should  furnish  a  supply  of 
men  for  the  sea,  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that 
neither  the  Pacific  seaboard  nor  even  the  southern 
part  of  the  Atlantic  is  adequately  furnished  with 
harbors.  Puget  Sound  is,  perhaps,  the  finest  har 
bor  in  the  world;  but  it  stands  alone.  A  fish 
ing  population  is  always  a  valuable  recruiting- 
ground  for  the  navy;  but,  except  in  the  most 
northern  latitudes — Maine  and  Oregon — there  is 
but  little  of  this  element  to  be  found.  Germany 
has,  indeed,  proved  that  by  a  careful  early  train 
ing  a  good  sailor  may  be  evolved  from  a  peasant 
from  the  heart  of  the  country;  but  it  is  doubtful 
whether  it  would  be  possible  to  transplant,  even 
in  a  modified  form,  the  German  system  to  a  coun 
try  so  impatient  of  discipline  as  the  United  States. 
The  mercantile  marine  of  America  enjoys,  un 
fortunately,  an  evil  reputation  among  sailors,  and 
much  is  needed  to  improve  the  status  of  men  both 
in  this  and  the  naval  branch  of  the  service.  Great 
Britain  suffered  in  the  past  from  desertion,  mu 
tiny,  and  other  drawbacks,  which  have  only  been 
obviated  by  entire  reform — first,  in  the  position 

363 


GREATER    AMERICA 

accorded  to  men  on  board  ship  as  regards  their 
rights,  and,  secondly,  in  the  selection  and  pro 
motion  of  officers. 

It  is  claimed  for  the  American  navy  that  it  is 
entirely  exempt  from  the  baneful  effects  of  patron 
age;  and  it  is  certain  that  the  officers  trained  at 
Annapolis  have  every  opportunity  of  becoming 
efficient,  while  they  are  subjected  to  a  discipline 
which  is  essential  to  men  who  may  be  called  on 
in  the  future  to  take  command  and  responsibility 
on  a  large  scale.  A  navy  general  staff  has  recently 
been  proposed  in  which  all  the  different  branches 
of  the  service — personnel,  fleet,  and  war  plans- 
should  be  thoroughly  co  -  ordinated  and  placed 
under  efficient  officers.1  A  naval  construction 

1  In  his  annual  report  made  to  the  President,  Mr.  Moody, 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  said :  "It  is  asserted  by  many, 
both  within  and  without  the  naval  service,  that  alterations 
in  the  organic  law  governing  the  administration  of  naval 
affairs  would  result  in  an  increased  efficiency  and  economy. 
The  agitation  for  a  change  comes  from  so  many  and  such 
respectable  quarters  that  it  cannot  be  denied  consideration. 
It  has  been  pointed  out  with  truth  that  in  the  civil  war, 
and,  in  a  very  much  less  degree,  in  the  war  with  Spain,  the 
organization  proved  inadequate.  ...  It  is  not  my  purpose  to 
recommend  specifically  at  this  time  any  of  these  proposals, 
but  only  to  bring  them  forward  for  the  earnest  discussion  and 
consideration  which  their  importance  deserves.  Mere  change 
is  not  reform,  and  none  should  be  attempted  until  it  appears 
clearly  that  conditions  would  be  bettered  thereby.  I  venture, 
however,  to  express  the  hope  that  Congress  may  give  to  the 
whole  subject  of  the  organization  of  our  naval  establishment 
its  best  thought  and  attention.  The  cost  of  our  naval  es 
tablishment  as  well  as  the  importance  of  the  efficiency  of  the 
navy  would  amply  warrant  all  the  study  which  can  be 
given." 

364 


GREATER    AMERICA 

programme,  to  cover  a  period  of  twenty  years, 
with  an  average  expenditure  of  about  thirty  mill 
ion  dollars  per  annum,  is  now  proposed.  There 
is,  therefore,  the  nucleus  of  an  efficient  arm, 
which  should  be  strengthened  and  equipped  in 
every  possible  way,  not,  perhaps,  with  a  view  to 
actual  conflict,  but  to  render  such  conflict  un 
likely.  The  machinery  has  been  provided,  here 
as  in  the  army;  what  is  now  necessary  is  the 
stimulus  afforded  by  national  sentiment  and  in 
telligent  interest.  The  formation  of  Navy  Leagues, 
which  have  proved,  both  in  Germany  and  Great 
Britain,  of  the  greatest  service  in  insuring  naval 
efficiency,  is  a  measure  which  should  be  initiated 
in  the  United  States.  Under  the  present  system 
of  government  such  leagues  would  be  extremely 
useful  in  influencing  public  opinion,  upon  which 
so  much  depends. 

It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  a  good  deal  has 
been  accomplished,  and  that  still  more  is  con 
templated,  towards  placing  the  military  and  naval 
services  upon  a  footing  commensurate  with  the 
great  and  growing  world  interests  which  it  is  their 
duty  to  defend. 


CHAPTER   XVI 
ASIA  IN  TRANSFORMATION 

AT  the  risk  of  appearing  to  digress  slightly  from 
the  actual  subject-matter  of  this  book,  Greater 
America,  it  is  necessary  here  to  give  a  brief  account 
of  the  changes  which  are  taking  place  in  Asia. 
That  these  must  profoundly  affect  not  only  the 
great  powers  of  Europe  (whose  fate,  indeed,  is  to 
a  certain  extent  bound  up  in  them),  but  must  in 
fluence  America  in  a  high  degree,  and  may  have 
a  determining  voice  in  the  future  of  Greater 
America,  may  not  be  obvious  at  first  sight.  But 
no  one  who  seriously  contemplates  the  extraor 
dinary  character  of  Asiatic  developments  and  their 
unmistakable  trend  can  doubt  that  this  is  the 
case. 

The  transformation  of  Asia  is  synonymous  with 
the  expansion  of  Russia.  The  Russification  of  a 
vast  continent  has  proceeded  at  a  pace  so  rapid 
that  many  of  us  can  remember  its  infancy — the 
time  when  the  expression  "  Mervousness "  was 
laughingly  applied  to  a  few  people  who  did  not 
accept  Russia's  "  assurances "  regarding  her  am 
bitions  in  Central  Asia. 

366 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Let  us  take  briefly  the  most  salient  points  in  the 
situation.  Asia  contains  about  one -half  of  the 
world's  population,  and  its  races  are  unusually 
prolific.  It  has  resources  which  are  practically 
unlimited,  including  an  area  of  food  -  producing 
land  which  is  unequalled  in  any  other  continent. 
It  is  now,  not  only  in  the  Near  but  in  the  Far 
East,  the  arena  for  the  great  powers  of  Europe, 
the  European  situation  being  reproduced  in 
both  these  regions.  Into  the  Oriental  arena 
the  United  States  has  been  drawn.  As  the 
owner  of  the  Philippines  she  is  practically  an 
Asiatic  power.  But,  apart  from  that,  her  in 
evitable  evolution  as  a  world-power  and  her  re 
lations  with  other  nations,  which  are  bound  to 
increase  in  intimacy,  compel  her  to  play  a  part 
in  the  international  drama  in  the  Far  East.  It 
would  be  hardly  consonant  with  American  am 
bitions  or  pretensions  if  that  part  were  a  minor 
one.  There  is,  indeed,  no  quarter  of  the  globe 
where  the  United  States  has  interests  in  which 
she  can  afford  to  put  herself  on  a  level,  say,  with 
Belgium. 

What  are  the  principal  changes  in  Asia  which 
will  bring  that  continent  into  touch  with  America? 
First,  we  have  the  annihilation  of  distance.  From 
east  to  west  flow  the  lines  of  international  com 
munication.  Already  the  traveller  round  the  world 
can  choose  alternative  routes  without  deviat 
ing  much  from  a  direct  path.  Oceans  no  longer 
divide;  they  rather  unite.  The  opening  of  com- 

367 


GREATER    AMERICA 

munication  through  Suez  brought  Europe  into 
close  contact  with  the  East;  the  opening  of  a 
trans-isthmian  canal  will  do  as  much  for  the 
greater  part  of  the  United  States.  The  Mississippi, 
the  cradle  of  a  great  industrial  future,  in  which 
is  the  centre  of  gravity  of  the  United  States,  is 
peculiarly  situated  as  regards  the  isthmus,  and 
the  opening  of  the  new  route  to  the  East  will 
give  the  vast  Mississippi  region,  as  well  as  the 
Atlantic  States,  a  short  and  direct  outlet  to 
markets  still  unexploited — the  Pacific  and  the  Far 
East. 

Asia  has  been  crossed  by  a  continuous  railway 
line,  already  throwing  out  branches,  and  the 
journey  between  Europe  and  the  Far  East  has 
been  reduced  to  some  twenty  days.  This  all- 
Russian  line  is  only  part  of  a  scheme  for  linking 
up  European  Russia  with  her  empire  in  the  Far 
East  of  Asia.  The  centre  of  the  continent  is,  for 
the  most  part,  a  vast  table-land,  rising,  on  the 
borders  of  northern  India  and  Tibet,  to  lofty 
mountain  ranges.  Physical  difficulties  render  this 
region  the  last  stronghold  of  Oriental  exclusive- 
ness;  but  even  now  the  insistent  European  is 
knocking  at  the  gates,  and  it  is  not  yet  certain 
that  he  will  not  find  another  semi-European  warm 
ing  his  hands  at  the  fire  when  he  does  break  in. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  central  Asia  has  already  its 
trunk-line  of  railway,  with  feeders  running  down 
towards  the  warm  waters  of  the  Indian  Ocean,  to 
the  borders  of  Afghanistan  and  northward  to 

368 


Or  THE     ]    "X 

IMVCRSITY 


50 


Railway  Map 
of 


ASIA 

SHOWING 

RUSSIAN  EXPANSION 


Lines  Constructed  _ 
Lines  Proposed  or  \ 
in  Construction  !> 
Expansion  of  Russia  \ 

since  1857 
Extension  of  Russian  / 

Influence  > 


70  Longitude  80  Eas 


f+s 


GREATER    AMERICA 

connect  with  the  Siberian  line.1  Then,  through 
the  territories  of  the  Sick  Man  of  the  East,  once 
prosperous  and  populated,  still  full  of  possibilities, 
a  line  is  projected  which  would  connect  the  Med 
iterranean  and  the  Persian  Gulf  and  give  yet  an 
other  alternative  route  to  the  East.  India  is  link 
ed  up  by  a  railway  system  of  some  twenty-seven 
thousand  miles,  and  Burma  has  her  own  railways, 
to  be  joined  later  to  those  of  India.  Northern 
and  southern  China  are  being  linked  by  rail 
way  lines,  foreign  built  and  owned.  France  is 
building  an  extension  of  her  Tonkinese  railway 
through  Yunnan  to  the  upper  Yangtse;  Canton 
is  being  connected  with  the  Yangtse  at  Han 
kow  by  an  American  line,  and  from  that  point 
a  Franco-Belgian  railway,  in  active  construction, 
will  shortly  run  to  Peking,  thus  connecting  China 
from  south  to  north.  Peking  again  is  joined  to 
the  Russian  Manchurian  railways  via  Tientsin  and 
Newchwang,  but  a  shorter  cut  is  said  to  be  pro 
jected,  if  not  actually  begun,  and  still  another 
by  which  the  Chinese  capital  will  be  linked  up 
directly  with  Lake  Baikal  and  the  Siberian  rail 
way  through  a  line  across  the  so-called  "  Gobi 

1  The  trans-Caspian  line,  some  two  thousand  three  hundred 
miles  in  length,  starts  from  Krasnovodsk,  on  the  Caspian, 
skirts  northeast  Persia,  and  runs  by  Merv,  Bokhara,  Samar 
kand,  Khokand,  and  Margilan  to  Andijan  in  Fergana.  It  has 
a  branch  north  to  Tashkend,  and  thence  a  line  (one  thousand 
two  hundred  miles)  is  being  constructed  to  Orenburg,  on  the 
borders  of  European  Russia.  A  branch  south  to  Meshed,  in 
Persia,  is  under  construction,  and  another,  from  Merv  to 
Kushk,  on  the  borders  of  Afghanistan,  has  been  completed. 
*4  369 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Desert."  Other  Russian  lines  south  of  Peking  are 
proposed,  while  the  Germans  are  busy  with  their 
lines  in  Shantung,  pushing  their  way  in  various 
directions  into  the  Hinterland.  Only  the  British, 
with  various  concessions  in  hand,  are  supine,  the 
trend  of  events  not  encouraging  the  investment  of 
capital.  From  every  quarter,  therefore,  the  steel 
lines — pioneers  of  political  aggression  rather  than 
civilization  and  progress  —  are  closing  round  or 
thrusting  themselves,  feeler-like,  towards  the  heart 
of  Asia.  That  great,  inert,  Oriental  continent  is 
being  galvanized  into  life.  The  second  change  in 
the  condition  of  Asia,  to  which,  of  course,  the  an 
nihilation  of  distance  has  largely  conduced,  is  the 
reproduction,  first  in  the  Near  and  then  in  the 
Far  East,  of  the  European  situation,  with  all  its 
rivalries,  intrigues,  and  combinations.  The  centre 
of  gravity  of  world  politics  has,  as  the  writer  pre 
dicted  twenty  years  ago,  shifted  from  the  Atlantic 
to  the  Pacific,  and  in  that  region  we  find  not  only 
Europe  but  America. 

The  principal  factor  in  accomplishing  this  trans 
formation  is  undoubtedly  the  great  northern  Co 
lossus.  Russia's  marvellous  advance,  her  aims 
and  their  significance  to  the  Anglo  -  Saxon  peo 
ples,  are  spoken  of  elsewhere.  Her  position  as  the 
owner  of  more  than  half  Asia  and  the  neighbor 
of  America  is  in  itself  sufficient  reason  to  compel 
American  interest  in  Asiatic  affairs.  A  more 
intimate  aspect  of  the  situation  appears,  how 
ever,  in  the  question  of  the  future  of  China,  and 


GREATER    AMERICA 

on  this  the  many  changes  in  Asia  have  all  a  more 
or  less  direct  bearing. 

Great  Britain  can  recall  the  time  when  she  en 
joyed  an  easy  supremacy  in  the  affairs  of  the  Far 
East.  Her  interests  there  were  purely  commercial. 
Both  she  and  the  United  States  contemplated 
nothing  less  than  the  acquisition  of  territory  in 
that  region.  Their  energies  were  bent  merely  on 
the  opening  of  obstinately  closed  doors  to  their 
trade.  Japan's  sudden  transformation  and  the 
ambitions  of  certain  European  powers  changed 
the  aspect  of  affairs.  First  came  the  defeat  of 
China  by  Japan,  the  eviction  of  Japan  by  Rus 
sia,  Germany,  and  France,  and  then  the  scram 
ble  for  Chinese  territory,  in  which  Russia  actually, 
though  not  officially,  made  the  first  move.  The 
extent  of  the  expansion  of  Russia  in  the  last  half- 
century  can  be  gathered  from  a  glance  at  the  map, 
prepared  for  the  purpose;  but  it  is  difficult  to 
discern  the  exact  process  of  growth  of  Russian 
power  in  the  Far  East.  At  certain  dates  we  see 
her  annex  or  acquire  great  slices  of  territory — the 
Amur  province,  then  Primorsk,  then  Manchuria; 
we  see  the  steady  increase  of  concessions  on  the 
part  of  China  to  her  friend  Russia,  and  at  a  certain 
date,  at  all  events,  we  know  that  the  foremost 
Chinese  statesman  of  the  day  practically  became 
the  agent  of  the  Tsar.  These  are  all  epoch-making 
events.  But  of  the  slow,  persistent,  silent  diplo 
macy,  the  thousand  intrigues  which  made  these 
events  possible  and  which  found  nothing  too  small 

37? 


GREATER    AMERICA 

or  too  insignificant  to  be  included  within  their 
scope — of  all  this  we  know  very  little.1 

Mongolia  is  valuable  to  the  power  which  desires 
to  dominate  China.  Although  the  general  con 
ception  of  that  region  is  that  of  a  huge,  sandy 
desert,  it  contains,  in  fact,  the  grazing-ground  for 
vast  herds  of  sheep  and  cattle  required  for  the 
feeding  of  a  densely  packed  country  like  north 
China.  Moreover,  it  is  the  breeding-ground  for 
a  small  and  sturdy  breed  of  horses,  invaluable  for 
various  purposes.  If  Mongolia  is  already  honey 
combed  with  Russian  influence,  we  know  that  the 
same  insidious  factor  has  penetrated  to  the  heart 
of  Tibet.  In  a  recent  work2  Mr.  Chirol  explains 
how,  through  one  of  the  heads  of  the  religious 
hierarchy  who  lives  at  Urga  and  has  come  en 
tirely  under  Russian  domination,  a  hold  has  been 
obtained  over  Lhasa.  This  personage  obtained 
the  admission  to  the  councils  of  the  Dalai  lama  of 

1  An  instance  of  these  hardly  perceptible  methods,  which 
came  to  the  writer's  personal  knowledge  recently,   may  be 
given  as  an  illustration.     Some  years  back  inquiries  were  set 
on  foot  at  the  principal  Mongol  lamaseries  at  Peking  for  men 
to  teach  Russians  the  Mongol  language.     Some  twenty-five 
or  thirty  of  these  men,  well  equipped  with  money  and  clothes, 
left  for  certain  towns  understood  to  be  somewhere  on  the 
Russian  frontier  to  teach  the  Russians  there.     Their  duties, 
needless  to  say,  were  to  prepare  the  way  for  Russian  domina 
tion.     The  Russian  officials  at  the  time  were  in  the  habit  of 
constantly  visiting  the  head   lamas   in    the  Great  Lamasery 
(said  to  have  about  one  thousand  five   hundred  lamas,  the 
chief  lama,  or  Gensen,  being  usually  a  Tibetan),  at  Peking, 
well  laden  with  gifts,  and  of  receiving  visits  from  them  in 
return. 

2  The  Middle-Eastern  Question.     1903. 

372 


GREATER    AMERICA 

a  Siberian  Buriat,  and  this  envoy  has  been  back 
ward  and  forward  several  times  between  Lhasa 
and  St.  Petersburg.  Russian  scientific  missions 
have  been  busy  in  Tibet  for  many  years ;  and  in 
the  recent  work  of  Dr.  Sven  Hedin,  recording 
his  observations  in  the  outlying  parts  of  Tibet 
and  his  abortive  attempt  to  reach  Lhasa,  it  is 
significant  to  note  that  his  two  Cossack  guards 
secured  for  him  not  only  respect  and  consideration 
wherever  he  went,  but  that  the  very  officials  who 
prevented  his  progress  to  the  Forbidden  City 
assured  him  that  under  no  circumstances  would 
they  use  force,  but  that  he  must  carry  out  his 
project  over  their  dead  bodies.1  One  of  the 
professors  at  the  St.  Petersburg  University,  M. 
Zybikoff,  a  Buriat  by  birth,  has  not  only  visited 
but  resided  in  Lhasa  as  a  lama,  and  he  asserts 
that  Buriats,  Kalmucks,  and  Mongols  of  the  Rus 
sian  dominion  receive  their  priests  from  Tibet  and 
send  their  youths  to  be  trained  in  Lhasa,  thus 
keeping  up  a  constant  stream  of  communication 
with  the  city,  which  is,  in  fact,  "  forbidden  "  only 
to  foreigners  who  are  not  Russian  subjects.  In 
cidentally,  a  Japanese  and  a  Hindoo  traveller  have 
visited  Lhasa  without  revealing  their  nationality 
and  have  given  accounts  of  the  city.  If  a  Europe 
an  Russian  has  not  been  openly  received  at  Lhasa 
it  is  probably  because  it  has  been  convenient  to 
Russia  to  maintain  Tibet  in  her  exclusive  attitude- 

1  Central  Asia  and  Tibet.     1903. 
373 


GREATER    AMERICA 

for  through  her  Buddhist  subjects  she  can  get  all 
she  requires  of  information  and  influence. 

The  British  movement  into  Tibet  has  its  origin 
no  doubt  in  a  desire  to  force  the  hand  of  Russia. 
It  is  important  to  retain  Tibet  as  a  real  buffer 
state  in  central  Asia  and  to  prevent  Russia  from 
coming  into  close  contact  with  the  protected  states 
on  the  northern  fringe  of  India.  A  close  connec 
tion,  based  on  religion  and  trade,  exists  between 
some  of  these  states  and  Tibet,  and  the  true  in 
terests  of  the  latter  lie  southward  and  not  north. 
There  is  no  trade  with  Russia,  and  Tibet  is  cut  off 
by  the  sand  wastes  of  Turkestan  and  the  deserts 
of  Mongolia  on  the  north  and  west ;  east  of  her  lies 
China,  and  the  main  current  of  national  life  flows 
in  that  direction.  Hence  her  primary  importance 
to  Russia.  A  glance  at  a  map  will  show  how 
Tibet  commands  the  sources  of  the  Yangtse,  and, 
with  France  creeping  up  through  Yunnan,  it  is 
plain  that  China  might  be  cut  off  from  the  rest  of 
the  continent  entirely,  dominated  north  and  west 
by  Russia  and  on  the  south  by  France. 

It  is  interesting  to  remember  that  the  seven 
teenth  century,  which  saw  the  founding  of  Boston 
and  the  colonies  of  Rhode  Island,  Maryland,  Caro 
lina,  and  Pennsylvania,  and  the  first  Dutch  settle 
ment  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  saw  also  the  foun 
dation  of  the  Russian  Empire  by  Peter  the  Great, 
who  took  his  half-savage,  half -Oriental,  loosely 
organized  kingdom,  centring  in  the  ancient  khanate 
at  Moscow,  and  turned  it  into  the  nucleus  of  a 

374 


GREATER    AMERICA 

modern  empire.  The  settlers  of  the  New  World 
began  with  individual  liberty,  initiative,  and  a 
spirit  of  independence  and  fraternity.  Russia  was 
founded  by  a  clever,  unscrupulous  despot,  ruling 
by  sheer  force  of  will  over  a  savage,  disunited 
congeries  of  tribes.  He  brought  from  his  sojourn 
in  the  West  some  of  the  features  of  civilization  and 
introduced  them  at  the  point  of  the  sword.  The 
New- World  colonists  began  their  lives  with  all 
the  equipment  that  the  best  civilization  of  the 
time  could  give  them.  It  is  a  singular  and  in 
teresting  contrast,  and  one  that  might  profitably 
be  followed  in  the  whole  history  of  the  two  peoples ; 
but  we  are  now  concerned  more  with  Russia's 
future  than  her  past.  Great  as  has  been  her 
material  progress,  she  remains  to  this  day  a  semi- 
civilized  giant.  For  the  handful  of  highly  polish 
ed,  elegant,  French-speaking  Russian  nobility  one 
meets  in  the  cities  there  is  a  vast,  illiterate,  half- 
civilized  proletariat.1  Only  of  late  years  has  there 
grown  up  a  middle  class,  which  combine  the 
heritage  of  poverty  and  labor  with  a  certain  degree 
of  education.  Whatever  the  forces  warring  within 
her,  however,  Russia  has  the  enormous  advantage 
in  brute  force  of  a  great,  rapidly  growing  popula 
tion,  like  a  vast  battering-ram,  directed  by  the 
highly  wrought  engine  of  the  governing  class,  whose 

1  In  All  the  Russias  Mr.  Henry  Norman,  no  captious  critic 
of  Russian  affairs,  says:  "Poverty  and  illiteracy  naturally  go 
hand-in-hand.  In  no  other  great  country  of  the  world  is  pov 
erty — monotonous,  resigned  poverty — to  so  great  an  extent  a 
national  characteristic  of  the  people." 

375 


GREATER    AMERICA 

motive  power  is  supplied  from  St.  Petersburg. 
Russia  is  the  apotheosis  of  centralization,  and 
should  that  central  brain  be  paralyzed  it  is  im 
possible  to  foresee  what  might  happen  to  the  vast, 
unwieldy  limbs;  but,  failing  such  a  catastrophe, 
the  giant  will  continue  on  his  path  until  he  meets 
a  strong  organism  on  which  to  try  his  strength. 
Hitherto,  be  it  observed,  he  has  proceeded  against 
the  lower  organisms  of  political  life,  the  weak 
central  Asian  khanates,  the  unorganized  Siberian 
and  Buriat  tribes,  the  terrified  and  unprogressive 
China.  His  ambitions  towards  Constantinople 
landed  him  in  a  war  with  great  powers,  since  when 
he  has  cast  covetous  eyes  but  has  done  nothing  but 
scheme  and  undermine  in  that  direction. 

Side  by  side  with  these  changes  on  the  Asiatic 
continent,  a  process  of  transformation  has  been 
working  in  the  Pacific  Ocean.  Although  this  ap 
pears  to  the  casual  observer  to  be  a  modern 
movement,  and  although  it  is  only  of  recent  years 
that  modern  statesmen  have  come  to  understand 
the  part  that  ocean  is  to  play  in  world  history,  yet 
the  early  statesmen  of  America,  with  a  remarkable 
foresight,  had  a  true  conception  of  the  importance 
of  that  ocean  and  laid  their  plans  accordingly. 
Jefferson,  at  a  time  when  the  mountains  still 
seemed  an  almost  impenetrable  barrier,  foresaw 
the  development  under  the  American  aegis  of  the 
whole  Pacific  slope.  Seward,  at  a  later  date, 
while  the  rest  of  his  world  was  exhausted  with  a 
fratricidal  struggle  and  cared  for  nothing  save 

376 


GREATER    AMERICA 

peace  and  reconstruction,  could  look  ahead  far 
enough  to  seize  the  opportunity  of  securing  for 
his  country  Alaska  and  the  Aleutian  islands. 

During  the  period  which  preceded  the  civil  war, 
America,  indeed,  had  been  playing  a  considerable 
part  in  Pacific  affairs.  The  war  of  1812  roused 
in  her  people  that  pride  in  and  love  of  ships  which 
was  their  heritage.  American  traders,  fishers,  and 
explorers  were  first  in  the  Pacific.  At  this  time 
England  was  engaged,  through  the  East  India 
Company,  in  a  slow,  stately,  and  not  altogether 
remunerative  trade  with  the  ports  of  the  Far  East. 
Her  ships  had  to  go  by  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope, 
and  a  year  was  not  an  unreasonable  time  for  the 
trading  venture  to  occupy.  Then  America  began 
to  send  across  from  her  Pacific  slope  the  light, 
swift  vessels  for  which  she  was  to  become  famous. 
The  discovery  of  gold  in  California  in  1847,  and  in 
Australia  in  1851,  gave  a  stimulus  not  only  to  the 
carrying- trade  but  to  industries  and  manufactures. 
The  Pacific  began  to  be  the  arena  of  a  number  of 
ocean  highways,  and  all  this  made  an  increase  in 
the  world's  shipping  an  imperative  necessity.  A 
keen  competition  for  the  carrying  -  trade  in  the 
Far  East  between  Britain  and  America  ensued, 
and  the  evolution  of  the  American  clipper,  which 
was  the  most  beautiful,  as  well  as  the  fastest  ship 
of  the  day,  gave  the  New  World  a  supremacy  in 
mercantile  marine  which  she  has  never  since 
attained. 

It  is  worth  while  to  pause  for  a  moment  in  our 

377 


GREATER    AMERICA 

sketch  of  Pacific  expansion  to  recall  these  halcyon 
days  which  must  surely  be  forgotten  by  Americans 
when  they  speak  of  the  " newness"  of  the  policy 
which  gives  them  interests  in  the  Pacific  and  in 
eastern  Asia.  The  late  Alexander  Michie,  writing 
from  actual  memory  of  those  days,  draws  the 
following  picture: 

"The  ocean  was  the  true  route  to  California  for 
emigrants  and  material,  but  the  voyage  was  long, 
and,  impatience  of  intervening  space  being  the 
ruling  temper  of  gold-seekers,  the  shortening  of 
the  time  of  transit  became  a  crying  want  for  the 
living  cargoes,  and  scarcely  less  for  the  perishable 
provisions  which  the  new  ships  were  designed  to 
carry.  Speed,  comfort,  and  capacity  had,  there 
fore,  to  be  combined  in  a  way  which  had  never 
before  been  attempted.  The  result  was  the  his 
torical  American  clipper  of  the  middle  of  the 
century,  beautiful  to  look  on  with  her  cloud  of 
white  cotton  canvas,  covering  every  ocean  high 
way.  These  were  vessels  of  large  capacity,  carry 
ing  one -half  more  dead -weight  than  their  reg 
istered  tonnage,  built  and  rigged  like  yachts,  and 
attaining  a  speed  never  before  reached  on  the 
high  seas.  .  .  .  The  Americans  not  only  had  the 
Californian  trade  practically  in  their  own  hands, 
but  were  prompt  to  turn  the  advantage  which 
that  gave  them  to  profitable  account  in  the  com 
petition  for  the  trade  of  China.  The  ships,  when 
empty,  sailed  across  the  Pacific,  loading  at  Canton 
or  Shanghai  tea  and  other  produce  for  London  or 

378 


GREATER    AMERICA 

New  York.  .  .  .  Larger  and  finer  ships  were  con 
stantly  being  added  to  the  American  fleet  until  they 
almost  monopolized  the  trade  not  only  between 
New  York  and  San  Francisco,  but  also  between 
China  and  Great  Britain.  .  .  .  Thus  the  China  Sea 
became  a  principal  battle  -  ground  whereon  the 
struggle  for  ascendency  between  the  ships  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  was  most  strenuous 
ly  fought  out."1 

How  the  British  roused  themselves  to  meet  their 
rivals,  the  heroic  measures  adopted,  including  the 
abrogation  of  the  Navigation  Acts,  and  the  part 
played  in  the  struggle  by  the  discovery  of  gold 
in  Australia,  by  the  civil  war  in  America,  by  the 
opening  of  the  Suez  Canal,  and  by  the  invention 
of  iron  and  steam  vessels,  is  a  story  which  can 
not  be  told  here.  Sufficient  that  the  energies  of 
Americans  were  turned  for  a  time  into  other 
channels,  their  shipping  declined,  the  day  of  the 
beautiful,  white- winged  argosies  was  over  and  the 
paths  of  the  Pacific  knew  them  no  more. 

The  second  period  of  American  activity  in  the 
Pacific  has  led  her  back  to  contend  once  more,  on 
very  different  terms,  for  the  markets  of  the  Far 
East.  No  longer  is  Britain  practically  the  only 
competitor;  no  longer  is  that  vast  region  a  terra 
incognita  waiting  only  for  Occidental  enterprise 
and  affording  unlimited  scope  for  the  merchant  ad 
venturer.  The  transformation  of  Asia  is  nowhere 

1  The  Englishman  in  China. 
379 


GREATER    AMERICA 

more  evident  than  in  the  Far  Eastern  section  of 
that  continent,  and  the  main  features  in  that 
change  are  the  advance  of  Russia,  already  de 
scribed,  and  the  renascence  of  Japan. 

These  two  factors — advancing  Russia  and  pro 
gressive  Japan — are  antipathetic.  Sooner  or  later 
their  interests  were  bound  to  clash.  To  Japan 
the  vital  question  in  the  Far  East  is  the  pres 
ervation  of  China  as  an  Oriental  state.  She  has 
been  plainly  shown  that  she  is  not  to  be  per 
mitted  to  exercise  authority  over  her  sister  na 
tion;  indeed,  the  legitimate  fruits  of  victory  were 
denied  her  after  the  Chino-Japanese  war.  Since 
that  time  she  has  changed  her  tactics  and  has  done 
everything  in  her  power  to  win  the  confidence  of 
China.  She  has  succeeded  well,  if  we  remember 
the  intense  contempt  with  which  the  Chinese  used 
to  regard  their  Japanese  neighbors.  But  the  steady 
absorbing  process  to  which  Russia  is  subjecting 
the  administrative  centre,  as  well  as  the  outlying 
provinces  of  China,  are  too  insidious,  and  too  far 
advanced  to  be  combated  by  similar  methods  on 
the  part  of  Japan,  who,  moreover,  has  not  been 
allowed  by  the  European  powers  (what  each  one 
claims  for  itself)  an  actual  foothold  in  the  Chinese 
Empire.  It  is,  therefore,  no  question  as  to  the  in 
dependence  of  Korea  alone — vital  as  that  is  to  the 
Japanese;  Russia  is  not  prepared  to  fight  for  that 
—nor  is  it  a  matter  of  trade  interests  in  Man 
churia,  though  these  may  be  used  as  a  lever. 
The  crux  of  the  situation  is  whether  or  no  Russia 

380 


GREATER    AMERICA 

will  give  definite  assurances  in  a  binding  form 
as  to  her  ambitions  in  eastern  Asia — assurances 
with  ample  guarantees  that  she  does  not  dispute 
the  sovereignty  of  China.  This  would  form  a 
basis  for  future  operations  and  would  establish 
an  element  of  permanency  which  would  be  un 
doubtedly  used  by  Japan  to  strengthen  the  posi 
tion  of  China.  That  apparently  moribund  empire 
would  certainly  use  her  independence  to  make 
fresh  engagements  with  Western  powers  as  to 
trade ;  but  in  the  influence  and  tutelage  of  Japan 
rests  the  only  hope  of  permanent  improvement  in 
her  condition. 

As  for  the  attitude  of  Japan  at  this  crisis,  it 
is  remarkable  for  its  consistency  and  firmness, 
despite  many  attempts  made  to  deflect  the  issue, 
to  discredit  her  by  apparent  concessions  which 
she  could  not  accept,  and  by  other  devices  to  place 
her  in  an  unfavorable  light  before  the  world. 
Japan  keeps  her  aims  steadily  before  her,  and 
what  those  aims  are  may  well  be  stated  in  the 
words  of  a  man  who  has  a  life-long  knowledge  of 
his  subject.  Captain  Brinkley,  in  his  recent  book 
says:  " Japan  has  risen  to  the  headship  of  the 
Far  East.  Is  that  the  goal  of  her  ambition  ?  One 
of  her  favorite  sayings  is,  '  Better  be  the  tail  of  an 
ox  than  the  comb  of  a  cock.'  She  is  now  the  comb 
of  the  Oriental  cock — that  is  not  enough ;  she  wants 
to  be  the  tail  of  the  Occidental  ox.  How  is  it  to 
be  done?  Evidently  by  following  the  route  that 
has  already  led  her  so  far.  She  cannot  turn  back. 

381 


GREATER   AMERICA 

Her  destiny  forces  her  on,  and  there  is  no  mistaking 
the  sign  -  post  set  up  by  her  recent  experience. 
She  has  been  taught  that  fighting  capacity  is  the 
only  sure  passport  to  European  esteem  "-  —(Captain 
Brinkley  has  already  pointed  out  that  until  she 
beat  China,  Japan's  internal  progress  had  won  her 
little  recognition  in  Europe  or  America)—  •"  and 
she  has  also  been  told  again  and  again,  is  still 
perpetually  told,  that  her  victory  over  China 
proved  nothing  about  her  competence  to  stand  in 
the  lists  of  the  West.  She  will  complete  the  proof, 
or  try  to  complete  it."1  Incidentally  it  may  be 
remarked  that  Japan's  position  as  the  "comb  of 
the  Oriental  cock"  would  be  immediately  jeop 
ardized  by  the  break  up  of  China,  which  would 
bring  several  European  powers  into  prominence 
in  the  Far  East  and  would  certainly  mean  the 
ascendency  of  Russia.  Japan  is,  therefore,  pro 
tecting  what  she  has  already  won,  as  well  as 
satisfying  a  legitimate  ambition  for  future  great 
ness. 

One  of  the  factors  in  the  situation  in  China  which 
is  hardest  to  gauge  is  the  rapprochement  which 
has  taken  place  between  the  thinking  classes  in 
Japan  and  China,  despite  the  defeat  suffered  by 
a  proud  people  at  the  hands  of  a  nation  they 
despised,  despite  the  ever-growing  web  of  Russian 
intrigue  and  influence.  It  seemed  as  though,  in  her 
extremity,  China  had  turned  to  her  once-despised 

1  Japan  and  China.     1903, 

382 


GREATER    AMERICA 

rival  for  help  against  the  Western  barbarians,  and 
the  founding  of  the  East  Asiatic  League,  with  an 
organ  at  Peking,  the  despatch  of  students  to 
Tokio,  and  the  demand  for  Japanese  teachers  in 
many  forms  of  industry  and  in  the  army,  are  signs 
of  good  feeling  hailed  as  a  happy  augury. 

The  great  difficulty  in  appraising  the  true  value 
of  such  signs  is  to  differentiate  between  the  real 
China  and  the  Manchu  government,  whose  acts 
represent  the  Celestial  Empire  to  the  outer  world. 
Progress  and  reform  had  quite  a  little  vogue  in 
court  circles  after  the  return  from  Singnan-fu. 
Missionaries  were  patted  on  the  back  by  hands 
steeped  in  the  blood  of  thousands  of  native  Chris 
tians  ;  ladies  of  legations  were  wept  over,  in  regret 
for  past  misunderstandings,  and  went  away  loaded 
with  sweet  words  and  cjieap  presents;  Imperial 
edicts  decreed  the  reform  of  education,  which,  if 
carried  out,  would  revolutionize  the  whole  fabric 
of  Chinese  society ;  and,  simultaneously,  a  despatch 
urged  the  immediate  capture  and  execution  of 
reformers  who  had  been  suggesting  less  drastic 
measures  without  the  imperial  imprimatur. 

The  extraordinary  force  vested  in  the  Manchu 
government,  and  controlled  by  the  Empress 
Dowager  and  her  immediate  relatives,  has  a 
peculiar  relation  to  the  Chinese  people.  It  has 
been  pointed  out  by  native  writers  (from  the 
secure  vantage-point  of  a  British  settlement)  that 
the  head  of  the  Manchu  dynasty  has  by  Chi 
nese  law  incurred  the  punishment  of  decapitation 

383 


GREATER    AMERICA 

by  having  surrendered  territory  to  a  foreigner. 
Moreover,  the  bulk  of  the  Chinese  neither  respect 
nor  love  the  wonderful  old  lady  at  Peking.  The 
vilest  stories  are  in  common  circulation  about  her, 
just  as  they  were  about  her  great  supporter,  Li- 
Hung  Chang.  At  the  same  time,  not  only  the 
Chinese  people  at  large,  but  some  of  the  best  and 
most  upright  of  Chinese  statesmen,  including  the 
Yangtse  viceroys,  Liu-kun-yi  and  Chang-chih- 
tung,  were  personally  loyal  to  her  and  saved  the 
empire  for  the  Manchu  dynasty  at  the  time  when 
the  secession  of  the  Yangtse  provinces  was  strong 
ly  urged  from  without.  No  adequate  explanation 
can  be  given  of  this  anomaly,  which  is  the  more 
confusing  as  one  attempts  to  analyze  it.  No  na 
tion  is  so  badly  governed  as  the  Chinese — none, 
perhaps,  enjoys  a  more  complete  local  autonomy. 
The  paradoxes  of  China  are  proverbial.  The  only 
suggestion  that  can  be  offered  as  to  the  continued 
ascendency  of  the  Manchus  is  the  fact  that  were 
they  to  fall  the  vast  net- work  which  emanates  from 
Peking  and  centres  there  would  be  thrown  out  of 
gear.  There  is  nothing  that  could  be  set  up  in 
its  place;  no  rival  dynasty.  The  nepotism  of  the 
Manchus  has  secured  them  a  monopoly  of  all  the 
best  posts  near  the  throne  and  has  precluded  the 
rise  of  a  Chinese  aristocracy.  The  actual  organi 
zation  of  society,  indeed,  precludes  any  real  Chi 
nese  aristocracy  or  ruling  class.  The  Manchus 
alone  have  the  privileges  attaching  to  an  heredi 
tary  nobility,  and  though  titles  have  been  be- 

3*4 


GREATER    AMERICA 

stowed  on  distinguished  Chinese,  these  are,  in  fact, 
for  foreign  consumption  only.  There  is  only  one 
Chinese  hereditary  noble,  who  derives  the  dignity 
from  his  descent  from  Confucius.  While  this  is 
the  case,  it  is  obviously  difficult  to  evolve  any 
class  combination  among  the  Chinese  which  could 
vie  with  that  of  the  small  but  powerful  Manchu 
aristocracy  which  are  spread  over  the  land,  "  eat 
ing  it,"  as  the  phrase  goes.  The  people,  in  many 
ways  wretched,  from  the  Western  point  of  view, 
being  the  victims  of  official  corruption,  heavy 
exactions,  and  incomplete  justice,  are  far  from 
contented,  but  yet  have  not  that  oneness  of  aim, 
that  power  of  combination,  which  makes  masses 
powerful  in  the  state.  Revolutions  and  rebellions, 
on  small  and  large  scales,  are  chronic,  but  no 
great  leader  has  appeared  who  could  point  the 
way  to  victory.  The  Chinese  has  no  aspirations 
at  all  after  ethical  perfection.  He  wants  to  be 
let  alone  and  to  have  an  opportunity  for  selling 
what  he  makes  or  raises.  He  has  a  rooted  objec 
tion  to  taxation,  and  would  infinitely  rather  bribe 
a  tax-gatherer  to  pass  him  over  than  give  up  his 
just  demand. 

Whatever  may  be  the  future  of  this  people,  it  is 
plain  to  the  most  enlightened  of  their  own  states 
men  that  they  are  not  ripe  for  the  introduction, 
wholesale,  of  a  European  civilization.  The  same 
consideration  probably  weighs  with  many  enlight 
ened  Chinese  in  their  allegiance  to  the  dynasty. 
That  dynasty  represents  to  the  ignorant  masses 
*s  385 


GREATER    AMERICA 

what  no  other  power,  no  representative  govern 
ment,  no  new  form  of  control  can.  They  can 
hardly  separate  the  Son  of  Heaven  who  rules  them 
from  the  vague  deity  of  whom  there  is  an  image 
in  the  breasts  of  the  most  ignorant  of  mankind. 
Russia  was  well  advised  when  she  began  her  at 
tack  on  the  Far  East  at  the  very  heart  of  empire, 
and  she  has  now  established  herself  in  the  minds 
of  the  government  at  Peking  as  the  friend  and 
protector  of  the  dynasty  against  those  clamorous 
nations  which  have  long  been  asking  for  reform 
— reform — reform!  Reform  would  have  to  begin 
with  the  court  itself,  and  that  would  not  suit 
either  the  Empress  Dowager  or  her  favorites,  so 
she  has  flung  herself  into  the  arms  of  the  one 
power  which  not  only  does  not  ask  for  these  in 
convenient  changes,  but  is  also  prepared  to  use 
force,  if  necessary,  to  back  her  opinions.  The  oft- 
repeated  assurances  of  Great  Britain  have  ceased 
to  be  regarded;  she  is  no  longer  considered  as 
China's  friend,  and  it  is  thought  easy  to  get  the 
better  of  her  with  Russia's  aid.  An  affront,  too, 
was  considered  to  have  been  put  upon  China  by 
the  British  alliance  with  Japan,  which  may  also 
have  estranged  somewhat  the  two  Oriental  coun 
tries.  It  was  believed  by  the  Chinese  to  have 
been  aimed  against  them.  "Why  did  you  not 
come  to  us,  make  an  alliance  with  us?"  asked  a 
Chinese  statesman  of  his  English  friend.  Not  very 
reasonably,  perhaps,  from  our  point  of  view,  but 
Chinese  point  may  well  be  different,  and  we 
386 


GREATER    AMERICA 

are  too  little  given  to  regard  it.  Under  any  cir 
cumstances,  however,  it  is  to  be  feared  that  China 
will  see  in  the  present  situation  only  a  fresh  proof 
of  Russia's  superiority  of  strength  and  purpose 
over  the  Anglo  -  Saxon  powers.  Her  budding 
friendship  for  Japan  may  not  stand  such  a  test. 
She  will  comment  on  the  futility  of  alliance  with 
Europe,  and  should  Japan  fail  in  the  attempt 
to  secure  her  independence,  will  make  the  best 
terms  she  can  with  the  conqueror,  which  will  mean 
her  own  partition  under  the  guise  of  protectorates. 
The  worst  thing  that  can  happen  to  China,  the 
dismemberment  which  began  on  the  last  occasion 
of  conflict  in  the  Far  East,  seems,  therefore,  once 
more  possible,  unless  Japan  is  successful  in  put 
ting  a  limit  to  Russian  ambitions. 

Is  China — rich  in  population  and  resources,  in 
potentialities,  awaiting  the  master-hand — rapidly 
degenerating  into  a  Sick  Man  of  the  East?  Or  is 
there  reserved  for  her  another  fate,  even  more 
inglorious?  She  is  one  of  the  last  of  Oriental 
empires.  Siam  is  drifting  towards  her  inevitable 
fate  as  a  "protectorate"  of  France.  Persia  is 
independent  only  in  name ;  a  fierce  battle  between 
Britain  and  Russia  is  being  silently  waged  over 
her  moribund  body.  Afghanistan,  Tibet — buffer 
states — cannot  long  withstand  the  dynamic  forces 
pressing  upon  them.  Turkey  is  upheld  merely 
by  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe— a  slender  reed. 
Is  Russia  to  hold  the  key  to  China's  future?  Is 
the  continent  of  Asia  to  be  divided,  giving  Russia 

387 


GREATER    AMERICA 

a  solid,  compact  empire,  leaving  Great  Britain 
the  southern  excrescences,  with  a  slice  or  two  for 
France  and  Germany  in  the  East?  This  would 
obviously  be  a  situation  very  difficult  for  Britain 
to  maintain,  and  how  much  more  so  if  the  poten 
tialities  of  China  are  to  be  developed  on  Slavonic 
lines. 

The  actual  position  of  the  two  Anglo-Saxon 
powers  at  this  crisis  in  the  history  of  the  Far 
East,  is  a  little  difficult  to  define.  That  both 
have  tangible  interests  which  are  threatened 
by  Russia  cannot  be  denied,  and  when  we  re 
member  the  early  history  of  Occidental  inter 
course  with  the  Far  East  it  seems  remarkable 
that  the  earliest  powers  to  open  and  develop  that 
region  should  even  contemplate  an  attitude  of 
neutrality  while  so  important  a  chapter  in  its 
history  is  being  enacted.  Both  Britain  and 
America  have  recently  executed  treaties  with 
China  which  practically  amount  to  an  assertion 
of  her  sovereignty  in  Manchuria,  and  it  is  reported 
that  Russia  is  willing  to  convey  to  those  and  to 
the  other  world  powers  an  assurance  that  she  has 
no  intention  to  deprive  China  of  that  sovereignty. 
But,  in  the  teeth  of  similar  assurances,  she  has 
assumed  in  that  region  a  position  incompatible 
with  China's  sovereignty,  and  to  Japan,  as  to  the 
one  power  whose  whole  fate  is  bound  up  in  this 
matter,  has  fallen  the  unpleasant  task  of  requiring 
a  more  definite  and  binding  promise.  It  is  de 
sirable  that  both  Britain  and  America  should  keep 

388 


GREATER    AMERICA 

this  broad  issue  in  mind,  since  it  is  the  root  of  the 
situation,  and  certainly  affects  them  both  in  more 
than  one  way.  Japan  is  hardly  likely  to  be  mis 
taken  in  her  estimate  of  the  situation  as  regards 
Russia  and  China,  and  if  her  estimate  is  right  the 
great  commercial  nations,  whose  aims  are  coinci 
dent  with  those  of  Japan,  must  view  with  grave 
misgivings  any  development  which  would  cripple 
the  one  progressive  Oriental  nation,  destroy  the 
only  hope  of  China  for  national  regeneration, 
and  throw  the  balance  of  power  into  Slavonic 
hands.  Japan,  as  a  naval  power,  holds  that 
balance  true  in  the  Far  East,  and  neither  Great 
Britain,  her  ally,  nor  America,  her  friend,  can 
afford  to  see  the  Japanese  navy  eliminated,  or 
even  reduced.  There  is  another  side  of  the 
question,  which  arises  out  of  the  possibility  that 
Japan  might  be  overcome  by  sheer  weight  in  any 
struggle  with  the  northern  colossus. 

America  has  always  desired  to  be  considered 
as  not  only  the  home  of  liberty  but  the  centre  from 
which  it  should  stream  out  into  the  world.  She 
places  more  importance  on  the  ethical  significance 
of  her  own  expansion  than  any  other  nation  has 
yet  done.  She  is  practically  pledged  to  the  cause 
of  freedom — even  lays  claim  to  quixotry  in  her 
dealings  with  oppressed  peoples.  Without  sub 
scribing  to  this  view,  without  retracting  the  state 
ment  so  frequently  made  in  this  book  that  Amer 
ican  expansion  has  been  neither  spasmodic  nor 
altruistic,  there  remains  the  fact  that  the  American 

389 


GREATER    AMERICA 

people  cannot,  in  the  face  of  their  actions  else 
where  and  their  frequent  protestations,  view  with 
out  deep  concern  the  extinguishing  of  progress 
and  liberty  in  Japan.  Neither  Britain  nor  the 
United  States  lifted  up  their  voices  against  the 
brutal  crushing  of  Finland — it  was,  perhaps,  im 
possible  for  them  to  do  so  save  by  an  unpardonable 
breach  of  international  etiquette;  but  in  the  case 
of  Japan  there  are  not  only  sentimental  or  moral 
grounds,  but  more  solid  ones,  which  could  be  made 
the  basis  of,  at  least,  remonstrance.  It  is  the  con 
duct  of  Russia  in  Manchuria  which  has  brought 
affairs  to  a  crisis,  and  Japan,  remembering  the 
language  held  by  her  Anglo  -  Saxon  friends  on 
this  subject,  was  anxious  that  the  collision  which 
seemed  inevitable  should  occur  over  a  matter  in 
which  all  the  great  powers  were  concerned.  Even 
when  disillusioned  by  a  direct  warning  from  Amer 
ica  and  by  an  evident  disinclination  to  interfere 
on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  Japan  has  stood  firm 
ly  in  defence  not  only  of  her  own  interests  but  of 
those  of  the  whole  commercial  world. 

What  course  can  be  suggested  which  would  best 
serve  the  interests  of  Anglo  -  Saxondom  ?  The 
worst  possible  course  is  to  permit  Russia  to  dis 
pose  of  the  one  active  factor  in  the  way  of  her 
domination  of  the  Far  East.  It  must  be  remem 
bered  that,  whereas  other  nations  have  interests, 
or  even  territory,  in  the  Far  East,  Japan  alone,  of 
the  active  powers,  is  at  home  there.  All  that  she 
has  of  resources,  interests,  power,  or  prestige  is 

390 


GREATER    AMERICA 

contained  in  the  north  China  Sea.  Russia  has 
reached  that  sea  by  contiguous  expansion ;  and  by 
means  of  a  line,  recently  derided  as  of  "  no  stra 
tegic  use,"  she  has  placed  this  outlying  part  of 
her  empire  in  direct  and  rapid  touch  with  the 
brain-power  at  Petersburg.  Were  her  expansion 
the  legitimate  expression  of  internal  growth  and 
progress,  as  has  been  that  of  the  United  States,  it 
would  be  unreasonable  to  adopt  a  hostile  atti 
tude  towards  it.  Even  from  the  point  of  view  of 
ethics  the  territory  hitherto  conquered  or  annexed 
by  Russia  is  probably  better  off  under  her  than 
under  half-savage  khans.  But  Russia's  expansion 
is  no  longer  legitimate.  She  has  reached  her  ob 
jective,  the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  has  not  paused  to 
develop  or  organize  the  vast  territories  she  has 
occupied ;  she  has  in  no  case  laid  the  foundation  of 
a  future  of  freedom  and  prosperity  for  the  con 
quered  peoples.  She  has  simply  imposed  a  cast- 
iron  system  and  planted  military  colonies  to  keep 
things  in  order.  She  has  no  excuse  save  her  own 
insatiable  ambition  and  land-hunger. 

When  she  comes  down  to  Korea  she  meets  for 
the  first  time  with  a  different  state  of  affairs.  A 
determined  and  civilized  people  now  oppose  her 
progress.  She  also  crosses,  not  for  the  first  time, 
the  interests  of  her  two  great  rivals  for  supremacy 
not  only  in  the  Far  East  but  in  world  politics. 
She  has  the  tacit  encouragement  of  her  friend 
Germany,  who  cannot  afford  to  offend  so  near  and 
great  a  neighbor.  She  can  count  on  the  neutrality, 

391 


GREATER    AMERICA 

at  all  events,  of  France.  At  the  same  time  it  is 
notorious  that  her  internal  condition  gives  rise 
to  serious  misgivings  among  the  most  thoughtful 
and  patriotic  of  her  people.  She  is  losing  ground 
in  Europe.  She  has  serious  problems  in  many 
parts  of  the  empire  which  may  become  dangerous. 
It  is  the  disloyal  and  disaffected  among  her  sub 
jects  who  are  clamorous  for  the  continuance  of 
her  aggressive  policy,  hoping  that  she  may  meet 
with  disaster.  Her  friends  wish  that  Russia 
might  cease  to  be  hag-ridden  by  destiny,  which  she 
believes,  with  Oriental  fatalism,  points  her  on 
to  the  subjection  of  Asia.  They  believe  that  a 
conflict  in  the  Far  East,  if  disastrous  to  Japan, 
may  be  equally  harmful  in  the  long  run  to  the 
conqueror.  The  political  subjugation  of  China 
may  be  followed  by  the  economic  conquest  of 
Russian  territory  by  the  Chinese  —  as  indeed 
is  already  occurring  in  eastern  Siberia  —  and 
other  results  equally  inimical  to  the  ultimate 
welfare  of  the  Russian  people  may  follow  a 
too  successful  territorial  expansion  in  the  Far 
East. 

The  naval  question  is  by  no  means  the  least 
pressing.  Greater  America  and  Greater  Britain 
must  both  view  with  apprehension  the  possibility 
that  the  one  naval  power  with  whom  they  are 
entirely  in  accord  as  to  policy,  might  be  crippled 
or  even  destroyed  by  the  fleets  of  Russia.  The 
immediate  result  would  be  to  place  Russia  in  the 
front  rank  of  naval  powers. 

392 


GREATER    AMERICA 

The  practical  question  for  the  Anglo-Saxon 
nations  is  whether  they  can  afford  to  look  on  while 
this  important  act  in  the  drama  of  "Asia  Trans 
formed  "  is  played  without  reference  to  their  own 
interests  or  sentiments. 


CHAPTER  XVII 
FOREIGN    RELATIONS 

IT  has  been  constantly  reiterated  in  this  book 
that  in  her  expansion  America  has  followed  a 
steady  and  even  consistent  policy.  It  therefore 
follows  that,  in  the  opinion  of  the  writer,  the 
Spanish  war  was  not,  as  is  sometimes  asserted, 
the  means  of  breaking  down  the  barrier  of  isola 
tion  which  the  wisdom  of  the  early  Americans 
had  enjoined.1  Apart  from  the  view  of  the  party 
politician,  who  may  choose  to  present  facts  in  a 
certain  light,  there  is  evidence  that  the  isolation 
of  the  United  States  has  been  more  of  a  condi 
tion — and  that  a  temporary  one — than  a  policy. 
What  Washington  enjoined,  and  what  has  been 
the  aim  of  every  wise  statesman  in  his  country, 
was  the  avoidance  of  entangling  alliances,  or  any 
alliances  save  temporary  ones.  "The  great  rule 
of  conduct  for  us,"  he  said,  "in  regard  to  foreign 
nations  is,  in  extending  our  commercial  relations, 
to  have  with  them  as  little  political  connection  as 
possible."2  It  is  notorious  that  to  an  alliance  with 

1  One  phase  of  American  foreign  policy  has  been  developed 
more  fully  in  chapter  vi. 

2  Washington  added:     "We  may  safely  trust  to  temporary 

394 


GREATER    AMERICA 

France  the  infant  republic  owed  much  of  its 
early  success.  In  modern  times  it  is  partly  owing 
to  the  countenance  of  Great  Britain  that  she  owes 
her  unimpeded  expansion  in  the  Pacific  —  unim 
peded,  at  all  events,  so  far  as  the  great  European 
powers  are  concerned. 

An  able  American  statesman1  gives  as  two  of 
the  chief  features,  in  an  isolation  which  he  re 
gards  as  now  impossible,  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  the  protective  tariffs. 

Apart  from  the  fact  that  a  protectionist  policy 
has  been  adopted  by  nations  who  have  no  desire 
for  isolation,  it  must  be  conceded  that,  if  this 
be  really  the  case,  it  is  well  for  Americans  that 
destiny  has  proved  too  strong  for  them ;  and  it  may 
be  hoped  that  a  commercial  policy  which  was  only 
a  temporary  expedient,  and  is  becoming  adverse 
to  the  interests  of  large  numbers  of  the  people, 
shall  pass  into  the  regions  of  limbo  at  the  same 
time  as  that  "  isolation  "  of  which  it  is  supposed  to 
be  an  expression.  Neither  of  them  had  any  real 
place  in  the  true  conception  of  the  republic. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is,  of  course,  the  main- 
sheet  of  all  who  believe  that  America  is  marked 
out  by  Fate  for  a  different  destiny  to  that  of  any 
other  world-power.  It  secures  to  her — so  far  as 
she  is  ready  to  stand  by  it — a  predominance  in  her 

alliances  for  extraordinary  emergencies."  Jefferson  used  the 
expression  "entangling  alliances"  in  his  inaugural  address 
in  1801. 

1  Richard  Olney , ' '  Growth  of  Our  Foreign  Policy. ' '  Atlantic 
Monthly,  March,  1900. 

395 


GREATER    AMERICA 

own  hemisphere,  and  prevents  the  re-creation  of 
the  European  situation  on  American  soil,  as  we  now 
have  it  in  eastern  Asia.  But,  in  order  to  justify 
this  famous  doctrine,  America  has  been  forced  to 
expand,  to  annex,  to  stretch  out  overseas;  she 
is  compelled  to  contemplate  a  complete  revision 
of  her  naval  and  military  scheme;  she  is  obliged 
to  enter  herself  among  the  nations  prepared  for 
war  —  and  all  this  would  be  useless  and  sense 
less  but  for  the  fact  that  the  very  spirit  of  the 
doctrine  which  kept  Europe  from  the  American 
sphere  has  taken  America  into  the  arena  of  world 
politics.  Whichever  way  we  turn  it  seems,  in 
deed,  quite  impossible  to  reconcile  the  "  isolation  " 
policy  with  the  ambitions  of  a  great  and  growing 
nation.  How  is  it  possible  to  put  a  ring-fence 
round  the  ambitions  of  a  people  like  the  Americans  ? 
The  policy  of  the  great  leaders  of  the  early 
republic  was  a  cautious  one.  It  might  not  have 
occurred  to  a  European  statesman  to  utter  the 
famous  warning  about  entangling  alliances,  but 
Washington  knew  the  self-confidence  and  inex 
perience  of  his  countrymen.  At  the  same  time, 
the  first  American  diplomacy  was  engaged  in 
attempting  to  disturb  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe  in  a  manner  favorable  to  the  independence 
of  the  new  republic.  This  was  the  first  of  a  long 
series  of  interventions,  some  trifling,  some  impor 
tant  (like  the  crushing  of  the  Barbary  pirates), 
all  dictated  by  self-interest.  Nevertheless,  it  is 
rather  the  exception  to  find  the  United  States 

396 


GREATER    AMERICA 

taking  part,  as  in  the  Mediterranean,  in  affairs 
which  were  not  directly  connected  with  her 
own  hemisphere.  That  hemisphere,  however, 
provided  her  with  sufficient  points  of  contact 
with  European  powers.  That  European  politics 
were  carefully  followed  and  manipulated  to  her 
advantage  will  be  evident  to  any  one  who  studies 
America's  acquisition  of  Louisiana,  the  Floridas, 
Oregon,  and  other  of  the  older  territories,  not  to 
mention  the  more  recent  annexations.  The  policy 
of  isolation  is  now,  in  fact,  a  mere  farce,  unless 
Americans  are  prepared  to  accept  its  full  signifi 
cance.  Europe  may  accept  at  present  a  Monroe 
Doctrine  which  cripples  her  energies  in  the  New 
World,  but  the  attitude  of  "  Hands  off,  Europe!" 
is  only  possible  if  America  herself  is  prepared  to  ab 
stain  scrupulously  from  any  interference,  interven 
tion,  or  even  expression  of  interest  in  cis- Atlan 
tic  affairs.  This  she  has  never  yet  done.  Apart 
from  the  numerous  cases  of  intervention  abroad 
(of  which  the  latest  examples  are  China  and  Tur 
key)  ,  while  she  has  consistently  resented  and  re 
pelled  any  suggestion  of  European  interference  in 
America,1  she  has  been  unable  even  to  resist  that 
tendency  so  strong  in  every  proud  and  liberty- 

1  In  the  New  Orleans  case  the  United  States  insisted  that 
Italy  should  abide  by  the  decision  of  the  American  courts, 
action  that  was  in  striking  contrast  with  the  line  of  conduct 
adopted  towards  Chili  in  1890,  when  ex-parte  evidence  was 
taken  in  the  United  States  and  special  rights  were  set  up. 
Only  when  a  charge  of  gross  injustice  was  fully  established  had 
the  United  States  the  right  to  claim  a  review  of  the  case. 

397 


GREATER    AMERICA 

loving  people  to  express  herself  strongly  in  cases 
of  misgovernment,  to  use  her  influence  on  behalf 
of  oppressed  peoples.  "There  is  no  reason,"  says 
Mr.  Olney,  "why  the  United  States  should  not 
act  for  the  relief  of  suffering  humanity  and  for  the 
advancement  of  civilization  wherever  and  when 
ever  such  action  would  be  timely."  He  instances 
another  case,  in  which  a  non-active  policy  would 
be  almost  impossible.  At  the  time  of  the  Na 
poleonic  wars,  America,  compelled  by  her  weak 
ness,  maintained  a  neutrality  which  was  humiliat 
ing  and  degrading  in  its  results.  Under  similar 
circumstances — or,  it  may  be  presumed,  any  cir 
cumstances  in  which  Britain  might  be  involved 
in  a  life-and- death  struggle  on  the  ocean — it  would 
be  practically  impossible  now  for  America  to  re 
tain  her  neutrality.  This  is  the  view,  not  of  a 
Briton,  be  it  remembered,  or  of  an  irresponsible 
press  writer,  but  of  an  American  statesman  of  high 
standing.  He  does  not  profess  satisfaction  with 
this  condition  of  affairs,  nor  does  he,  in  the  writer's 
opinion,  give  due  weight  to  the  mass  of  historical 
evidence  which  can  be  brought  forward  to  prove 
that  America  has  never  been  free  from  foreign 
entanglements  of  some  kind.  He  is  rather  of  the 
school  of  American  thinkers  who  would  prefer  for 
their  country  that  ideal  expansion  which  would 
give  her  all  she  wants  of  trade,  prestige,  territory 
— what  not? — without  the  corresponding  obliga 
tions  and  responsibilities.  But  his  conclusions 
are  so  thoroughly  in  accord  with  the  spirit  in 

398 


GREATER    AMERICA 

which  this  book  is  written  that  they  may  well 
be  summarized  here.  America  has  expanded. 
Whatever  her  foreign  relations  in  the  past, 
she  has  now  come  into  the  European  family, 
and  while  that  does  not  imply  that  she  must  not 
study  her  own  interests  first,  it  does  imply  some 
of  the  obligations  of  family  life.  Finally,  if  the 
exigencies  of  the  situation  make  alliance  with  one 
or  other  power  inevitable,  America,  in  choosing 
Britain,  will  select  the  one  most  formidable  as  a 
foe  and  most  effective  as  a  friend,  "whose  people 
make  with  our  own  but  one  family,  whose  internal 
differences  should  not  prevent  a  united  front  as 
against  the  world  outside,  whose  influence  upon 
the  material  and  spiritual  conditions  of  the  human 
race  has,  on  the  whole,  been  elevating  and  benefi 
cent,  and  whose  example  and  experience  cannot 
help  being  of  the  utmost  service  in  our  dealing 
with  the  difficult  problems  before  us."1 

If  any  American  still  cherishes  the  illusion  that 
a  study  of  European  politics  is  not  essential  to 
the  statesmen  of  the  New  World,  he  must  sure 
ly  abandon  it  when  he  reflects  on  the  nature  of 
American  relations  with  Germany.  To  ignore  the 
significance  of  Germany's  attitude,  to  be  ignorant 
of  its  bearing  on  the  politics  of  the  rest  of  Europe, 
means  failure  to  grasp  salient  features  of  Amer 
ica's  position  as  a  world-power.  To  give  the  true 
proportions  to  this  subject  would  involve  more 

1  Richard  Olney , ' '  Growth  of  Our  Foreign  Policy. ' '  A  tlantic 
Monthly,  March,  1900. 

399 


GREATER    AMERICA 

space  than  can  be  afforded  in  this  book,  and  yet 
its  bearing  on  Greater  America  is  such  that  we 
must  endeavor  to  take  a  bird's-eye  view  of  it. 

The  growth  of  Germany  is  one  of  the  most 
striking  features  of  modern  Europe.  Her  popu 
lation  is  bounding  forward  at  a  rate  only  equalled 
in  Russia;  she  has  been  converted  from  an  agri 
cultural  to  an  industrial  and  commercial  power; 
she  has  acquired  colonies  and  strategic  points,  has 
built  up  a  fine  mercantile  marine,  and,  finally,  has 
embarked  on  an  ambitious  naval  policy.  Ac 
cording  to  the  programme  at  present  laid  down, 
the  year  1916  (probably  an  earlier  date)  will  see 
Germany  second  instead  of  fifth  among  the  nations 
in  sea  power.  The  policy  is  a  very  thorough  one, 
and  is  not  confined  to  the  mere  laying  down  of 
ships,  but  includes  the  increase  and  equipment  of 
dock-yards  and  the  training  of  a  personnel.  For 
the  latter  Germany  has  in  her  hardy  coast  popula 
tion  excellent  material. 

Germany's  position  in  Europe  is  a  peculiar  one. 
She  lies  between  two  great  powers  (one,  at  least, 
her  traditional  enemy)  which  have  for  some  years 
past  been  in  close  alliance.  On  the  south  she  has 
the  great,  unwieldy,  disorganized  Austria -Hun 
garian  Empire;  on  the  north  the  little  kingdoms 
of  Denmark,  Holland,  and  Belgium.1  The  avowed 

1  By  the  treaty  of  London  (1831)  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
was  guaranteed  by  four  powers — Austria,  Russia,  Great 
Britain,  and  Prussia;  but  it  was  only  in  1839  that  all  the 
European  powers  recognized  the  kingdom  of  Belgium. 

400 


GREATER    AMERICA 

aspirations  of  Pan-Germanism  are  to  gather  all 
these  fragments  into  a  federated  German  Empire. 
Vast  as  is  the  scheme,  unlikely  to  be  fully  realized, 
it  yet  has  about  it  an  element  of  possibility  and 
reasonableness.  Many  portions  of  Austria-Hun 
gary,  for  instance,  are  already  German-speaking. 
They  will  soon  be  involved  in  a  counter- struggle 
against  the  rival  force  of  Pan- Slavism.  Denmark 
and  Holland — especially  the  latter — are  more  or 
less  economically  dependent  on  Germany.  She 
has  recently  completed  a  canal  which,  by  giving 
access  from  her  great  manufacturing  centres  to  a 
German  port,  would  enable  her,  if  she  wished,  to 
divert  some  of  that  traffic  which  is  Holland's 
principal  asset.  Denmark  is  a  harder  nut  to 
crack.  Here,  as  in  Holland,  there  must  be  a  con 
flict  between  loyalty  to  a  national  ideal  and  the 
desire  to  share  that  material  prosperity  in  which 
small  and  isolated  peoples  can  no  longer  hope  to 
participate.  It  is  suggested  that  Denmark  should 
be  neutralized,  in  her  own  interests  and  that  of 
Europe,  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  where  the  guaran 
tee  is  to  come  from,  in  view  of  the  position  of  Ger 
many  and  her  ambitions. 

These  contingencies  may  seem  remote,  but  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that,  by  reason  of  their 
form  of  government,  Germany  and  Russia  are  en 
abled  to  take  the  long  view  in  their  foreign  policy 
which  is  impossible  to  Britain  or  America,  and, 
having  set  a  goal  before  them,  press  forward 
steadily  towards  it.  Even  at  the  present  stage 

a«  401 


GREATER    AMERICA 

we  see  that  Germany  was  recently  within  an  ace 
of  securing  a  most  important  overland  line  of 
communication  with  the  East,  which  might  have 
provided  an  alternative  or  a  rival  route  to  Suez. 
Her  ambitions  in  Asia  Minor  have  been  for  the 
time  checked,  but  she  has  already  secured  a  posi 
tion  there  which  cannot  fail  to  be  valuable.  It 
has,  incidentally,  forced  Great  Britain  to  move 
in  a  way  she  would  not  otherwise  have  done, 
and  it  has  —  temporarily,  at  all  events  —  check 
mated  Russia's  designs  on  the  Holy  Land  and 
the  Persian  Gulf. 

It  is,  however,  as  a  naval  power  that  Germany 
looks  to  the  future.  Hitherto  it  has  been  believed 
that  her  main  object  was  to  cripple  Great  Britain. 
Her  writers  have  been  very  outspoken  on  the  sub 
ject,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  to  offset,  if  not 
to  outvie,  the  supremacy  of  Britain  on  the  ocean 
is  in  Germany's  opinion  a  vital  part  of  her  own 
development.  But,  so  far  as  European  politics 
are  concerned,  she  is  no  longer  in  a  position  to 
declare  herself  "with  all  the  continent  against 
England."  The  rapprochement  which  has  recently 
taken  place  between  France,  Italy,  and  Britain, 
collectively  and  individually,  is  not  without  its 
significance.  These  are  all  naval  powers  and  the 
near  neighbors  of  Germany,  whose  continental 
ambitions  would  seriously  upset  the  balance  of 
power  which  it  is  to  their  interest  to  maintain. 
The  South  African  war,  too,  occurring  at  a  time 
when  Germany  had  not  completed  her  prepara- 

402 


GREATER    AMERICA 

tions,  has  ended  in  a  manner  which  seems  to  elim 
inate  her  hopes  in  that  quarter.  Her  present  colo 
nies  in  Africa,  Asia,  and  the  Pacific  are  far  from 
flourishing.  She  does  not  desire  to  extend  them 
on  similar  lines,  but,  rather,  to  increase  her  hold 
ing  of  strategic  points,  even  in  tropical  countries. 
German  ambitions  are  now  taking  a  turn  in  which 
Britain  ceases  to  be  the  principal  obstacle.  She 
desires  an  extension  of  power,  not  so  much  in  ter 
ritory  as  in  the  control,  or  joint  control,  of  trade 
routes ;  in  a  great  central  European  federation  un 
der  her  own  hegemony;  in  planting  commercial 
colonies  in  South  America  and  securing  a  prepon 
derating  influence  in  its  affairs.  She  hopes  to  ob 
tain  a  colonial  empire  without  fighting  for  or  buy 
ing  it.  Holland's  great  East  Indian  possessions 
she  feels  secure  of  in  the  course  of  time.  She  must 
have  a  strong  naval  power  to  control  so  vast  an 
island  empire,  and  to  maintain  a  position  where 
she  will  be  between  the  United  States  on  the  north 
and  Australasia  on  the  south  as  rivals  in  the  Pa 
cific.  She  is  extremely  anxious  not  to  be  debarred 
from  another  arena  of  international  interests,  the 
Caribbean.  It  is,  perhaps,  not  very  obvious  how 
she  can  achieve  this  end  in  the  teeth  of  the  Mon 
roe  Doctrine  and  the  fact  that  not  a  coral  island 
now  remains  that  is  not  pre-empted.  Holland, 
however,  has  a  group  of  islands  (Cura9oa)  which, 
although  not  on  a  direct  trade  route  from  Europe, 
occupy  an  important  position  midway  between  the 
Antilles  and  Panama.  Holland,  too,  is  a  South 

403 


GREATER    AMERICA 

American  power,  though  the  value  of  Dutch  Guiana 
may  be  more  theoretical  than  practical.  Another 
European  power,  Denmark,  also  has  West  Indian 
possessions.  St.  Thomas  has  a  potentially  good 
harbor  and  commands  the  Anegada  passage,  which 
is  the  direct  and  main  route  from  the  isthmus  to 
Europe.  It  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that 
America  has  long  been  desirous  of  securing  the 
Danish  islands,  which  are  economically  decadent 
and  strategically  of  no  value  to  Denmark.  That 
she  has  not  been  able  hitherto  to  accomplish  her 
object  has  been  commonly  attributed  to  Danish 
sentiment,  but  is,  in  reality,  the  direct  result  of 
pressure  and  influence  brought  to  bear  by  Ger 
many,  as  on  a  recent  occasion,  through  the  instru 
mentality  of  a  personage  connected  with  the  court 
at  Copenhagen. 

A  very  interesting  question  arises  in  connection 
with  this  incident.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  may 
prevent  Germany  from  purchasing,  say,  a  coaling- 
station  at  Cartagena,  though  such  an  interpreta 
tion  is  straining  its  terms.  The  United  States, 
as  has  already  been  said,  is  probably  prepared  to 
go  to  this  length  and  abide  the  consequence.  By 
no  conceivable  interpretation,  however,  can  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  prevent  Danish  or  Dutch  islands 
from  gravitating  into  the  German  orbit  through 
a  process  of  federation  by  their  sovereign  states. 
And  yet  such  an  eventuality  is  by  no  means  an 
impossibility  and  would  be  a  direct  challenge  to 
the  position  taken  up  by  America. 

404 


GREATER    AMERICA 

Were  Germany  a  great  Pacific  power  the  im 
portance  of  these  stations  in  the  Caribbean,  once 
the  canal  is  opened,  would,  even  from  a  commer 
cial  point  of  view,  be  at  once  apparent ;  and,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  she  is  already  in  a  minor  degree 
established  in  the  Pacific,  owning  already  part  of 
New  Guinea  and  various  groups  of  islands.  She 
is  confident,  moreover,  of  her  ultimate  domination 
over  the  Dutch  East  Indies,  which  would  bring 
her  at  another  point — Borneo — into  close  touch 
with  America  in  the  Philippines.  Then  there  is 
Samoa,  where  the  two  powers  are  already  side  by 
side.  Altogether,  the  question  of  actual  relations 
with  Germany  is  one  to  be  carefully  studied  in 
connection  with  Greater  America. 

German  ambitions  in  South  and  Central  Amer 
ica  have  taken  the  form  of  commercial  settlements. 
The  German  makes  a  singularly  good  pioneer 
trader  and  settler  in  a  foreign  country.  He  has  a 
curious  likeness  in  this  respect  to  the  Chinaman. 
Both  are  frugal,  industrious,  painstaking,  insinuat 
ing,  adaptive,  contented  with  small  profits;  both 
retain  their  own  national  characteristics,  language, 
ideas,  and  love  of  the  fatherland,  without,  how 
ever,  being  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word  colonists. 
Both  take  little  part  in  domestic  politics,  which, 
perhaps,  is  why  they  do  not  become  political 
pioneers  for  their  own  countries.  They  simply 
accept  the  government  they  find  and  make  the 
best  of  it. 

Some  years  ago  there  was  a  strong  impression 

405 


GREATER    AMERICA 

that  Germany  was  steadily  bent  on  colonial  ex 
pansion  in  South  America.  The  number  of  Ger 
man  immigrants  to  southern  Brazil,  the  Argen 
tine,  and  Uruguay,  and  the  fact  that  communities 
of  Germans  were  gaining  in  strength  and  main 
taining  their  purely  Teutonic  character,  gave  color 
to  this  idea.  The  extension  of  the  Monroe  Doc 
trine  to  the  southern  continent  puts  a  new  com 
plexion  on  all  this.  Any  openly  expressed  designs 
would,  for  the  present,  be  out  of  the  question. 
The  fact  remains,  however,  that  colonization  com 
panies  and  steamer  lines,  both  highly  subsidized, 
continue  to  send  out  German  immigrants;  and  if 
this  stream  has  declined  of  late  years  that  is 
probably  due  to  industrial  expansion  at  home 
and  to  the  fact  that  Germany  is  not  yet  ready  to 
assert  herself.  The  actual  sentiment  of  German 
immigrants  towards  their  fatherland  is  a  difficult 
factor  to  gauge.  The  United  States  has  successful 
ly  assimilated  so  large  a  stream  of  Teutonic  immi 
gration  that  Americans  are  naturally  sceptical  as 
to  the  strength  of  German  tradition.  It  is  notable, 
too,  that  this  assimilation  has  proceeded  in  the 
teeth  of  a  very  real  affection  on  the  part  of  Ger 
mans  for  their  own  language  and  literature  and  a 
pride  in  the  intellectual  achievement  of  the  father- 
land.  Attempts  have  been  made  to  stimulate  this 
sentiment  in  the  United  States  in  the  interests  of 
Pan-Germanism,  but  it  has  utterly  failed  to  shake 
the  position  of  Germans  as  loyal  citizens,  and 
it  may  be  said  of  those  who  become  naturalized 

406 


GREATER   AMERICA 

that  they  are  intensely  American.  It  must  be 
remembered  that,  whatever  the  German's  love  for 
his  fatherland,  he  realizes,  when  he  leaves  it,  the 
rigidity  and  tyranny  of  the  government  which  the 
militarism  and  arrogance  of  the  east  Prussian 
element  has  imposed  on  a  united  Germany.  The 
fatherland  of  to-day  may  be  greater,  stronger,  more 
progressive  than  of  old,  but  by  just  so  much  as  she 
succeeds  in  her  fight  for  commercial  and  material 
power  she  ceases  to  exercise  that  hold  upon  the 
affections  of  her  people  which  was  founded  upon 
intellectual  and  aesthetic  conquests  and  the  rivalry 
between  schools  of  thought  rather  than  centres  of 
commerce.  The  German  colonists  in  Latin  Amer 
ica,  therefore,  may  cherish  their  heritage  of  lan 
guage  and  literature  without  wishing  to  be  in 
cluded  in  the  modern  German  Empire  and  to 
come  under  that  rigid  militarism  on  which  it  is 
founded.  Germans  notoriously  avoid  their  own 
colonies,  not  altogether  for  the  alleged  reason  of 
their  unpromising  aspect,  but  because  they  find 
themselves  dragooned  by  officials  in  a  manner 
which  recalls  unpleasantly  their  early  experiences 
in  the  mother-country.  It  is,  for  all  these  reasons, 
more  than  possible  that  the  German  element  in 
South  America  will  remain  neutral,  if  not  hostile, 
to  any  scheme  of  national  colonization;  but  it 
remains  to  a  great  extent  homogeneous.  There 
is  always,  of  course,  the  possibility  of  an  Uitland- 
er  question  arising  similar  to  the  one  in  South 
Africa,  for  the  conditions  of  government  are  in 

407 


GREATER    AMERICA 

many  parts  as  bad  as  possible.  What  course 
Germany  would  take  in  such  a  case  is  largely  de 
pendent  on  two  things — her  own  condition  of  pre 
paredness  and  that  of  the  United  States.  German 
influence  would  have  long  ago  assumed  far  more 
serious  proportions  but  for  the  undeniable  fact 
that  the  German  immigrant  is  willing  to  inter 
marry  with  natives  in  all  countries  where  a  white 
stock  is  found.  Throughout  Central,  and  in  some 
parts  of  South,  America,  for  instance,  communities 
of  several  hundred  Germans — clerks,  merchants, 
planters,  and  small  traders — are  found,  very  few 
of  whom  brought  wives  from  the  old  country. 
They  intermarry  with  the  Spanish  -  Americans, 
and  the  result,  if  influenced  chiefly  by  the  stronger 
parental  type,  is  nevertheless  a  variation  on  the 
old  German  stock,  and  more  bound  by  ties  to  the 
country  of  birth  than  to  that  to  which  by  name, 
and  probably  by  speech,  they  belong.  In  southern 
Brazil  the  black  element  makes  intermarriage,  to 
a  people  like  the  Germans,  far  less  possible. 

Reference  has  been  made  to  the  Venezuela  ar 
bitration,  which  has  raised  a  question  of  the  first 
importance  in  international  relations  —  namely, 
whether  the  powers  which  declared  the  "  pacific 
blockade"  are  entitled  to  preferential  treatment 
or  not.  If  the  decision  be  in  the  affirmative,  the 
tendency  will  be  to  appeal  to  such  measures ;  if  not, 
the  use  of  the  "  pacific  blockade  "  will  stand  con 
demned.  In  either  case,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  will 
be  affected. 

408 


GREATER    AMERICA 

It  seems  probable,  taking  all  these  circum 
stances  as  far  as  possible  into  consideration,  that, 
although  actual  political  colonization  by  Germany 
may  not  be  in  question,  German  influence  in 
South  America  may  yet  become  a  serious  one. 
In  southern  Brazil,  for  instance,  no  less  than  one 
hundred  and  fifty  million  dollars  of  the  foreign  cap 
ital  invested  is  German.  The  same  process  is  at 
work  in  all  parts  of  the  southern  hemisphere,  Brit 
ain  being  the  only  serious  competitor.  American 
capital,  influence,  and  prestige,  despite  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  the  Pan- American  scheme,  are  rather 
on  the  wane.  North  Americans  are  antipathetic 
to  South  Americans,  and  the  gulf  is  widened  by 
mutual  suspicion  and  distrust;  whereas  Germans 
adapt  themselves  to  the  conditions  of  life  and  are 
regarded  as  useful  and  harmless  by  their  hosts. 

If  in  all  this  there  is  no  argument  for  a  close 
study  of  German  policy  in  its  bearing  on  Greater 
America,  this  book  will  certainly  have  failed  in  its 
object.  German  ambitions  clash  at  many  points 
with  those  of  Anglo-Saxondom,  and  the  future 
may  bring  this  home  to  the  English-speaking 
peoples  and  may  help  to  cement  the  bond  of  union 
between  them.  The  attempt  made  by  the  Kaiser 
to  win  American  confidence  and  to  undermine 
the  Anglo-American  understanding  has  been  a 
signal  failure.  The  incidents  of  Venezuela,  Manila 
Bay,  and  especially  the  German  attitude  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Spanish  war,  cannot  be  forgotten. 

If  friendship  between  Germany  and  the  United 

409 


GREATER    AMERICA 

States  is  merely  a  diplomatic  fafon  de  parler,  it  has 
in  the  past  been  a  warm  sentiment  between  the 
American  Republic  and  Russia.  This  "tradi 
tional  friendship"  rests  on  the  most  shadowy 
basis,  but  has  nevertheless  been  used  with  effect 
on  certain  occasions.1  Russia,  in  fact,  was  an 
American  power  at  one  time,  and  was  engaged 
in  extending  her  influence  quietly  but  steadily 
along  the  Pacific  coast,  long  before  she  had  actually 
crossed  Asia  and  established  herself  on  the  other 
side  of  the  ocean.  She  had,  besides  the  great 
territory  known  as  Alaska,  settlements  as  far 
south  as  California,  and  in  the  early  part  of 
the  nineteenth  century  she  threatened  to  make 
the  Pacific,  north  of  51  degrees  on  the  American 
and  45  degrees  on  the  Asiatic  coast,  a  mare 
claus^im.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  was,  in  fact, 
partly  aimed  at  her,  and  induced  her  to  withdraw 
some  of  her  pretensions.  The  purchase  of  Alaska, 
in  1867,  put  an  end  to  her  American  possessions, 
for  by  that  time  she  was  fully  occupied  with  a 
more  promising  scheme  of  contiguous  expansion. 
Russia  still  remains,  however  (with  the  exception 
of  Britain,  in  Canada),  the  nearest  European  power 
to  the  American  Republic.  Although  the  proposal 
to  unite  the  Asiatic  and  American  continents  by  a 

1  The  Russian  fleet  visited  the  United  States  during  the 
civil  war,  an  act  construed  to  be  one  of  extreme  friendliness 
at  a  time  when  Europe  generally  was  in  sympathy  with  the 
Confederacy.  Dr.  Wendell  Holmes  gave  expression  to  this 
sentiment  in  the  words,  ' '  Who  was  our  friend  when  the  world 
was  our  foe?" 

410 


GREATER    AMERICA 

railway  line  and  tunnel  under  Bering  Strait  is  too 
chimerical  to  come  into  the  range  of  practical  con 
siderations,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  develop 
ment  both  of  Alaska,  the  Aleutian  isles,  and  the 
Pacific  slope,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Asiatic 
littoral,  especially  Manchuria,  on  the  other,  will 
make  commercial  relations  between  America  and 
Russia  an  important  factor.  There  is  something 
unusually  interesting  and  picturesque  in  this  con 
tact  between  the  two  powers  which  stand  in  the 
modern  world  for  the  extreme  examples  of  oppos 
ing  systems.  The  Russian  Empire  is  almost  as 
young  as  the  young  American  Republic;  she  has 
made  a  progress  in  her  own  way  even  more  re 
markable  than  that  of  the  United  States.  In  one 
respect  she  is  the  superior.  She  possesses,  besides 
a  vast  number  of  subject  races,  a  homogeneous 
population,  which  increases  with  a  rapidity  un 
equalled  elsewhere.  It  is  estimated  that  one-six 
teenth  of  the  world's  population  lives  under  the 
Russian  flag.  De  Tocqueville,  in  1835,  expressed 
the  conviction  that  the  Russian  and  American 
peoples  would  one  day  divide  the  world.  We  are 
not  quite  so  certain  now,  when  we  see  the  stagnancy 
of  the  true  American  population,  that  the  New 
World  is  as  full  of  vitality  as  De  Tocqueville 
believed.  Russia,  too,  despite  her  phenomenal 
expansion,  has  the  elements  of  weakness  at  her 
very  heart.  Nevertheless,  the  shock  between  two 
systems  so  radically  opposed  cannot  fail  to  have 
serious  consequences,  and  if  the  latent  forces 

411 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  the  two  Titans  are  ever  consciously  arrayed 
against  each  other  the  struggle  will  probably  be 
of  a  moral  nature.  Whatever  the  future  may 
hold,  it  is  certain  that  relations  between  Russia 
and  America  must  become  more  intimate.  The 
New  World  cannot  afford  any  longer  an  attitude 
of  indifference  as  regards  happenings  in  the  Old. 
The  United  States  has  come  down  into  the  arena 
of  the  Pacific,  in  which  the  future  of  Asia  is  to 
be  largely  determined.  She  is  deeply  concerned 
in  that  future,  which  will  directly  affect  the  in 
terests  not  only  of  her  seven  or  eight  million 
Pacific  subjects  and  of  her  Pacific  coast,  but  in 
directly  the  whole  of  Greater  America. 

The  actual  relations  of  America  with  Oriental 
countries  have  been  more  intimate  than  is  some 
times  supposed.  America  is  proud  of  her  claim 
to  be  the  first  to  open  Japan  to  the  outer  world. 
It  was  inevitable  that  this  great  power,  with  its 
thousands  of  miles  of  littoral  along  the  Pacific, 
should  stretch  across  the  ocean  to  that  other  coast, 
where  an  ancient,  rich,  and  picturesque  civiliza 
tion  was  to  be  found — a  contrast  to  the  bareness 
of  life  in  the  pioneer  colonies  at  home.  It  would 
have  been  turning  the  back  on  American  aspira 
tion  and  achievement  in  the  past,  as  well  as  shut 
ting  the  eyes  to  the  menace  of  the,£ature,  had  the 
republic  refused  to  play  her  part  in  the  Oriental 
drama.  She  enjoys  also  the  distinction  of  being 
the  first  power  to  make  &A;featy  with  Korea,  and 
she  has  recently  executed  one  with  China,  which 

412 


GREATER    AMERICA 

at  the  present  juncture  must  be  regarded  as  an 
important  factor  in  the  situation,  since  it  asserts 
not  only  American  interests  in  Manchuria,  but 
the  sovereign  rights  of  China  in  that  region — the 
very  point  for  which  Japan  is  contending. 

France  is  a  Pacific  power,  but  she  is  little  likely 
to  be  brought  by  reason  of  this  into  contact  with 
America.  Her  departure  from  Mexico  and  relin- 
quishment  of  the  Panama  canal  removed  her  from 
the  American  sphere,  but  she  retains  a  foothold  in 
the  Caribbean,  and  also  off  the  coast  of  Newfound 
land,  and  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  islands 
like  these,  of  little  intrinsic  value  to  their  possessors 
but  ardently  desired  by  other  nations,  may  easily 
become  pawns  in  the  game  of  international  politics. 
France  is  even  a  South  American  power,  by  reason 
of  her  portion  of  Guiana.  She  does  not  love  a 
purely  commercial  form  of  colonization,  nor  is 
she  successful  in  it.  Her  stationary  population 
makes  the  replenishment  of  tropical  colonies  an 
impossibility,  and  she  has,  besides,  in  northern 
Africa,  a  far  nearer  and  more  congenial  sphere  for 
activity.  There  may,  therefore,  arise  one  day  the 
question  of  some  of  these  scattered  remnants  of  her 
empire  changing  hands,  and  in  this  way  her  re 
lations  with  America  may  become  more  cordial,  or 
be  strained,  according  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
moment.  Obviously,  American  statesmen  can 
not  afford  to  be  oblivious  of  France  when  they 
take  their  survey  of  affairs  which  affect  their 
country.  The  final  elimination  of  Spain  from 

413 


GREATER    AMERICA 

the  eastern  hemisphere  and  from  the  Pacific  re 
moves  her  altogether  from  American  affairs,  save 
so  far  as  her  kinship  with  and  influence  over  the 
Latin-Americans  are  concerned.  The  relations  of 
the  United  States  with  these  ancient  outposts  of 
the  Spanish  Empire  have  been  dealt  with  else 
where;  Denmark  as  a  Caribbean  power  has  also 
been  treated  of;  Holland  plays  her  part  chiefly 
as  the  cat's-paw  of  Germany.  Incidentally,  it 
must  be  said  that  one  of  the  sorest  spots  in  Ger 
man-American  relations  is  the  fact  that  it  is  cer 
tain  that  Germany  would  intervene,  in  the  event 
of  the  Dutch  queen  dying  without  issue,  to  pre 
vent  the  establishment  of  a  Netherlands  republic. 
Minor  questions  in  American  foreign  relations 
have  been  raised  lately  in  establishing  commercial 
intercourse  with  Abyssinia,  for  which  purpose  a 
mission  was  despatched;  and  the  sending  of  a 
squadron  to  Beirout  to  protect  American  interests 
on  a  recent  occasion  is  another  indication  of  the 
activity  and  catholicity  which  the  interests  of 
Greater  America  enjoin  in  her  foreign  policy. 

Last  of  all,  we  come  to  the  relations  subsisting 
between  the  English-speaking  peoples.  Canada's 
position  has  been  fully  discussed  elsewhere.1  It 
is,  of  course,  bound  up  with  the  relations  of  the 
mother-country  and  her  quondam  colonies. 

As  far  as  national  sentiment  is  concerned,  there 
is  no  doubt  that  a  great  change  is  visible  on  either 

1  Chapter  x.,  "Canada  and  Pan- Americanism." 
414 


GREATER    AMERICA 

side  of  the  Atlantic.  The  soreness  of  spirit  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  arrogance  and  contempt  on  the 
other — an  American  might  possibly  reverse  these 
terms;  he  has  invariably  believed  Great  Britain  to 
be  very  sore  at  the  loss  of  her  colonies,  and  at  one 
period,  at  all  events,  he  indulged  in  a  national 
vanity  which  was  quite  beyond  the  normal  air  of 
even  a  Briton's  superiority — have  given  way  to  a 
genuine  appreciation  of  each  other's  good  qualities. 
The  American  remains,  as  he  was  in  De  Tocque- 
ville's  day,  more  sensitive  to  criticism  than  his 
British  cousin.  He  has  not  gone  through  the 
hardening  process  to  which  our  continental  critics 
have  subjected  us.  He  remains  somewhat  self- 
assertive  in  consequence,  and  is,  therefore,  liable 
to  be  misunderstood;  but  there  is  an  interest  and 
sympathy  in  British  affairs  among  the  better 
educated,  and  even  an  excess  of  Anglophilism  in 
certain  circles,  to  which  we  have  responded  with 
an  almost  hysterical  outburst  of  admiration  for 
everything  American.  A  far  surer  foundation, 
however,  for  friendship  is  the  growing  sense  of 
community  of  political  interests,  the  intermingling 
of  the  two  societies,  facilitated  by  improved  com 
munications,  and  also  the  removal  of  many  points 
of  discussion,  if  not  of  dissension.  The  most 
serious  questions,  such  as  those  of  Venezuela, 
the  Bering  Sea,  the  trans  -  isthmian  canal,  and 
Alaska,  have  been  amicably  settled,  and  those 
still  remaining,  of  which  the  fisheries  is  the 
most  important,  can  be  disposed  of  by  means 

415 


GREATER    AMERICA 

of  direct  diplomatic  negotiation  or  by  reference 
to  The  Hague  tribunal.1  One  result  of  Amer 
ican  expansion  is  to  make  the  republic  both 
more  interesting  and  more  intelligible  to  British 
people.  It  was  the  purely  local  character  of 
the  politics — their  provincialism,  narrow  range, 
and  unpicturesque  monotony — which  made  them 
distasteful  to  a  British  observer.  America  is 
past  the  stage  of  incubation;  she  has  emerged 
as  a  full-fledged  world  -  power.  We  watch  with 
interest  and  follow  with  criticism  her  efforts  in 
fields  where  we,  too,  have  labored.  She,  on  her 
part,  is  able  to  appreciate  and  understand  far 
better  the  circumstances  and  problems  of  our 
national  life.  In  some  phases  of  her  expansion 
she  is  following  in  our  footsteps,  and  the  dif 
ficulties  she  encounters  lead  her  to  a  more  sym 
pathetic  judgment  of  our  past  failures  and  achieve 
ments.  She  cannot  hope  to  expand — nor  even  to 
retain — without  crossing  the  paths  of  other  pow 
ers  as  ambitious  and  progressive  as  herself,  and 
without  shouldering  responsibilities  heavy  to  be 
borne.  Whatever  our  own  future  may  be  it  should 
not  cross  hers.  We  desire  that  freedom  of  poli 
tical  life,  of  trade,  and  communications  which  is 
her  goal  also. 

The  practical  question  in  Anglo-American  re- 

1  There  seems  to  be  no  sufficient  justification  for  a  fresh 
arbitration  treaty,  which  is  opposed  to  the  opinions  and 
prejudices  of  a  majority  of  the  American  people,  and  would 
be  bitterly  resented  by  the  Senate  as  infringing  their  con 
stitutional  control  of  foreign  affairs. 

416 


GREATER    AMERICA 

lations  is  exactly  what  either  people  has  to  gain 
from  alliance — not,  perhaps,  an  actual  paper  treaty, 
but  a  strong  and  tangible  yet  unwritten  bond,  con 
firmed  by  small  concessions  on  either  side  and 
carried  into  the  realms  of  diplomacy.  Great 
Britain  stands  to  gain  a  great  deal  that  is  vital 
to  her  at  this  stage  of  her  development.  What 
America  stands  to  gain  may  be  left  to  the  readers 
of  this  book  to  decide. 
27 


APPENDIX 


The  following  comparative  tabular  statement  indicates 
the  numerical  strength  of  the  fleets  of  the  powers  named. 

BUILT 


If 
°£ 

I 

£ 

Russia 

Germany 

^ 

II 

•S5 
Dec 

C 
1 

Battle-ships  (ist  class)  

A2 

jo 

1  3 

I  2 

I  2 

IO 

6 

Battle-ships  (ad  class)  

8 

j 

i 

Battle-ships  (36  class)  
Coast-defence  vessels 

2 
2 

i 

I  A. 

I 

J  2 

12 
j  j 

5 

Cruisers,  armored  

18 

2 

A5 
2 

6 

Cruisers,  protected  (ist  class)  .  .  . 
Cruisers,  protected  (zd  class)  .  .  . 
Cruisers,  protected  (3d  class)  .... 
Cruisers,  unprotected 

21 

51* 

3*t 

JO 

16 

i? 
j 

6 

5 

I 

8 
10 
20 

5 
ii 

3 
ii 

2 
j  j 

10 

8 

Torpedo  vessels.           ... 

•3  A 

16 

2 

j 

Torpedo-boat  destroyers  .    .  . 

112 

14 

48 

^8 

i  j 

14 

1  7 

Torpedo  boats  

8c 

24.7 

132 

0  1 

14^ 

2  7 

67 

Submarine  torpedo  boats  .  . 

c 

I  <C 

I 

7 

*  Including  three  partially  protected.          t  Including  one  partially  protected. 
BUILDING 


11 

£ 

Russia 

Germany 

I 

11 

II 

! 

Battle-ships  (ist  class).. 

Battle-ships  (2d  class)  .  .  . 
Coast-defence  vessels  

Cruisers,  armored  

i>l 

l~\ 

7 

i 

'3. 

8 

8 
JM 

6 
j 

{j* 

i 
j  j 

h 

Cruisers,    protected     (ist 
class)  

\     4* 

i* 

1  z*f 

Cruisers,    protected    (ad 
class)     . 

2 

A 

Cruisers,    protected     (3d 
class)  

M 

— 

IM 



i 

Scouts 

4J 

*  •  > 

Torpedo-boat  destroyers  . 
Torpedo  boats.  ... 

4*f 

I9* 
IS* 

5" 

iQ    I 

4*1 

I18* 

6 

U    ) 

*6*r 

2 

g 

6 

2 

18 

Submarine  torpedo  boats 

(    4 
1  10* 

MS* 

if* 

2 

— 

3 

4 
5 

*  To  be  laid  down — 1903-1004. 
419 


APPENDIX 


B 


420 


INDEX 


"ABSORPTION,  not  annexation," 
as  applied  to  Mexico  and 
Central  America,  170. 

Abyssinia,  America  establishing 
commercial  relations  with,  414. 

Adams,  John,  President,  re 
ferred  to,  263. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  President, 
his  declaration  in  reference  to 
Texas,  53;  on  the  acquisition 
of  Cuba,  126,  127. 

Afghanistan,  a  buffer  state,  387. 

Africans,  see  Negroes. 

Aguinaldo,  rebellion  organized 
by,  86. 

Alaska,  how  governed,  265;  its 
promising  future,  268,  269. 

Amazon  River,  suggested  as 
southern  boundary  of  the 
United  States,  170. 

America,  see  United  States. 

"American  hegemony,"  a  will-o'- 
the-wisp,  221,  223,  225. 

American  people,  the  composi 
tion,  characteristics,  and  ten 
dencies  of ,  1-37,  298-301,  307, 
308,  313,  362;  how  affected  by 
European  immigration,  1-9, 
n,  16-19,  60;  proud  of  their 
colonial  ancestors,  4;  their 
literary  and  artistic  mediocrity, 
8;  leisured  class  of,  9-1 1 ;  effect 
of  corrupt  party  tactics  upon, 
11-13;  of  the  West,  12-15,  18; 
colonial  societies  of,  16;  modi 
fication  in  national  character 
of,  16-19;  their  relations  with 
the  Indians,  19-22,  60;  how 
they  are  affected  by  the  negro 
problem,  22-27,  60,  61;  their 
interest  in  educational  proj 
ects,  27,  28;  their  education1 
too  materialistic,  29,  30;  the 


effect  of  industrial  expansion 
upon,  30-37;  relations  of  capi 
tal  and  labor  among,  30-35; 
how  affected  by  millionair- 
ism  and  trusts,  31-33,  35 ,36; 
their  high  standard  of  living, 
34;  how  differentiated  from 
the  rest  of  the  world,  36,  37; 
review  of  their  successive 
colonizations,  38-61,  62-84, 
85-111,  112—131,  i32-i46;how 
affected  by  religious  persecu 
tion  at  home  and  abroad,  42, 
43,  44;  their  triumph  over 
physical  difficulties,  45;  their 
early  expansionist  tendencies, 
4-8 »  53,  55,  56;  their  liberal  in 
terpretation  of  their  Constitu 
tion,  50,  51;  their  colonization 
of  Texas,  52  and  n.\  their 
boundary  disputes  with  neigh 
boring  nations,  53,  54;  their 
filibustering  activities,  54,  55; 
how  their  civil  war  checked 
the  expansion  of  their  country, 

56,  57,     129,     130;    their    at 
titude  as  to  the  purchase  of 
Alaska,    57;    development    of 
their  trade  with  the  Far  East, 

57,  58;   their  long  -  continued 
struggle  with  Spain,  59;  their 
love  of  phrases,  63,  66;  over- 
fond    of   government    reports, 
76-78;    concerned   more   with 
the  ethics  of  government  than 
with  its  practical  justice,  in; 
compared  with   Germans  and 
Englishmen  as  colonizers,  158; 
their  investments   in   Mexico, 
1 66   and   n. ;    as   distinguished 
from     the     people     of     other 
American  countries,   vi.,    199, 
200;    why    their    trade    with 


421 


INDEX 


South  America  is  declining, 
219,  220;  how  they  are  gov 
erned,  253-283;  their  govern 
ment  inconsistent  and  illogical, 
277;  their  misconception  of 
Oriental  character,  288,  289, 
299,  300;  how  they  regard 
their  possession  of  the  Philip 
pines,  331-335;  their  maritime 
exploits,  377-379.  See  United 
States. 

American  society,  its  hetero 
geneous  character,  16—19;  its 
aloofness  from  political  affairs, 
308. 

American  sphere,  the  new,  147- 
170. 

"Americans,"  as  applied  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States, 
vi.,  199,  200. 

Americans  in  the  tropics,  147- 
170. 

Anglo-American  relations,    414- 

4i7- 

Anglo-Saxon  race,  characteristics 
of,  117,  151,  203,  358. 

Annexation,  see  Colonization; 
Expansion. 

Antilles,  see  West  Indies. 

Araucanians,  the,   206. 

Arbitration,  a  motive  for  Pan- 
American  movement,  216,  218, 
222;  a  new  Anglo-American 
arbitration  treaty  would  be 
resented  by  the  United  States 
Senate,  416  n. 

Argentina,  the  people,  resources, 
and  government  of,  207-209, 
214;  its  trade  with  the  United 
States,  215  n.,  216  n.',  financial 
record  of,  420. 

Arizona,  seizure  of,  from  Mexico, 
53;  Territory  of,  56;  govern 
ment  of,  265. 

Arkansas,  its  admission  to  the 
Union,  52. 

Armenian  immigration,  2. 

Army,  United  States,  its  condi 
tion  and  efficiency,  345-357; 
organization  of  the  general 
staff,  350  n. 

Asia,  its  partitionment,  286; 
transformation  of,  366-393; 
its  population  and  resources, 
367;  its  railways,  368-370; 
early  competition  for  its  mari- 


II. 


time  trade,  378,  379;  attitude 
of  Russia  and  Japan  in,  370- 

16,   380-383,   386-392;   the 
anchu  dynasty  and  its  con 
trol  of  China,  383-386;  inter 
ests   of   Greater    Britain    and 
Greater  America  in,  388-393. 
Asia   Minor,   Germany's  designs 

in,  402. 
Australia,  discovery  of  gold  in, 

377- 

Austria- Hungary,  its  relations 
with  Germany,  400,  401. 

Aves  Islands,  decision  of  Con 
gress  regarding,  and  the  prin 
ciple  involved,  55. 

BAHIA  HONDA,  American  station 
in  Cuba,  191. 

Balance  of  power,  as  a  motive 
for  colonizing,  43,  44;  first 
American  diplomacy  engaged 
in  disturbing,  396. 

Balance  of  trade,  anti-expansion 
ists  fear  to  disturb,  48. 

Balmaceda,  Jos6  Manuel,  fate  of, 
206. 

Belgium,  its  relations  with  Ger 
many,  400,  401. 

Bengali,  their  services  in  British 
India,  326,  327. 

Bering  Strait,  proposed  tunnel 
ling  of,  410,  411. 

Black  Republic,  the,  its  check 
ered  history,  176—178. 

Blaine,  James  G.,  his  initiation 
and  interpretation  of  Pan- 
Americanism,  199,  220,  222. 

Blanco,  Guzman,  Venezuela  dic 
tator,  202. 

Bolivar,  Simon,  and  his  con 
ception  of  Pan- Americanism, 
199;  his  death,  202;  his  theories 
of  government,  203  n. 

Bolivia,  characteristics  of,  205; 
its  trade  with  the  United 
States,  215  n.,  216  n. 

Boundary  disputes,  with  Mexico, 
Great  Britain,  and  other  na 
tions,  53,  54. 

Brazil,  people,  resources,  and 
government  of,  210-213;  her 
trade  with  the  United  States, 
215  n.,  216  n.;  German  and 
American  capital  invested  in, 
409. 


422 


INDEX 


Brinkley,  Captain,  quoted  on  the 
character  of  Japan,  381,  382. 

Britain,  see  Great  Britain. 

British  rule  in  India,  318-333. 

British  West  Indies,  compared 
with  the  French  West  Indies, 
186-188;  importance  and  de 
sirability  of,  193,  194;  favor 
American  amalgamation,  195— 
197;  complementary  to  Can 
ada,  197. 

Britons,  as  colonizers,  compared 
with  Spaniards,  156. 

Buchanan,  James,  President, 
proposed  a  protectorate  over 
portions  of  Mexico,  55. 

Bureau  of  American  Republics, 
at  Washington,  217,  279  n. 

Bureaucracy,  in  the  Philippines 
and  in  the  States,  75-79. 

Burmese,  indolence  of,  99. 

CALHOUN,  JOHN  C.,  referred  to, 
263. 

California,  effect  of  discovery  of 
gold  in,  i,  377;  applies  for 
admission  into  the  Union, 

Canada,  boundary  between  Ore 
gon  and,  54;  her  import  trade 
with  the  United  States,  168 
n.;  rapid  growth  of,  197; 
complementary  to  the  British 
West  Indies,  197;  Blaine  fa 
vored  annexation  of,  199;  and 
Pan  -  Americanism ,  226-252; 
her  commercial  and  political 
relations  with  the  mother- 
country,  228-232,  234-246, 
251,  252;  her  trade  relations 
with  the  United  States,  228- 
230,  236-238,  244-248;  how 
influenced  by  her  French 
population,  230-233;  her  ob 
jection  to  the  Monroe  Doc 
trine,  239,  240;  immigration 
to,  242,  243,  247,  248;  is  she 
being  Americanized ?  242,  251; 
her  resources,  242,  243;  Amer 
ican  capital  invested  in,  245  n. ; 
her  dependence  upon  the 
American  press  and  news 
agencies,  246,  247;  her  rail 
way  development,  248,  249 
her  water  communication,  250 
her  ports  on  the  Pacific,  250 


her  provinces  compared  with 
States  across  the  frontier, 
250. 

Canadian      Northern     Railway, 
249. 
anadian  Pacific  Railway,  248. 

Canal,  Panama,  a  consideration 
of  the  problem,  160—165;  its 
bearing  on  American  expan 
sion,  190—198. 

Capital,  foreign,  discriminated 
against  in  the  Philippines, 
105,  1 06;  its  introduction  into 
the  Philippines  demanded,  107, 
1 08;  a  comparison  of  English 
and  American,  invested  in 
South  America,  220;  American, 
invested  in  Canada,  245  n.; 
German  and  American,  in 
South  America,  409;  financial 
record  of  Spanish  -  American 
republics,  420. 

Capital  and  labor,  relations  be 
tween,  30-35 ;  of  United  States 
and  Japan  compared,  30,  31, 
33.  34,  35 ;  their  approaching 
conflict,  32,  240;  gap  between, 
widened  by  trust  develop 
ment,  35, 36 ;  in  the  Philippines, 
101—106;  in  Cuba, 133-136; in 
the  West  Indies,  196. 

Caribbean  Sea,  expansion  in: 
Cubans  and  their  American 
friends,  1 12-131 ;  Cuba  and  the 
United  States,  132—146;  Amer 
ican  control  of,  171-198;  what 
man  and  nature  have  done  for 
the  islands  of ,  171-173;  prob 
able  effect  of  the  isthmian 
canal  upon,  190-198. 

Carthage,  the  first  great  colonial 
power,  39. 

Castillo,  Senor  Canovas  del,  a 
typical  Spaniard,  155. 

Catholic  Church,  the,  in  the 
Philippines,  91,  92;  in  Central 
America,  156,  157;  in  the 
French  West  Indies,  188;  in 
the  South  American  republics, 
211-213;  a  factor  opposed  to 
Pan  -  Americanism,  213;  in 
Canada,  231,  232,  233. 

Central  American  republics, 
character  and  condition  of, 
148-151  and  n.;  155-158;  their 
colonization  considered,  158, 


423 


INDEX 


159;  their  import  trade  with 
the  United  States,  168  n.; 
financial  record  of,  420. 

Chili,  the  people,  resources,  and 
government  of,  205-207 ;  her 
trade  with  the  United  States, 
215  n.,  216  n. ;  financial  record 
of,  420. 

China,  importance  of  com 
mercial  treaties  with,  to  de 
velop  the  Philippines,  107; 
how  involved  in  the  trans 
formation  of  Asia,  366-393; 
railways  of,  369,  370;  her 
war  with  Japan,  371;  her  se 
cret  alliance  with  Russia,  371- 
374;  attitude  of  government 
and  people  to  Japan,  382- 
385;  not  ripe  for  European 
civilization,  385-388;  United 
States  makes  treaty  with,  412. 

Chinese,  immigration  of,  dis 
couraged,  18;  secret  societies 
of,  87,  98;  a  limited  number 
admitted  to  the  Philippines, 
i  o  i ;  their  general  exclusion 
from  the  Philippines  prevents 
the  development  of  the  isl 
ands,  108. 

Chino-Japan  war,  results  of,  371, 
380. 

Chirol,  Mr.,  exposes  Russia's 
domination  over  Lhasa,  372. 

Church,  Catholic,  see  Catholic 
Church. 

Cincinnati,  Society  of  the,   16. 

Cities,  American,  growth  of,  2. 

Civil  Service,  colonial,  the  United 
States  needs  an  efficient,  289, 
290,  301,  309-314;  that  of  the 
United  States  and  other  na 
tions  compared,  290-301;  Phil 
ippine,  278  n.,  312,  314,  335- 
342;  in  British  India,  324,325, 
.341. 

Civil-service  reform,  need  for, 
l<>-.  -309,  312. 

Civil  virar,  the,  checks  expan 
sion  movement,  56,  129,  130; 
United  States  army  before  and 
after,  345;  United  States  navy 
before  and  after,  359,  360. 

Clay,  Henry,  and  the  first  ap 
plication  of  the  Monroe  Doc 
trine,  127;  a  Pan- Americanist, 
217  n. 


Coffee  and  sugar,  as  a  basis  for 
reciprocity  with  Mexico,  168. 

Colombia,  its  rejection  of  canal 
treaty,  160;  iis  imports  from 
the  United  States,  168  n. ;  char 
acteristics  of,  202;  financial 
record  of,  420. 

Colombians  unfit  for  canal  con 
struction,  356. 

Colonial  Dames,  Society  of,  16. 

Colonial  societies,  what  they 
indicate,  16. 

Colonies,  see  Colonization;  Ex 
pansion. 

Colonization,  by  the  American 
people,  38-61,  62-84,  85-111; 
motives  for,  the  same  from 
age  to  age,  39-42  ;  by  Carthage, 
39;  by  Greece  and  Venice,  39; 
by  Rome,  39,  40;  by  Portugal, 
40;  by  Spain,  40;  by  France, 
40;  by  Holland,  40;  by  Eng 
land,  41,  42;  religious  per 
secution  a  prime  factor  in 
American,  42,  43;  interna 
tional  rivalry  as  a  motive  of, 
43,  44;  the  beginnings  of 
American,  and  the  opposition 
it  has  encountered,  47,  48; 
of  Texas,  52  and  n.;  attempted 
by  conquest  and  purchase,  54, 
55;  principle  involved  in  the 
occupation  of  the  Aves  Islands, 
55;  inability  of  the  United 
States  to  colonize  Indians  and 
negroes,  59,  60;  what  history 
of,  shows,  6 1 ;  Democrats  op 
pose,  143;  of  the  West  Indies 
by  France  and  Great  Britain, 
185-189;  of  South  America, 
201,  202,  405-409,  413;  op 
posed  to  democracy,  277,  284; 
problems  involved  in,  240, 
263-283,  284-301,  302—316, 
317-344,  345-365,  388-393. 
See,  also,  Expansion. 

"Colony,"  how  the  meaning  of 
the  word  is  distorted  by 
Canadians  and  Australasians, 
38,  39- 

Committee  system  of  United 
States  Congress,  the,  260,  261. 

Congress,  United  States,  its  con 
stitution  and  powers,  254,  255, 
258,  259-261,  264,  276,  277, 
279,  280. 


424 


INDEX 


Constitution,  United  States,  how 
interpreted  to  give  power  to 
the  government  to  acquire 
territory  by  conquest  or  treaty, 
49,  50,  277,  284;  should  offer 
no  hinderance  to  the  country's 
expansion,  50. 

Consular  service,  American,  314, 

3I5- 

Cortes,  Spanish,  how  composed, 

154- 

Costa  Rica,financial  recordof  ,420. 

Cuba,  attempts  to  purchase,  54, 
55,  128;  war  in,  led  to  Amer 
ican  protectorate,  58,  112,  129, 
130;  character  of  the  people 
and  conditions  of  life  in,  113- 
131,  132-146;  a  coming  negro 
problem  in,  119;  immigration 
into,  121  and  n. ;  defective  edu 
cational  opportunities  of,  122, 
123;  scarcity  of  agricultural 
and  skilled  labor  in,  124; 
how  affected  by  British  oc 
cupation  in  1762,  124,  125; 
proposed  acquisition  of,  by 
young  American  republic,  125- 
130;  claims  representation  in 
the  Cortes,  127;  its  revolt  from 
Spain,  127—131,  132;  Lopez 
expedition  to,  129;  guerilla 
war  in,  130;  its  freedom  es 
tablished,  131;  its  relations 
with  the  United  States,  132- 
146,  179;  its  labor  problem, 
133—136;  improvement  of  its 
sanitation  and  public  works, 
136,  137;  educational  reforms 
effected  in,  137—140;  condition 
of  law  in,  140,  141;  a  "pro 
tected  republic,"  142;  its  pros 
perity  depends  on  reciprocity 
with  the  United  States,  142, 
144;  its  annexation  considered, 
143,  145,  146;  its  first  presi 
dent,  144,  145;  controls  the  en 
trance  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexi 
co,  190,  191;  compared  with 
Jamaica,  194;  complementary 
to  the  United  States,  197; 
government  of,  267,  268;  a 
protectorate  of  the  United 
States,  274-276. 

Cubans,  character  of,  and  condi 
tions  of  life  in  Cuba,  112—131, 
132—146;  illiteracy  of,  122; 


their    lack    of    administrators 
and  business  -  men,    123;   and 
of     agricultural     and     skilled 
labor,  124.     See  Cuba. 
Curacoa,  importance  of,  403. 

DANISH  and  Dutch  West  Indies 
compared,  189. 

Democracy,  opposed  to  trusts, 
31'  33>  35>  36>'  shibboleths  of, 
never  checked  United  States 
expansion,  48,  284;  its  power 
yet  to  be  demonstrated,  61; 
its  clash  with  Orientalism, 
82-84,  97,  101,  104;  its  com 
promise  with  imperialism,  1 08, 
in,  302,  303;  opposed  to  a 
system  of  patronage,  277;  op 
posed  to  any  form  of  colonial 
government,  277,  302;  grave 
fault  of  American,  308. 

Democratic  party,  its  demand 
for  the  annexation  of  Oregon, 

Denmark,  her  treaty  with  the 
United  States  regarding  the 
West  Indies,  56,  57,  and  n.; 
her  West  Indian  dependencies, 
189;  her  relations  with  her 
neighbors,  400-404. 

Dependencies,  see  Colonization; 
Expansion. 

De  Tocqueville,  his  prediction  of 
the  annexation  of  Texas,  52 
n.;  on  the  loquacity  of  Amer 
ican  public  officers,  77  n.;  on 
the  growth  of  Russia  and  the 
United  States,  411. 

Diaz,  Porfirio,  President  of 
Mexico,  165,  166,  169. 

Dilke,  Sir  Charles,  on  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  British  West 
Indies,  186. 

Diplomatic  service,  American, 
315,  316. 

Dominica,  see  British  West  In 
dies. 

Dominican  Republic,  a  travesty, 
178,  179;  its  population,  269. 

Dutch  and  Danish  West  Indies 
compared,  189. 

EAST  INDIA  COMPANY,  and  Eng 
land's  trade  with  the  Far 
East,  377. 

Ecuador,   character  of,    204;   its 


425 


INDEX 


trade  with  the  United  States, 
215  n.,  216  n.\  financial  record 
of,  420. 

Education,  as  a  factor  in  the 
negro  problem,  25;  a  solvent 
for  all  racial  and  political 
problems,  27-30;  in  England 
and  the  United  States  com 
pared,  28,  29;  too  materialistic 
in  the  United  States,  29,  30;  of 
the  Filipinos,  84,  91—97;  defec 
tive  opportunities  for,  in  Cuba, 
122,  123;  how  improved  in 
Cuba  under  the  protectorate, 
137-140. 

"Elastic  clause,"  see  Constitu 
tion. 

Elections  in  the  Philippines,  70- 
73,  79,  80. 

Electors,  and  their  election  of 
President  and  Vice-President, 
255. 

Elgin,  Lord,  negotiates  reci 
procity  treaty  between  Can 
ada  and  the  United  States, 
228. 

Emigration,  to  the  West,  46;  to 
Oregon,  53. 

England,    public    life    in,    cpm- 

Eared  with  that  in  the  United 
tates,  10,  ii ;  education  in, 
compared  with  that  in  the 
United  States,  28,  29;  House 
of  Lords  compared  with  Amer 
ican  Senate,  36;  the  main 
factor  in  her  colonization,  41, 
42;  in  the  war  of  1812,  51. 
See  Great  Britain. 

English-speaking  peoples,  pro 
posed  federation  of,  252. 

"Entangling  alliances,  true 
meaning  of  phrase,  394-396. 

Europe,  South  American  trade 
with,  214,  215;  South  America 
complementary  to,  219,  220; 
attitude  of,  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  223-225,  397,  403, 
404,  406,  408;  its  future  parti 
tion,  286;  international  rela 
tions  of,  394—417. 

Examinations,  non-competitive, 


for  civil  service,  305. 
Expansion,  United  States,  tem 
porarily  checked  by  civil  war 
and    reconstruction,    56,    129, 
130;  United  States  never  hesi- 

426 


tated  on  path  of,  48,  284; 
legality  of,  50;  theory  and 
practice  of  Pacific,  62-84,  85- 
ui;  of  trade  in  the  Philip 
pines,  106-108;  in  the  Carib 
bean,  112-131,  132-146;  spirit 
of,  evolves  a  new  phase  01  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  128,  170; 
bearing  of  the  Panama  canal 
upon,  190—198;  marred  by 
corrupt  party  government, 
240,  263-283,  302-312;  de 
mands  a  colonial  civil  service, 
284  —  301,  309  —  314;  natives 
should  be  employed  in  the 
governmental  processes  of, 
317-342;  needs  a  practical 
judicial  system,  342,  343;  an 
efficient  army  and  navy  es 
sential  to,  345-365;  demands 
the  employment  of  native 
troops,  352-357;  British  and 
American,  in  the  Far  East, 
388-393.  See  Colonization. 

FAMILY  COMPACT,  the,  how  it 
affected  Cuba,  124,  125. 

Far  East,  the,  development  of 
trade  with,  557.  See  Asia; 
Japan;  Philippines. 

Favoritism  in  the  army,  abolish 
ment  of,  349. 

Federal  government,  its  relations 
to  the  States,  253,  254,  255— 
258;  its  democratic  character 
lost,  277;  its  control  of  oversea 
dependencies  lacks  perma 
nency,  278. 

Federation,  not  annexation,  the 
purpose  of  Pan- Americanism, 
226,  252;  of  English-speaking 
peoples,  252. 

Ferdinand  of  Aragon,  on  char 
acter  of  Spaniards,  152. 

"Fifty-four-forty  or  fight,"  the 
party  cry  of,  54. 

Filibustering,  government  en 
courages,  54,  55. 

"Filipino  Nation,"  the  non 
existent,  67. 

Filipinos,   character  of,   63,   65- 


67,  71,  72,  79-83,  86-88, 
91—94,  97—104,  270-274,  288, 
289,  334,  335;  social  organi 
zation  of,  68,  69;  views  of 
prominent,  72,  89-91;  their 


INDEX 


resistance  to  American  arms, 
86;  their  opposition  to  taxa 
tion,  90;  their  attitude  to 
religion,  91,  92,  271;  their 
education,  92-97,  104;  have 
no  status  in  the  world  of 
labor,  97-105;  their  conflicting 
interests,  108;  what  they  want 
ed  and  what  they  got,  in; 
how  they  are  governed,  266, 
267,  270,  274;  anxious  to  be 
absorbed  by  Greater  America, 
273,  274,  278;  compared  with 
the  people  of  British  India, 
319,  320.  See  Philippines. 
Finland,  the  brutal  crushing  of, 

39°- 

Florida,  purchase  of,  from  Spain, 
51;  eventful  history  of,  51  n.\ 
admitted  to  the  Union,  52. 

Ford,  I.  N.,  quoted,  202. 

France,  fails  in  true  colonization, 
40;  her  sale  of  Louisiana,  49; 
her  West  Indian  islands,  185- 
189;  her  protectorates,  276 
«.;  in  China,  371,  388;  her 
international  relations,  402, 
413;  her  navy  compared  with 
the  navies  of  other  nations, 
419. 

Franking,  the  abuse  of,  306. 

Free- trade,  British,  its  effect  on 
Canada,  228. 

Fremont,  John  C.,  his  exploring 
expedition,  53. 

French  Canadians,  characteris 
tics  of,  230-233. 

French  West  Indies,  government 
and  people  of,  185-189;  com 
pared  with  British  West  In 
dies,  186-188;  probable  future 
of,  195. 

Friars,  their  expulsion  from  the 
Philippines,  89,  91. 

Froude,  James  Anthony,  his  pict 
ure  of  the  happy  West  Indian 
negro,  183,  184. 

Fuegians,  the,  206. 

Funston,  General,  promotion  of, 

349- 
Fur  trade,  expansion  due  to,  53. 

GARRISON,  LLOYD,  favored  the 
secession  of  Massachusetts,  53. 

German  immigration,  extent  and 
effect  of,  3,  5;  to  Brazil,  52. 


Germany,  her  protectorate  sys 
tem,  276  n.\  her  naval  policy, 
357;  her  mercantile  marine, 
362;  in  China,  371,  388;  her 
international  relations,  394— 
414;  her  growth  and  position, 
400,  401;  her  growing  naval 
strength,  402 ;  her  attitude  to 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  403,  404, 
406;  in  Central  and  South 
America,  405-409;  her  navy 
compared  with  the  navies  of 
other  powers,  419. 

Grand  Trunk  Pacific  Railway, 
249. 

Great  Britain,  American  claims 
to  Oregon  disputed  by,  53,  54; 
effect  of  her  occupation  of 
Cuba  in  1762,  124,  125;  her 
dependencies  in  the  West 
Indies  compared  with  those 
of  France,  186-188;  impor 
tance  and  desirability  of  her 
West  Indian  dependencies, 
193,  194;  which  favor  Amer 
ican  amalgamation,  195-197; 
her  interests  in  Chili,  207;  in 
Brazil,  211;  growth  of  im 
perialism  in,  226,  238,  239;  her 
relations  with  Canada,  228— 
232,  234-246,  251,  252;  her 
protectorates,  275  n.\  her 
colonial  civil  service  compared 
with  the  systems  of  other 
nations,  290-301,  318-344;  her 
civil  service,  306,  307;  her  rule 
in  India,  318-333,  352-355; 
her  "two -power  standard" 
naval  policy,  357,  358;  how 
involved  in  the  transformation 
of  Asia,  369-393;  review  of 
her  international  relations, 
394-417;  her  navy  compared 
with  the  navies  of  other 
powers,  419.  See,  also,  Eng 
land. 

Greater  America,  what  it  means, 
iii.-v. ;  how  governed,  253-283. 

Guadeloupe,  see  French  West 
Indies. 

Guam,  island  of,  how  governed, 
266. 

Guantanamo,  American  station 
in  Cuba,  191. 

Guatemala,   financial  record  of, 


420. 


427 


INDEX 


HAGUE  TRIBUNAL,  the,  and  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  224;  sug 
gested  reference  to,  of  Anglo- 
American  disputes,  416. 

Half-breeds,  lack  of  virility  of, 
118-120. 

Havana,  "the  key  of  the  New 
World,"  191. 

Hawaii,  reciprocity  treaty  with, 
58;  its  acquisition,  58;  Amer 
icanized,  62;  how  governed, 
266,  269. 

Hay,  John,  Secretary  of  State, 
his  management  of  the  Pan 
ama  affair,  279. 

Hayti,  the  Black  Republic,  a 
warning,  176-178. 

Hedin,  Dr.  Sven,  on  Russian 
control  of  Tibet,  373. 

Hispaniola,in  the  French  period, 
178;  future  of,  192. 

Holland,  and  her  trading  com 
panies,  40;  her  relations  with 
Germany,  400-405,  414. 

Holmes,  Oliver  Wendell,  quoted, 
410  n. 

Honduras,  Walker's  attempt  to 


conquer, 
of,  420. 


55;   financial  record 


House  of  Representatives,  the, 
255,  264,  276,  277,  279,  280; 
its  committee  system,  260, 
261,  280. 

Houston  establishes  the  inde 
pendence  of  Texas,  52,  56. 

Hungarian  immigration,  2,  3,  22. 

IMMIGRATION,  extent  and  effects 
of,  1-9,  n,  16-19;  Hungarian, 
2,  3,  22;  Italian,  2,  3,  22; 


Armenian,    2, 


Roumanian, 


2;  Russian,  2,  3;  Polish,  2, 
22;  German,  3,  5;  Irish,  3, 
5;  restriction  of,  6,  18;  how 
directed  to  the  West,  44;  to 
Texas,  52  n. ;  will  it  change 
the  character  of  the  Cuban 


people?  143;  to  Argentina, 
208;  of  Americans  to  Canada, 
242,  243,  247;  of  British  to 
Canada,  243,  248. 
Imperialism,  and  democracy, 
relations  between,  108;  com 
mercial  rather  than  political, 
197,  198,  226;  not  founded 
entirely  on  sentiment,  238,  239. 

428 


India,   British  rule  in,  318-333, 


352-355;     compared     to     the 
Philippines,  319,  320,  352. 
Indian  Bureau,  the,  20;  reserva 


tion  system,  21. 

Indians,  their  relations  with 
the  American  people,  19,  22, 
60,  287;  victims  of  the  Spoils 
System,  20;  effect  of  reserva 
tion  system  upon,  20,  21,  60; 
foes  of  the  Western  frontiers 
men,  46;  their  claims  in 
Alabama  and  Georgia  dis 
regarded,  51;  raids  by  the 
Seminoles  in  Florida,  5 1 ;  their 
claims  no  bar  to  expansion, 
56;  in  Mexico,  167;  in  South 
America,  201,  202,  204-206, 
210;  in  Alaska,  265;  govern 
ment  of  their  reservations,  265, 
266. 

Industrial  depression  predicted, 

Industrial   expansion,    effect   of, 

3°-37- 

Insurrectos,  Philippine,  87. 

Inter-Colonial    Railway,    248. 

International  rivalry  in  coloniza 
tion,  43,  44. 

Intervention,  European,  by  the 
United  States,  cases  of,  397, 

399- 
Iowa,     its     admission     to     the 

Union ,  52. 
Irish    immigration,    extent    and 

effects  of,  3,   5. 
Italian  immigration,  2,  3,  22. 
Italy,  her  international  relations, 

402;  her  navy,  419. 

JACKSON,  ANDREW,  and  his  Spoils 
System,  12;  his  force  of  char 
acter,  26 


203. 
,,  isla 


Jamaica,  island  of,  its  strategical 
situation,  193;  compared  with 
Cuba,  194. 


Japan,     racial     question     in,     6; 


labor  in,  and  in  the  United 
States  compared,  30,  31,  33- 
35;  intensely  monarchical,  83; 
and  Russia,  Manila  will  be 
affected  by  result  of  war  be 
tween,  107;  her  attitude  in 
Asia's  transformation,  371, 
380-383,  388-391;  her  rela 
tions  with  the  United  States, 


INDEX 


412,413;  comparative  strength 
of  her  navy,  419. 

Japanese  and  Chinese  immigra 
tion  discouraged,  18. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  on  the  ac 
quisition  of  Cuba,  126,  127, 
143;  his  force  of  character, 
263;  on  the  development  of 
the  Pacific  coast,  376. 

Jesuits,  their  work  in  Chili,  212. 

Judicial  system,  elective,  240, 
241;  need  of  a  new,  for  the 
Philippines,  342,  343. 

KATIPUNAN,  the,  87. 

Key  West,  its  strategic  value, 
191. 

Kingston,  harbor  of,  194. 

"Know-nothing"  party,  4. 

Korea,  attitude  of  Russia  tow 
ards,  380,  381,  391;  United 
States  makes  treaty  with,  412. 

LABOR  AND  CAPITAL,  relations  be 
tween,  30—35;  of  Japan  and 
the  United  States  compared, 
30,  Si,  33-35;  approaching 
conflict  between,  32,  240 ;  Trust 
development  widens  gap  be 
tween,  35,  36;  in  the  Philip 
pines,  101-106;  in  Cuba,  133- 
136;  in  the  West  Indies,  175. 

Labor  unions,  in  Manila,  102, 
103. 

Ladrones,  Philippine,  86-88,  92, 
102,  103. 

Latin-Americans,  character  of, 
150,  157,  158,  200-203,  216, 
270. 

Laurier,  Sir  Wilfrid,  and  reci 
procity  between  the  United 
States  and  Canada,  229,  230. 

Law,  Cuba's  system  of,  140,  141; 
in  the  Philippines,  342,  343. 

Legarda,  Senor  B.,  his  views  on 
Philippine  policy,  72,  90. 

Leisured  class  of  America,  the, 
9,  10 ;  their  distaste  of  public 
service,  10,  n. 

Leroy-Beaulieu,  quoted  on  Eng 
land's  concessions  to  her  colo 
nies,  120;  on  the  government 
of  the  French  West  Indies,  187. 

Lhasa,  its  underground  connec 
tion  with  St.  Petersburg,  372, 
373- 


Lincoln,  Abraham,  President,  the 
great  exception,  263. 

Literature  and  art  in  the  United 
States,  8. 

Lodge,  Henry  Cabot,  on  the  effect 
of  the  American  Revolution  in 
Spanish  America,  151  n. 

Lopez  expedition,  the  abortive, 
129. 

Louisiana  Purchase,  the,  48-50; 
not  provided  for  under  the  Con 
stitution,  49;  French  spoken 
in,  61. 

Luzuriago,  R.  de,  on  the  admis 
sion  of  the  Philippines  into  the 
Union,  72. 

Lynchings  due  to  local  condi 
tions,  256. 

"MACHINE,"  the  political,  259- 
261. 

Madison,  James,  on  the  annex 
ation  of  Cuba,  126  and  n.\  his 
force  of  character,  263. 

Mahan,  Captain,  compares  Cuba 
and  Jamaica,  194. 

Makato,  Tentearo,  quoted  on  la 
bor  conditions  in  Japan  and 
the  United  States,  30,  31. 

Malayans,  characteristics  of,  97, 

98-   355- 

Manchu  dynasty,  its  control  of 
China,  383-386. 

Manchuria,  Russia's  attitude  to, 
380,  381,  390. 

Manila,  capture  of,  59;  climate 
of,  98;  trade  unions  in,  102, 
103;  its  possibilities  depend 
ing  on  result  of  Russo-Japan 
war,  107. 

Marshall,  Chief- Justice,  his  au 
thoritative  reading  of  the 
"elastic  clause"  of  the  Con 
stitution,  50. 

Martinique,  see  French  West 
Indies. 

Massachusetts,  its  secession  sug 
gested,  53. 

Mercantile  marine,  American, 
361-363. 

Mestizos,  Philippine,  68,  69,  79, 
82,  84,  86,  89,  92;  Cuban, 
114,  118. 

Mexico,  her  loss  of  Texas,  52 
and  n. ;  her  war  with  the 
United  States,  53,  345;  her 


429 


INDEX 


cession  of  territory  compris 
ing  California,  New  Mexico, 
Nevada,  Utah,  and  portions 
of  Colorado  and  Wyoming, 
53,  54;  Buchanan  proposes  a 
protectorate  over,  55;  its  ab 
sorption  considered,  147,  148, 
165-170;  a  republic  only  in 
name,  165;  her  government 
under  Diaz,  165,  166;  Amer 
ican  investments  in,  166  and 
n. ;  her  people  illiterate,  166; 
her  Indian  and  other  problems, 
167,  1 68;  her  imports  from 
the  United  States,  168  n.\  an 
unsolved  problem,  169,  170; 
financial  record  of,  420. 

Mexico,  Gulf  of,  Cuba  controls 
entrance  to,  190,  191;  devoid 
of  harborage,  192. 

Michie,  Alexander,  quoted  on 
America's  maritime  exploits, 

378«  379- 
Michigan,  its  admission  into  the 

Union,   52. 
Midway  Island,  naval  station  in 

the  Pacific,  58. 
Militia  law,  changes  in,  351. 
Millionairism,  a  modern  disease, 

.3I~33- 

Miranda,  Francisco  Antonio  Ga 
briel,  Venezuelan  patriot,  202, 
203. 

Mississippi  River,  importance  of, 
191,  368. 

Mona  Passage,  deficient  in  har 
borage,  192. 

Mongolia,  the  centre  of  Russian 
influence  in  the  East,  372—374. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  the,  its  ten 
dency  to  preserve  the  balance 
of  power,  44;  its  first  ap 
plication,  127;  how  it  was 
applied  to  help  Spain,  128;  a 
later  development  of,  128; 
Pan- Americanism  woven  into, 
2  20-2255;  a  matter  of  policy, 
not  of  international  law,  220- 
222;  designed  in  Europe,  220; 
attitude  of  South  American 
states  to,  223;  Europe's  atti 
tude  to,  223-225, 397,403,404, 
406,  408;  objectionable  to 
Canada,  239,  240;  a  feature  of 
America's  isolation,  395,  396; 
aimed  at  Russia,  410. 


Municipal  government  in  British 
India,  328,  329. 

NAPOLEON  I.,  his  motive  in  dis 
posing  of  Louisiana,  49. 

National  character,  American,  3, 
4,  15-18. 

National  expansion,  see  Coloniza 
tion;  Expansion. 

Navy,  United  States,  its  suppres 
sion  of  piracy  in  the  Medi 
terranean,  51;  in  the  War  of 
1812,  51;  should  keep  pace 
with  the  country's  expansion, 
195;  condition  and  efficiency 
of,  357-365;  compared  with 
the  navies  of  other  powers, 
419. 

Negroes,  the,  nature  and  impor 
tance  of  the  problem  they 
present,  22-27,  60,  61,  287; 
their  steady  increase,  22;  what 
their  leaders  desire,  22;  op 
position  to  their  citizenship 
in  the  Southern  States,  23; 
how  they  can  be  dealt  with 
justly,  24,  27;  a  subject  race, 
24,  27;  what  education  will  do 
for  them,  25 ;  their  segregation, 
6 1 ;  will  be  a  future  problem 
for  Cuba,  119,  142 ;  in  the  West 
Indies,  173,  174,  181-185,  l87» 
189,  196;  in  Brazil,  210;  in 
Canada,  241;  in  Puerto  Rico, 
269;  in  Trinidad  and  San 
Domingo,  269;  are  a  retrogres 
sive  race,  273;  their  employ 
ment  by  the  government  at 
Panama  advocated,  356,  357. 

New  England,  disappearance  of 
its  yeomen,  15  n. 

New  Mexico,  seizure  of,  53; 
government  of,  265. 

New  York  City,  nativity  of  its 
population,  3. 

News  agencies,  Canada  depend 
ent  upon  American,  246,  247. 

Nicaragua,  filibustering  attempts 
to  conquer,  55 ;  financial  record 
of,  420. 

Non  -  competitive  examinations 
for  civil  service,  305. 

Norman,  Mr.  Henry,  quoted  on 
the  Russian  people,  375  n. 

North,  the,  compared  with  the 
South  at  the  time  of  the 


430 


INDEX 


adoption  of  the  Constitution, 
47,  48;  important  develop 
ment  of,  53,  54. 

North  Americans  antipathetic 
to  South  Americans,  409. 

Nunez,  Rafael,  the  Colombian 
dictator,  202. 

OKLAHOMA,  government  of,  265. 

Olney,  Richard,  quoted  on  the 
growth  of  America's  foreign 
policy,  395  and  n.,  398,  399. 

Ordinaire,  M.  Maurice,  on  mod 
ern  colonization,  187,  188. 

Oregon,  annexation  of,  53,  54. 

Ostend,  conference  at,  54;  mani 
festo,  the,  129,  214. 

PACIFIC,  the,  development  of 
American  interests  in,  57-60, 
62-111,  366-393. 

"Pacific  blockade"  of  Vene 
zuela,  223,  224. 

Palma,  Senor,  first  President  of 
the  Cuban  Republic,  144,  145. 

Panama  Canal,  a  consideration 
of  the  question,  160-165;  its 
bearing  on  American  expan 
sion,  190—198,  200,  367,  368; 
President  Roosevelt's  and  Mr. 
Hay's  admirable  settlement  of 
matters  affecting,  279;  em 
ployment  of  natives  in  polic 
ing  and  constructing,  356, 

Pan- Americanism,  in  the  South 
ern  Continent,  199—225;  the 
orginators  of  the  movement, 
199;  the  four  Pan-American 
conferences,  213,  216-218;  at 
titude  of  the  United  States 
to  the  movement,  213—225; 
arbitration  as  a  motive  for, 
216;  other  objects  aimed  at, 
218;  interwoven  with  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  220-225;  in 
Canada,  226-252. 

Pan-Germanism,  aspirations  of, 
401,  406. 

Pango-Pango,  Samoa,  58. 

Pan-Slavism  versus  Pan-German 
ism,  401. 

Paraguay,  its  trade  with  the 
United  States,  215  n.,  216  n. ; 
financial  record  of,  420. 

Partido  Federal,  the,  89. 


Parties,  political,  see  Politics. 

Patronage,  the  lever  of  the  body 
politic,  258,  259,  262;  the 
corner-stone  of  official  and 
political  life,  304,  305,  307; 
its  effect  on  the  army,  346, 
347,  349;  navy  exempt  from, 
364- 

Pensacola,  its  strategic  value, 
191. 

Persia,  contest  for,  387. 

Peru,  characteristics  of,  204, 
205;  its  trade  with  the  United 
States,  215  n.,  216  n.;  financial 
record  of,  420. 

Peter  the  Great,  and  the  found 
ing  of  the  Russian  Empire, 

374,  375- 

Philippines,  the,  their  acquisi 
tion,  59,  85,  331;  problems  to 
be  solved  in  their  coloniza 
tion,  62  —  84,  287  —  312,  317— 
344,  352,  355,  356;  elections 
in,  70—73,  79,  80;  governor  of, 
73,  74;  bureaucracy  in,  75-79, 
81;  taxation  in,  80;  review 
of  the  United  States'  coloniz 
ing  efforts  in,  85-111;  secret 
societies  of,  87 ;  native  con 
stabulary  of,  88,  89;  expulsion 
of  friars  from,  89;  the  Church 
in,  91,  92;  education  in,  92-97, 
104;  the  labor  question  in, 

E7~ 105;  climate  of,  98,  99; 
Dreign  capital  and  foreigners 
discriminated  against  in,  105, 
1 06;  trade  expansion  in,  106— 
1 08;  material  progress  in  de 
velopment  of,  108—110;  gov 
ernment  of,  266,  267,  271- 
274,  278,  331-335;  Spoils  Sys 
tem  in,  278  n.,  335;  compared 
with  British  India,  319,  320; 
judicial  system  in,  342,  343; 
employment  of  native  troops 
in,  352,  355>  356-  See  Fili 
pinos. 

Pines,  Isle  of,  restored  to  Cuba, 
191. 

Plate  River,  its  wonderful  sys 
tem  of  navigation,  209. 

Political  corruption,  its  cause 
and  effect,  11-13. 

Politicians,  American,  number 
of,  309. 

Politics,   decline  of  State,   257; 


431 


INDEX 


growth  of  party  system,  258; 
patronage  and  vested  interests 
control,  258,  259,  262,  304, 
305;  obstacles  to  overcome  in 
reforming,  283;  civil-service 
reform,  305—309;  elimination 
of,  from  the  army,  346-349; 
European,  a  necessary  study 
for  the  American  statesman, 

399- 

Polk,  James  K.,  his  attempt 
to  purchase  Cuba,  128;  his 
enlargement  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  222. 

Population,  increase  of  urban, 
2  n. ;  of  the  United  States 
and  of  various  States  com 
pared,  13  n. ;  overflow  of, 
the  main  factor  in  British 
colonization,  41,  42;  of  the 
original  thirteen  States,  and 
how  distributed,  47,  48. 

Portugal,  her  motives  for  coloni 
zation,  40. 

President,  the,  election  of,  241, 
254,  255;  powers  of,  261—264, 
267,  278-282,  305,  310. 

Press,  the  American,  its  influ 
ence  in  Canada,  246,  247. 

Protectorates,  how  distinguish 
ed,  274-276;  a  list  of  existing, 
275  n.,  276  n. 

Puerto  Rico,  occupation  of,  58, 
147;  a  territory  with  no 
claims  to  statehood,  and  her 
inhabitants  denied  citizenship, 
179,  180  and  n.,  181;  gov 
ernment  of,  266—269,  27°I 
people  of,  269. 

Puget  Sound,  363. 

RAILWAYS,  in  Cuba,  137 ;  in  Peru, 
205;  in  Chili,  207;  in  Brazil, 
21 1 ;  in  Canada,  247-249;  of 
Asia,  368-370. 

Reciprocity,  its  importance  to 
Cuba,  142,  144;  to  Mexico, 
1 68;  treaties  with  Brazil  and 
Spain  in  Cuba,  215;  with 
Canada,  228,  229,  230,  236, 
240-246.  See  Tariff. 

Reconstruction  checks  expan 
sion,  56. 

Religious  persecution,  an  im 
portant  factor  in  the  colo 
nization  and  development  of 


America,  42,  43;  Utah  founded 

because  of,  44. 
Republics,    Spanish  -  American, 

characteristics     of,      200-213; 

trade  of,  214,  215  n.,  216  n.; 

financial  record  of,  420. 
Rockhill,   Mr.,  in  charge  of  the 

Bureau  of  American  Republics, 

279  n. 
Rome,  the  first  state  colonizer, 

39,  40. 
Roosevelt,     President,     quoted, 

4,  68,  223,  224,  288,  308,  351; 

his  admirable  administration, 

279,    281,    282;    his   army   re 
forms,  349-351. 
Root,   Elihu,  Secretary  of  War, 

his  reforms  in  the  army,  347- 

^  351' 

Roumanian  immigration,  2. 

Russia,  result  of  her  war  with 
Japan  important  to  Manila, 
107;  her  aggression  a  menace 
to  the  trade  interests  of  the 
Far  East,  107  ;  naval  policy  of, 
358;  her  ambitions  inimical 
to  the  United  States  and  a 
menace  to  the  world,  358, 
359;  her  attitude  in  the  Far 
East,  37°-376,  380,  381,  387- 
389,  392;  founding  of  the 
empire  and  character  of  the 
government,  374-376,  411;  re 
view  of  her  foreign  relations, 
394—417;  her  navy  compared 
with  the  navies  of  other 
nations,  419. 

Russian  immigration,  2,  3. 

Russo-Gertnan  agreement,  a  side 
light  on,  358,  359  and  n. 

ST.    JOHN,    island    of,    Seward's 

offer  for,  57  n. 
St.  Lawrence,  the,  and  Canada's 

water  communication,  250. 
St.   Lucia,  its  importance,   194. 
St.  Thomas,  island  of,  seeks  ad 
mission    into    the    Union,    56; 

57  and  n.,  192,  193. 
Salvador,    its    financial    record, 

420. 
Samoa,   its   acquisition,    58,    62; 

how  governed,   266. 
San    Domingo    seeks    admission 

into  the  Union,  56,  57  and  n. 

See  Dominican  Republic. 


432 


INDEX 


Sanitation  in  Cuba,   136,   137. 

Secret  societies  in  the  Philip 
pines,  87. 

Selva,  Carlos,  on  the  instability 
of  Latin  -  American  govern 
ment,  150,  151  n. 

Seminoles,  see  Indians. 

Senate,  United  States,  voting 
strength  of  East  and  West  in, 
13  n.;  Trusts  will  find  their 
strongest  support  in,  36;  com 
pared  with  British  House  of 
Lords,  36;  its  constitution 
and  powers,  254,  262,  264,  276, 
277,  279,  280,  304,  306;  com 
mittee  system  of,  260,  261. 

Seward,  William  H.,  his  offer 
for  St.  Thomas  and  St.  John, 
57  n.;  his  acquisition  of  Alaska 
and  the  Aleutian  Islands,  376, 

377- 

Siam,  a  probable  French  pro 
tectorate,  387. 

Silvela,  Don  Francisco,  on  lack 
of  patriotism  in  Spain,  155  n. 

Slavery  contest,  how  it  affected 
the  admission  of  new  States 
into  the  Union,  52,  53,  129, 
130;  no  hinderance  to  ex 
pansion,  55. 

Socialism,  not  yet  a  menace 
to  capitalism,  32,  33;  would 
aggravate  the  situation  in 
Cuba,  135;  in  Spain,  154. 

Societies,  colonial,  what  they 
indicate,  16;  secret,  of  the 
Philippines,  87.  See  Cincin 
nati;  Colonial  Dames;  Sons 
and  Daughters  of  the  Revo 
lution. 

Society,  American,  its  hetero 
geneous  nature,  16-19. 

Sons  and  Daughters  of  the 
Revolution,  16. 

South,  the,  and  the  negro  prob 
lem,  22-27;  compared  with 
the  North  at  the  time  of  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution, 
47,  48;  admission  to  the  Union 
of  slave-holding  States  in, 
52;  in  competition  with  Cuba, 
132,  133. 

South  America,  republics  of, 
characteristics  of  their  people 
and  governments,  200-213;  col 
onization  of,  201,  202;  prod- 


ucts  of,  214;  its  trade  with 
the  United  States,  215  n.,  216 
n. ;  its  commercial  interests 
paramount,  219,  220;  its  at 
titude  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
223;  how  affected  by  the 
Russo-German  agreement,  358, 
359;  German  ambitions  in, 
405-409;  people  of,  anti 
pathetic  to  North  Americans, 
409;  financial  record  of  the 
various  republics  of,  420. 

Spain,  motives  for  her  coloniza 
tion,  40;  her  sale  of  Florida, 
51;  her  claims  to  Oregon,  53; 
American  government  seeks 
to  purchase  Cuba  from,  54, 
55,  128;  her  war  with  the 
United  States,  58,  59,  112, 
345-347;  America's  struggle 
with,  of  long  continuance, 
59;  denies  representation  to 
Cubans,  127;  Cuba  revolts 
from,  127-131;  failure  of  Os- 
tend  manifesto  to  force  a 
quarrel  on,  129;  development 
of  her  colonial  system,  150; 
characteristics  of  her  people, 
151-153,  154-156;  her  Cortes, 
how  composed,  154;  her  gov 
ernment,  154,  1 5  5 ;  her  elimina 
tion  from  American  affairs, 
413,  414.  See  Cuba. 

Spaniards,  character  of,  151—153, 
154—156,  176,  200-203,  207, 
218,  219. 

Spanish  -  American  republics, 
financial  record  of,  420.  See 
Central  America;  South  Amer 
ica. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  quoted  on  race 
fusion,  118  n.,  119  n. 

Spoils  System,  the,  baleful  in 
fluence  of,  12,  20,  240,  301,305; 
the  corner-stone  of  govern 
mental  power  in  the  United 
States,  277;  in  the  Philippines, 
278  n. 

States,  their  relation  to  the 
federal  government,  253,  254, 
255-258. 

Subig  Bay,  selected  as  a  naval 
station  in  the  Philippines, 
109  n. 

Subsidies,  in  the  development  of 
the  mercantile  marine, 361, 362. 


433 


INDEX 


Suez  Canal  compared  with  that 
proposed  at  Panama,  163, 
164,  367.  368. 

Sugar  and  tobacco,  how  affected 
by  tariff  in  the  Philippines, 
107;  in  Cuba,  132,  133. 

TARIFF,  its  effect  in  the  Philip 
pines,  107;  in  Cuba,  132;  in 
Mexico,  167-169;  in  the  French 
West  Indies,  186;  in  Canada, 
228-230,  236—238,  244-248;  a 
feature  of  America's  isolation, 

395- 

Tavera,  Dr.  Pardo  de,  his  views 
on  Philippine  matters,  72,  89— 
91. 

Taxation,  attitude  of  Filipinos 
towards,  90. 

Teachers,  how  they  should  have 
been  prepared  for  the  Fili 
pinos,  94,  95;  the  poorest 
paid  class  in  the  Philip 
pines,  95;  how  obtained  for 
Cuba,  138,  139. 

Texas,  annexation  of,  52;  De 
Tocqueville's  prediction  rela 
tive  to,  52  n.;  its  admission 
into  the  Union,  52,  53. 

Tibet,  the  "forbidden,"  open 
to  Russians,  372,  373;  British 
movement  into,  374;  a  buffer 
state,  387. 

Tobacco  and  sugar,  how  af 
fected  by  tariff  in  the  Philip 
pines,  107;  in  Cuba,  132,  133. 

Tornado,  her  capture  of  the 
Virginius,  130  n. 

Trade,  anti-expansionists  fear 
to  disturb  balance  of,  48; 
expansion  of,  in  the  Philip 
pines,  106-108;  of  United 
States  will  be  stimulated  by 
Panama  Canal,  162,  215;  with 
Mexico,  1 66 ;  with  South  Amer 
ica,  214-216  n.,  219,  220;  with 
the  Far  East,  376-379. 

Trans-Canada  Railway,   249. 

Trans-Caspian  Railway,  369  n. 

Transformation  of  Asia,  366-393. 
See  Asia. 

Treaty,  with  Denmark,  56,  57  n.] 
with  Hawaii,  58;  with  Japan, 
412;  with  China,  412,  413. 

Tropics,  Americans  in,  284-301. 

Trusts,  the,  opposed  to  democ 


racy,  32,  33,  35,  36;  not  yet 
menaced  by  socialism,  32; 
not  altogether  due  to  financial 
conditions,  33;  their  develop 
ment  widens  gap  between  cap 
ital  and  labor,  35;  regulation 
°ff  35  f  36;  wiU  find  their 
strongest  support  in  the 
Senate,  36;  discriminated 
against  in  the  government  of 
the  Philippines,  108;  feed  the 
political  machine,  108;  in 
national  affairs,  236;  and  sub 
sidies  develop  the  mercantile 
marine,  361,  362. 

Turkey,  how  upheld,  387. 

"Two-power  standard,  Great 
Britain's,  357,  358. 

UNITED  STATES,  the,  immigra 
tion  to,  1—9,  ii,  16-19,  60; 
literature  and  art  in,  8; 
national  characteristics  of  her 
people,  9;  her  leisured  class, 
9-11;  public  life  in,  compared 
with  that  in  England,  10,  n; 
her  political  corruption,  n— 
13;  her  colonial  societies,  16; 
a  great  world  power,  19,  44, 
45,  59;  her  Indian  problem, 
19-22,  60;  her  negro  problem, 
22-27,  60,  61;  education  in, 
27-30;  her  industrial  expan 
sion,  30-37;  her  Senate  com 
pared  with  English  House  of 
Lords,  36;  her  expansion 
through  colonization,  38-61, 
62-84,  85-111,  112—131;  her 
oversea  expansion  due  to 
international  rivalry,  43,  44; 
tendency  of  her  Monroe  Doc 
trine  and  its  applications,  44, 
127,  128;  weaknesses  of  the 
thirteen  original  States,  45; 
her  acquisition  and  settlement 
of  the  Northwest  Territory, 
45,  46;  her  purchase  of  Loui 
siana,  48-50;  discovery  of  the 
"elastic  clause"  of  her  Con 
stitution,  50;  her  disregard  of 
the  highest  judicial  authority, 
50,  51;  her  great  prosperity 
and  rapid  growth  after  the  ac 
quisition  of  Louisiana,  51; 
her  purchase  of  Florida,  51; 
her  annexation  of  Texas,  52  ( 


434 


INDEX 


53;  admits  Florida,  Arkansas, 
Michigan,  Iowa,  and  Wis 
consin,  52;  her  war  with 
Mexico,  53,  345;  her  boundary 
disputes  and  acquisition  of 
California,  New  Mexico,  Ari 
zona,  Nevada,  Utah,  Colorado, 
Wyoming,  and  Oregon,  53, 
54;  her  unofficial  encourage 
ment  of  filibustering,  54,  55, 
129,  130;  her  semi-official 
efforts  to  acquire  Cuba>  54, 
55,  125—130;  her  expansion 
checked  by  civil  war,  56,  57, 
129;  her  acquisition  of  Alaska, 
57 ;  her  trade  invasion  of  the 
Pacific,  57,  58;  her  first  naval 
station  in  the  Pacific,  58; 
her  acquisition  of  Hawaii  and 
of  Samoa,  58;  her  protecto 
rate  of  Cuba,  war  with  Spain, 
and  capture  of  Puerto  Rico 
and  Manila,  58,  59,  112,  130, 
131;  her  most  pressing  prob 
lem,  60;  her  government  of  the 
Philippines,  theoretical  and 
practical,  62-84,  85-111;  her 
department  reports  prolix  and 
redundant,  76—78;  her  re 
pudiation  of  the  Ostend  mani 
festo,  129;  her  relations  with 
Cuba,  132-146;  her  new  sphere 
and  its  possibilities,  147—170; 
can  she  "Americanize"  Cen 
tral  America  and  Mexico?  158, 
159;  her  isthmian  canal  prob 
lem,  160-165;  her  exporta- 
tions  to  other  American  coun 
tries,  168  «.;  her  control  of 
the  Caribbean,  171-198;  her 
Puerto- Rican  problem,  179- 
181;  her  acquisition  of  the 
British  West  Indies  consid 
ered,  193—197;  her  attitude  to 
the  Pan-American  movement, 
199,  213—225;  her  trade  with 
South  America,  214,  215  n., 
216  n.,  219,  220;  her  inter 
pretation  of  the  Monroe  Doc 
trine,  220,  222;  her  attitude 
to  Canada,  226-252;  and  her 
dependencies,  how  governed, 
253—283;  problems  involved 
in  her  expansion,  284-288, 
302-316,  317-344;  her  need  of 
iffi  ' 


an  efficient  colonial  civil  ser 


vice,  289,  290,  301,  309-314; 
her  colonial  civil  service  com 
pared  with  that  of  other  na 
tions,  290-301,  318-344;  her 
consular  and  diplomatic  ser 
vice,  314-316;  her  military 
system,  345  ~357;  her  naval 
system,  357-365;  her  mercan 
tile  marine,  361-363;  how  in 
volved  in  the  transformation 
of  Asia,  366-393;  her  foreign 
relations,  394—417;  cases  of 
European  intervention  by, 
397-399;  her  navy  compared 
with  the  navies  of  other 
nations,  419.  See  American 
people. 

Uruguay,  character  of,  210,  214; 
its  trade  with  the  United 
States,  215  n.,  216  n.',  finan 
cial  record  of,  420. 

Utah,  founded  by  reason  of 
religious  persecution,  44. 

VENEZUELA,  characteristics  of, 
202-204;  the  "pacific  block 
ade"  of,  223,  224,  408;  its 
financial  record,  420. 

Vested  interests  and  patronage 
control  the  body  politic,  258, 
259,  262. 

Vice- President,  election  of,  255. 

Virginius,  capture  of,  and  ex 
ecution  of  her  crew  and 
passengers,  130  and  n. 

WAKE,  island  of,  how  governed, 
266. 

Walker,  William,  filibuster,  55, 
214. 

War,  with  England,  51;  with 
Indians  in  Florida,  ci;  with 
Mexico,  53,  345;  the  civil 
war,  56;  with  Spain,  58,  59. 

War    college,    establishment   of, 

348,  349- 

Washington,  George,  as  an  Amer 
ican  type,  15,  263;  quoted  on 
"entangling  alliances,"  394 
and  n.,  396. 

Webster,  Daniel,   263. 

West,  the,  people  and  develop 
ment  of,  12-15,  46>  475  with 
a  minority  of  electors  has 
a  majority  of  Senators,  13 
and  n.;  its  pioneers  sought 


435 


INDEX 


religious  freedom,  42;  how 
emigration  was  directed  to, 
44;  causes  of  emigration  to, 
and  its  development  towards 
statehood,  46,  47;  first  news 
paper  of,  46. 

West  Indian  problem,  the,  184, 
185. 

West  Indies,  the,  treaty  with 
Denmark  regarding,  56,  57 
and  n. ;  their  imports  from  the 
United  States,  168  n. ;  Amer 
ican  control  of,  considered, 
171-198;  inhabitants  and  con 
ditions  of,  173-189,  196; 
French  and  British,  compared, 
185-188;  Dutch  and  Danish, 
compared,  189;  importance 
and  desirability'  of  British, 
193,  194;  favor  American 


amalgamation,  195-197;  ef 
fect  of  Panama  Canal  upon, 
197,  198. 

Windward  Passage,  commanded 
by  Cuba,  192. 

Wisconsin,  its  admission  into  the 
Union,  52. 

Wood,  General  Leonard,  his  so 
lution  of  Cuba's  educational 
problem,  137-139;  his  pro 
posed  promotion,  349;  his 
visit  to  the  East,  352. 

"YANKEES"  of  the  southern 
hemisphere,  207. 

ZYBIKOFF,  M.,  testifies  to  Rus 
sia's  domination  over  Tibet 
and  Lhasa,  373. 


THE    END 


FOURTEEN  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 


This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


HOV281987 


23Apr'56GT 
APR  2  4 195R  IZ 


LD  21-100m-2,'55 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


58215 


U.C.  BERKELEY  LIBRARIES 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


